Natural Resource Use: global and regional
Websites/Multiple Documents
Description:
"The Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) helps people to realize the benefits of their countries? endowments of oil, gas and minerals. We do this through technical advice, advocacy, applied research, policy analysis, and capacity development. We work with innovative agents of change within government ministries, civil society, the media, legislatures, the private sector, and international institutions to promote accountable and effective governance in the extractive industries..."
Source/publisher:
Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI)
Date of entry/update:
2014-12-03
Grouping:
Websites/Multiple Documents
Language:
English
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Individual Documents
Sub-title:
Clear Path for US, France, EU to Block Gas Revenue Payments to Junta
Description:
"(Paris) – The French company TotalEnergies has signaled support for targeted sanctions on Myanmar’s natural gas revenues to block the country’s abusive military junta from profiting from hundreds of millions of dollars in payments, Human Rights Watch said today.
TotalEnergies acknowledged the shift in a response to a letter from Human Rights Watch urging the company to support sanctions to stop gas payments to Myanmar military-controlled entities. TotalEnergies has operated the Yadana gas project in Myanmar since the 1990s, which pays revenues to the junta-controlled Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE).
“The fact that both TotalEnergies and human rights groups now support sanctions on Myanmar’s gas revenues leaves the US and European Union without any excuses to delay action,” said John Sifton, Asia advocacy director at Human Rights Watch. “These governments should immediately impose measures vitally needed to target funds that pay for the junta’s abusive rule.”
In a January 18, 2022 letter to Human Rights Watch, the TotalEnergies CEO, Patrick Pouyanné, said the company had spoken with French and US authorities concerning the implementation of targeted sanctions on gas revenue flows and said that it “will not only comply with any sanction decision from the European or American authorities but also supports the implementation of such targeted sanctions.”
TotalEnergies also formally asked the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to put in place sanctions that would create “a legal framework to respond to calls requesting us to stop the financial flows” to MOGE.
Since overthrowing the democratically elected government on February 1, 2021, Myanmar’s military has carried out nationwide crackdowns on anti-junta protesters, activists, journalists, and the political opposition, killing more than 1,400 people and amounting to crimes against humanity. Renewed attacks on ethnic minority areas have resulted in numerous war crimes. TotalEnergies has faced growing calls over the past year to suspend payments to the junta from Myanmar civil society and labor organizations, as well as pressure from institutional investors.
Since the coup, the US, Canada, United Kingdom, and EU member states have imposed targeted economic sanctions on junta leaders and several conglomerates and companies owned or controlled by the Myanmar military, but not on MOGE or payments it receives. The French government of President Emmanuel Macron has not supported such measures. The administration of US President Joe Biden has been unwilling to impose sanctions on gas payments unilaterally without the support of France and other EU nations.
The US and France should now reach a common position on imposing such sanctions, Human Rights Watch said.
Natural gas projects in Myanmar generate over US $1 billion in foreign revenue for the junta annually, its single largest source of foreign currency revenue. The money is transmitted in US dollars to MOGE or other military-controlled bank accounts in foreign countries, in the form of fees, taxes, royalties, and dividends from the export of natural gas, most of which travels by pipeline to Thailand or China.
The largest gas revenues paid are made via the majority Thai state-owned PTT, which purchases approximately 80 percent of Myanmar’s exported natural gas from joint ventures owned with TotalEnergies, Chevron, and MOGE. PTT separately owns stakes in joint ventures with the South Korean company POSCO, which transports and sells gas to China. Human Rights Watch has previously written to all of these companies and their shareholders, urging them to support sanctions on gas revenue.
“TotalEnergies’ support for sanctions should be an example to other energy companies operating in Myanmar, as well as to the Thai government, the single biggest buyer of Myanmar gas,” Sifton said. “Board members and institutional investors in other companies should push them to follow TotalEnergies’ decision.”
One critique of sanctions is that they might shut down gas operations completely, harming the general population. However, targeted sanctions on revenue and tax payments would not disrupt operations, just the flow of funds to the junta. The EU and US are in a key position to impose sanctions since payments for gas operations are made in US dollars and involve multinational banks that fall under the jurisdiction of EU and US law. Sanctions by those authorities can stop payments made by banks in Thailand, Singapore, South Korea, and other locations because foreign banks must comply with EU and US authorities when they ultimately require EU and US banks to process, or “settle,” Euro or dollar transactions.
“With TotalEnergies’ announcement, governments now have no reason to oppose or avoid tough measures that show support to the millions of people in Myanmar who want justice and accountability,” Sifton said. “Junta leaders are only going to turn away from their brutality and oppression if the economic costs of their abuses are too great for them to bear.”..."
Source/publisher:
"Human Rights Watch" (USA)
Date of publication:
2022-01-20
Date of entry/update:
2022-01-20
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Sanctions, Business and the Military, Oil and gas, Natural Resource Use: global and regional, 2021 Burma/Myanmar coup d'état
Language:
more
Description:
"ENI, a multinational oil and gas company headquartered in Italy, will explore for oil and gas in eight townships in Mandalay Region, U Tin Win Hlaing, the chairman of the Mandalay regional parliament’s Industry, Energy and Electricity Committee, confirmed to The Irrawaddy.
Exploration will be carried out in PSC-K, an onshore oil and gas block encompassing 1.3 million acres (approximately 526,000 hectares) and more than 370 villages in Tatkon, Yamethin, Pyawbwe, Wundwin, Thazi, Myittha, Kyaukse and Singaing townships, he said.
ENI Co. explained its exploration plans to the Mandalay regional government and parliament in early November, and plans to hold consultations with local residents later this month. “First, it will conduct geophysical surveys before conducting a feasibility study,” U Hlaing Win said.
ENI Co. and local company Myanmar Petroleum Exploration and Production (MPEP) won a tender in 2014 to explore onshore block PSC-K. The Italian company owns 90 percent of the venture, and the local company 10 percent..."
Source/publisher:
"The Irrawaddy" (Thailand)
Date of publication:
2019-11-14
Date of entry/update:
2019-11-14
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Government of Myanmar (oil and gas), Natural Resource Use: global and regional, Burma/Myanmar's relationship with the Global Economy, Burma/Myanmar's Foreign relations, general, Renewable energy Myanmar
Language:
more
Description:
"Forest Trends, a non-profit Washington-based organisation established since 1988, with the funding of Joint Peace Fund, released a 72-page important report titled, “Natural resource governance reform and the peace process in Myanmar,” written by Kevin Woods, which emphasizes that the ongoing peace negotiation process directly address the governance of natural resources to realize resource federalism.
Regarding this, the report wrote: “The federal decentralization of land and resource governance on the other hand, if managed well with a full set of integrity mechanisms, could be a means of addressing grievances in many of Myanmar’s resource producing areas.” “Decentralization generally fails to help locals unless accompanied by appropriate governance mechanisms to ensure compliant implementation – meaning that more focus on and support for resource governance institutions and mechanisms is needed. The extractive sector could act as a driver of more equitable socio-economic development that helps provide greater stability during the post-conflict transition,” explained the report further..."
Source/publisher:
"Shan Herald Agency for News" (Myanmar)
Date of publication:
2019-10-23
Date of entry/update:
2019-10-23
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Peace processes, ceasefires and ceasefire talks (websites, documents, reports and studies), Armed conflict and peace-building in Burma - theoretical, strategic and general, Natural Resource Use: global and regional
Language:
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Description:
"Myanmar?s Union government collects much of the trillions of kyat generated by oil, gas, gemstones and other minerals each year, primarily through its state-owned economic enterprises (SEEs).
In the face of such centralized control over revenue, many ethnic groups have long asserted their right to make decisions over resource management in their states. Combatants in areas of active conflict and leaders from several ethnic minority parties—particularly those associated with Kachin, Rakhine and Shan states—have openly called for greater resource revenue sharing. (See map below for more on Myanmar?s extractive geography.)
In response, the newly elected National League for Democracy (NLD) has committed to "work to ensure a fair distribution across the country of the profits from natural resource extraction, in accordance with the principles of a federal union." As such, a resource revenue sharing system will undoubtedly be on the table in the upcoming discussion on federalism.
However, as we have seen in other countries, these systems come with considerable risks. In the most extreme cases, such as Peru, they can actually exacerbate conflict, encouraging local leaders to use violence to compel greater transfers from the central government or gain control over mine sites. While these experiences are atypical, natural resource revenue sharing often leads to financial waste, local inflation, boom-bust cycles and poor public investment decisions.
However, if well designed, resource revenue sharing can: improve development outcomes and the quality of public investment; attract high quality private investors to the sector; and help secure a lasting peace. Sharing the Wealth: A Roadmap for Distributing Myanmar?s Natural Resource Revenues outlines options available under the current legal structure to help the new leadership fulfill its commitment to decentralize natural resource revenues. It is also meant to inform Myanmar?s broader discourse on how best to distribute these revenues.
First, it outlines the current state of fiscal decentralization in Myanmar. Second, it describes the size and location of extractive activities given the limited information currently available. Third, it aims to share good practices for revenue distribution and international experiences. Fourth, it outlines policy options and considerations for policymakers on intergovernmental transfers and addresses the debate on tax assignments..."
Andrew Bauer, Paul Shortell, Lorenzo Delesgues
Source/publisher:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Date of publication:
2016-02-15
Date of entry/update:
2016-04-06
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Economic oppression, Extortion, Robbery, Natural Resource Use: global and regional, Decentralisation (Decentralization) in Burma/Myanmar, Natural Resource Use, Burma/Myanmar - reports, articles etc., Natural Resource Use, Burma/Myanmar - policy and law
Language:
English
Format :
pdf pdf
Size:
2.37 MB 11.6 MB
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Description:
Summary: "This paper presents an overview of the distinctive
features of communal tenure in
different community-based land and natural resource
management systems. Communal
tenure refers to situations where groups, communities, or one or more villages have
well defined, exclusive rights to jointly own and/or manage particular areas of natural
resources such as land, forest and water. These are
often referred to as
common pool
resources: many rural communities are dependent on these resources for their
livelihood. In communal tenure, both the boundaries of the resource owned in
common and group membership are clearly defined. These are necessary conditions to
exclude outsiders and to secure the rights of group
members so that these rights cannot
be taken away or changed unilaterally.
Two models of communal tenure are presented in the
paper;
these models differ in
terms of the function of the state, the length of tenure and the characteristics of the
resource system concerned. In the first model, the
permanent title
model, the state fully
and permanently hands the land over to local indigenous communities for private
collective ownership. In this situation, the resource system is often multi-facetted,
comprising agricultural lands as well as forest, water and pasture land. Permanent title
for indigenous peoples? communal land is a special
claim supported by national
legislation and by international conventions, coven
ants and declarations that many
countries have endorsed. Examples of permanent title in Asia include the Philippines
and Cambodia, where legislation provides for collective rights of indigenous
communities. In many instances such as Cambodia, Philippines or, for instance, Papua
New Guinea, the indigenous groups or communities that are eligible by law for private
and permanent communal tenure need to become a legal entity to be recognized as
a
communal right-holder by the state. This may require community incorporation.
However, the process of incorporation can be cumbersome for people who are not
necessarily literate in the national language or in
the demands of state bureaucracy.
In the second model, the
delegated management
model, the state maintains ownership
of the resources and delegates management to local
groups, most often villages, for a
specific period of time, with the possibility of renewal. Such agreements are generally
subject to national legislation only. In this case,
the resources are often uniform and
relate to, for example, community forestry, community fishery, pasture or irrigation
group tenure that all come in many different forms
with different bundles of rights.
This model is far more common than the first, with
Nepal, India, Thailand, Cambodia
or Mongolia providing examples.
In addition to these two general models, one may still find traditional customary
communal tenure in remote communities. Here the state does not actually regulate or
intervene in the management of resources, but all local communities in the area would
know of the local rules of harvesting and withdrawal rights.
Both the permanent title in communal land and the d
elegated management model may
originate from an existing customary arrangement, where the rules are known and have
been adhered to by right-holders ? and their neighbors ? for generations. The state can
acknowledge these existing communal systems through
formalization of existing rules
and rights. In a different situation, where customary arrangements are no longer
present and the resource is degraded and under open
access, the formalization of
Communal tenure and the governance of common property resources in Asia
delegated management of, for example, a new community forest, may imply setting up
or
inducing
communal tenure institutions, where they did not previously exist.
Inducing institutions is a major exercise in social
engineering; the resulting induced
institution must be carefully aligned with the physical and natural characteristics of the
resources or resource system and, ideally, should build on an existing set of norms in
the community. Where governments and/or donor projects have a pro-poor approach in
inducing communal tenure for natural resource management, the pro-poor targeting
mechanisms must be mainstreamed in the institution
building.
In all communal tenure systems, the physical and biological characteristics of the
resource system factor decisively into the regulatory frameworks that communities
establish. One must match with the other. In situations where both subsistence and
market value products can be withdrawn from the resource system there are also many
kinds of interlinked and embedded rights: the communal tenure is usually embedded
within a larger nested hierarchy of institutions."
Nowadays the communities will often need support an
d recognition by the state in
order to manage effectively their common pool resou
rces. As a consequence,
communities will need to establish two sets of rule
s: (i) those rules that constitute the
community as an entity in the eyes of the state and
(ii) those that define internal rules
of benefit sharing. Whereas constitutional rules de
fine the community as a legal entity,
internal community rules establish the management r
ights in the resources and the fair
appropriation of benefits.
Interest in communal tenure and common property res
ource management has risen since
the 1980s among academics, governments and internat
ional development organizations
working on land and natural resources management. D
ebates on communal tenure are
still ongoing in many countries in Asia, in the con
text of market pressures and
dynamics, which call for privatization to increase
productivity, and in the context of
big business vying for a stake in valuable land and
other natural resources, in some
instances leading to land grabbing. The current mar
ket driven pressures on natural
resources create both challenges and opportunities
for communities and governments.
Overall, policies and institutions that promote acc
ountability and good governance
over these resources, both by the government at nat
ional and local level and by
communities, are required. Some specific approaches
, such as communities? mapping
of their territories, are proving useful tools to s
afeguard their lands, although they are
not sufficient conditions: the wider political and
regulatory environment must be
supportive too.
Communal tenure will very likely play a significant
role in the policies and actions for
climate change mitigation. With the emergence of in
itiatives for Reduced Emissions
from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD and REDD+)
, governance and benefit
sharing of carbon finance become critical questions
in defining who owns the carbon
stocked in forest. Marketable community rights to t
his special resource unit (stocked
carbon) must be supported by national legislation t
hat favors communal tenure of some
of the carbon properties. This may lead to a separa
tion of rights to carbon from the
broader rights to the forest and land, an aspect no
t yet addressed by theoretical work on
communal tenure..."
Kirsten Ewers Andersen
Source/publisher:
Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)
Date of publication:
2011-04-00
Date of entry/update:
2014-12-08
Grouping:
Individual Documents
Category:
Natural Resource Use - global theory, standards, mechanisms, guidelines and analysis, Natural Resource Use: global and regional, International standards, mechanisms and guidelines relating to land, including tenure, Customary tenure - global and regional
Language:
English
Format :
pdf
Size:
464.43 KB
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