Statement of ABSDF (Dawn Gwin)

[caroline@xxxxxxxxxx]

STATEMENT CONCERNING THE RELEASE OF AUNG SAN SUU KYI FROM HOUSE ARREST 

It is impossible to resist the feeling of relief and euphoria that
accompanies the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. We now know
some of the emotions those involved in the antiapartheid struggle must
have felt on that day when Nelson Mandela was released from Robin Island.
The analogy to the release of Nelson Mandela, however, must be made very
carefully because SLORC is not F. W. De Klerk. SLORC could have two very
different motives for releasing Aung San Suu Kyi, and in order to
understand the significance of her release we need to examine both
potential motives very carefully.  When F.W. De Klerk released Nelson
Mandela, he was throwing in the towel.  He was saying that he understood
that apartheid had lost the struggle and now it was time to begin the
process of negotiating the terms of the surrender. It is possible that by
releasing Aung San Suu Kyi, SLORC, like De Klerk, is throwing in the
towel; signaling that it understands that democracy is inevitable and now
is the time to start the long process of negotiating the surrender of
dictatorial power on the best possible terms. We fervently hope this is
what motivated the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, and that the Burmese
democratic resistance is about to embark on a South African-like process
involving a negotiated return to democracy in Burma.  However, we must
examine the possibility, indeed the probability, that there is another
much less hopeful motive behind SLORC's release of Aung San Suu Kyi . 
After nearly 7 years of consolidating its rule, SLORC may now believe its
power a so deeply entrenched that it has nothing to fear from Aung San Suu
Kyi. Under this Scenario, SLORC is not throwing in the towel. Ouite the
contrary the release of Aung San Suu Kyi indicate that a confident, cocky
SLOR,C believes the triump of its military dictatorship is now so complete
and so thorough that it can even release a figure of the structure of Aung
San Suu Kyi and not be seriously threatened.  We should not forget that
this same SLORC government offered democratic election to the Burmese
people and May of 1990, but only because it had mistakenly convinced
itself it could win or controlled those elections to legitimize its hold
on power. When instead, those elections threatened to take power from
SLORC they were very quickly ignored. SLORC, then, is a government that
has a history of making gestures which, on the outside, would seem to
indicate a movement toward democratic government, but which actually are
designed to consolidate SLORC's power the release of Aung San Suu Kyi may
be following this old familiar pattern. SLORC may believe that releasing
her will significantly reduce the level of external international pressure
while at the same time believing it now strengthened apparatus of
repression can easily handle any internal Burmese pressure that Aung San
Suu Kyi can generate. The net result of her release, SLORC therefore may
believe, is a SLORC military dictatorship more in control than ever. Some
may say that SLORC would be a bit naive to believe such a scenario would
work in that they are under estimating the power of Aung San Suu Kyi. But
SLORC was naive to believe that it could successfully manipulate the May
1990 election, but that did not stop it fonn believing it could. There is,
regretfully much historical evidence to lead us to believe that SLORC is
releasing Aung San Suu Kyi only because it believe that such a move will
reduce international pressure; and thereby, prolong its absolute grip on
dictatorial power.  The fact is thought that it is too early to know with
cerainty what is motivating SLORC. To those who say that it is impossble
that SLORC is throwing in the towel preparing to negotiate with Aung San
Suu Kyi for democratization, we point out that many in the anti-apartheid
movement said the same thing about F. W. De. Klerk and they turned out to
be wrong. The facts are not yet in, and we must allow ourselves to be
trapped in any rigid preconceived positions. As a practical matter,
governing the behavior of members of the democratic resistance, howevet,
it little matters right now which motive is behind the release of Aung San
Suu Kyi. If SLORC is throwing in the towel and preparing to enter the long
road of negotiations to decide the terms of its eventual surrender to
democracy then the democratic resistance must redoub}e its efforts to give
Aung San Suu Kyi the strongest bargaining position she can possibly have
in the upcoming negotiation process. On the other hand, if SLORC's motive
for the release is to increase its grip on power and allowed it to
indefinitely avoid democratization by lowering international pressure,
then the democratic resistance must redouble its effort to ensure that
SLORC's cynical plan does not succeed. Under either scenario our duty is
to redouble our efforts on behalf of democracy in Burma. But at least now
we can do so in the wonderful joy of knowing that Aung San Suu Kyi is
free 
ALL BURMA STUDENT's DEMOCRATIC FRONT ( DAWN GWIN- HEADQUARTERS )
Date- July 11, 1995


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