Article by Harn Yarngwe

[strider@xxxxxxxxxxx]

Sunday Perspective: 
Slorc's cease-fire talks -- an analysis and recommendations
 
 
 
>From January 13-25, HARN YAWNGHWE travelled to Bangkok, Chiang Mai 
and Manerplaw. The trip was made at the request of the Oslo Group, 
Prime Minister Dr. Sein Win of the National Coalition Government 
of the Union of Burma and Chairman U Win Khet of the National 
League for Democracy -- Liberated Area. The following is his 
assessment.
 
 
IN the past, at least five different departments of the Thai 
Government have been responsible for policy towards Burma: the 
Prime Minister's Office (PMO), the Foreign Ministry (FM) the 
Ministry of the Interior (MOI), the National Security Council 
(NSC) and the military.
Coordination among the various departments has always been 
problematic because of the vested interests of powerful 
individuals within the establishment.
It was generally accepted that the PMO and FM were more 
sympathetic to the Burmese democracy movement than the MOI, NSC or 
the military.
The visit of the Nobel Peace laureates to the Thai-Burmese border 
in 1993, which was a tremendous international success, 
unfortunately changed the power structure in Thailand.
The FM was blamed for allowing Thailand to be used by the Burmese 
democracy movement.
The State Law and Order Restoration Council (Slorc) in Rangoon 
also embarked upon a campaign to undermine the influence of the FM 
by ignoring initiatives proposed by the FM. The Thai Foreign 
Minister himself visited Rangoon in September 1993 to improve his 
standing but returned empty handed.
In contrast, visits to Rangoon by the military and NSC achieved 
great success.
The MOI also lost its influence as General Chavalit, the Interior 
Minister, became more and more pre-occupied with his own political 
survival.
This has left the field open for the NSC to push its own Burma 
policy forward as the national policy.
Although the PMO and the military deny that Thailand has changed 
its policy towards Burma and the Burmese democracy movement, the 
NSC's policy is definitely the de facto policy in force today and 
accounts for the hardening of the Thai position toward the Burmese 
democracy movement within the last six months.
There are indications that a special joint-operations task force 
will be set up to implement NSC policy. This will prevent the MOI 
from directly influencing Burma policy on the ground.
Thai National Security Policy: According to the NSC, the three 
most pressing problems faced by Burma today are:
a) National reconciliation between the Burman and other ethnic 
groups,
b) Democratization, and
c) The illegal drug trade -- opium production.
The NSC concedes that, in the long run, a democratic system of 
government is required to sustain national reconciliation in 
Burma. However, it maintains that democratization and the illegal 
drug trade are Burma's internal problems and do not concern 
Thailand.
For the time being, the NSC is only concerned with national 
reconciliation in Burma because it poses a possible threat to 
Thailand's security. It postulates that, if the fighting in Burma 
continues, the situation could deteriorate as in Bosnia and result 
in a massive influx of refugees into Thailand.
The NSC is, therefore, determined to stop the fighting and 
strengthen Slorc's position so that it can remain in control and 
prevent Burma from breaking up.
To achieve its goal, the NSC is prepared to use whatever means it 
has at its disposal to encourage the Karennis, Karens and Mons 
along Thailand's border to negotiate cease-fires with Slorc.
It would also like to see all Burmese dissidents -- students and 
others -- leave Thai soil. The NSC would like to send all Burmese 
students to the `safe' camp or back across the border into the 
jungles. The NSC has proposed to Slorc that it announce an amnesty 
and take back dissidents. The NSC would be prepared to expel 
foreigners and NGOs that oppose its policy or attack the Thai 
Government.
In the NSC's view, if all Burmese dissidents are returned to Burma 
and cease-fires are negotiated between Slorc and the ethnic 
groups, Thailand's security will be assured.
Ideally, the NSC would like all parties involved in the Burmese 
conflict to talk and negotiate a settlement, but in its view, this 
is an internal Burmese matter. The NSC, however, would ensure that 
Slorc makes some concessions to the ethnic groups.
Slorc's Cease-fire Offer: Based on previous Slorc settlements with 
ex-Communist Party of Burma (CPB) forces and the Kokang, Wa, Shan, 
Pa-O, Palaung and Kachin ethnic groups, it is expected that Slorc 
will first negotiate separate cease-fires with the Mon, Karenni 
and Karen.
The negotiation period could be very short as was the case with 
the ex-CPB, Kokang and Wa groups -- or extended, as was the case 
with the Kachin.
There is a definite possibility that the various negotiations will 
be concluded before the Asean meeting in Bangkok in July 1994. At 
the very least, some `significant' announcement will be made 
before then.
It is expected that Slorc will grant some measure of local 
autonomy to the various ethnic groups.
According to Thai sources, Slorc will adopt the `Yunan' or China 
model where, for example, the Karen National Union (KNU) would be 
allowed to contest local elections in the Karen State and become a 
state government with limited powers. However, the KNU will have 
limited input into national politics, which will continue to be 
controlled by the military.
This means that a federal system of government is not negotiable 
and the ethnic peoples will be relegated to the status of 
second-class citizens. Ethnic states will also be further divided 
along ethnic lines into sub-regions with local autonomy to further 
weaken their political influence on national politics.
The consensus of the various groups along the border is that Slorc 
will use the National Convention and the cease-fire talks to 
demonstrate to the international community that it is making 
progress in democratizing the political process in Burma.
This claim will be made sometime before the Asean meeting. Once it 
is accepted by Asean and its dialogue partners, Slorc will appeal 
to the international community for aid to develop the country in 
order to maintain the peace.
Slorc is already using the Kachin cease-fire talks to encourage 
foreign NGOs to come and help develop the border regions. 
Recently, the Kachin Baptist Convention was allowed to invite a 
number of foreigners to visit the Shan and Kachin States.
There is also the strong possibility that Slorc will move against 
Khun Sa's Mong Tai Army (MTA) to demonstrate that it is not 
involved in the drug trade. Slorc has already moved up troops to 
block the MTA into an area between the Salween river and the Thai 
border.
The US Drug Enforcement Administration is reported to have warned 
the Thai Government not to allow Khun Sa to retreat into Thailand. 
Once Khun Sa is sacrificed, the US DEA and the UN will be 
hard-pressed not to step up their drug eradication aid programmes 
to Slorc.
Whether or not Slorc succeeds in removing Khun Sa, it has nothing 
to lose by launching operations against him. Khun Sa is a product 
of the Burmese military's strategy to undermine the Shan 
nationalist movement and the military has long benefited 
financially from Khun Sa.
However, his recent nationalist tendencies have become problematic 
to Slorc. And although Khun Sa is known internationally as the 
"Drug King", the drug trade in Burma is now controlled by other 
Slorc allies -- the ex-CPB, Kokang and Wa forces. Khun Sa has, 
therefore, become expendable.
Once foreign aid to Burma is restored, Slorc will consolidate its 
position and try to weaken the democracy movement. When this 
threat diminishes, it will withdraw some of the concessions 
granted to the ethnic groups (the right to bear arms, etc.)
A government elected under the guidelines drawn up by the National 
Convention could also be set up to win international approval and 
to negotiate difficult issues with the ethnic groups.
At an appropriate time, the military could `legally' seize power 
and once again `save' the country form disintegrating. General Ne 
Win seized power from an elected government in 1962, claiming that 
the proposal to amend the 1947 constitution to a federal 
constitution was leading to national disintegration.
Observations: The current Thai policy to cooperate closely with 
Slorc is a very dangerous one because it leaves Thailand with no 
other options should it prove unsuccessful. While it may be 
possible to argue that the current policy is good for Thai 
security at the moment, it is dangerous to allow short-term 
security considerations to override a nation's long-term foreign 
policy options.
The Thai Government may feel it can distance itself from the NSC 
should the policy prove unsuccessful or claim the credit if it 
succeeds. The NSC may feel it can adopt the same tactic since the 
current policy is being implemented by a Thai businessman who is a 
personal advisor of the chairman of the NSC.
A similar arrangement was used by the NSC chairman and his advisor 
in Cambodia for the Khmer Rouge. However, neither the NSC nor the 
Thai Government will be able to deny responsibility for the 
current policy if it fails, as was demonstrated in Cambodia.
While the NSC policy is based on security reasons, personal 
motivations cannot be ruled out altogether. Both the NSC chairman 
and his advisor resent US and other western influence in the Third 
World. Like Slorc they subscribe to the view that Asians should 
resolve Asian problems.
In the advisor's opinion, Thailand initiated the Cambodia solution 
and invited the UN to help resolve the problem, but instead of 
resolving it the Asian way, the UN agenda was hijacked by western 
nations and Thailand became the culprit. Therefore, he does not 
want the UN to become involved in yet another neighbouring 
country.
The advisor has also had a business and personal relationship with 
the Burmese military since the 1960s. He was the agent for the 
US$1 million Thai fishing trawler that was blown up in January 
1991 by dissident Burmese students.
The Thai NSC's analysis of the situation in Burma is seriously 
flawed. Based on its familiarity with the poorly-organised Burmese 
democracy movement on the border, the NSC has underestimated the 
strength of the movement within Burma. It assumes Aung San Suu Kyi 
has no real support and she is only being used by western nations 
to advance their own agenda.
The NSC views the Burmese military as a potent political force 
with 350,000 disciplined members plus their immediate circle of 
beneficiaries.
Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, with its 2 
million members, and the fact that it won 80 per cent of the 
contested seats in the 1990 elections is conveniently ignored.
Based on this mistaken premise, the NSC has concluded that only 
the Burmese Army has the capability and organisation to `save' 
Burma.
The NSC further assumes that Burma is about to disintegrate 
because the Burmese Army's control is not strong enough.
The reverse is true.
Burma is about to disintegrate because the Army has progressively 
tightened its control on the Burmese population since independence 
in 1948. The Army is the largest it has ever been, and the threat 
of disintegration has never been greater. Strengthening the 
military's control in Burma will accelerate the process of 
disintegration.
The NSC assumes that ethnic conflict in Burma results from racial 
hatred. Although various ethnic groups are involved and most 
resistance groups are organised along ethnic lines, the basic 
issue in Burma is not a racial one.
Apart from isolated incidents, the ethnic armies do not 
systematically massacre other ethnic populations. In general, they 
attack Burmese Army units and government installations, and the 
Burmese Army itself is multi-ethnic.
The Burmese Army, however, does commit atrocities against specific 
ethnic and religious populations. Racial hatred and mutual 
distrust do exist, but have existed from the very beginning, in 
1946.
Burma's ethnic leadership has campaigned for equal political 
rights. Only when their rights were repeatedly denied and they 
were suppressed by force of arms, did the ethnic groups resort to 
armed struggle.
Even secessionist movements are fueled, not by a desire to be 
ethnically pure, but by a desire to be able to control their own 
destiny.
Cease-fires with a token freedom to engage in trade without real 
political concessions at the national level will, therefore, not 
solve Burma's problems.
The NSC is assuming that the Burmese population is poor and is 
suffering primarily because of the fighting. It is claiming, if 
the fighting is stopped, Burma's people will enjoy new economic 
benefits and suffer less.
The Burmese population has resorted to armed struggle because 31 
years of military rule has impoverished the land and reduced the 
people to beasts of burden at the mercy of the military.
Stopping the fighting while ignoring the root cause of the 
suffering and poverty will only aggravate the situation and 
prolong the suffering.
The NSC is assuming that, given a strong Slorc, cease-fires, and 
increased investments, Burma's economy will begin to develop 
enough to satisfy everyone, and both political and ethnic issues 
will be forgotten.
In order for a nation to be able to absorb investments and 
develop, its economy and infrastructures must be functioning. 
Unlike other developing nations, all infrastructures that propel 
Burmese society and the economy have been destroyed by the 
military in over 30 years of unchallenged rule.
Only a facade used to impress uninitiated foreigners remains. Even 
the military, which was once the only functioning institution, has 
deteriorated into a gang of petty warlords.
Increased investments will not rebuild the economy. The increased 
cash flow will only benefit the power elite and serve to further 
alienate the impoverished population. To have economic 
development, the military's stranglehold on power has to be 
broken.
Analysis: Given the fact that, since 1948 the Burmese military has 
always opted for a military solution to Burma's political 
problems, the fact that it is now offering to negotiate a 
cease-fire with the various ethnic groups, is something to 
consider.
Cease-fires are, of course, nothing new. Cease-fires have been 
negotiated and broken numerous times in the past as political 
negotiations failed.
What makes this cease-fire different is the fact that the ethnic 
groups are being allowed to retain their arms and territory while 
they negotiate for some form of recognition.
In the past, the military had always insisted the ethnic armies 
had to surrender first before any negotiations could be broached. 
This condition no longer seems to apply.
Considering the fact that the Burmese Army is numerically the 
strongest it has ever been in its entire history, and it now has 
the most modern weapons it has ever possessed, this change in 
tactic is significant.
Why is Slorc not pursuing the military solution that it has always 
adopted? The clue to this may be contained in the speeches made by 
Slorc Secretary Lieutenant-General Khin Nyunt inviting the ethnic 
groups to cease-fire talks. He repeatedly asserted that the 
invitations are not being extended " ... because Slorc is facing 
difficulties in political, military, and economic spheres."
In spite of its increased repression of the civilian population, 
Slorc has not been able to suppress dissent. Sporadic outbursts of 
violence in different parts of the country attest to the tenuous 
control Slorc has.
The recent knifing of a student by pickpockets in Rangoon gave 
Slorc nightmares about a student uprising, prompting it to fire 
senior police officials to appease dissatisfied students. An 
automobile accident in Mandalay also became a cause for rioting.
Slorc may have turned Burma into a nation of 40 million hostages, 
but, in turn, it has become a besieged invader in its own country. 
In spite of having relocated millions of villagers to ensure its 
safety, Slorc is safe only in the cities and behind the barbed 
wire of its fortified military garrisons.
Slorc is also aware that its National Convention has fooled no one 
domestically nor internationally. The unanimous resolution passed 
by the UN General Assembly on December 20, 1993 made it clear that 
the international community would not accept Slorc's continued 
manipulation of the political process.
Compounding Slorc's problems is Burma's economy. In spite of rosy 
forecasts and reports of growing foreign investments, Slorc has 
not been able to attract enough investment to make up for the 
losses in foreign aid. Burma's foreign debt has mushroomed to 
US$47.5 billion while foreign exchange reserves grew to US$137 
million in 1993, from a low of US$10  million in 1988. The foreign 
investment Slorc has been able to attract has crated its own 
problems. The cities are experiencing a mini-boom but the people 
in the country are worse off than they were five years ago when 
Slorc took over. Even the army units are having to resort to 
living off the land.
To make matters worse, most of the small foreign businesses 
investing in Burma are owned by overseas Chinese from Thailand, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Taiwan and elsewhere.
This visible Chinese presence, coupled with the massive influx of 
traders across the border from China, is causing even Burmese 
within the military to question Slorc economic policies.
There are indications that the military is also becoming 
increasingly restive as General Ne Win grows older and his health 
deteriorates (he is 84.)
All these factors lead to the conclusion that Slorc is not in as 
strong of a position as it would like the world to believe. It is 
important to realize that Slorc is not entering into negotiations 
with the ethnic groups from a position of strength.
It is also important to know that Slorc is negotiating in order to 
find a solution to the problems it is facing in order to ensure 
its survival. Slorc is not yet looking seriously for a solution to 
Burma's problems.
Slorc will negotiate with the ethnic groups but concede only 
enough to ensure its own survival. Remaining in power is Slorc's 
bottom line.
Another important conclusion to be drawn from Slorc's change in 
tactics is the fact that Slorc is vulnerable to international 
pressure. If Slorc had been able to gain international recognition 
and foreign aid, it would not have bowed to pressure from Japan, 
China and Thailand to negotiate with the ethnic groups.
Proposed Strategy: Given the conclusion that Slorc is vulnerable 
to external pressure and that it will negotiate with the ethnic 
groups only to ensure its survival, the following strategy is 
proposed.
>From the way Slorc is conducting the cease-five negotiations and 
from the above analysis, it is clear that Slorc wants to divide 
the Burmese democracy movement into those fighting for ethnic 
rights and those fighting for democracy.
Slorc knows that it cannot hope to continue to survive if the 
various groups work together as a single movement fighting for 
their basic rights and putting aside ethnic differences.
In conducting separate negotiations, Slorc is hoping to exploit 
the divergent views and interests of the various groups and 
completely separate the two issues of ethnic rights and democracy. 
It is further hoping to weaken the position of the ethnic groups 
by exploiting the differences that exist between the various 
ethnic groups.
Any strategy that is adopted, therefore, must seek to preserve and 
strengthen the unity that already exists between the ethnic and 
other groups within the democracy movement. Communication is 
vital.
It is also clear the Slorc's negotiation strategy is to concede as 
little as possible while extracting maximum political mileage 
internationally. Slorc is willing to grant limited autonomy to the 
ethnic groups if this will ensure its survival and its ability to 
retain control of the national political process. In other words, 
if Slorc's strategy succeeds, democracy in Burma will be 
postponed.
The negotiating strategy of the democracy movement, especially the 
ethnic groups, must underline the fact that the basic rights they 
desire include the right to determine the national political 
system.
In other words, local autonomy without a say in national politics 
is unacceptable. As full citizens, the ethnic people must have the 
same basic human and political rights as their fellow-citizens, 
Cease-fire negotiations must lead to negotiations on Burma's 
political future, and all citizens, regardless of their ethnic 
backgrounds, must be allowed to participate in the process.
Another obvious aim of Slorc cease-fire negotiations is to gain a 
measure of international acceptance and with it a loosening of 
economic purse strings.
While the people of Burma need assistance, the premature granting 
of aid will inhibit the process of political negotiations 
necessary if the problem in Burma is to be resolved.
Aid should be withheld until separate ceasefire negotiations 
become a full-fledged political dialogue between the military and 
the ethnic and other groups in the democracy movement.
Unlike in other countries, the government in Burma does not 
provide for the people. They survive is spite of the government.
Aid to the government does not mean aid to the people. To ensure 
aid reaches to the people, it must be delivered directly to the 
people or the government has to be changed.
Economic aid, whether private or public, must not be resumed 
prematurely. Cease-fire negotiations do not necessarily guarantee 
that political talks will follow. Aid should resume only with 
political change.
Possible Dangers: The main danger in this cease-fire negotiation 
process is the Slorc might succeed in dividing the democracy 
movement. The incident between the Karens and students reported by 
the British Broadcasting Corporation is a case in point. 
Fortunately, the issue was resolved quickly and peacefully by the 
National Council of the Union of Burma.
The second danger is the Slorc might refuse to move from 
individual cease-fire negotiations to a broader-based dialogue 
with all parties involved in the conflict in Burma.
The third danger is that donor nations and well-intentioned NGOs 
might prematurely resume aid to Slorc before it commits itself to 
political dialogue and agrees to negotiate with both the ethnic 
and other groups in the democracy movement.
The greatest danger, of course, is the Slorc may be able to 
achieve all three of the above.
Recommendations: 1. Although the various ethnic groups have to 
negotiate separately with Slorc, communications between the groups 
must be maintained and enhanced to ensure that Slorc cannot play 
one group off against the other.
2. Pro-democracy groups, especially those in the Democratic 
Alliance of Burma and the NCUB, should refrain from publicly 
criticizing member organizations in their negotiations. Support 
and understanding for each other's position should be encouraged. 
Dialogue is essential.
3. The ethnic groups should insist on wider participation in 
political negotiations to resolve Burma's problems and not just 
negotiate cease-fires.
4. A clear message should be sent to the international community 
to continue their efforts to bring about change in Burma, in spite 
of the cease-fire negotiations. The process needs to be extended 
beyond the cease-fire negotiations Slorc is hoping to conclude.
5. Given that the ethnic groups will not be able to travel 
overseas this year to lobby for their cause internationally, the 
National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma must represent 
ethnic interests by lobbying  both as the NCGUB and the NCUB. The 
main focus will be the United Nations, Asean and Japan, and the 
main request will be for the holding of tripartite talks between 
the military in Burma, the democracy movement and the ethnic 
groups.
6. All concerned should help to maintain unity among the ethnic 
and other groups within the democracy movement. Visits and 
expressions of concern would be useful, as well as material 
assistance.
7. The status of students and other democracy groups in ethnic 
areas during negotiations with Slorc need to be clarified. Their 
freedom of movement and ability to function should be guaranteed.
8. Bangkok-based embassies should be encouraged to visit the 
border areas to assess the situation on the ground and show 
concern for the democracy movement as a whole.
9. Thailand should be asked to review its policy. It should be 
commended for its desire to bring about national reconciliation in 
Burma. But in the interest of its own future relations with Burma, 
it should be encouraged to help bring about real change rather 
than merely supporting Slorc's agenda.
10. Thailand should be encouraged to continue being tolerant 
towards members of the Burmese democracy movement. Many of the 
students in exile will, in the future, become leaders of Burma. 
Their safety and freedom of movement are prime concerns. The 
freedom of elected representatives to travel is another key issue.
11. Japan and Asean nations should be requested to assist Thailand 
in persuading Slorc to have a dialogue with leaders of the 
democracy movement as well as with the ethnic leaders in order to 
find a long-term solution. Cease-fires alone are not sufficient.
12. The United Nations should be requested to implement the 1993 
UNGA resolution by bringing about tripartite negotiations (the 
military, ethnic groups and others in the democracy movement.)
13. The UN, Japan and Asean should be requested to refrain from 
premature aid to Slorc. If any aid is to be given, cross-border 
aid directly to the suffering population should be considered.
14. NGOs should be educated and requested to refrain from rushing 
to Burma until real change takes place. They can start by working 
across the border if they really wish to alleviate the suffering.
15. The US government should be encouraged to complete their Burma 
policy review as quickly as possible and to decisively implement a 
policy which will facilitate all of the above.