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Burma Issues Newsletter: March 1995



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Burma Issues Newsletter
March 1995

          While it is clear that UNHCR is utterly failing
          to provide even rudimentary security to refugees,
          either in Bangladesh or in Burma, to lay all
          blame at its door would be simplistic. The GoB
          {Govt of Bangladesh] castigates UNHCR as slowing
          down the repatriation process. The SLORC does not
          want UNHCR to have anything but a token,
          white-washing presence. From bitter experience,
          the refugees know that UNHCR cannot be trusted. 
                    <Anna Mitchell.  See BETWEEN A ROCK AND
                    A HARD PLACE: THE FATE OF THE ROHINGYA>

=====================================================
Contents:

BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: THE FATE OF THE ROHINGYA
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATING TO THE ROHINGYAS
CITIZENSHIP IN BURMA
THE CIVIL WAR.
ESCAPE TO NOWHERE
REVIEW--MARTIN SMITH'S  "ETHNIC GROUPS IN BURMA"
NEWS THIS MONTH

=====================================================



BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: THE FATE OF THE ROHINGYA
 by Anna Mitchell

There is a trick well-known to every conjurer. "Watch!" he
says, flourishing empty sleeves and pockets. And while
audience attention is firmly focused where the Maestro
wants it, hey presto!, the white rabbit emerges
unexpectedly from his hat.

 SLORC has an instinct for such tricks and sometimes it
appears that the international community is like a meek
theatre audience, spellbound and amazed that the action is
not where it appears to be, things are not what they seem.

 While international concern seemed fixated on the release
of Aung San Suu Kyi until the January assault on Manerplaw
swung attention round to the Thai-Burmese border, an even
more outrageous and systematic assault is taking place on
the Bangladesh-Burmese border. Here the UNHCR, financially
supported by the US, Japan and Canada, is colluding in a
repatriation program. Characterised as 'voluntary', it
redefines the word in an alarming way.

 The Rohingyas, a Muslim minority of over one million in
the Buddhist state of Arakan, have been persecuted in
Burma for decades. Since 1942, 1.5 million have either
been expelled or forced to flee. The earliest Muslim
settlements in Arakan can be dated back to the 7th Century
AD: but many Rohingyas are still not entitled to any form
of citizenship. Their relationship with the Arakanese
(Rakhine) people has waxed and waned over the centuries,
but since the SLORC takeover in 1988, relations have
deteriorated drastically.

 In early 1991 the SLORC instigated a campaign to
exterminate the Rohingyas. This involved the by-now
horribly familiar litany of atrocities - looting, rape,
forced labour and relocation, destruction of villages and
religious institutions, detention, execution. From 1991 to
mid-1992, between 250,000 and 300,000 Rohingyas fled into
Bangladesh in search of what they hoped would be temporary
asylum. They were housed in 18 camps along the border.

 Even as they escaped to the camps, an agreement was
signed between Bangladesh and Burma to repatriate them,
despite no change in the conditions which had caused their
flight in the first place. The agreement did not define
the role of UNHCR in Burma, and its attempts at monitoring
the situation in the refugee and transit camps inside
Bangladesh were continually frustrated

 In November 1993 UNHCR and SLORC signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU), but this gave little protection to
returning refugees and has anyway expired. In the same
month the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) agreed that UNHCR
should be permitted to verify the highly questionable
voluntary nature of the repatriation, but this was
rendered impossible for them to do, since they were only
granted access to refugees on the night prior to their
repatriation, and it was unclear how freely the refugees
could speak to UNHCR. There was well-documented evidence
of coercion in the camps - refugees resistant to
repatriation were deprived of food, beaten, humiliated and
physically forced into trucks and sent to transit camps. 

 These methods caused UNHCR to withdraw from the program
in December 1993. It was suspended in January 1994, and
during the next few months the repatriation rate declined
significantly. NGOs were permitted to carry out relief
activities in the camps, but anxiety and tension remained
high.

 In May 1994 the GoB and UNHCR signed a new agreement
which theoretically provided safeguards for the refugees.
>From May to July 1994, 43,000 repatriations took place
under this agreement. These cannot be considered
voluntary, since Bangladesh camp officials openly
brutalised refugees, particularly in the transit camps. 

 A revised and streamlined repatriation program has been
in force since July, replacing refugee interviews with
mass registration. In effect the mass registrations are
simply UNHCR promotion sessions aimed at dispelling
refugee fears for their safety. Camp officials make it
quite plain the refugees have no option but to return. Any
resistance, or even questioning, is summarily punished.
Under the November 1993 MOU with the SLORC, UNHCR does
have a presence both in Rangoon and Arakan. However, a
basic condition of the agreement is that the SLORC Home
Affairs Minister remains responsible for the entire
repatriation program. UNHCR can only monitor the refugees'
return to 5 reception centres within Burma, not the
promised return to their villages of origin. Much of the
land formerly farmed by the Rohinghyas has been
confiscated and subsequently settled by Burmans. The
ultimate fate of returned refugees is not subject to any
outside scrutiny.

 Identity cards issued to returning refugees do not accord
them any citizenship rights. Small-scale projects aimed at
facilitating their return are entirely in the hands of
SLORC officials. UNHCR is not permitted to provide any
information on the situation of the 135,000 refugees
repatriated since September 1992.

 While it is clear that UNHCR is utterly failing to
provide even rudimentary security to refugees, either in
Bangladesh or in Burma, to lay all blame at its door would
be simplistic. The GoB castigates UNHCR as slowing down
the repatriation process. The SLORC does not want UNHCR to
have anything but a token, white-washing presence. From
bitter experience, the refugees know that UNHCR cannot be
trusted. 

 What can be done? It would appear that the most creative
approach to the problem is to work with the GoB in a way
which enables them to care for the refugees in a
humanitarian manner until such time as the Rangoon junta
has been either toppled or forced to cease victimising its
own people. Some $3.2 million has already been donated to
local, non-refugee populations in health, food and
sanitation projects. The GoB has benefitted from tariffs
imposed on relief goods and from substantial donations of
equipment, including vehicles. Staff provided by the GoB
for the relief effort are paid by UNHCR. And, as
everywhere, refugees are used to provide Bangladeshi
businesses with cheap labor .

 Yet until such time as a safe return can be genuinely
guaranteed, it seems even more effort must be concentrated
on helping both the government and citizens of Bangladesh
to assist the beleaguered and powerless Rohingyas. In
doing so, they would not only acquire the respect of the
international community, they could turn misfortune to
advantage to the benefit of all concerned.

 As for the SLORC, it should be made aware that not
everyone is mesmerised either by their fake 'peace talks'
with other ethnic minorities (talks in which the Rohingyas
have not even been invited to participate) or by their
armed offensive along its eastern border. Sooner or later
the spotlight will shift to reveal the most misused,
abused and voiceless of all Burma's gentle peoples.

Sources:

The Rohingyas: forcibly repatriated to Burma - Report by
Medecins san Frontiers, 22 September 1994 The Return of
Rohingya Refugees to Burma: Voluntary Repatriation or
Refoulement? - Draft report submitted to US Committee for
Refugees, 27 November 1994 Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh
- Report by Yvette Pierpaoli, Refugees International
representative, 6 June 1994 "Arakan" (Official Mouthpiece
of Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front) - Vol 7, Issues 7 & 8,
July and August 1994 "Mirror or Arakan" January 1995 UNHCR
statistics 

=====================================================
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATING TO THE ROHINGYAS

Early 1991

SLORC institutes a Rohingyan extermination campaign
code-named 'Pyi Thaya' (Prosperous country).

Late 1991-mid 1992 

250,000-300,000 Muslim residents of Rakhine State seek
refuge in Bangladesh.

Feb 1992 

Bangladesh permits UNHCR to assume a formal role in the
relief operation, due to deteriorating health conditions
in the camps and international pressure.

April 1992 

Agreement signed between GoB and Burma to repatriate
refugees without UNHCR presence.

Sept 1992 

First wave of repatriations commences, amidst refugee
protests and violent incidents. UNHCR and private relief
groups denied access to camps.

Dec 1992 

UNHCR withdraws from the repatriation as its voluntary
character is not respected 

Feb 1993 

UNHCR resumes involvement on the Bangladesh side only,
after being allowed to conduct individual interviews with
heads of families to ascertain voluntary nature of
repatriation.

Feb 1993-July 1994 

UNHCR plays limited role in repatriation process. Refugees
'volunteer' to return in climate of extreme coercion.

Nov 1993 

MoU signed between UNHCR and SLORC which secures a UNHCR
presence in Rangoon and Arakan. A basic condition is that
the SLORC Immigration & Manpower Department remains
responsible for the repatriation operation. UNHCR officers
authorised only to go as far as reception centres in
Burma. 84% of repatriations in Nov and Dec occur without
any UN supervision. Late Jan 1994  

UNHCR again agrees to take part in program.

May-July 1994 

GoB and UNHCR sign a temporary MoU setting forth criteria
for the repatriation. Approximately 43,000 repatriations
take place under this MoU, in a climate of well-documented
coercion.

July 1994 

GoB and UNHCR agree to "implement a policy based on the
view that conditions have been created to allow all
refugees to return to Burma."

Aug 1994 

Bangladesh and Burma agree on a repatriation rate of 5,000
refugees per week.

Sept 1994 

Approx 61,000 refugees repatriated, leaving 190,000
refugees remaining in 18 camps. UNHCR under pressure from
GoB to complete repatriation by the end of the year.

Feb 1995 

Total no. of repatriations to date 134,800 


=====================================================

CITIZENSHIP IN BURMA

Under the 1982 Citizenship Law, inhabitants of Burma are
divided into three classes of citizenship:

1) Burma citizens, 2) Associate citizens. and 3)
Naturalized citizens 
1) Only those born in Burma and registered in Rangoon are
considered full citizens. Anyone who joined the opposition
during or after 1988 has had their citizenship revoked.

2) An individual, or his/her direct ancestors, must have
applied and been acknowledged prior to 1982 as associate
citizens under the Union Citizenship Act, 1948. To qualify
under this Act, a Rohingya would have had to have been
descended "from ancestors who for two generations at least
have all made any of the territories include (sic) within
the Union their permanent home and whose parents and
himself were born in any such territories shall be deemed
to be a citizen of the Union." It is unclear how many of
the Rohingya registered for citizenship prior to 1982,
and, given the isolation and lack of infrastructure in
Arakan State, such a restriction is unfairly prejudicial.

3) A naturalised citizen must have been born in Burma and
their parents "entered and resided in the State prior to
4th January, 1948," or at least one parent must have been
recognized as a naturalized citizen. A Rohingya who would
otherwise qualify but who failed to apply for citizenship
prior to their twenty-third birthday ceases to be
eligible. Similarly, if at least one parent does not have
some form of Burmese citizenship (ie one parent loses
his/her citizenship and the other is a foreigner, or both
parents lose their citizenship), then the children also
lose their citizenship. 

As a result of the exclusionary nature of the citizenship
act and SLORC policies towards the Rohingya a significant
proportion of the Rohingya, both refugees and residents of
Arakan State are, in effect, stateless persons, deprived
of any rights whatsoever.

Source: The Return of Rohingya Refugees to Burma:
Voluntary Repatriation or Refoulement? - Draft report
submitted to US committee for Refugees, 27 November 1994,
pp 17-19


=====================================================

THE CIVIL WAR.

Following nearly three years of relative quiet on the
battle fronts, Slorc launched a major military offensive
against the Karen in mid-December 1994. The offensive
caught Thai authorities, basking in the "success" of their
constructive engagement policy with Slorc, by surprise.
Although sporadic fights between several of the ethnic
insurgent groups and Slorc troops had continued since
Slorc's 1992 cease-fire, there had been no major campaigns
between armed combatants. 

The offensive began as the Karen National Union (KNU) was
struggling with an internal conflict between Karen
Buddhist and the Karen Christian leadership of the KNU,
sparking speculation that there was a definite link
between the two events. Karen Buddhists, although making
up a majority of the KNU, have few top leadership
positions. This situation created tension within the
organization which erupted in early December near the KNU
headquarters of Mannerplaw. A small group of Karen
Buddhists mutinied and closed off part of the Salween
River which provides a major transportation service for
Mannerplaw. Negotiations between this small group of
dissidents and some of the KNU leaders seemed to have
reached a mutually agreeable solution when several
mutineers suddenly, and without warning, rejected the
agreement.

 According to one eyewitness, several Karen Christians
were, at that point, executed. A KNU statement of 15
December, charged that Slorc was behind the conflict and
had sent agitators to stir up dissension between Buddhists
and Christians. The statement went on to say, "Through the
work of its undercover agents, it [Slorc] succeeded in
organizing some unscrupulous opportunists to agitate in
one area of the KNU." The Burmese military's history of
creating religious and ethnic conflicts to gain a firmer
hold over the country gives reason to suspect the
statement is correct.  

While the KNU was trying to settle this "internal"
conflict, Slorc began moving heavy weapons and
reinforcements into its Sleeping Dog Hill stronghold above
Mannerplaw (TN 941216). One source estimated that at least
nine Burmese battalions numbering 2,700 to 3,600 troops
were deployed around Mannerplaw which was being defended
by some 1,000 Karen troops (TN 950126). Slorc also had at
its disposal, heavy artillery pieces recently purchased
from China. With the help of some Karen mutineers who were
well acquainted with the local terrain, Slorc launched its
attack against Mannerplaw.  On January 27, 1995, the
Burmese army overran Mannerplaw. Karen soldiers, not
wanting to leave a base for Slorc, burned down their
headquarters of 21 years. "It was clear in advance that
the Slorc, with heavy weapons it had acquired from China,
had the capacity for a heavy offensive." the Karen said in
a statement issued on the 5th of February. KNU leader,
General Bo Mya also said he abandoned Mannerplaw because
he did not want Karen killing Karen, referring to the
presence of some Karen mutineers among the attacking Slorc
troops.

 The fall of Mannerplaw was a definite political victory
for Slorc, but KNU's withdrawal not only saved lives, but
also set the stage for a new strategy in the struggle for
self-determination. "On 26th January, the KNU abandoned
Mannerplaw and switched from static defence, positional
warfare to active guerrilla warfare in order to continue
the struggle." the KNU statement explained. Karen
mutineers number approximately 400 to 500 members
according to local sources. Slorc has insisted that the
attack on Mannerplaw was carried out by members of this
Karen Buddhist faction with only some logistical support
from the Slorc. However, even Slorc's friends find that
hard to believe. 

On February 3, the Burmese envoy to Thailand, U Tin Win,
was summoned to the Foreign Ministry to receive an aide
memoir from Dr. Surin, officially conveying Thailand's
concerns over the impact the assault could have on the
life and property of Thai nationals living along the
common border. (BP 950204) A few days later, an unnamed
Thai official commented, "If we [Thai government] believe
the Slorc's words that the fighting was between the two
Karen rival forces and not the Burmese army's operation
against the KNU, we would not have summoned the Burmese
ambassador for a protest." (TN 950208) Slorc was quick to
act on the new situation. On December 21, they formed the
Karen mutineers into the Democratic Kayin Buddhist
Organization (DKBO) with its own army, the Democratic
Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA). 

By the end of January, the military regime had officially
handed Mannerplaw over to the DKBO and renamed the Karen
State as the Kayin State (BP 950130). Slorc's propensity
to use a change of name as an attempt to signify important
political changes, was once again employed. Kawmoora,
another large KNU base further south, and opposite the
Thai town of Mae Sot in Tak Province, continued to come
under heavy artillery attacks from Slorc soldiers. Thai
border authorities estimated that from 3,000 to 3,500
Slorc troops were carrying out the assault against
Kawmoora which was being defended by approximately 1,000
KNU forces.  The artillery barrages were fierce, with
reports of 1,000 or more shells falling on the camp each
day. 

Some of the shells also fell on the Thai side of the
border, resulting in a Thai military build-up in the area.
On February 20, several shells fell extremely near Huay Ka
Lok refugee camp which is four kilometers inside Thailand.
The shelling was no accident, and terrified refugees ran
for cover wherever they could find it.  That night the KNU
decided to abandon Kawmoora, and their troops began to
withdraw early on the morning of the 21st. Local sources
claim that, shortly before the KNU troops had withdrawn,
Slorc fired shells into Kawmoora which contained some sort
of chemical which caused disorientation, bleeding from the
ears and nose, and unconsciousness in many of those
affected. Efforts are still being made to confirm this,
and to identify the type of chemical used. In keeping with
its tradition of manipulating the news, Slorc reported
that the Burmese military was not involved in the assault
on Kawmoora. Their television news report claimed that the
attack was made by Karen Buddhist mutineers (DKBO), and
that the KNU fled into 'the other country', their way of
referring to Thailand when they are displeased with their
neighbor.

 As the fighting raged on, it was once again, the
villagers who had to suffer the most. From 6,000 to 10,000
new refugees fled into Thailand, leaving behind their
homes, their gardens, their meagre possessions, and their
hope for the future. If Slorc continues its offensive,
tens of thousands more might move into Thailand, creating
a serious problem for Thailand and for the private
organizations who are struggling to provide them with
basic food, shelter and medical services. Thailand, while
not happy about welcoming new refugees onto its soil, has
pledged to protect them and help provide them with the
services they need. Private organizations working along
the border say that local Thai officials have been very
cooperative. 

from "Hanging on to Hope", Burma Issues, February, 1995



=====================================================


ESCAPE TO NOWHERE

 We can push the refugees out at any time...we will assist
only those who are wounded or sick, and send them back
immediately when they are well enough to travel, without
waiting until the fighting stops...My understanding is
that it is a military, not political matter. If it was a
political matter we would give them protection...but I
want to stress that we will certainly push them back, we
can not let them stay here for years. - Thailand's
Interior Minister Sanan Kachornprasart on the thousands of
refugees fleeing the SLORC's arrival at Mannerplaw.

SLORC's belligerence against villagers along the
Thai-Burma border has been a deadly fact of life for
years. But while the people have learned to
accommodate--or escape-- the violence that accompanies the
Burmese army wherever it goes, a clear understanding of
this perpetual and malevolent abuse often escapes
international attention. With the recent escalation in
SLORC's campaign to wipe out resistance, it has become
even more pressing for Burma-watchers worldwide to
understand the people's dilemma, especially because the
spectre of forced repatriation can be felt looming eerily
overhead. 

To many observers-- diplomats, aid workers, journalists
and government bureaucrats-- SLORC's recent capture of
Mannerplaw was a combat episode that sent thousands of
Karen villagers into Thailand. They perceive a causal link
between fighting in the jungles and new refugee arrivals.
Without doubt, when the bullets start flying people will
run away to whatever safe ground they can find, as they
have done from the Mannerplaw area. However, a closer
examination of the refugee situation-- especially in the
Mae Sot area where some of Thailand's oldest refugee
settlements are-- shows that the connection is not quite
so simple. 

When asked, most refugees will cite that their reasons for
fleeing their villages inside Burma-- and not going back--
are not extraordinary military offensives. Refugees come
to Thailand because not because of extraordinary combat,
but because brutal military domination over civilian life
has become ordinary, and the ordinary has become
intolerable. This applies even to the thousands of recent
arrivals from the attack on Mannerplaw, the majority of
whom were already refugees in their own land before they
crossed the border. Consider these statements collected
from Karen refugees in camps near Mae Sot. 

When is combat ever cited as the reason they fled? We came
to Thailand about 10 years ago because we were afraid of
the Burmese, so we ran. They tortured people. We didn't
dare stay anymore. The whole village came. Nobody lives
there anymore I left my village about 20 years ago with my
family because the Burmese were doing their Four Cuts
policy [Four Cuts is a Burma Army policy of systematically
terrorizing, executing and driving into destitution
civilians in the villages in an attempt to undermine
civilian support for opposition forces - this policy is
still in full force]. They were killing many people. Ð We
came to Thailand about 7 years ago because the Burmese
disturbed us all the time, tortured people, arrested
people and ordered them to be porters and do many other
things. First we went to Noh Pa Doh refugee camp, then we
moved here. When I was in Pee Ta Ka village, people chose
me to be headwoman. The villagehead has to stay in the
village all the time because when SLORC comes and demands
things like porters, the headperson has to deal with them
or else they go and make trouble for the villagers, and
the SLORC also orders the headperson to go here and there
all the time. The SLORC camp is near the village, in Paw
Yin Pu, so they could come every day when they wanted. I
was too old and weak to go here and there whenever SLORC
ordered me. I couldn't do it, so I left the village. 

The villagers liked me and wanted me to go back, but I
didn't dare to stay there anymore.  I came here 5 or 6
years ago because we lost everything there. We had a field
but the government took it. My father loaned the field to
the government because he needed to borrow money to buy
goods to trade. Then we couldn't pay back the money so
they took the land. I came to Thailand about 10 years ago
because the Burmese [army] oppressed us. Whenever they
came to our village they took people to be porters, and I
was afraid of that. This is our second year in Thailand.
We came because the Burmese asked for porters and we
didn't have time to work to survive, so we didn't want to
stay anymore. I came with my whole family. 

We came to the Thai side because we didn't dare stay there
anymore- the Burmese arrested people and used us as slaves
and porters. If you didn't escape, they never released
you. We've been on this side for 9 years now. I came to
Thailand 5 years ago because it was too hard for us to
stay in our village. We couldn't get food for ourselves
because we had to work for SLORC all the time. I also had
to go as a porter twice for 10 days each time. I came to
Thailand 9 years ago because we faced many problems and we
were afraid of the Burmese. Whenever they saw us they
arrested us and forced us to carry things for them, and
sometimes they beat us. I had to go as a porter so many
times I can't even count them. When they told us to carry
we didn't even know how many days it would be, we just had
to run away because they never released us for 5 or 10
days. We left our village because the Burmese Army came. 

They arrested people to be porters, tortured people and
buried some people alive to kill them. We went to Kler
Day, then 4 years ago the Burmese Army came there too so
we had to come here. This July I went back to my home
village to visit some relatives. The soldiers came to
catch porters. If the real issue were temporary asylum
from combat, none of these people or thousands like them
would choose to give up their farms, their homes, their
jobs, their children's education, their entire lives, to
wander unwanted and abused into marginally better
conditions in Thailand-- and then stay for 2, 5 or 10
years. It's easy enough to find temporary shelter in the
rugged mountains. 

Unfortunately for the thousands of families that flee to
the hills, it is often impossible to return to their
former lives, and the long trek to Burma's "liberated
areas" or Thailand begins. In addition to the some 75,000
refugees currently registered in camps in Thailand, there
are unknown numbers who have fled their villages and came
to the camps only briefly before drifting into mainstream
Thailand. The refugee numbers can be deceptively low,
because as these people check out, new ones arrive and the
camp rosters seem to show a stable population. There are,
of course, many, many people who come to Thailand for the
same reasons but never enter the camps at all, but pick up
work as illegal migrant laborers. Further, there are
untold thousands, by many estimates hundreds of
thousands-- of villagers who have fled the areas of the
most severe oppression and settled anew, still within
Burma's boundaries in border areas the consider safe. 

Until recently, Mannerplaw had been one such location. And
this is just the Karen people coming to Kawthoolei. What
about the Kachin, Rohingya, Chin, Mon, Burman and peoples
of Shan state. Thus, we can see that the over the last few
decades there has been a massive internal dislocation and
international migration of people fleeing oppression in
Burma. The numbers can only be guessed at, but in Thailand
clues everywhere indicate that the problem is immense: a
huge illegal migrant population, increasing numbers of
women and children from Burma ending up in the sex
industry, and new refugee arrivals daily. January's
collapse of Mannerplaw sparked a crucial leg of the
journey for some 10,000 or more people: crossing the
border into Thailand. 

The majority of these people originally came from areas
far flung from the isolated jungles around the ex-KNU and
resistance headquarters.  Joining the refugees already in
the Mae Sot area, these people now must finally submit
nearly all control over their lives to external forces. No
land, no citizenship, no political rights, and most
significantly, no voice in the upcoming inevitable
discussion on how to send them back to Burma. Thai
officials have indicated that the refugees will be sent
back as soon as the situation inside Burma returns to
"normal." This is exactly what the people should fear, and
what the international community must help to prevent. 

What is normal inside Burma is a perverse betrayal of
human dignity, and this, of course, is what refugees have
been fleeing in one way or another for decades. It's bad
enough that ostensibly savvy Thai officials should fall
into the trap of thinking that the situation across the
border could simply "return" to a state that is normal
enough for the refugees' to return home and exist safely.
That some, such as Khun Sanan quoted above, flout even
that flawed premise indicates the careless whim upon which
so many lives depend. Unfortunately, others who don't
pretend to believe that the situation in Burma will be
returning to normal aren't much better. Army Commander
Wimol Wongwanich told reporters that when the time comes
refugee repatriation must be handled "carefully." Although
the asylum-seekers have asked to be repatriated to
specific locations (places which no doubt would offer at
least temporary relief from their tormentors), Khun Wimol
argues that this would be tantamount to supporting the
rebels. "When we try and send them back somebody always
comes out and says we aren't showing respect for human
rights," he complains, "which isn't true because we've
been careful to look after them and to repatriate them to
the proper place." 

Are these places the army camps and relocation camps that
the people fled to begin with?  The plight of these new
asylum-seekers underscores even more distinctly the
solution to the crisis. Security and peace for Burma's
people can only be achieved by the universal application
of all civil, political and human rights which are due to
all members of the human family. There is only one
solution to the refugee crisis: an enormous social
transformation in Burma which replaces the
disproportionate power of the military wielded with brutal
impunity in campaigns of ethno-political hegemony, with
some form of government which guarantees all Burma's
people to the basic human rights to pursue freedom and
happiness.  

For refugees waiting out the resolution of Burma's woes
from the cramped squalor of Thailand's border camps, the
light at the end of the tunnel is not yet visible and the
walls seem to be closing in. Compounding the oppression of
their initial victimization inside Burma, they have found
only meagre succour from the powers available to help
them, and can expect little improvement unless
international pressure on their tormentors both inside
Burma and out escalates.


=====================================================

REVIEW--MARTIN SMITH'S  ETHNIC GROUPS IN BURMA:
DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS BY MARTIN SMITH

 A report by Anti-Slavery International

Martin Smith is well known for his writings on Burma, and
his magnum opus 'BURMA: Insurgency and the Politics of
Ethnicity' is an invaluable work of reference for anyone
involved with any aspect of that country. His latest work,
a succinct 140 pages, was commissioned by Anti-Slavery
International, the eighth volume in its human rights
series.  The report is divided into three sections.  The
first gives a brief overview of Burma's recent history,
followed by a most useful survey of Burma's main ethnic
groups, in which are included the Chinese and Indians. The
numbers cited (an estimated 400,000 Chinese and one
million Indians) amply justifies their inclusion, and the
intermittent racism they have suffered is on a par with
any other group. Although the Chinese have been living in
Burma since the days of Kublai Khan, both they and the
Indians are usually omitted from Burma's listed ethnic
groups. In this section Smith tackles some contentions
questions, such as "What is an Ethnic Minority?" and what
number can be realistically attached to the Karen
population of Burma? (SLORC calculates 2.5 million, the
KNU claims 7 million, and independent anthropologists
estimate 4 million: but more importantly, Smith identifies
the complicating factors of language and population
distribution) The second section deals with military rule
and human rights abuses. While much of the material here
will be sadly familiar to those following Burma, it is
well-chosen and clearly laid out. Relevant United Nations
declarations, articles and conventions are highlighted and
attached firmly to specific forms of abuse. The point is
made that ASI considers arbitrary arrest and violence used
to forcibly relocate villages, and military demands for
compulsory or unpaid labour, to be modern forms of
slavery. The environmental and cultural effects of Burma's
long conflict is carefully documented, in select rather
than comprehensive detail. Topics covered are the
destruction of forests, the likely environmental
consequences of planned dams and tourism projects, the
neglect of education, religion and culture in border
areas, opium cultivation, increasing levels of forced
prostitution and the spread of AIDS. Again, the specific
rights of children, women and indigenous people are linked
to the mismanagement of Burma's natural and human
resources.  The final section indicates the way in which
Burma might move towards a harmonious future. Smith points
out that while peace is a
pre-requisite to development, democracy and human rights,
it does not by itself guarantee any of these things. For
progress towards these goals, there must be wide-spread
public debate and consultation with opposition leaders of
all persuasions and ethnicities. This in turn means that
all political prisoners and detainees must be released and
permitted to consult freely with each other. Some
guidelines are offered to NGOs planning to enter Burma.
Smith perceives limited signs that SLORC is influenced by
international opinion - its signature to a small but
increasing number of international conventions and
protocols in recent years, its willingness to accept
visits from the UN Special Rapporteur and the UN
Commissioner for Human Rights, its opening of dialogue
with Aung San Suu Kyi, its drafting of a constitution
which does offer some concessions to ethnic demands. While
SLORC concessions to world opinion have a surreal, Alice
in Wonderland quality - for they always appear to offer
far more than they deliver - the fact that even gestures
are made should not be discounted if the long deadlock
with Rangoon is ever to be broken. Nowhere does Smith
suggest that anyone should accept SLORC statements or
gestures at face value, or that pressure on the regime
should be relaxed. ETHNIC GROUPS IN BURMA carries a
chronology of important dates, a selected bibliography and
extracts from the ILO Conventions concerning Forced or
Compulsory Labour. It does not have an index. The book
succeeds admirably in focusing on some important aspects
of Burma, and sorting out salient facts from the mass of
material available. By this means the book is kept simple
without becoming simplistic. It provides a timely and
readable introduction to Burma for those unable or
unwilling to handle weightier tomes: and even experienced
Burma hands will find the professional presentation
helpful for quick reference. Copies are available from
Anti-Slavery International, The Stableyard, Broomgrove
Road, London SW9 9TL, England. Price (until March 1st) is
UKL4.00 (+50p post and packing).


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NEWS THIS MONTH

U Nu dies - Burma's only democratically elected Prime
Minister, U Nu, died on February 14, aged 88. The NCGUB
issued a statement of profound regret at this death.

Diplomatic Visits - Thai Foreign Minister Thaksin, on his
January visit to Rangoon, invited Sec-1 Khin Nyunt to
visit Thailand. The invitation was accepted but has now
been postponed. (TN 950203) 
Suu Kyi speaks - In a rare public statement, Aung San Suu
Kyi announced that she had not and would not strike a
secret deal with the SLORC. Both a Canadian envoy to Burma
and Alvaro de Soto were denied permission to visit Aung
San Suu Kyi. (TN 950124, Montreal Gazette 95012, BP
950215)

UN Chief representatives in Rangoon - Alvaro de Soto,
Assistant to the UN Secretary-General and Francisco
Vendrelli, Director of East Asia & Pacific Division of the
UN Political Affairs Dept met with Burma's Foreign
Minister Ohn Gyaw during their 5-day mission to Burma. 

Political Prisoners Freed - Prior to the visit to Rangoon
of the UN Secretary General's representative, 23 political
prisoners were released, including the NLD's Aung Khin
Sint.

Renewed fighting between SLORC and the KNU - Following a
split in the KNU ranks between Christian and Buddhist
factions, the Burmese army broke its ceasefire agreement
and joined with the breakaway Buddhists, now known as the
Democratic Kayin Buddhist Organisation (DKBO) to capture
Manerplaw on January 27. The KNU torched most of the camp
before departing. (TN & BP 94128)

New name - The SLORC has now renamed Karen State
(Kawthoolei) Kayin State and 'handed it over' to the DKBO.
(TN 950130)

Refugees - Between 6,000 and 12,000 new refugees have
flooded into Thailand as a result of renewed fighting. (TN
& BP 950131) 
Kawmoora has been under heavy attack from Burmese
artillery since late 1994. The KNU has stated that it will
not surrender this last, heavily fortified stronghold.
(BP(950201)

Amnesty International issued a statement saying that
Burmese troops are forcing hundreds of civilians to carry
weapons and supplies into combat zones. (TN & BP 950204)

The DKBO attacks refugee camps, threatening to burn them
down and looting supplies. On February 13 they kidnap 4
Karen Buddhists from Bae Klaw Camp, but a second kidnap
attempt fails (TN950215) 
=====================================================

Conflict over Thai policy

The Thai government has reacted with confusion to SLORC's
latest move.

On January 27, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
called on the Foreign Ministry to review its constructive
engagement policy towards Burma. (BP)

On January 31 Foreign Minister Thaksin defended this
policy and said Thailand would remain neutral in the
current offensive against the Karen. (TN)

On February 1 NSC Secretary General Charan Kullavanijay
said General Bo Mya and other refugees would be granted
temporary shelter in Thailand, but would be returned as
soon as Burma was safe. On the other hand, the Interior
Minister, Sanan Kachornprasart said recent Karen refugees
would be forced back to Burma without waiting for the
fighting to stop. (TN & BP)

On February 2 the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
Chair, Suthin Nappaket, said ASEAN should exclude Burma
from its planned first meeting of 10 SEA nations in
December, as disciplinary action for its attack on
Manerplaw. (TN)

On February 3 Deputy Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan said
Thailand would not abandon ASEAN's constructive engagement
policy towards Burma. (TN)

On February 4, outgoing Foreign Minister Thaksin had
changed his mind, and questioned constructive engagement
in the light of Rangoon's latest offensive. (TN & BP)

On February 7 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said it
would consider whether Thailand should serve as a mediator
between the Burmese junta and the ethnic minorities. (BP)

On February 10, Suthin criticised Thailand's constructive
engagement policy, saying it was unprincpled, and anyway
it clearly wasn't working. (TN)

On February 11 Army Commander General Wimol reaffirmed
that the Thai army would not permit Karen refugees to use
Thai soil to stage a counter-attack against the Burmese.
(BP)

On February 15 Burma accused Thailand of obstructing its
fight against the KNU by supplying the Karen with food and
medicine. (BP) 
On February 16 Acting Foreign Minister Surin summoned the
Burmese Ambassador to protest the abduction of three Karen
leaders from a Thai refugee camp, saying it was a
violation of Thai sovreignty. He also protested the
incursion of Burmese troops onto Thai soil. Surin further
stated that Thailand would do what it could to help in the
conflict between the Burmese and the Karen. (TN)

House Committee on Foreign Affairs again urged the Thai
government to review its Burma policy, and to avoid the
influence of permanent officials. NSC Secretary-General
Charan responded to Suthin's criticism by stating there
was nothing wrong with Thailand's current policy towards
Burma. (TN & BP)

Burma threatened Thai troops with shelling if they were
not removed from the area opposite Kawmoora. Thailand's
Third Army Commander pointed out that Thailand was
entitled to protect its own territory. 
Meanwhile the Thai Board of Trade led a delegation of 80
businessmen to Rangoon to meet ministers reponsible for
trade, economic planning and development mining,
agriculture, forestry, transport and telecommunications.
It said Burma appeared to be more stable. (TN 950216)

END