BurmaNet News: September 3, 1994

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************************** BurmaNet **************************
"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
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BurmaNet News: Saturday, September 3 1994

QUOTE OF THE DAY:

   "Thein Shwe is a real effective guy.  Col. Ba Hein was just a joke."

                         Unnamed Burma watcher commenting on the current and
                         former Burmese military attaches posted in Bangkok.

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Contents:

1: MNRC: REGARDING THE PROTECTION OF MON REFUGEES
2: NATION: NATION:  SLORC'S SPIES KEEP CLOSE WATCH ON JUNTA'S FOES AT HOME
   AND ABROAD
3: NATION: BURMESE ISLANDS FOCUS OF STRATEGIC MOVE BY CHINA

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Mon National Relief Committee
September 2, 1994
[abridged]

On behalf of the Mon refugees who fled into Thailand and have taken refuge
after the SLORC troops attacked on July 21, the Mon National Relief Committee
issues this statement to highlight the crisis of the current situation and
suggest for the real protection of [the refugees].  At the same time we would
like to propose the need for conducive conditions before a repatriation of
these refugees to their former Halockhani Camp.

 ...Thai authorities have not allowed the refugees to relocate in Thailand,
and block the transportation road to the camp and cut off them to the outside
world.  After that, the Mon refugees have faced shortage of food and other
supplies, and health conditions are precarious with increasing cases of
malaria, respiratory diseases and vitamin deficiencies.

Although the Mon refugees want to stay in Thai side of the border, we clearly
understand that the Thai authorities will not allow them to do so.  On 25th
August, the MNRC negotiated with some commanders of the Ninth Division of
Thai Army in Kanchanaburi and they asked MNRC to persuade the Mon refugees to
voluntarily repatriate to their former camp.  On 29 August, Thai authorities
allowed the Committee to go int the camp and to explain the refugees about
the discussion between the commanders of Ninth Division and MNRC.  But the
Mon refugees still refused to voluntarily return back.  On 30th August, MNRC
discussed with camp leaders again to find the best ways for real protection
of them, after they returned back to their former Halockhani Camp.  In the
meeting, we adopted the following five points and informed the Ninth Division
Army through the Thai Border Patrol Police, later the Army rejected the
proposed points.

On 31st August, under the command of the Ninth Division Army the Thai Border
Patrol Police closed the rice store and pressured the Mon refugees.  The
police have arranged to cut off the rice distribution to the refugees who
refused to return back to the former camp.  And the MNRC cannot make obtain
any guarantees of safety for the refugees who return back to old Halockhani
camp when they can no longer tolerate the hunger.  Therefore, we urgently
need the international communities including UN Agencies, Government
Agencies, Non-Governmental Organizations, mass media to approach the terrible
situation here and cooperate with the Thai authorities for the better
protection of the Mon refugees.  We also appeal to the Thai Government on the
following points:

1    That the Thai Government and the Thai Army lift the blockade and not use
     force or pressure on the Mon refugees as the MNRC is ready to negotiate
     the process of repatriation of Mon refugees with Thai authorities.

2    That the Thai Government take responsibility for guaranteeing or signing
     government level [guarantees] which assure that there will not be any
     troubles to the Mon refugees in the future from the Burmese Government.

3    That after returning the Mon refugees to their former Halockhani Camp,
     it is necessary for the Thai Government to allow international aid
     agencies [access] and make an agreement in providing assistance to [the
     refugees] until the situation permits them to go back home safely.

4    That the Thai Government relocate the Mon refugees from Kway Saya (Baleh
     Donephai), who were left homeless when the Burmese attacked them and
     burnt down their houses, to a safe place.

5    Propose the International Community that the Mon refugees are in need of
     international agencies or UNHCR to open an office in the camp and
     monitor the situation there after the refugees have returned back to
     their former Halockhani Camp.

signed,

    Mon National Relief Committee
    September 2

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NATION:  SLORC'S SPIES KEEP CLOSE WATCH ON JUNTA'S FOES AT HOME AND ABROAD

BURMA military intelligence plays a key role at home
and abroad, especially in Thailand where it is said to
be expanding its network of spies and informers. AUNG
ZAW reports.

Since his appointment as Burma's intelligence chief in 1984, Khin
Nyunt has continued to build the state security apparatus into
an effective instrument of repression and espionage both at home
and abroad - and in the process is believed to have established
himself as Burma's most powerful man.

Agents of his Directorate Defence service Intelligence (DDSI) keep
a watchful eye on opponents in Burma and abroad including the US,
Canada, Germany, Australia, Britain and Thailand. Its also keeps
watch on army officers.

DDSI has been playing an inportant role in Burma. In 1988 the
democracy movement forced Ne Win's regime to step down, but when 
the regime almost collapsed, the DDSI intervened. Khin Nyunt authorized
sabotage tactics to create anarchy in order to pave the way for
the military to stage a coup. To date, the military intelligence 
service have played an inportant role in control ling the public
and crushing pro-democracy activisits.

The Thai language newspaper Naew Na recently published a front
page story quoting a source in Foreign Ministry as saying that
Burma's DDSI, under the command of Lt Gen Khin Nyunt, planned
to send five spies to work in the Burmese defence Office in
Bangkok with aim of expanding its intelligence and espionage
activities. The five officers were Myint Oo, Tun Khin, Thaung
Kyi, Tun Thein and Saw Kyaw Lan San. they are officials of the
DDSI.

However, Thailand's Foreign Minister Prasong Soonsiri said that he
needs time to verify reports that the Burmese junta planned to
send "spies" into Thailand. Suvit Simasaun, Foreign Ministry
spokesman , said the report puzzles him.

Prasong added that report is nonsense. He said that even if it
were true, he could not talk about it publicly because it would
be a state secret and could affect relations with Burma. Naew na
also reported that an NGO official who has contact with a former
Burmese military officer from DDSI recently sneaked across the
Thai-Burma border and fled to another country. The defector was
unhappy with the Slorc's close control of its people and the way
it prevented competent officials from advancing. He said that no
one had any chance for promotion unless they belonged to the same
unit as the Slorc leaders.

The defector had worked for DDSI since 1972 and in the three
years before his defection was responsible for intelligence
gather in Thailand, giving him access to information gathered by
DDSI agent here. 

The defector told the NGO officials that the center of Burma's
intelligence gathering is the office of the military attache in
Bangkok. Formerly, this was Col Ba Hein. The current incumbent
is Col Thein Shwe, the military attache hand picked by Lt Gen
Khin Nyunt himself. Col Thein Shwe replace Ba Hein in 1992. Naew
na said "Thein Shwe is ambitious". Even though he is an air force
officer he was given important position . He used to work as a
liaison officer to foreign embassies in Rangoon . One Burma
watcher based in Bangkok said earlier "Thein Shwe is a real
effective guy.  Col. Ba Hein was just a joke.

Naew Na reported that after Thein Shwe came to Thailand, Burma's
military intelligence acquired a Thai spy who has provided Burma
with good information. The spy, code named Victor, is highly
valued by the Burmese. It is believed that DDSI runs several
agents including Burmese, Thai and ethnic minorities and a well-
informed source suggested that among the five Burmese spies "some
might be Karen". 

In fact, many informers and intelligence officer are working in
Thailand and the Burmese opposition in exile believes that some
have already penetrated the inner-circle of opposition groups on
the border and the Burmese asylum-seeker community in Thailand.
The Burmese community in Thailand-in particular those who are
pro-democracy activist-are vulnerable because they are considered
"illegal immigrants."  Since leaving Burma when the military staged
a bloody coup in 1988, they have lived in fear and mistrust. 
Dissident groups on the border say they don't know who are
informers and spies--"but we can only guess".


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NATION:  BURMESE ISLANDS FOCUS OF STRATEGIC MOVE BY CHINA
September 2

CHINA 's role in equipping and training Burma's
military is growing , Writes Aung Zaw

The purchase by Burma's military junta of two frigates from China
further intensifies the growing military relationship between the
two countries as China looks to increase its influence in an
area it views as strategically important.

Jane's Defence Weekly reported in its latest issue that did not
know when the frigates were to be delivered or whether China had
agreed to arm them with missiles. Other sources, including the
BBC world service, said the purchase of the frigates has been
delayed due to financial problems. 

The Jianghu- class frigates are capable of being fitted with
ground-to-ground missiles in a moved to modernize Burma's navy.
Jane's Weekly's noted Burma is the only state in the region whose
navy does not possess such equipment . Thailand has six vessels. 
Since the Burmese military regime (Slorc) took power in 1988,
relations between Rangoon and Beijing have been steadily
improving . Many Chinese military delegations have visited Burma
and Rangoon's high-ranking officials have made several state
visits to China. Recently, Gen Li Jiulong, commander of China's
Changdu military region, visited Burma.

According to a recent report in the Far Eastern Economic Review,
Chengdu is the command headquarter and major supply base for
Chinese troops in Tibet. In recent years, it has also served as
the source of Chinese arms and ammunition for Burma. But the
magazine noted that Gen Li is know to have paid special
attention to Burma's navel facilities during his visits.
China become the Slorc's most important military all as early as
1989. In 1990 the Chinese began to deliver military supplies,
estimated by western military observers to be worth about US$ 1.2
billion, to Rangoon These included F-6and F-7jet fighters, radar
and radio equipment, surface to air missiles, tanks, armoured
personnel carriers, anti-aircraft guns and naval ships.Rangoon has
also bought naval vessels from Yugoslavia and, in the last two
years, Burmese naval and air force officers have been sent to
China and Yugoslavia for year-long training courses.

It is believed that Beijing promised to upgrade Burma's navy and
air force in response to requests from Rangoon's navy, which has
traditionally lagged behind the army and air force. Chinese
military experts have been send to Rangoon;according to analysts
they are the first foreign military advisers to visits Burma since
Ne Win took power in 1962. Reports emerged last year that the
Chinese had assisted Burma to build new naval bases at Coco and
Haigyl islands in the bay of Bengal. 

This prompted analysts to comment that: "Burma's strategic
location between India and Southeast Asia makes its one of the
most important cards the Chinese could play in their foreign
policy.

However, Far Eastern Economic Review said Rangoon has come
under pressure to allow Chinese access to three islands south of
Sittwe in Western Arakan state, Coco island in the India Ocean,
and Zedetkyi Kyun or Matthew's island off the Tenasserim coast in
the southeast.

"The last of these islands is especially sensitive, as it is
located off the coast of Burma's southernmost tip, Kawthaung or
Victoria Point, close to the northern entrance to the Straits of
Malacca. Satellite images also indicate that a 45-metre antenna
for monitoring radio traffic has been installed on Coco island,"
the magazine reported. 

Apart from naval facilities, Rangoon in the Last year has bought
more them 10,000 automatic machine gun, equipment and spare-
part from China, with the total value of about US$500,000, Western
military observers said. The Slorc has also bought four
coast guard naval boats.

Nevertheless, Rangoon has a problem with anti-Chinese sentiment
among the Burmese people, particularly soldiers and military
officers. Last year some Burmese military officers were arrested
for plotting the assassination of Lt-Gen Khin Nyunt, Burma's most
powerful man. Their reason was that they felt to top brass had
sold the country out to the Chinese.  "There is growing criticism of Chinese
influence in Burma's military, " a source close to Rangoon army officers
said.

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ABBREVIATIONS USED BY BURMANET:

 AP: ASSOCIATED PRESS
 AFP: AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE
 AWSJ: ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL
 BBC: BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION
 BI: BURMA ISSUES
 BIG: BURMA INFORMATION GROUP
 BKK POST: THE BANGKOK POST
 CPPSM: COMMITTEE FOR THE PUBLICITY OF THE PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE IN MONLAND
 DA:  DEPTHNEWS ASIA
 FEER: FAR EAST ECONOMIC REVIEW
 NATION: THE NATION (DAILY NEWSPAPER, BANGKOK)

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