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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STR



Subject: INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT: 1993

Attn: Burma Newsreaders
Re: INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT: 1993

Courtesy of the Libraries of the University of Missouri-St. Louis-
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SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC


BURMA


I.  Summary

Burma accounts for over 50 percent of worldwide illicit opium production.
Following the 1988 coup and the suspension of most foreign narcotics control
aid, the Government of Burma (GOB) focused on domestic political problems and
sharply reduced its already limited counternarcotics program.  Potential
opium production nearly doubled within one year, and has remained near that
level since them.  In 1989, the GOB arranged cease fires with major
insurgent/trafficking groups.  Although it claims that these accords include
long-term opium poppy crop substitution goals, there has been no decline in
opium poppy cultivation in areas controlled by these groups.


The GOB acceded to the 1988 UN Convention in 1991 and continues to claim it
is committed to eliminating narcotics production.  Recent indications of
official attention to the problem include destruction of a few surrendered
heroin refineries, action against some corrupt officials, greater narcotics
enforcement in Rangoon and select provincial towns, limited cooperation with
the DEA, participation in a USG-funded opium yield study, and permission for
increased multilateral involvement in the GOB's border development program.
However, these efforts have not reduced Burma's vast narcotics production.
Seizures remain insignificant, given the size of the crop; major traffickers,
to date, have been exempt from exempt from arrest and in some cases openly
associate with senior military officials.  Due to accommodations reached with
the GOB, former insurgent groups exercise security and militia functions and
engage in the narcotics business in areas they control.


The USG currently provides no direct assistance to the GOB; bilateral
counternarcotics cooperation is limited to working-level DEA/GOB liaison.  An
effective counternarcotics strategy in Burma would meld long-term development
and crop substitution with law enforcement efforts, including opium poppy
eradication, interdiction, and prosecution of major traffickers.  There are
few signs that the GOB will seriously adopt and implement such a strategy in
the near future.  Should it do so, international support might be
forthcoming.


 II.  Status of Country


Burma's opium poppy crop is cultivated mostly in the rugged mountainous areas
of the Shan State.  For decades, much of this remote area has been outside
 central government control and under the sway of insurgents or private
armies  that support themselves partly through the sale of narcotics. Since
1989, the GOB has reached accommodations with Wa and Kokang trafficking
groups, offering them limited political autonomy and development assistance
 in exchange for ending their insurgencies.  The GOB claims these accords
 permit border development programs designed eventually to end these groups'
reliance on opium for their livelihoods. They have not reduced overall
cultivation, however; only areas controlled by the Kachin Independence
Organization, which has not reached an accord with the government, show a
decline.  Credible reports also suggest that these arrangements effectively
permit extensive Kokang and Wa business activities, at least partially
 capitalized by drug sales.  Burma's military rulers continue to ascribe a
higher priority to political accommodation with these former insurgents than
to combatting narcotics.


While Thailand remains Burma's largest narcotics conduit to the world market,
heroin also exits via southern China to Hong Kong and through southern Burma
 to Malaysia and Singapore.  Some drugs also flow to India and Bangladesh.



 III.  Country Actions Against Drugs


Until 1988, combatting illicit narcotics was a GOB objective because
narcotics revenue supported many insurgents, particularly the Burmese
Communist Party (BCP).  In 1988, the military government sharply repressed
political opponents and concentrated its police and army resources on
internal control.  It all but abandoned eradication and maintained only
minimal narcotics law enforcement efforts.  Opium poppy cultivation rose
sharply in areas west of the Salween River, including areas where GOB access
is greatest, and which had been subject to USG-funded aerial eradication
programs in the 1980s.  The greatest increases in opium poppy cultivation,
however, have come in the Wa area, which was never targeted for aerial
eradication because it was under firm BCP control until 1989.  As a result of
its cease-fire with the GOB, the Wa now operate large narcotics refineries
along the Chinese border.  The Kokang Chinese, despite participation in
GOB-sponsored development efforts, continue as major traffickers.


The Shan United Army (SUA) also remains a powerful drug trafficking and
heroin refining organization.  As part of its deal with the Wa, the GOB since
early 1990 has provided direct military support for the Wa's ongoing war with
drug trafficker Khun Sa's SUA.  With Rangoon's support, the Wa have enlarged
their sphere of control to include significant drug turf along the Thai
border.  The GOB has also conducted episodic military operations against the
SUA, leading to heavy casualties but few drug seizures.  The SUA, however,
remains well-entrenched in its enclaves along the Thai/Burma border.


Policy Initiatives.  In May 1991, the GOB officially legitimized several
drug- trafficking insurgent groups.  Burmese officials say that peasant
farmers under control of these groups lack economic alternatives to opium,
which border development programs are designed to provide.  The GOB says its
anti-narcotics focus will be on long-term rural pacification and development
to create alternative incomes for opium poppy growers.  To this end, the GOB
has sought assistance from the UN in cooperation with Thailand and China.
While such development is necessary, it must be coupled with strong law
enforcement to reduce opium poppy output.  However, expansion of the GOB's
writ into the opium poppy cultivation belt, an unstated goal of the program,
will be slow and may ultimately fail precisely because of the arrangements
Rangoon has struck with ethnic groups.  Permitting several ethnic insurgent
groups to transform their armed forces into local militias all but precludes
effective GOB law enforcement.


Accomplishments.  Burmese efforts to combat narcotics production and
trafficking remained minimal.  The GOB continued to take small
counternarcotics steps on its own and to view claimed narcotics control
activity as a means to improve its international image.  It is clear that the
fight against illicit drugs is not the GOB's highest priority.

The GOB claims to have eradicated about 1,215 ha of opium poppy in 1992 (less
than one percent of the estimated cultivation); publicly destroyed 225 kg of
heroin and over five mt of opium, plus other drugs and precursor chemicals;
and destroyed a heroin refinery surrendered by Wa leaders.  These largely
cosmetic efforts had scant impact on overall narcotics production.  Foreign
participants in GOB-arranged trips to the border region continued to observe
that Burma has only minimal control over the heavily armed Wa and Kokang
militias.  They also saw some evidence of the nascent development efforts
designed to effect a phase-out of opium poppy cultivation.


Since 1990, there has been an increase in enforcement activity by police
narcotics task forces and army personnel in Rangoon and some northern
provincial towns, and additional police narcotics task forces have been
established.  According to GOB 1992 statistics, seizures of opium increased
by 25 percent and of heroin by 50 percent over 1991.

During 1992, Burma signed separate trilateral agreements with the UNDCP and
China, Laos, and Thailand for counternarcotics cooperation and subregional
border development, which included crop substitution, law enforcement and
health, drug treatment, and AIDS prevention components.  Foreign Minister U
Ohn Gyaw and Home Minister Lieutenant General Phone Myint participated in an
unprecedented trilateral meeting in Bangkok to discuss narcotics control with
ranking Thai and Lao officials.  In April, the UNDCP established small
offices in the northern towns of Kengtung and Tachilek.  Implementation of
the Burma/Thai and Burma/China border programs, with UNDCP contributions
estimated at $4.5 million and $7.7 million over the next three years, began
in late 1992.

The GOB and UNDCP agreed on the need for an aerial opium survey of project
areas, to be conducted during the 1992-93 crop season.  The GOB has since
delayed this survey for another year, however.


Law Enforcement Efforts.  Burmese antidrug legislation is broad but
inadequately enforced.  The 1974 Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Act was
replaced by a new law promulgated on January 27, 1993, which closed several
gaps in the previous legislation, such as criminalizing money laundering.


The law is clearly intended to move Burma toward compliance with the 1988 UN
Convention.  Many details remain unclear, however, and the interpretation and
enforcement of the law will be more important than its text.


Burmese anti-narcotics policies and activities are coordinated by the Central
Committee for Drug Abuse Control, chaired by the Home Affairs Minister.  Key
enforcement agencies are the People's Police Force, the Burmese Army and the
Burmese Air Force.  Others involved in narcotics control are the National
Intelligence Bureau, the Directorate of Defense Services Intelligence, and
the Bureau of Special Investigation.  Since 1988, the Burmese military has
assumed direction over narcotics control, though operational responsibility
remains with the police.


The GOB has noted the USG's indictment of SUA leader Khun Sa, but it refuses
to extradite him to the U.S.  because it denies that a valid U.S.- Burmese
extradition treaty exists.  The GOB has declared Khun Sa a criminal under
Burmese law, and professes a willingness to prosecute him in Burma if caught.


 Corruption.  Narcotics-related corruption is a serious problem in Burma.
Multiple, reliable reports confirm that lower-level civilian, Police, Customs
and Army personnel frequently acquiesce or participate in drug trafficking in
exchange for payoffs; corruption among ranking officials also has been
alleged by plausible but unsubstantiated reports.  The GOB carried out
several crackdowns on anti-narcotics police forces in 1992 which led to
forced resignations or transfers.  However, no senior Army personnel were
arrested for narcotics-related corruption, although credible reports indicate
that some army units actively assist in Wa and Kokang drug trafficking
activities.


Agreements and Treaties.  The GOB is a party to the 1988 UN Convention, but
made reservations on extradition and the submission of disputes to the World
Court.  Burma has also acceded to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic
Drugs but not the 1972 Protocol to the Convention or the 1971 Convention on
Psychotropic Substances.  It has no bilateral narcotics agreement with the
U.S.


The GOB's January narcotics law addresses important areas with regard to
financial investigations, corruption, conspiracy, money laundering and
international cooperation.  Depending on its actual implementation, the law
represents an important step toward bringing the GOB into compliance with the
objectives of the UN Convention.


Cultivation/Production.  Far and away the world's leading opium poppy
cultivator, Burma produced an estimated potential of 2,280 mt of opium on
153,710 ha in the 1991/92 crop season -- over 50 percent of the world's
potential illicit output.  Although opium poppy is grown in Kachin, Chin, and
Kayah states, the chief growing area is the Shan Plateau -- extending almost
the full length of the mountainous Shan State, with an average elevation of
1,000 meters.  Fields range from 0.1 to 4.0 ha, averaging 0.5 ha.

Residents in the growing areas are largely dependent on income from opium
poppy for survival, although local chiefs also are believed to coerce them to
cultivate as much poppy as the labor supply allows.  No longer concentrated
along the Thai/Burma border, heroin refineries now also range along the PRC
frontier in areas controlled by the Wa and the Kokang Chinese.


While the GOB's nascent rural development program may ultimately provide the
infrastructure and other facilities necessary to enable poppy growers to find
other sources of income, the obstacles -- including lack of resources and
difficulty of access -- are considerable.  In the meantime, as Rangoon
remains preoccupied with political/security concerns, high production and
trafficking levels will certainly continue.


Demand Reduction Programs.  Preventive education is carried out by the
Ministries of Education and Information.  The Ministry of Health manages drug
treatment and detoxification, supervising 28 centers with an estimated annual
capacity of 3,500-4,000 addicts.  The Ministry of Social Welfare oversees
drug rehabilitation efforts.


 Domestic addiction remains a serious problem.  Addicts must register and
undergo compulsory treatment/rehabilitation, including six weeks of
detoxification treatment for heroin addicts, but relapse rates are high.
According to Health Ministry figures, there are approximately 13,000
registered addicts to heroin, 34,000 to opium, and 5,000 to other substances.
Some Burmese and UN observers put the total addict population at 150,000 or
more, out of a population of 42 million.  While opium and heroin are
frequently smoked, widespread heroin injection has resulted in many
drug-related AIDS cases and positive HIV tests.  There are no reliable
figures for overdose deaths, nor is it possible to estimate accurately
illicit narcotics consumption.  The USG has repeatedly drawn official
attention to the rise in local consumption.


Some knowledgeable observers believe that the GOB's increasing concern about
AIDS, especially among military personnel, has been a factor in the modest
increase of counternarcotics activity over the past two years.  Official
statistics indicate that, of recent heroin addicts tested for HIV, up to 82
percent were positive.



IV.  USG Policy Initiatives and Programs

U.S.  Policy Initiatives.  From 1990 to 1992, the USG did not certify Burma
as cooperating fully or taking steps on its own to control narcotics under
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.  The USG has strongly
encouraged the GOB to play a responsible role in curbing the production,
processing and trafficking in opium and heroin on its territory.  To this
end, the USG is prepared to support appropriate multilateral efforts through
the UNDCP and other UN agencies, provided Burma demonstrates its serious
commitment and allows adequate access to project areas and requisite
monitoring of progress by UN officials.  The USG maintains close contact with
UNDCP, which has a local representative and two field workers in Burma.
 
Bilateral Cooperation.  Bilateral counternarcotics cooperation is principally
limited to activities of the DEA, which maintains contact and exchanges
information with enforcement officials.  In 1992, the Burmese military used
DEA-supplied intelligence in a corruption investigation, and worked with the
DEA on a joint undercover operation targeting major traffickers.  This case
culminated in early 1993 with the arrest of several persons on narcotics
charges and the seizure of several properties believed acquired with
narcotics earnings, although no heroin was seized or major trafficker
arrested.  In February 1993, the USG carried out a scientific collection of
opium poppy samples to improve assessment of Burmese opium production.  Since
1988, the USG has provided no direct counternarcotics assistance to the GOB.


The Road Ahead.  The future of USG counternarcotics activities rests upon
Burma's readiness to engage in serious law enforcement and to fulfill its
international commitments under the 1988 UN Convention.  Any USG support
would be predicated on serious Burmese steps toward meeting the Convention's
objectives, including unrestricted access to the areas for aid workers, far
more opium poppy eradication and opium interdiction, destruction of many more
refineries, and arrests of major traffickers.  An effective assistance
program could then mesh rural development and crop substitution with training
and equipment to allow GOB agencies to carry out their law enforcement
responsibilities.


[Chart - Burma 1993 Statistical Tables]

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