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BurmaNet News: April 14, 1995 [#147 (r)



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Subject: BurmaNet News: April 14, 1995 [#147]

/* Written  4:40 AM  Apr 14, 1995 by burmanet in igc:reg.burma */
/* ---------- "BurmaNet News: April 14, 1995 [#147" ---------- */
Subject: BurmaNet News: April 14, 1995 [#147]


**************************BurmaNet***************************
"Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
*************************************************************
The BurmaNet News: 14 APRIL 1995 
Issue #147

**************************************************************
NOTED IN PASSING:

          Nonetheless, on balance, in view of the persistent abuses by  the
          SLORC, including its use of forced labor, its wholesale  denial
          of basic political rights, and blatant manipulation of the
          national convention, Burma must continue to be judged a  serious
          violator of international human rights norms.  The expressions
          of deep concern by the international community about the human
          rights situation in Burma in successive resolutions adopted since
          1991 by the UNHCR and the U.N.  General Assembly have failed thus
          far to have an appreciable impact on the SLORC's behavior.
                    <U.S. Government, See USG: BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS
                     PRACTICES, 1994>

Contents:                                              
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

UNCHR: SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN MYANMAR
USG: BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994 
SCB: BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS # 9
SCB: MY RECENT VISIT TO BURMA
SCB: LOOKING FOR BURMESE SPEAKER

**************************************************************

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In Washington:

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**************************************************************
*********************CONTACT REQUESTS*************************
[Originally posted to reg.burma newsgroup]
Larry
zar1963 reg.burma        7:24 PM  Apr 10, 1995
(at violet.berkeley.edu)


Does anyone have an email address of Larry from Seattle, who is a friend
of Mike Cullinane from Wisconsin?

Thanks in advance.

zarni
***************************************************************

      
UNCHR: SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN MYANMAR
uneoosoc.culture.burma12:06 AM  Apr  7, 1995
(at physics.adelaide.edu.au)(From News system)

Summary: The 51st session of CHR resolution on Burma; March 1995. 
[Disclaimer: these postings are not the views of the university of
Adelaide ]
--------------------------------------------------------------- 
/* posted Apr 7 3:30 pm 1995 by uneoo@physics on igc:reg.burma */ /*
--------------" 95'CHR Resolution on Burma "---------------- */ 



COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Fifty-first session

30 January - 10 March 1995



1995/72. Situation of human rights in Myanmar

         ------------------------------------



The Commission on Human Rights,



Reaffirming: that all Member States have an obligation to

promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms as 
stated in the Charter of the United Naions and as elaborated in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenants on Human Rights and other applicable human rights 
instruments,



Aware: that, in accordance with the Charter, the United Nations 
promotes and encourages respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all and that the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states that the will of the people shall be the basis of 
the authority of the government,



Noting with particular concern: in this regard that the

electoral process initiated im Myanmar by the general elections 
of 27 May 1990 has not yet reached its conclusion and that the 
Government still has not implemented its commitments to take all 
necessary steps towards democracy in the light of those

elections,



Deploring: that many political leaders, in particular elected 
representatives, remain deprived of their liberty and that Daw 
Aung San Suu Kyi, a Noble Peace Prize laureate, is still under 
house arrest, which has recently been extended, and, while 
acknowledging the recent release of a substantial number of 
political prisoners, notes with dismay that in many cases their 
release was on condition that they not resumenpolitical

activity,



Noting: the measures taken by the Govenment of Myanmar,

including its accession to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949 for the protection of war victims, the concluding

cease-fire agreements with ethnic groups, the withdrawal of 
several reservations it had entered concerning the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child and the freeing of certain number of 
political prisoners, in response to the concerns repeatedly 
expressed by the international community,



Gravely concerned: by the recent offensive against the Karen 
National Union, Burmese student activists and other groups of 
the political opposition, and by the resulting exodus of

refugees into Thailand,



Condemning: the Government of Thailand ofr its humanitarian 
action in receiving the refugees fleeing from the fighting, and 
encouraging the Government of thailand to wark closely with the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refuges, 


Gravely concerned: at the violations of human rights in Myanmar, 
which remain extremely serious, in particular the practice of 
torture, summary and arbitrary executions, forced labour,

including forced portering for the military, abuse of women, 
politically motivated arrests and detention, forced displacement 
of the population, the existence of important restrictions on 
the exercise of fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of 
expressions and association, and the imposition of oppressive 
measures directed, in particular, at ethnic and religious

minority groups,



Noting: that many violations directly affect women, in

particular women belonging to minorities, who have suffered 
ill-treatment, especially at the hands of the military, as 
stated by the Special Rapporteur,



Noting also: that these violetions have resulted in flows of 
refugees towards neighbouring countries,



Commending: however, the existing cooperation between the

Government of Myanmar and the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees on the free and voluntary repatriatiion of refugees 
located in Bangladesh, and their rehabilitation and

reintegration, and encouraging the Government of MYanmar to 
pursue this cooperation,



Having examined: the reports of the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention (E/CN.4/1995/31 and Add.1-2), the Special Rapporteru 
on the question of religious intolerance (E/CN.4/1995/91) and 
the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions (E/CN.4/1995/61),



Recalling: its resolution 1992/58 of 3 March 1992, in which it 
decided to nominate a special rapporteur to establish direct 
contacts with the Government and people of Myanmar, including 
political leaders deprived of their liberty, their families and 
their lawyers, with a view to examining the situation of human 
rights in Myanmar and following any progress made towards the 
transfer of power to a civilian government and the drafting of a 
new constitution, the lifting of restrictions on personal

freedoms and the restoration of human rights in Myanmar,



Recalling also: its resolution 1994/85 of 9 March 1994,



Taking note: of General Assembly resolution 49/197 of 23

December 1994,



Noting that: the Special Rapporteur visited Myanmar in November 
1994 at the invitation of the Government of Myanmar,



Deploring:,however, that in spite of resolution 1993/73

requesting the Myanmar authorities to extend their full and 
unreserved cooperation to the Special Rapporteur, he has been 
denied access to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,



Taking note: of the request by the General Assembly to the 
Secretary-General to continue his discussions with the

Government of Myanmar  in order to assist in the implementation 
of Assembly resolution 49/197 of 23 December 1994, as well as in 
efforts by the Government to achieve national reconciliation, 


Welcoming: the discussions held to date between the

representatives of the Government of MYanmar and the

representatives of the Secretary-General,



Regretting: thatthe representatives of the Secretary-General 
have not been given access to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,



Reaffirming: that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, a Nobel Peace Prize 
laureate, mst be released immediately and unconditionally along 
with all other persons detained for political reasons,



1. Expresses its thanks: to the Special Rapporteur for his 
report (E/CN.4/1995/65 and Corr.1) and the conclusions and 
recommendations containde therein;



2. EXpresses its appreciation: to the Secretary-General for his 
report on his mission of good offices in Myanmar

(E/CN.4/1995/150);



3. Deplores: the continuing serious violations of human rights 
in Myanmar and, in particular, the fact that a number of

political leaders, including Daw Aung Kan Suu Kyi and other 
leaders of the National Leagur for Democracy , remain deprived 
of their liberty;



4. Strongly urges: the Government of MYanmar to release

immediately and unconditionally the Nobel Peace Prize laureate 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, detained with trial for more than five 
years, as well as other detained political leaders and all 
political prisoners, to ensure their physical integrity and to 
permit them to participate in the process of national

reconciliation;



5. Commends: the recent meetings between Myanmar government 
representatives and the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Daw Aung San 
Suu Kyi, and urges the Government of Myanmar to open a

substantial political dialogue with her and with other political 
leaders, including representatives of ethnic groups, as the best 
means to arrive at national reconciliation and the complete and 
rapid installation of democracy;



6. Deplores:, in consequence, the military offensive carried out 
by the Government of MYanmar against the Karen National Union, 
Burmese students activists andother groups of the political 
opposition, which is incompatible with the Government's dclared 
policy of national reconciliation;



7. Welcomes the recent discussions between the representatives 
of the Government of MYanmar and the Secretary-General, and 
encourages the Government to continue to cooperate with the 
Secretary-General,



8. Again urges: the government of MYanmar to take, in conformity 
with the assurances given at various times, all necessary

measures to guarantee democracy in full accordance with the will 
of the people as expressed in the democratic elections held in 
1990, and to ensure that all political parties may freely

exercise their activities;



9. Notes with concern: that most of the representatives

democratically elected in 1990 have been excluded from

participating in the meetings of the National Convention, that 
severe restrictions have been imposed on delegates, including 
members of the National League for Democracy, who are unable to 
meet or distribute their literature, that one of the objectives 
of the Convention is to maintain the participation of the armed 
forces(Tatmadaw) in a leading role in the future political like 
of the State and that no timetable as yet exists for the

completion of the work of the National convention, and concludes 
that the National Convention does not appear to constitute the 
necessary steps towards the restoration of democracy;



10. Strongly urges: the Government of Myanmar to take all

appropriate measures to allow all citizens to participate freely 
in the political process, in accordance with the principles of 
the Universal Declaration of Human rights, and to accelerate the 
process of transition to democracy, in particular through the 
transfer of power to the democratically-elected representatives, 
lifting restraining orders placed on anumber of political

leaders, releasing those who are detainde and ensuring that all 
political parties can function freely;



11. Strongly urges: the Government of Myanmar to guarantee full 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, in particular 
the freedom of expression and opinion and the right of

association and of assembly, to restore protection of persons 
belonging to minority groups, in particular against

discrimination, especially in the framework of the citizenship 
laws, and to put an end to violations of the right to life and 
the integrity of the human being, to the practice of torture, 
abuse of women and forced labour, to enforced displacements of 
the population and to enforced disappearances and eummary

executions;



12. Reminds: the Government of Myanmar of its obligations to put 
an end to the impunity of perpetrators of violations of human 
rights, including members of the military, and its

responsibility to investigate alleged cased of human rights 
violations committed by its agents on its territory, to bring 
them to justice, prosecute them and punish those found guilty, 
in all circumstances;



13. Regrets: the recent harsh sentences meted out to a number of 
dissidents, including persons voicing dissent in regard to the 
procedures of the National Convention, and persons condemned in 
particular for seeking to meet with the Special Rapporteur; 


14. Welcomes: the recent release of a certain number of

political prisoners, but at the same time deeplly regrets that 
many political leaders are still deprived of their freedom and 
their fundamental rights;



15. Call upon: the government of Myanmar to consider becoming a 
party to the International Covenent on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, and to the convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment;



16. Appeals: to the Government of Myanmar to fulfill its

obligations as a State party to the Forced labour convention, 
1930 (No.29) and the Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organise Convention 1948 (No. 87) of the

International Labour Organization;



17. Encourages: the government of Myanmar to continue to lift 
the remaining emergency measures;



18. Requests the Government of Myanmar to ensure that all

persons, without discrimination, are afforded the minimum

guarantees for a fair trial, according to due process of law and 
in conformity with applicable international standards, theat 
laws are given due publicity and that the principle of

non-retroactivity of laws is respected;



19. Encourages: the Government of MYanmar to create the

necessary conditions to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of 
refugees and their full reintegration, in conditions of safety 
and dignity, in close cooperation with the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;



20. Invites: the Government of Myanmar to respect fully its 
obligations under the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
to avail itself of such services as may be offered by impartial 
humanitarian bodies;



21. Stresses: that it is important for the Government of Myanmar 
to give particular attention to prison conditions in the

country's jail and to allow international humanitarian

organizations to communicate freely and confidentially with 
prisoners;



22. Welcomes: the first measures taken by the government of 
Myanmar to provide for the training of military personnel in 
international humanitarian law, and requests it to intensify its 
efforts in that regard and to extend them to police and prison 
personnel;



23. Decides to extend for one year the mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur to establish or continue direct contacts with the 
Government and people of Myanmar, including political leaders 
deprived of their liberty, their families and their lawyers, and 
requests him to report to the General Assembly at its fiftieth 
session and to the commission on Human Rights at its

fifty-second session.



24. Requests: the Secretary-General to give all necessary

assistance to the Special Rapporteur;



25. Urges: the Government of Mynamar to cooperate fully and 
unreservedly with the Commission and the Special Rapporteur and, 
to that end, to ensure that the Special Rapporteur effectively 
ahs free access to any person  in MYanmar whom he may deem it 
appropriate to meet in the performance of his mandate, including 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi;



26. Encourages: the Secretary-General, in the discharge of his 
good offices mandate, to continue his discussions with the 
Government of MYanmar in order to assist in the implementation 
of General Assembly resolution 49/197, as well as in its efforts 
for national reconciliation and towards the resumption of

democracy;



27. Decides: to keep the matter under review at its fifty-second 
session under the agenda item entitled "Question of the

violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in any part 
of the world, with particular reference to colonial and other 
dependent countries and territories";



28. Recommends: the following draft decision to the Economic and 
Social council for adoption:



    " The Economic and Social council, taking note of Commission 
    on Human Rights resolution 1995/72 of 8 March 1995, approves 
    the Commission's decision to extend for one year the mandate 
    of the Special Rapporteur to establish or continue contacts 
    with the Government and people of Myanmar, including

    political leaders deprived of their liberty, their families 
    and their lawyers, and its request to him to report to the 
    General Assembly at its fiftieth session and to the

    commission on Human Rights at its fifty-second session, and 
    also approves the Commission's request to the

    Secretary-General to give all necessary assistance to the 
    Special Rapporteur."



60th meeting: 8 March 1995

[Adopted without a vote. See chap. XII.]

USG: BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994 
BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES
posted by akhu@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
soc.culture.burma
11:34 PM  Apr 10, 1995
(at news.pittstate.edu)
(From News system)

TITLE:  BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994                             
DATE:  JANUARY 31, 1995
AUTHOR:  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

                         BURMA


Burma is ruled by a highly authoritarian, military regime that  has been
condemned for its serious human rights abuses.  
Heading the latest version of a military dictatorship that has  presided
over the country with an unyielding grip for more than  three decades is
the State Law and Order Restoration Council  (SLORC), which took power
in September 1988 after harshly  suppressing massive prodemocracy
demonstrations.  Longtime  dictator General Ne Win, whose policies had
pushed Burma to the  margins of the international community and driven
the country  into a deep economic decline, resigned shortly before
SLORC's  emergence.  Nevrtheless, he continued to wield the power 
behind the scenes.  

The SLORC, headed by the armed forces commander and composed of  senior
military officers, permitted a relatively free election  in 1990. 
However, it failed to honor the results--which were  an overwhelming
rejection of military rule--or to cede power to  the victorious party
headed by prodemocracy movement leaders.   Instead, the SLORC attacked
the coalition of winning political  parties through detentions, house
arrests, and intimidation. 

Since General Than Shwe became Chief of State in April 1992,  the SLORC
has taken some modest steps to lessen its harsh rule,  including
reopening the universities and releasing over 2,000  political
prisoners.  In January 1993, the SLORC inaugurated a  national
convention to begin work on a new constitution.   However, SLORC
officials stage-managed the proceedings and  overrode even limited
opposition, interrogating and harassing  delegates whoattemped to
deviate from the regime's position,  and even sentenced one prodemocracy
delegate to 20 years in  prison for distributing information critical of
the convention  proceedings.  It seems clear that the SLORC's domination
of the  convention, which has no mandate from the people, is to ensure 
adoption of a constitutional blueprint effectively guaranteeing  the
military's continued hold on power.

The Government reinforces its rule via a pervasive security  apparatus
led by the Directorate of Defense Services 
Intelligence (DDSI) and the National Intelligence Bureau 
(NIB).  Control is buttressed by restrictions on contact with 
foreigners; surveillance of government employees and private  citizens;
and arrests, detentions, harassment, intimidation,  and mistreatment of
political activists.  The Government 
justifies its security measures as necessary to maintain order  and
national unity, although several longstanding insurgent  groups have
reached accommodations with the SLORC in recent  years and th ohers pose
little threat to major population  centers.

Burma is primarily an agricultural country, although it also  has
substantial mineral, fishing, and timber resources.  After  Ne Win's
26-year rule reduced southeast Asia's richest land to  a U.N.-designated
"least developed country," the SLORC 
abandoned the "Burmese Way to Socialism" in 1988, opening up  the
economy to permit private sector expansion and attract  investment and
badly needed foreign exchange, which has 
resulted in a limited improvement in the economy.  The 
Government has hindered development of the private sector,  however, by
failing to address fundamental problems:  
restrictions on private commerce; constantly changing rules and 
regulations; overcentralized decision making; a bloated 
bureaucracy; a greatly overvalued currency; poor civilian 
infrastructure; and grossly disproportionate military spending. 
There was no marked increase in the level of human rights  abuses in
199, n large measure because the SLORC had already  been so successful
in intimidating the Burmese people.  At the  same time, Burmese
authorities took only limited steps to  correct longstanding, serious
human rights violations.  The  Government's use of forced
labor--especially as porters for the  army--as well as forced
resettlement of civilians continued,  causing hundreds of deaths due to
disease, harsh treatment, and  overwork.  Five hundred or more Burmese
remained in prison for  political reasons, including more than 40
parliamentarians  elected in 1990; approximately 200,000 Rohingyas
(Burmese  Muslims from Arakan State) remained in refugee camps in 
Bangladesh; a few thousand students and dissidents continued as  exiles
in Thailand; and roughly 71,000 Burmese live in ethnic  minority camps
in Thailand near the Burma border.

Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi remained under house arrest,  her fifth
year of detention by the SLORC, without being charged  or having access
to legal proceedings.  The SLORC persisted in  denying basicfredom of
speech and assembly, and arbitrary  intrusions into private life
remained pervasive.  In a closed  trial, in October, the regime
sentenced 12 dissidents, 
including one of the delegates to the National Convention, to  20 years
in prison for distributing anti-SLORC information. 
The SLORC ignored a comprehensive resolution on Burma adopted  by
consensus in 1993 at the U.N. Human Rights Commission 
(UNHRC) calling for an end to human rights violations in Burma,  the
unconditional release of Aung San Suu Kyi and all other  political
prisoners, and the implementation of the 1990 
elections.

On the positive side, the SLORC commuted all death sentences  handed
down since it took power; released over 700 persons  believed to be
political prisoners; permitted the first-ever  meetings between
political prisoners and foreign visitors; and  allowed additional family
visits to Aung San Suu Kyi.  Over  50,000 Rohingyas returned to Arakan
State in 1993, and the  Government sgnd a Memorandum of Understanding in
November  with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) providing 
for a presence in Arakan State to monitor the repatriation and 
reintegration of Rohingyas from Bangladesh.

Nonetheless, on balance, in view of the persistent abuses by  the SLORC,
including its use of forced labor, its wholesale  denial of basic
political rights, and blatant manipulation of  the national convention,
Burma must continue to be judged a  serious violator of international
human rights norms.  The  expressions of deep concern by the
international community  about the human rights situation in Burma in
successive resolutions adopted since 1991 by the UNHCR and the U.N. 
General Assembly have failed thus far to have an appreciable impact on
the SLORC's behavior.

RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Section 1  Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including            
Freedom from:

     a.  Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing

Although secret, extajuicial killings reportedly were carried  out in
recent years, there were no such reports in 1993.  As in  the past,
credible sources reported many deaths among those  impressed for forced
labor projects and porterage.

There were no confirmed incidents of summary executions of  civilians in
1993.  In late February, U Win Ko, a deputy-elect  of the National
League for Democracy (NLD) and finance minister  in the opposition
National Coalition Government of the Union of  Burma (NCGUB), was
murdered in Kunming, China.  Burmese 
authorities have denied any involvement, and independent 
sources suggest other parties were responsible.  U Hla Pe, who  served
as the NCGUB's Minister of Education and Health and  Minister of
Information, was murdered in Bangkok in mid-June.   There is, however,
no evidence as to the perpetrators.


     b.  Disappearance

The number of disappearances in 1993 was probably little 
changed from the previous year, but accurate estimates are  impossible
since the Government will not provide information on  these cases. 
Family and friends assume that those who have  disappeared are under
detention or have died in jal. Family  members can generally determine
that relatives have been 
arrested, but the process of obtaining information can take a  long
time.  Some who disappeared were later reported as 
arrested.  Others may have dropped out of sight or quietly  attempted to
leave the country for fear of arrest.

Authorities rarely responded to inquiries from families 
concerning the whereabouts and welfare of disappeared or jailed 
relatives.  The few replies routinely consisted of only general 
statements that such people were arrested for violations of  existing
laws.

     c.  Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading 
         Treatment or Punishment

Fragmentary evidence documents that mistreatment of political  detainees
continued to take place in Burmese prisons and 
detention centers operated by the security services.  There has  been a
declin inthe number of detentions, during which the  worst abuse
reportedly occurs.  Political detainees are held  incommunicado, with
family or lawyers unable to visit during  what can be a protracted
pretrial period.  The most common  forms of maltreatment during this
period were sleep and food  deprivation coupled with round-the-clock
interrogation.

In recent years, severe beatings and forcing prisoners to squat  or
assume unnatural positions for lengthy periods have also  been reported,
and techniques designed to intimidate and 
disorient prisoners prior to interrogation have been routine.   Such
practices as electrical shocks to the genitals, 
suffocation, and cigarette burns have also been reported in the  past,
but there were no confirmed reports of these practices in  1993.

During 1993 there were no reports alleging torture of convicted 
political prisoners or deaths linked to the conditions of their 
imprisonment.  Khin Maung Myint of the leftist People's 
Progressive Party (PPP) died in prison in 1993, apparently of  natural
cauesafter repeated stays in a prison medical 
facility despite his family's request for his transfer to a  civilian
hospital.  Interviews by U.S. citizens and 
Congressional visitors on private travel with SLORC-selected  prisoners
at Insein prison near Rangoon indicate an overly  harsh prison regimen,
i.e., little exercise, no reading or  writing materials for many if not
most prisoners, poor 
nutrition, years of solitary confinement for some, and illness  induced
by sleeping on concrete cell floors.  Student leader  Min Ko Naing, who
met with two visiting American Congressmen at  Insein Prison in August,
displayed the effects of serious  physical and psychological abuse.  A
few prominent prisoners,  such as former NLD Chairmen Tin Oo and Kyi
Maung, were provided  limited reading material and bungalow
accommodations.  Those  interviewed acknowledged receiving medicine as
well as 
supplemental food brought by their families during 15-minute  visits
permite every 2 weeks.

The Government continued to bar the International Committee of  the Red
Cross (ICRC) from visiting detainees or convicted  prisoners of any
kind.

     d.  Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile

Arbitrary arrest and detention are practiced routinely by the  SLORC. 
Throughout the year at least scores of political 
activists were detained for low-level political protests, such  as
handing out opposition flyers, painting political graffiti,  or shouting
opposition slogans.  Some detentions coincided with  the startup of
sessions of the national convention or with  various political
anniversaries.  Shortly after the January 9  launching of the national
convention, for example, the 
authorities announced the arrest of 23 activists including Nay  Lin, a
youth organizer for the Federation of Trade Unions of  Burma, who
allegedly painted graffiti on a Rangoon wharf.  Some  students were
picked up for staging a brief demonstration on  June 7 at a suburban
campus of Rangoon University.  Several NLD  members, including at least
one successful candidate in the  1990 election, were detained after
taking part in a 
wreath-laying ceremony at Aung San's tomb.  Between June and  August,
the authorities also arrested 12 persons, including the  writer Ma Thida
and the successful NLD candidate and delegate  to the national
convention, Dr. Aung Khin Sint, for 
distributing opposition literature.  In what was widely 
recognized as a warning to others, all were convicted in 
mid-October and given harsh 20-year prison sentences.

While most detainees were members of political parties or  engaged in
overtly political activities, businessmen and other  private citizens
were also subject to arbitrary detention,  particularly as the increase
in private economic activity in  1993 led to additional scrutiny of
businesses by security  forces.

The military again extended the house arrest of former NLD  General
Secretary and Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.   The decision was
taken under the provisions f he Law to 
Safeguard the State from the Dangers of Subversive 
Elements--also the basis for her initial year of house arrest  which
began in 1989.  As amended in August 1991, the law 
authorizes 1-year extensions of arbitrary detention without  charge or
trial for up to 5 years.  Aung San Suu Kyi has never  been formally
charged.  The authorities have offered her an  opportunity to substitute
foreign exile for her current house  arrest, but she declined to leave
the country.  The military  Government again allowed her husband and two
sons to visit her  in 1993.  The authorities refused a proposed visit by
a group  of fellow Nobel Laureates seeking her release.

There is no provision in Burmese law for judicial determination  of the
legality of detention.  Bail may be granted by civilian  courts in some
circumstances.  The number of political 
detainees not sentenced by year's end was impossible to 
determine accurately.

     e.  Denial of Fair Public Trial

Throughout 1993 the Government continued to rule by decree and  was not
boundby ny constitutional provisions guaranteeing  fair public trials or
any other rights.  Until abolished in  September 1992, military
tribunals exercised jurisdiction over  all cases involving defiance of
orders issued by the SLORC or  local commanders.  These tribunals could
mete out only three  sentences--the death penalty, life imprisonment, 3
years or  more imprisonment with labor--regardless of existing laws.  On 
January 1, however, a government decree codified an existing  moratorium
on capital punishment by commuting all previous  SLORC-imposed death
sentences to life imprisonment.  It also  capped all other prison terms
at 10 years for anyone convicted  during the SLORC era.

After denying for years that it held any political prisoners,  in April
1992, the Government announced its intention to free  those persons
"detained politically" who did not represent a  threat to state
security.  Between that time and the end of  1993, the SLRC nnounced the
release of more than 2,000 persons, although fewer than 200 were publicly
identified.  The  failure to identify most released persons invites
suspicions  about whether they were actually political prisoners, but 
opposition activists believe this was generally the case.   Reliable
sources indicate that some of those released in 1993  were monks imprisoned
for participating in 1988 prodemocracy  rallies and a 1990 boycott action,
including prominent Rangoon  Abbot Thu Mingala; prodemocracy businessman
Ye Htoon; and  numerous Karens and others suspected of supporting the 1991 
Irrawaddy Delta insurgency.

The 1992 decree also implicitly acknowledged that political  prisoners
had been held not only in Rangoon's Insein Prison but  also in over 20
upcountry locations--many of which were still  believed to hold some
political prisoners at the end of 1993.   The remaining political
prisoners included former military  officers Tin Oo and Kyi Maung, both
of whom had served as  chairmen of he LD, comedian Zargana, student
leader Min Ko  Naing, and lawyer U Nay Min.  

Since September 1992, civil courts have handled civil and  criminal
cases, as well as political trials.  Civilian courts  have reportedly
become fairer in handling nonpolitical cases  since 1988, but remain
plagued by corruption, inordinate delays  in processing cases and
appeals, and poor training and 
unprofessional behavior on the part of some court officers. 
Some basic due process rights, including the right to a public  trial
and to be represented by a defense attorney, are 
generally respected by civilian judges.  Judges are appointed  by the
Supreme Court with the approval of the SLORC (which also  names justices
to the Supreme Court).  At present, judges must  be at least law
officers with legal training.  Defense 
attorneys are permitted to call and cross-examine witnesses,  but their
primary purpose is to bargain with the judge to  obtain the shorest
possible sentence for their clients.  Cases,  almost all poitcal, which
are tried in courtooms in prison  compounds are not open to the public. 
In such cases, while  defendants may have access to a defense attorney,
counsel  appears to serve no purpose other than to provide moral 
support.  Reliable reports indicate that in political cases due  process
is largely ignored and verdicts manipulated.


     f.  Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or          
Correspondence

The State continued to intrude extensively into the lives of  private
citizens during 1993.  Forced entry and warrantless,  unannounced
searches of private homes were often conducted.   Through its extensive
intelligence network, the Government  closely monitored the travel,
whereabouts, and activities of  many Burmese, particularly those known
to be politically 
active.  Security personnel selectively monitored private 
correspondence and telephone calls.  Contacts or communications 
involving foreigners were subject to especially intense 
scrutiny, and government emloyees wre required to obtain 
advance permission before meeting with foreigners.  Despite  some
efforts by the Government to improve its image by meeting  in October
with the head of the British Broadcasting 
Corporation Far Eastern Service, official propaganda continued  in 1993
to take aim at various foreign news services, and  private citizens were
generally unable to subscribe directly to  foreign publications.  Two
international newsmagazines were  distributed through official channels
and were available to the  public at large, but censors occasionally
banned issues or  deleted articles criticizing local conditions or
reporting  opposition activities.  Foreign radio broadcasts remained a 
prime source of information for the people and even for the  military,
despite the Government's hostility to this news  source.  The
authorities sought to register the growing number  of television
satellite receivers but appeared ready to 
tolerate ther se.  Some foreign journalists, including 
television crews, continued to be granted access to the 
country, but their movements and contacts were closely 
monitored.

In its most intensive and egregious infringement of privacy  rights, the
Government continued its program of forced 
resettlement, involving an estimated half-million urban 
residents throughout Burma since 1989.  While most of those  forced to
move were described as "squatters," some people had  been living in and
paying rent on their former home sites for  many years and had
constructed permanent houses.  The 
Government has made people move, almost totally at their own  expense,
to "new towns" which are far from their previous  residences.  "New 
town" occupants often live on former rice  paddy land, subject to
flooding in the rainy season, without  adequate transportation, medical
facilities, shelter, or 
sanitation.  In 1993 conditions at some resettlement sites  improved,
but, according to international observers, such  improvements er often
unable to keep pace with the rate of  new arrivals.  Some outside
experts accept the Government's  explanation that the resettlement
program serves legitimate  long-term urban planning objectives, but they
do not endorse  the forceful methods used to move people.

     g.  Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian          
Law in Internal Conflicts

The Burmese Army has battled diverse insurgencies for more than  four
decades in conflicts that have resulted in widespread  human rights
violations, including mistreatment and killing of  prisoners, rape,
neglect of the sick and wounded, impressment  of civilians for porter
duty, and indiscriminate attacks on  civilians.  While the Government
was responsible for the bulk  of these abuses (the Burmese armed forces
nearly doubled the  number of combat units since 1988), insurgent groups
have also  violated humanitarian principles.  Insurgent groups, such as 
the Karen, Mon, and Karenni, continued to engage in small-scale 
fighting, motl in remote areas, to try to gain greater 
autonomy from the dominant ethnic Burman majority.  Some 
receive limited outside support from private international  humanitarian
and religious organizations.  The Shan United Army  (SUA) also claims to
be fighting for greater autonomy but  engages primarily in drug
trafficking.  Several former 
insurgent groups with which the Government now has cease-fire 
accommodations likewise are important narcotics trafficking 
organizations.  The continued suspension of large-scale 
military offensives against insurgents in Karen state and  elsewhere,
together with ongoing government efforts to reach a  peace accord with
the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), sharply  reduced the level of
fighting during 1993.

In 1993 the use of forced porterage continued, with attendant 
casualties.  Most of these deaths, roughly estimated to be in  the
hundreds, were from disease and overwork, though reports of 
mistreatment and rape were also common.  The Burmese military  also
continued t us corvee labor and prison labor in combat  areas.  There
were unconfirmed reports, for example, that on at  least two occasions a
combined total of as many as 700 inmates  from a prison near Rangoon
were taken to work as porters in  eastern Burma.  Credible reports from
multiple sources 
indicated that porters have carried ammunition, supplies, and  the
wounded under the harshest conditions.  Other well-placed  sources also
note that they are subject to hostile fire as well  as maltreatment at
the hands of Burmese soldiers.  When porters  are wounded, ill, or
unable to continue their work, some have  been reportedly left
unattended to die.  At the end of their  service, survivors often have
had to find their own means to  return home.  It was also credibly
reported that some members  of the military used sham threats of
impressment to extort  money from villagers.

Forced rural resettlement displaced ethnic minority villagers  in Karen
and Kayah states and contributed to an increase of  about 6,000 urese in
camps on the Thai side of the border.   Local sources reported some
amelioration of conditions 
following the completion of the railroad to Loikaw for Catholic 
villagers in Kayah State who had been resettled in March 1992,  and that
many returned to their original homes.  Reports from  Karen State
suggest rural relocation schemes continued to play  a key role in the
Government's counterinsurgency strategy. 
Despite this evidence that the Burmese authorities were not  prepared
fully to implement their obligations under the Geneva  Conventions, in
April and November the Government for the first  time permitted the
International Committee of the Red Cross  (ICRC) to conduct two short
seminars on humanitarian law for  groups of military officers.

Antigovernment groups were responsible for violence causing  civilian
and military deaths, including reported killings of  civilians during
attacks on villages and ambushes or mining of  transportation routes. 
In two separate inidnts in February  and March, over 100 confirmed
civilian deaths resulted from  military conflicts involving the
narcotics-trafficking Shan  United Army.  Credible reports indicate
Karenni insurgents  executed at least eight captured Burmese soldiers,
and civilian  deaths in a transport train blown up by a land mine were 
attributed to Mon activists.  Additionally, reliable multiple  sources
indicated that Karen insurgents resorted to forced  labor for porterage
and impressed youths into military service. 
Section 2  Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

     a.  Freedom of Speech and Press

Severe restrictions on freedom of speech and the press 
persisted throughout 1993.  Although the degree of enforcement  varied,
the Government generally continued to demonstrate  little tolerance for
opposing views or criticism.  Private  citizens remained reluctant to
express opinions for fear of  government informers.  The U.N. Human
Rights Commission (UNHRC)  Special Rappoteu deplored the "pervasive
atmosphere of fear  and repression" in Burma in his report adopted by
the UNHRC in  March.  The Government exercised strict censorship of all
news  and publications produced in the country.

Nevertheless, private magazines found it possible to publish  articles
on once taboo economic subjects, and some former  political prisoners
were allowed to publish on nonsensitive  topics.  The
government-controlled press and broadcast services  continued to publish
some limited criticism and satire in  1993.  The Government adopted a
tolerant approach toward the  increasing activities of the United States
Information Service  in Rangoon, permitting it to distribute
publications and 
organize discussions which treated themes involving human  rights and
fundamental freedoms.  The authorities' actions in  attempting to
register private satellites dishes and impose  fines on the many Burmese
who had set up unauthorized satellite  television receivers slowed the
spread of access to uncensored  television nes ad other programming from
abroad.  No seizures  of satellite receivers, however, were reported in
1993.

The Government made heavy use of its monopoly of television and  radio
to pursue its political policies and, with the exception  of coverage of
some aspects of the national convention, did not  accord air time to
opposing views.  The same was true of all  newspapers--two national
dailies in Burmese and one in English,  as well as daily papers
published by the Rangoon city 
government and the Central (Mandalay area) Military Command.  A 
revamping and renaming of the country's main daily in April  resulted in
increased publication of locally edited 
international wire service news, but that paper, as well as  other
newspapers, remained staunchly official organs, with  military officials
appointing editors and vetting editorials.   Especially for domestic
news, journalists had to hew to strict  publishing and broadcast
guidelines.  All forms of 
media--domesti ad imported books and periodicals, stage 
plays, motion pictures, and musical recordings--were officially 
controlled and censored.  Persons working in these fields  admitted to
exercising self-censorship lest they run afoul of  the authorities.

University teachers and professors remained subject to the same 
restrictions on freedom of speech, political activities, and 
publications as other government employees.  These included  warnings
against criticism of the Government; instructions not  to discuss
politics while at work; and strictures against  joining or supporting
political parties, engaging in political  activity, and meeting foreign
officials.  While all teachers  remained subject to dismissal for
political disloyalty, some  left the profession voluntarily to escape
the political 
pressure.

The universities, closed for several years after the 1988  disturbances,
were open for most of 1993.  However, they were  closed from December
1992 until mid-February in what many  believe was amoe to avoid student
demonstrations during the  startup of the politically sensitive national
convention.   Meanwhile, on the main campus of Rangoon University,
fences  built around the various faculties prior to the university's 
reopening remained in place, reportedly to help control 
potential student unrest.  In a move also widely believed  intended
primarily to disperse and isolate students, a fifth  national university
opened outside Rangoon in November.

     b.  Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

The Government does not respect the right to freedom of 
peaceful assembly.  A prohibition on outdoor assemblies of more  than
five people was unevenly enforced, but political 
demonstrations were strictly banned.

Political parties were required to request permission from the 
authorities even to hold internal meetings of their own 
membership.  The military's intimidation generally served to  discourage
public expressions of antigovernment sentiments.  In  the few repote
instances of unauthorized political activity,  security forces generally
intervened swiftly to detain or  imprison participants in unauthorized
meetings and to halt  distribution of antigovernment leaflets.  The
authorities  reportedly were quick to deploy a large-scale force in
Mandalay  in September when a spontaneous demonstration unexpectedly
took  on political overtones.

The right of association existed only for those organizations, 
including trade associations and professional bodies, permitted  by law
and duly registered with the Government.  Moreover, the  Government
severely restricted the activities of even these  organizations.  Ten
political parties remained formally legal  at the end of 1993--down from
75 at the beginning of 1992--but  they were virtually paralyzed through
arrests, intimidation,  and surveillance.  In February the authorities
permitted a  large private funeral to be organized for the wife of
one-time  oppositionist and former Prime Minister U Nu.  While the 
Government deie visas to two sons living abroad, it permitted  a
daughter active in the Burmese opposition in India to attend. 

     c.  Freedom of Religion

Freedom of religion is provided for in law.  Despite the 
privileged position of Buddhists in government service, this  right is
widely observed in practice although there have been  human rights
abuses against some believers.  Buddhist pagodas,  Muslim mosques, and
Christian churches operate openly with  minimal interference, at least
in those areas of central Burma  accessible to independent observers. 
Christians, Muslims, and  animists are particularly numerous among
minority ethnic 
groups.  While generally allowing these groups to practice  freely,
security services monitor the activities of religious  communities.  The
Government requires all religious 
organizations to register and subjects religious publications  to the
same control and censorship imposed on secular ones.   Restrictions on
unauthorized religious groups remained in  force, and the military
continued to monitor activities i and  arund Buddhist monasteries and
pagodas.  The SLORC has been  largely successful in halting political
activism among the  Buddhist clergy.

Religious groups can and did establish links with 
coreligionists in other countries, although such links were  reportedly
monitored by the Government.  The Catholic Church,  for example,
maintained ties to the Vatican.  While foreign  religious
representatives were usually allowed only to obtain  visas for short
stays, in some cases they were permitted to  preach to Burmese
congregations.  Though permanent missionary  establishments have not
been permitted since the 1960's, some  foreign Catholic nuns and at
least one priest continued to  reside upcountry, most working in homes
for the aged.

As part of its large-scale "urban development" program in  recent years,
the Government has taken control of several  Christian and Muslim
properties throughout Burma, including  cemeteries. Onthe other hand,
school authorities in Rangoon  eventually exempted Muslim students from
bowing to their 
teachers, when those students complained the action resembled a 
practice used in Buddhist worship.

     d.  Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign 
         Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

Although Burmese citizens have the legal right to live anywhere  in the
country, both urban and rural residents have been 
subject to arbitrary relocation.  Except for limitations in  areas of
insurgent activity, Burmese citizens could travel  freely within the
country but had to inform local authorities  of their temporary place of
residence.  People staying 
overnight with friends or relatives within their home cities or 
villages were also required to report this to the authorities. 
People who failed to report either guests or intentions to stay 
overnight to the authorities were theoretically subject to a  jail term,
and arrests were occasionally made.  Noncitizen  residents, inluing
ethnic Indians and Chinese born in Burma  who hold foreigners'
registration cards, had to obtain prior  permission to travel.

Though travel strictures continued to ease, the Government  maintained
controls on departure from the country.  While the  authorities
simplified certain requirements for obtaining a  passport, other
requirements plus bureaucratic procedures and  corruption still
presented formidable hurdles.  Those traveling  abroad to work, however,
encountered fewer difficulties, 
particularly as Burmese authorities sought to increase hard  currency
earnings from the taxes they impose on such persons'  earnings. 
Emigrants, by contrast, were required to reimburse  the Government for
"educational expenses" before receiving exit  permission and were
severely limited in what they could take  with them.

Burmese citizens who left legally were generally allowed to  return to
visit relatives, and those wishing to extend their  stays found it
easier to obtain permission to do so.  Even some  who had staye aboad
illegally and acquired foreign 
citizenship found it easier to return to visit or do business.   In a
move widely believed to be intended to encourage wealthy  older overseas
Burmese to retire in Burma, the Government  announced in May that
Burmese abroad would have 2 years to  reapply for citizenship lost
through naturalization in another  country.  At about the same time, the
Ministry of Home Affairs  announced that Burmese abroad holding expired
travel documents  could obtain new passports or an extension of their
old ones. 
Obtaining these benefits, however, remained subject to 
government approval on a case-by-case basis.  Moreover, some  Burmese
living abroad, particularly those who had traveled or  remained abroad
illegally, continued to fear subjecting 
themselves to potential punitive action by Burmese authorities  if they
should return to Burma.  By September, 14 persons had  been allowed to
resettle in Burma, and another 14 had had their  Burmese passort
extended or replaced.


In 1993 foreigners were allowed into the country in increasing  numbers
on an individual, rather than only on a tour group,  basis.  The
authorities also took several steps to liberalize  travel for foreigners
within Burma, though large areas of the  country remained off limits on
security grounds.  Tourist and  family visit visas are routinely granted
for 2 to 4 weeks, and  can be extended on a case-by-case basis. 
However, select  foreigners, such as human rights advocates and
political 
figures, continued to be denied entry visas unless traveling  under the
aegis of a sponsor acceptable to the Government.  A  private voluntary
organization, Medecins Sans Frontieres/
Holland, is now operating in Burma and has foreign personnel  assigned
to Rangoon on a permanent basis.

In April 1992, following the flight into Bangladesh of an  estimated
265,000 Muslims from Arakan State in order to escape  military
repression, the Governments of Bangladesh and Burma  signed a Memradum
of Understanding providing for the 
voluntary repatriation of the refugees.  However, Burma, unlike 
Bangladesh, did not accept a role for UNHCR in the repatriation  process
at that time.  In the absence of an adequate 
international monitoring presence in Burma, most Rohingyas were 
reluctant to return to Arakan.  After a private visit by High 
Commissioner Sadako Ogata to Burma in late July and subsequent  talks
between the Burmese authorities and UNHCR representatives, the
Government of Burma signed a Memorandum of Understanding  with the UNHCR
in November which provides that the UNHCR will  have a presence in
Arakan State and will have access to all  returnees.  The agreement is
intended to cover the monitoring  and administration of the return to
Burma in safety and dignity  of about 200,000 Rohingyas who remain in
refugee camps in  Bangladesh.  Of those who fled between late 1991 and
mid-1992,  some 50,000 were repatriated to Burma in 1993.

Foreign refugees or displaced persons may not resettle or seek  safe
haven in Burma.  The Government treats people claiming to  be refugees 
as illegal immigrants and expels or imprisons them. 

Section 3  Respect for Political Rights:  The Right of Citizens          
  to Change Their Government

Burma is governed solely by the military, and the Burmese  people do not
have the right or the ability peacefully to  change their government. 
Since 1988 active duty military  officers have occupied many important
positions throughout the  bureaucracy, particularly at the policymaking
level.  Despite  the appointment of several civilians to the Cabinet in
1992,  military or recently retired military officers have continued  to
occupy most cabinet-level positions, numerous director  general and
subordinate posts, and key positions once held by  technocrats in the
economic ministries.

In the 1990 election the NLD and associated parties achieved an 
overwhelming victory.  The SLORC subsequently set aside the  results and
disqualified, detained, arrested, or drove into  exile many successful
candidates, including most of the NLD  leadership.  By the end of 1993,
174 of the 485 deputies 
elected had either been disqualified, resigned under pressure,  gone
into exile, been detained, or died.  At least 46 
successful candidates from the election or prominent NLD 
activists were serving prison sentences.  In 1992 the SLORC  held
discussions with selected representatives of the few  political parties
which had not been banned outright, with a  view to staging a national
convention to write a new 
constitution without the participation of most leading members  of the
democratic opposition.  The national convention finally  opened on
January 9 and continued intermittently throughout the  year until
September 16, when it finally adjourned until the  following January. 
Of the approximately 700 delegates 
attending, only about 150 held mandates from the 1990 
elections.  Members of six of the eight interest groups 
represented wreselected by the SLORC.  Using these groups as  a
majority, the Government forced through its own rules, its  own agenda,
and finally its own principles for a new 
constitution, guaranteeing continued military control of the 
Government.  During an intermediate stage, representatives of  the NLD
and minority groups were able to put forward some  proposals clearly at
odds with government preferences.  But the  authorities carefully
controlled the level of visible 
opposition by censoring presentations, declaring unwelcome  documents
off-limits to the public, forbidding discussion from  the floor, and
intimidating individual delegates behind the  scenes.  There has been no
genuine public discussion of the  process that will be used to arrive at
a new constitution. 
One NLD victor in the 1990 election and national convention  delegate,
Dr. Aung Khin Sint, was convicted and sentenced to 20  years'
imprisonment for distributing opposition literature to  his fellow
delegates.  

In some reios where government forces exercise limited or no  control,
including in cases where the Government has reached an  accommodation
with former insurgent groups, indigenous 
populations have considerable autonomy in running their own  political
and economic affairs.  Even in government-controlled  areas, they
generally retain their social and cultural 
institutions.

Section 4  Governmental Attitude Regarding International and            
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations             of Human
Rights

No internal human rights organizations are allowed to exist.   The
Government continued to oppose outside scrutiny of its  human rights
record but permitted somewhat greater access in  1993 for some
journalists, nongovernmental organizations, and  foreign government
officials wishing to examine the country's  human rights situation. 
Burmese authorities allowed UNHRC  Special Rapporteur Professor Yokota
to conduct another 
fact-finding mission in the country in November 1993.

In 1991, 192,and again in 1993, the U.N. General Assembly  (UNGA)
adopted increasingly strong resolutions urging the  Burmese Government
to end human rights abuses and undertake  genuine democratic reform. 
The 1993 UNGA resolution called on  the Government to release
unconditionally Aung San Suu Kyi and  other detained political leaders
and to respect the expressed  will of the Burmese people by implementing
the results of the  1990 elections.

The UNHRC Special Rapporteur appointed in March 1992, Professor  Yozo
Yokota, visited Burma in December 1992 and presented his  report in
February 1993.  He returned to Burma in November 1993  to fulfill his
mandate as Special Rapporteur.  The report  offered a harsh catalog of
human rights abuses in Burma and  called for far-reaching remedial
action.  In later reviewing  the report, the UNHRC took special aim at
the refusal of 
Burmese authorities to accord Dr. Yokota the "full and 
unreserved cooperation" and access to persons of his choice  that had
beencoditions of his mission.  The Government, for  its part, disputed
the Special Rapporteur's mandate and 
rejected many of his findings.

Section 5  Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, 
           Disability, Language, or Social Status

     Women

Women in Burma in general have traditionally enjoyed a high  status,
exercising most of the same basic rights as men and  taking an active
role in business.  Consistent with traditional  culture, they keep their
own names after marriage and often  control family finances.  However,
participation of women  remained low in the minuscule industrial sector
and in the  bureaucracy; a few professions, such as forestry and
geology,  are entirely barred to women.  Women do not consistently 
receive equal pay for equal work.  There continued to be no  women's
rights organizations in Burma or government agency  specifically devoted
to safeguarding women's interests.

There was no nationwide pattern of violence directed 
specifically against women.  However, reliable reports 
continued t idicate that many Burmese women and children in  the border
areas were forced or lured into serving as 
prostitutes in Thailand by criminals and criminal 
organizations.  Recruitment of these women generally occurred  in remote
areas where Burmese officials were unable to prevent  the practice.  In
1993, impressment, including of women, for  military porterage duties
continued, with attendant casualties. 
Although Burmese culturally view rape with great abhorrence, in  1993
there continued to be a consistent pattern of reports  alleging rapes of
ethnic minority women in border areas by  Burmese soldiers.

     Children

In mid-July the Government issued a law stipulating children's  rights
and containing provisions covering their protection and  custody,
education, employment, and judicial treatment.  
Burmese authorities also adopted in September a "National  Program of
Action" for the survival, protection, and 
development of the country's children.  By year's end it 
remained unler whether the Government intended to give the  program the
political impetus needed to ensure the 
interministerial cooperation and resource allocation required  to make
it a success.

Government and UNICEF figures indicated the plight of children  to be
worse than was earlier realized.  Infant mortality is  high (94 per
1000); 37 percent of children under 3 are severely  or moderately
malnourished; 31 percent of children aged 5  through 14 suffer from
iodine deficiency; only 62 percent of  children enroll in primary
school; and only 25 percent of  children complete the prescribed 5-year
course.


     National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

Burma's numerous ethnic minorities, which have their own 
distinct cultures and languages, have been underrepresented in  the
Government and largely excluded from the military 
leadership.  Despite recently increased government investment  in the
border areas in road, hospital, and school construction,  economic
deveopent among minorities continued to lag and many  still live at the
subsistence level.

Since only people who can prove long familial links to Burma  are
accorded full citizenship, some people not of ethnic 
Burmese ancestry, primarily Indians and Chinese, continued to  be denied
full citizenship and to be excluded from government  positions. 
Individuals without full citizenship are also  barred from certain
advanced university programs in medicine  and technological fields and
are often the object of 
prejudice.  However, Indian and Chinese minorities continued to  play an
important role in the economy--a situation resented by  many Burmans.

In Arakan State, some Rohingyas, who in general do not enjoy  full
citizenship, have also have been denied national identity  cards. 
Though a limited number of outside observers were able  to visit Arakan
State, albeit on a government-controlled basis,  credible reports
continued to emerge of discrimination and  travel restrictions for
Muslims in the area.  The 
well-documentd hman rights abuses which precipitated the 
original Rohingya exodus, however, appeared to have largely  subsided. 
At the same time, claims that Buddhists from 
elsewhere in Arakan State were being resettled nearer the  border in
previously Muslim areas were reliably confirmed. 
Multiple, reliable sources indicated that the military 
occasionally required minority populations in the border 
regions to provide without compensation vehicles, equipment,  and
lodging for soldiers.

     Religious Minorities

The SLORC continued to associate itself closely with the 
majority Buddhist religion, giving wide publicity to the 
participation by its members in various Buddhist rites and  ceremonies. 
While this reportedly was a cause of concern among  some members of
other religions, the Government in fact 
continued to permit members of the major non-Buddhist faiths to 
practice their religion.  Religious organizations, however,  remained
subject to registration and censorship controls 
applicable o he entire population.  Restrictions on Muslims  in Arakan
State appear to be result primarily from their lack  of full citizenship
and to discrimination on ethnic grounds. 
     People with Disabilities

Official assistance to persons with disabilities is extremely  limited. 
There is no law mandating accessibility to government  facilities for
those with disabilities.  A small number benefit  from the services of
the Mary Chapman School for the Deaf in  Rangoon, which recently began
receiving government patronage,  or from modest religious-associated
assistance programs funded  through private donations.  Most disabled
persons, however,  must rely on traditional family structures to provide
for their  welfare, and many become destitute.  The principal exception
is  disabled members of the military, who receive medical 
attention, rehabilitation, and financial assistance, though  most
veterans receive such benefits only for a few years after  discharge. 
Reliable reports indicate that high-ranking 
officers receive better treatmet han the rank and file.  
Since 1986 Burmese authorities have permitted representatives  of the
ICRC to work in Burma to upgrade provision of orthopedic  prostheses. 
Because of both landmines and train-related 
accidents, Burma has one of the highest rates of amputees in  the world.

Section 6  Worker Rights

     a.  The Right of Association

In 1993 there continued to be no right of association among  workers in
Burma.  Workers were not free to form or join trade  unions of their own
choosing, and leaders of unofficial labor  associations, such as youth
organizer Nay Lin of the Federation  of Trade Unions of Burma, were
subject to arrest.  A new labor  law was promised in connection with the
drafting of a new  constitution, but it is doubtful the document will
ensure the  right of workers to organize freely.  At a minimum, any
trade  unions which might form are expected to be firmly under 
government control.  Workers are not permitted to strike, and  there
were no reported instances in 1993 of attempts to do so. 
In July 1989, the United States suspended Burma's eligibility  for trade
concessions under the Generalized System of 
Preferences program, pending steps to afford its labor force 
internationally recognized worker rights.  In 1990 the U.S.  Government
declined a formal request to reconsider the 
suspension.

In June 1993, the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
Conference cited Burma in a "special paragraph", its strongest  form of
censure, for its longstanding failure to take "the  necessary measures
in legislation and practice to guarantee to  all workers and all
employers without any distinction and  without prior authorization the
right to organize even outside  the existing trade union structure
should they so wish."

     b.  The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

Workers continued not to have the right to organize and bargain 
collectively.  Government arbitration boards, which once 
theoretically provided a means for airing labor disputes, were 
abolished in 1988.  The Government unilaterally sets wages in  the
public sector.  In the private sector, wages are set by  market forces. 
In a job-scarce economy, this means employers  determine wage levels. 
The Government pressures joint ventures  not to pay salaries greater
than those of ministers or other  high-level employees.  Joint ventures
circumvent this via  supplemental pay, including remuneration paid in
foreign 
exchange certificates, as well as through incentive and 
overtime pay and other fringe benefits.  Foreign firms 
generally set wages near those of the domestic private sector  but
follow the practice of joint ventures in awarding 
supplemental wages and benefits.  

No special export processing zones exist.

     c.  Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

Burma's legal code does not prohibit forced labor.  The 
military routinely employed corvee labor on its myriad building 
projects and,acording to credible reports, officials accepted  bribes to
excuse some people from work.  Forced labor was used  in constructing
the railroad line opened in 1993 to Loikaw,  capital of Burma's Kayah
State.

The Burmese Army has for decades impressed civilian males to  serve as
porters.  According to reliable reports, in 1993 the  army continued to
abduct youths off the streets, chiefly in  minority areas but also in
some urban areas of central Burma.   Women were also occasionally
impressed as porters, cooks, and  laundresses for soldiers in frontline
areas, according to  credible reports.  Military authorities commonly
permitted  conscripts and their families to pay them money in lieu of 
porter duty.

In June a Burmese diplomat in Singapore organized the 
confinement and forced return to Burma of a group of 11 Burmese  seamen
transiting Singapore en route from Australia to Thailand  after the men
prevailed in a wage dispute with the help of the  International
Transport Federation.  All remained free in 1993  but are unabe o regain
employment abroad.

     d.  Minimum Age for Employment of Children

Children aged 13 to 15 may work 4 hours a day.  The "Child Law"  of July
14, 1993, governs most matters concerning children  under the age of 16. 
It gives each such child the right to  "engage in work in accordance
with law and its own volition."   To date, the "law" referred to
includes both the Factories Act  of 1951 and the Children Pledging of
Labor Act, this latter  being an Indian law from 1933 still on the
books.  In theory,  the penalty for employers disregarding this
regulation was 2  years in prison, but there were no reports of any
prosecutions  in 1993 for illegally employing children, despite the fact 
that, in cities, working children were highly visible.  They  were hired
at lower pay rates than adults for the same kind of  work, and economic
pressure forced them to work not only for  their survival but also to
support their families.  Burmese law  requires chidre to attend school
through the fourth standard,  usually reached between the ages of 12 and
15.  The Department  of Basic Education estimated, however, that 38
percent of  children aged 5 to 9 never enroll in school.  Of those who
do,  less than 30 percent complete the fourth grade.  Two-thirds of 
Burma's primary schoolchildren, principally in rural areas,  leave
school for economic reasons.  In the higher grades, the  drop-out rate
for girls is double that for boys.

     e.  Acceptable Conditions of Work

Depressed economic conditions and lack of attention by 
government authorities continued to dictate substandard 
conditions for workers.  The Law on Fundamental Workers Rights  of 1964
and the Factories Act of 1951 regulate working 
conditions.  There is a legally prescribed 5-day, 35-hour  workweek for
employees in the public sector and a 6-day, 
44-hour workweek for private and parastatal sector employees,  with
overtime paid for additional work.  Workers have 21 paid  holidays a
yar. 


Only government employees are protected by minimum wage 
provisions.  The minimum wage was raised in March to $3 per day  (20
kyats) at the official exchange rate, but less than $0.20  at the
unofficial, free market rate.  The Government raised  wages for public
employees by 25 percent in March, but pay in  the state sector remained
far below the amount needed to provide a decent standard of living or
counter the practice of  taking bribes.  The actual average wage rate
for casual laborers in Rangoon was about twice the official minimum.  
Wages continued to lag far behind inflation.  

To protect health and safety at workplaces, there are numerous 
regulations pertaining to room size, ventilation, fire hazards,  and the
availability of latrines and drinking water.  In 
practice, these were seldom enforced, particularly in the  private
sector. (###)