SLORC AT THE UNGA

[darnott@xxxxxxxxxxx]

ANALYSIS OF THE STATEMENT BY HIS EXCELLENCY U OHN GYAW, MINISTER
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CHAIRMAN OF THE DELEGATION OF THE UNION
OF MYANMAR IN THE GENERAL DEBATE OF THE FIFTIETH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK 3 OCTOBER 1995.
 
 
This Statement is remarkable mainly for what it leaves out. There
is no mention whatsoever of democracy, human rights, or 
cooperation with the Secretary-General, all of which received
copious lip-service in previous years. There is no reference to
dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi or reconciliation with the non-
Burman ethnic groups; no hint that the Burmese people chose
civilian rulers in 1990, or that the United Nations has adopted
strong resolutions on Burma over the past five years. Instead,
there is repeated use of such terms as the "stability of the
State", "non-disintegration of national solidarity" and the
"spirit of patriotism". 
 
This year's Statement uses a totally different style from those
of previous years, which have been conciliatory and defensive. It
begins with an lecture on UN reform which aligns Burma with the
Non-Aligned Movement and ASEAN, followed by the unapologetic
presentation of a programme for a militarised, unitary State. The
main elements are:
 
* "ENSURING THE STABILITY OF THE STATE". This is to be
accomplished by the Orwellian neologism of "national
reconsolidation" (according to Burmese speakers the Burmese term
indicates unification by force) along with a "new constitution
which would be in harmony with present-day realities and reflect
the aspirations of the entire nation".  
 
As an example of "national reconsolidation", U Ohn Gyaw cites the
"return to the legal (sic) fold of 15 out of the 16 armed
groups[1]". Apart from the 1989 deals with the Wa and Kokang,
where the inducement to agree a cease-fire was tacit permission
to traffic opium, the "returns" have been the result of military
action and low-intensity conflict involving systematic and
massive human rights violations directed against the civilian
population and (in the case of the Kachin and Mon) pressure from
the neighbours. 
 
The draft of the "new constitution" being worked on by the
(military-organised) national convention describes a centralised
unitary state in which the military would control political life.
No doubt the "present-day realities" referred to are the
realities of military rule, which the constitution would solemnly
legitimise. The Commission on Human Rights concluded in its 1995
resolution on Myanmar that "the National Convention does not
appear to constitute the necessary steps towards the restoration
of democracy". Democracy is clearly not on the military's agenda.
 
 
 
* FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE:
According to human rights organisations, the traditional village
structure of Burma is breaking down as more and more land is
confiscated for military farms and plantations run by slave
labour. Combined with the export of rice while domestic consumers
go without, the result is increasing malnutrition and high rates
of child and maternal mortality (see recent UNICEF figures). In
contrast with countries like Singapore, the Burmese economy is in
ruins, the principal growth area of the economy and focus of
international investment being resource extraction, revenues from
which go to the military rather than benefiting the people as a
whole.  
 
This Statement comes at a time when there is mounting evidence
that the human rights situation in Burma is deteriorating.
Increased incidence of killings, disappearances, torture, rape,
forced labour, extortion, racism and religious intolerance by the
Burmese military have been documented over the past year by human
rights organisations and UN rapporteurs. (See, for instance,
Amnesty International's report of 22 September 1995 "Myanmar:
Conditions in prisons and labour camps" which speaks of thousands
of political prisoners throughout the country who are subject to
torture and forced labour.)
 
It also comes as the United Nations and a growing number of
countries are emphasising the inseparability of human rights,
(including the right of popular participation) and development.  
According to the Working Group on "An Agenda for Development",  
"A vigorous civil society is indispensable to creating lasting
and successful development" (para 245). Although the Foreign
Minister speaks of the need for development, a vigorous civil
society is not on the Burmese military's agenda.  
 
This Statement supports the view that the Burmese military
believes that the neighbours and international investment will
allow it to stay in power indefinitely, and that international
opinion is irrelevant. Yet U Ohn Gyaw did, at the end of his
Statement, renew his country's "dedication and commitment to the
principles and purposes of the Charter". One of the purposes of
the United Nations, as expressed in the Charter, is to promote
and encourage "respect for human rights and for fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or
religion". 
 
 
The forthcoming General Assembly resolution on the Situation of
Human Rights in Myanmar should: 
 
* Be very firm in pointing out Burma's violations of its duties
under the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, as well as of its obligations under specific treaties to
which it is a party, such as the Geneva Conventions of 1949, ILO
Convention 29 on Forced Labour, and the Convention on the Rights
of the Child.
 
* Emphasise that the National Convention, designed to legitimise
military rule, against to the will of the people as expressed in
the 1990 elections, stands in direct opposition to the principle
enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that the
"will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of
government" (Article 21). 
 
* State that the military "reconsolidation" of the non-Burman
ethnic groups into a centralised, unitary, military State does
not reflect the political or development needs and aspirations of
ethnic and other national groups. 
 
* Request the Secretary-General to (a) facilitate round-table
negotiations between the de facto Government, the political
opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi, and genuine representatives
of the non-Burman ethnic groups; (b) impose a time-frame for this
process of national reconciliation and restoration of democracy;
and (c) report to the General Assembly and the Commission on
Human Rights on progress made.
 
 
David Arnott 5 October 1995
________________________________________________________________
 
[1] Since the Chin National Front, two Naga groups, two Arakanese
groups, the Karen, the Karenni, the ABSDF and the Mong Tai Army
are still in a state of belligerency with Rangoon, it is
difficult to know where the figure of "16" armed groups comes
from. And presumably among the "15" are the Karenni, who are
currently fighting the Burma Army which broke the cease-fire
agreement they had signed two months before.