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Burma Issues Newsletter, APril 94





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                   BURMA ISSUES NEWSLETTER
                        April 1994

Burma Issues, formerly Burma Rights Movement for Action
(B.U.R.M.A) is a non-governmental organization in Bangkok that
monitors current events in Burma with a focus on human rights,
the civil war, ethnic issues and the environment.

PO Box 1076
Silom Post Office
Bangkok 10504

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NEWS BRIEFS
Arms Embargo

1.  Canada's ambassador told the United Nations in December that
Canada would support an international embargo on weapons sales
to Burma.  Anne Park, head of the Canadian delegation to the UN
Commission on Human Rights reiterated this in March in Geneva.

2.  A petition from the Montreal and Ottawa Conference of the
United Church calling for a complete arms embargo and full
economic sanctions against SLORC is on its way to the General
Council meeting this August, for approval by the whole Church.
Source:
Canadian Friends of Burma, 940415

Legal Responsibility
The Center for Constitutional Rights in the USA has written to
the chairpersons and CEO's of Texaco and Unocal warning them that
under US law they can be held legally liable for injuries
inflicted by the Burmese army in support of their operations in
that country.  In a letter to the two companies, the CCR states,
As you may know, under standard US tort law, each of us, whether
a natural person or a corporation, is responsible for the
reasonably foreseeable consequences of our actions, even if those
consequences involve the actions of a third party.  Thus, if a
corporation enters into a contractual relationship with
disreputable parties, and it is reasonably foreseeable that those
parties will hurt someone, the corporation may be held liable for
the harm resulting from the business transaction.

Both Texaco and Unocal are exploring for gas and oil in Burma,
and Unocal is involved in a gas pipeline project to transport gas
from Burma to Thailand.  There are widespread reports that SLORC
is using slave labor to build a road and a rail road in support
of this project.  

Source:
Center for Constitutional Rights


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The Dark Side of Development
Lubricating SLORC's cease fire negotiations with Burma's
rebellious ethnic minorities has been the promise of development
for their lands and peoples.  As more anti-Rangoon groups are
lured or chased to the bargaining table, "development" will
become a central item of dialogue.  Before the rush to "develop"
takes off, however, Burma-watchers should examine the
implications of this tenuous murky concept.

Development means many things to many people, but in the realm
of poverty alleviation it usually implies people's progression
from relative poverty to relative wealth, managed by some form
of external assistance.  However, one's expectations of what
development should and could be are very often confounded by what
development turns out to be.  For donors, governments and
investors, development has an unassailably positive ring to it,
but for poor people around the world who have witnessed their
independence and economic security eroded by international aid,
development has a much more ominous connotation.

Too often the partisan politics and financial interests of those
in power contort development into a superficially altruistic con
game, where the only real losers are the poor themselves.  While
international NGOs have had some success in community-level
development work, often satisfying and promoting the interests
of the poor, there are other-- more powerful-- players in the
international development game.  Burma's ethnic minorities, who
have long suffered under negligent and abusive administrative
efforts by Rangoon, should be extremely careful about becoming
the targets of government-coordinated development schemes.

Communities are most vulnerable to manipulative development when
governments act as mediators between moneyed aid agencies-- such
as the World Bank, IMF, UNDP or bilateral agencies such as USAID
or England's ODA-- and a "target" population.  Negotiations take
place between outsiders ignorant of people's struggles and elite
bureaucrats who are often equally ignorant or blatantly callous
to average people's concerns.  Usually, high level bureaucrats
responsible for administering foreign aid have much more in
common with northern donors than with the poor in their own
countries, often holding multiple college degrees and living
privileged urban lives.  Sometimes the result is merely moronic--
lots of money is wasted and the poor neither suffer nor benefit. 

But other times development is clearly detrimental to ordinary
people's own aspirations for self improvement, resulting in
measurable reduction in the standard of living, quality of life
and a measurable increase in abuse and denial of fundamental
rights and freedoms.

The only way to counter the exclusivity and danger of this aid
is for communities to begin educating themselves about the
dangers of expensive development projects and define with their
own values how they would like to change, if at all.  As
neighbors discuss and debate the most important issues for their
communities, they must also unite with others to seek only
assistance that they deem appropriate and desirable for their
people and themselves.  

Conscious of the dangers of large-scale international aid in any
situation, and aware of the dangers of government oppression in
Burma, international aid organizations should consider laying a
pre-development foundation in communities at risk.  This activity
might include community work in:

Training in community organizing, social analysis and
representation

Teaching relevant human rights concepts, such as the of rights
of peoples, indigenous peoples' rights, civil and political
rights and economic, social and cultural rights as defined in
various international documents.

Presenting case studies of international aid that has harmed,
rather than benefitted poor people

The role of education in both oppressing minority populations and
liberating them from majority domination

Strategies for peaceful resistance to social oppression


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ECONOMICS
Unocal and Total

Concern continues to grow in many quarters about the gas pipeline
which is to be constructed from the Martaban/Yadana gas fields
in the Gulf of Martaban (Burma) through areas of Burma occupied
by Mon and Karen ethnic groups and on into Thailand.  A road and
rail line being constructed from Ye to Tavoy, ostensibly for the
purpose of moving troops and supplies needed to protect the
pipeline, is already making use of much forced labor, and has
caused the displacement of a large number of villagers living
near it.  

One of the major operators in this project is Unocal of the USA. 
Unocal is already the largest foreign investor in Thailand, and
is presently exploring for oil and gas in Thailand, Indonesia,
Syria, Yemen, Burma and Trinidad.  It is also the largest holder
of petroleum and gas reserves in Thailand.

Together with Total of France, Unocal holds 47.5% interest in the
26,140 square kilometre Gulf of Martaban project.  If the project
goes through, most of the gas produced in this concession will
flow to Thailand which is in desperate need of energy to fuel its
rapidly growing industrialization.  With a 19% annual increase
in electricity demand, The Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT)
has been campaigning for the Martaban project since 1988.  The
PTT is backed by the Thai military.

In 1991 the PTT itself was interested in taking on the project,
but their request for a loan was rejected by the World Bank and
criticized for "acting as a front for SLORC".  The World Bank
went on to say that it, "like most other international
organizations, does not recognize the present regime in Rangoon. 
We also don't look favorably on applications for extended and
soft loans by others on its behalf."

The actual pipeline route apparently will begin its on-shore
portion at the Heinze Channel and proceed to a pass known as Nat
En Taung.  At least one Thai gas run electricity generating plant
in Ratburi Province will make use of the gas.

Both Unocal and Total claim that they are not involved in the
politics of Burma, and are only providing an investment which
will benefit the people of that country.  Joseph Daniel, Total's
vice-president for corporate communications said that Total
"sticks to its fundamental principle of not interfering with
local-national political affairs in the countries where the
company is involved."  Yet it is universally known that Burma is
engaged in an ethnic and political struggle which has not yet
been brought to a positive and constructive end.  In 1991,
elections were held with the expressed goal (by SLORC) that power
would be turned over to the winners.  They continue to refuse to
hold to their promise, and the legally elected government was
finally forced to set itself up as a government in exile.  

Unocal, Total, and all other companies investing in Burma have
limited themselves to negotiating with SLORC, thus taking
political sides in this conflict, and thus interfering in the
internal political issues of Burma. 

Opposition groups have continually raised this concern, but to
no avail.   As one opposition member stated, "These companies
relate to SLORC as though it represents the interests of the
people of Burma, and consequently they have brought even more
confusion into our political and ethnic struggles.  Now is simply
not the time for foreign companies to invest in our natural
resources."

Sources:
IRRC, 1994 Company Report-D

Local Sources




Singapore PM Visits Burma
Goh Chok Tong, PM of Singapore,  made a three day official visit
to Burma from March 28 to 30.  Goh said his visit to Burma was
to explore opportunities for investment by Singapore companies. 
In 1993-94, SLORC and Singapore trade reach  S$720 million and
Singapore investment exceeded S$135 million.  Goh indicated that
future Singapore investments will also focus on tourism in Burma.

During a press conference, Goh insisted that the SLORC must open
its door if SLORC wants to join the international community.  He
repeatedly told SLORC to enforce political stability for better
foreign investment.  In addition, he said that since Burma was
closed for so long and still remains somewhat isolated from the
international community, time for the more foreign investments
would be required.

Goh said he not only talked about economics but also had
political dialogue with Gen. Than Shwe and Lt. Khin Nyunt,
believed to be the most powerful men in the military.  Goh did
not elaborate on the contents of all of these talks. 
He affirmed that ASEAN's constructive engagement policy towards
Burma is right. He criticized the attitude of western countries
towards Burma as being hypocritical and said that  when it comes
to real choices, these western countries place economics first.

ASEAN countries, including Singapore, are in competition to
investment in Burma while the people of Burma continue to call
for economic boycotts and to cut all relationships with SLORC. 
Goh seems unconcerned with the voice of the Burmese.  Most of his
view points are obviously based on economic opportunism, no
matter how many people are being killed by SLORC. 

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FORCED LABOR

The following is an interview given by Maung Aye, a 28-year-old
farmer from Ye Pyu Township.  His story is similar to that told
by many other villagers who are fleeing to the Thai/Burma border
to escape being forced by SLORC to work on the Ye/Tavoy rail
road.

     I arrived here a couple of months ago.  I came because
     the soldiers are shooting at people around my village. 
     I can't bear to live there now.  When I was there I
     had to work on the railway for 15 days at a time and
     they fed us nothing.  We had already run out of food,
     so we asked to go home but they wouldn't let us.  So
     we asked them for food but they refused to give us any
     and shot at us.  Twenty-six people were shot after
     stealing food from the soldiers.  They were shot on
     the railway around Nat Gyi Sein village in Ye
     Township.  

     Then, when we got back to our village, the soldiers
     came and called us to go back to work again, but we
     didn't dare go back, so the soldiers beat many
     villagers.  No one wanted to go back to the work site
     because they can't get any food there.  The soldiers
     took many people to the railway by force and they fed
     them nothing.  When the soldiers were around the
     village that time, I was hiding in the bushes.  Then
     when they left to go back to their camp, I ran away
     and came here.  I just kept running, because I knew
     the way.  

     My family was unable to follow.  Then the soldiers
     came to my house and poked my wife in the side with a
     rifle butt.  They kicked her hard in the stomach, and
     she vomited blood.  Then they kicked my baby son down
     into the fire, and all the hair on his head was burnt. 
     They slapped my 7-year old son in the face and he
     cried out.  They beat them because I had escaped.  

     I worked at the railway three times.  Each time was 15
     days with no time off.  After 15 days on the railway,
     I had only 3 days back in the village before going
     again.  I saw over 4,000 people working altogether,
     including so many women, and also pregnant women and
     a few children.  The youngest was 14, and there were
     old people over 50 and up to 60 years old.  We all had
     to do the same work together.  At night we slept on
     the ground.  There were always soldiers around.  

     Some women were raped, including a woman named Ma
     Thein Myint from our village.  When the officer raped
     her she was screaming, and they shot her to death. 
     She was 21 years old, and she was my cousin.  She was
     raped by a Lieutenant Colonel named Thaun Myint.  My
     farther tried to report it, but the officer he had to
     report it to was the same one who raped her, so it was
     just ignored and no action was taken.  I also heard
     that they raped two women from another village, then
     killed them by stabbing them with a knife.

Source:
Karen Human Rights Group 940413



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POLITICS
Thai Policy Towards Burma

Thailand continues to pursue its "constructive engagement" policy
towards its neighbor Burma.  The Thai government's
rationalization for holding to this policy is that, while
Thailand truly wants to see a peaceful solution to the civil war
in Burma, Thailand can not exert pressure on the Burmese to make
specific political changes as this would be interfering in the
internal affairs of a sovereign country.  

ASEAN supports Thailand in this position, stating that no country
has the right to interfere in the election process or the writing
of a constitution of another country.  Burma has already held an
election in 1990 and is now in the process of drawing up their
new constitution.  This they must do without being pressured or
manipulated by other countries.

In Thailand, the Burma policy is mainly influenced by three
different departments:  the Ministry of Interior (MOI), Foreign
Minister (FM) and the National Security Council (NSC).  These
three departments do not always see eye to eye on how Thailand
should be relating to Burma and have, on occasion, appeared to
be in competition for control over the Burma policy.  This has
created confusion among both the military junta ruling  Burma and
the opposition forces.

Most recently, the NSC seems to have taken the lead in
establishing Thai policy, and has made it clear that Thailand
will relate to SLORC as the legitimate government, and will hold
fast to the "constructive engagement" policy.  Stating that
Thailand has diplomatic relations with SLORC, the NSC confirmed
that the internal affairs of Burma, such as their human rights
situation, were not for Thailand to question or challenge.

At one point, the Thai Foreign Minister, Prasong indicated that
he felt there were some aspects of Thai policy towards Burma
which were in need of re-evaluation giving opposition groups and
human rights organizations hope that positive changes were in
store.  Prasong said that Thailand wants its neighbors to evolve
out of military rule into more democratic structures and the
present Thai policy has not resulted in very positive changes.
It has, in fact, strengthened military dictatorship in Burma. 
Prasong suggested that Thai policy should be more in line with
that of the international community which places a higher
emphasis on human rights for establishing a foreign policy.  This
was reiterated by Thai Deputy Foreign Minister Surin who said
that Burma is a special case, and that Thai policy towards Burma
should look more carefully at the human rights situation in the
country..

He later, however, seemed to change his position.  He stated that
Thai policy on Burma remained unclear, and should now be
readjusted to meet the changes taking place in Burma.  With SLORC
initiating a national convention in order to draw up a new
constitution, Prasong suggested that Thailand should encourage
the process.  He also said Thailand should help Burma improve its
international image by serving as Burma's "window to the world". 
This window would give the leaders of Burma a chance to become
more aware of how the modern world thinks and works, and the
international community would begin to see more clearly how SLORC
is slowly bringing about positive reforms to Burma.

Presently, the Thai policy towards Burma is probably clearer than
it ever has been.  Both the NSC and the FM seem to fully accept
SLORC as the legitimate government of the country, and have made
it clear that "constructive engagement" is the Asian way of
bringing about change in contrast to the isolation policy of the
West.  However, "constructive engagement" is not simply reflected
in a closer relationship between the Thai government and SLORC. 
It is also reflected in increased pressure on the Mon, Karen,
Karenni and Shan ethnic groups living along the Thai/Burma border
to sign cease-fire agreements with SLORC as well as on other
opposition forces to stop using Thailand as a base of anti-SLORC
operations.  

Critics of "construction engagement" say that Thailand is simply
interested in supporting a winner in Burma which will guarantee
Thai economic interests there.  Constructive engagement, they
say, is not a policy to engage constructively with the group
which seems to most fully reflect democratic principles and the
voice of the Burmese people, but rather to engage with the group
which offers the greatest hope for one's own economic and
political benefits.  

Dr. Alan Smith of the Asia Institute, Monash University,
Melbourne states, 
     Thailand with its ASEAN partners have favoured
     'constructive engagement' with the SLORC, by which
     they mean through continuing interaction, to offer
     encouragement to embark on appropriate reform.  This
     policy of course politically justifies the
     continuation of a profitable relationship but reflects
     also the ASEAN countries' rejection of Western
     inspired intervention in the affairs of non-Western
     states, in general, including potentially, of course,
     themselves.

Certainly it could be argued that until now, Thailand's
commitment to 'constructive engagement' has been a convenient
facade for inaction.  It has sought to avoid antagonising the
SLORC in order to profit from the relationship, but it has also
tolerated political activity of the organised Burmese opposition
within Thailand while facilitating the provision of humanitarian
aid to refugees and displaced persons in Thailand."
Smith goes on to argue, 

     "SLORC has accepted that with Thailand's support it
     may be possible to strike deals with the minorities
     which will enable it to perpetuate the military's
     control of Burma with the minimum of concessions to
     democratic process and the minimum of concessions to
     the minority nationalities.  Recent action by Thailand
     to apply pressure to the opposition groups to this end
     should be seen as a clear departure from 'constructive
     engagement' and clearly running counter to
     international policy."

Thus the "construction engagement" policy contradiction appears
to emerge ever more clearly.  While ASEAN nations continue
insisting that they do not want to interfere in the internal
affairs of Burma, they blatantly do so by choosing to relate
constructively with SLORC (the ASEAN approach which they
pontificate) while isolating the opposition groups in order to
force them to negotiate with SLORC (the Western approach which
they denounce as ineffective).  

While much attention has been given to the ASEAN "constructive
engagement" policy, not enough has been given to their "isolation
policy" towards the democratic opposition forces.  While the two
policies are opposites, they work in totally harmony in favor of
SLORC and against the popular movement for democratic and ethnic
rights which has been struggling for several decades already. 
The process being created by these two policies does not
necessarily bode well for the future of the people of Burma.  

Presently Mon, Karen and other groups along the Thai/Burma border
are being pressured to enter cease-fire talks with SLORC at a
distinct disadvantage, leaving little hope that a much needed
long-term peace settlement can finally be reached.  Refugees and
political exiles living in Thailand are under increasing threat
of repatriation, something they will accept only when SLORC gives
up power and allows the people's elected representatives to
establish a civilian and democratic government.  Only then will
they feel they can return home safely and begin rebuilding their
country.   These two issues alone suggest that isolating the
opposition will not bring peace and stability to Burma.

ASEAN would do well to reconsider their "constructive engagement"
policy.  If they are truly interested in regional stability, and
in protecting their economic interests in Burma, they should
pursue a course which will lead to a positive solution to the
root causes of conflict in Burma.  No positive benefits can come
to anyone if a forced "peace" in Burma suddenly goes sour and
erupts once again into bloody civil unrest.
Sources:

"Ethnic Conflict and the State in Burma", Dr. Alan Smith, January
994