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USCR REPORT ON THE REPATRIATION OF
Subject: USCR REPORT ON THE REPATRIATION OF ROHINGYAS (PART 2 OF 4)
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The Rohingya as Refugees and asylum
Seekers in Bangladesh
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Refugees are recognized by the international community as being worthy of
and when necessary, entitled to, protection from the causes of their
flight. Through consistent state practice and opinion juris (i.e. a sense
that a practice is legally obligatory), norms have evolved into principles
of customary international law. These norms binding upon all states, set
forth certain minimum obligations that countries incur when refugees cross
thier borders in search for asylum.
Consequently, states are, at a minimum, obligated and obliged to respect
the principle of nonrefoulement; that is, states are constrained from
forcing back refugees to a country where their life or freedom would be
threatened. Similarly, states are obligated to ensure that the fundamental
human rights of refugees and asylum seekers are respected. Such rights , as
set forth in UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusions, include "the right to
life, liberty, and security of person, " and the right to be free from
subjugation "to torture or to cruel , inhumane or degrading treatment or
punishment." Beyond these and other "basic minimum human standards" that
all human beings are entitled to states have obligations that, in the case
of humanitarian refugees, "may be limited to the provisions of temporary
refuge and material assistance, and the pursuit of voluntary repatriation."
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Bangladesh's response to the Rohingya Exodus
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At the beginning of the Rohingya exodus, the Bangladesh government allowed
the refugees to seek temporary asylum in Bangladesh, through it opposed the
involvement of UNHCR and Western humanitarian relief organizations in the
relief operation. For a short time, Bangladeshi public opinion was largely
sympathetic to the Rohingya's plight -- but both the public and the
government's attitude quickly changed. In december 1991, a Bangladeshi
paper quoted a government official as saying, " our hands are already full
with many issues. We don't like to have a new problem [sic.] The sooner we
get rid of the Rohingya refugee problem the better." In mid-February 1992,
Bangladesh allowed UNHCR to assume a formal role in the relief operation as
a result of deteriorating health conditions in the camps and increasing
international pressure. Bangladesh continued, however, to characterize the
refugee influx as a short-term problem, and to demand repeatedly for the
Rohingya's prompt return to Burma. Bangladesh Foreign Minister Mostafirzur
Rahman, for example, stated in April 1993 that the repatriation would be
completed in six months.
The eventual return of the Rohingya, in principle, has not been an issue of
debate. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of the rohingya interviewed by
the author indicated a willingness and desire to return to their homes in
Burma when the Burmese government demonstrates a commitment to respect
their basic human rights. The means by which repatriations are achieved are
the real point of contention. During 1992 and 1993, human rights monitors
and the UNHCR repeatedly alleged that the Bangladesh government was
coercing, and at times physically forcing, the refugees to return to Burma
in violation of the principle of voluntary repatriation. As detailed below,
these allegations were well founded and disputed only in terms of degree.
On April 28 1992, the Bangladesh government and SLORC signed Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) under which Burma agreed to accept the return of those
refugees who could "establish bonafide evidence of their residence in
Burma." The agreement lacked mechanisms for monitoring the safety of
returnees. Similarly, UNHCR's role in the process was not clearly
delineated. The Agreement merely stated that Bangladesh "would fully
associate the representatives of the UNHCR to assist them in the process of
safe and voluntary repatriation." The MOU did not mention any role for
UNHCR in Burma. Furthermore, evidence indicated that human rights abuses
were continuing in Arakan. According to a UNHCR cable, at that time,
refugees were still arriving in Bangladesh "at a rate about 1,500 per day."
On September 22, 1992, the first repatriation took place. The government of
Bangladesh effectively precluded UNHCR from monitoring the return of the
refugees; UNHCR was notified only after the repatriations had taken place.
Prior to and following the repatriations, the refugees held large protest
demonstrations. They demanded a halt to the repatriations, saying that they
were involuntary, and that the refugees were not in fovor of returning to
Burma. In the course of these demonstrations, 15 refugees were killed and
100 other wounded; 119 refugees were arrested. Bangladesh subsequently
blocked UNHCR's and private relief groups' access to the camps.
On October 8, 1992, UNHCR and Bangladesh agreed that UNHCR would play a
role in verifying the voluntary nature of the return movements. UNHCR
subsequently reported that repatriations on October 12 and October 31 were
voluntary, although UNHCR officials were only allowed access to the first
batch of refugees on the night prior to their repatriation. It is unclear
how freely refugees were able to speak to UNHCR.
According to a UNHCR situation report, 84 percent(4814 refugees) of the
repatriations in MOvember and December 1992 occurred without UNHCR
supervision. Refugee protests continued to erupt in opposition to these
repatriations. Bangladeshi authorities responded by beating and arresting
refugee leaders.
The methods used by the Bangladesh government to return the refugees
prompted UNHCR to withdraw from the repatriation program on December 22,
1992. A UNHCR press release indicated that Bangladesh had been coercing
refugees to return and that UNHCR had been "prevented from conducting
private interviews to ascertain whether those returning [were] doing so
voluntarily." The U.S. State Department expressed similar condemnations
about "coerced repatriations." According to refugee witnesses, UNHCR
officials, and UNHCR situation reports, the Bangladesh government used
overt physical force to carry out many of the unsupervised repatriations.
In such cases, camp officials and police forcefully herded designated
refugee families into cattle trucks; they were then driven to the land
border, or ferried across the Naaf River, where they were expelled into
Burma. Overt physical force was also reportedly used to move refugees from
the regular refugee camps into the transit camps. An additional 11,216
repatriations occurred after UNHCR's withdrawal. USCR has asserted that in
the absence of UNHCR involvement these repatriations must be considered
involuntary.
In late January 1993, Dhaka suspended the repatriation program, saying it
would discuss the program's future with UNHCr. Shortly thereafter, UNHCR
agreed to take part again in the repatriation process, and discussions
regarding a Bangladesh UNHCR MOU ensued. In retrospect, a UNHCR official
told the author that UNHCR's withdrawal and protest resulted in only "a
slight improvement" in the Bangladesh government's repatriation practices.
During the next feew months, the rate of repatriation declined
significantly from December 1992 and January 1993 levels. Dhaka reportedly
continued pressuring refugees to repatriate. Such pressure included threats
of imprisonment for minor violations of camp rules; imprisomment could be
avoided by volunteering to repatriate. The government did, owever, release
several hundred detaained refugees, and stopped blocking NGOs from carrying
out their relief activities. Nevertheless, tensions between refugees and
local people remain high. IN late april, the police clashed with
demonstrators protesting against the Rohingya's continued presence in
Bangladesh; 26 local people were injured.
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The Bangladesh-UNHCR
Memorandum of Understanding
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On May 12, 1993, Bangladesh and UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding
setting forth the criteria and modalities for the repatriation of the
Rohingya refugees. According to the MOU, Bangladesh was to move refugees
identified as volunteers to one of several transit camps where UNHCR was to
conduct "independent interviews with [the] prospective returnees for
certifying the voluntary nature of the repatriation." The MOU also granted
UNHCR full daytime access to the refugee camps and transit centers.
The MOU also contained clauses that established a voluntary repatriation
process. As such, the MOU stood as a formal acknowledgement by the
government of Bangladesh of the right of the Rohingya refugees to voluntary
repatriation. The MOU stated, "the two sides shall cooperate with each
other to prevent any attempt by any side to interfere with the exercise of
freedom of option by the refugees."
Teh MOU also stated, "The two sides shall cooperate with each other to
ensure safe and voluntary repatriation of ... refugees who opt to return
under existing conditions." The MOU added, "a refugee wishing to return to
Myanmar can do so at any time, and none can prevent him from exercising
this right. No refugees, likewise, will be forced or coerced to leave
Bangladesh ..."(Emphasis added.)
However, at the time of the signing of the MOU, there had been no
appreciable improvement in the human rights situation in Burma. As set
forth above, a refugee has the right to return to his country whenever he
wishes, but principles of voluntary repatriation require that repatriation
be promoted only when the safety of refugees can be assured.
At the time, the Bangladesh government seemed to be intent on continuing
repatriations and indeed continued to promote repatriations after the
signing of the MOU. In this sense, the MOU was flawed; it did not contain
clauses that predicated the carrying out the promotion sessions on an
appreciable improvement in the conditions that caused the refugees to flee
or on UNHCR's presence in Arakan.
>From the signing of the MOU through JUly 1994, 42,900 repatriations took
place under the authority of this agreement. However, the repatriations
that occurred during this time cannot all be considered voluntary, as
coercion and forced repatriations continued in contravention of principles
of voluntary repatriation.
Repatriations were induced through repeated beatings of refugees, which
fostered an extreme climate of fear. According to refugees, camp officials
have used this fear, as well as inflicting actual abuses, to compel
refugees to present themselves to UNHCR as "volunteers" for repatriation.
When UNHCR interviewed refugees to ascertain if they were returning
voluntarily, many refugee felt that they had to say they were volunteers;
othewise, they could have faced retribution by camp officials. On high
ranking UNHCR official estimated that as many as fifty percent of the
repatriations that occurred prior to August 1994 were effected either
through overt force or other coercive methnod. Others say that this is a
conservative estimate.
According to UNHCR staff and refugees residing in the transit camps,
Bangladeshi officials made life in the transit camps purposefully difficult
as a means of coercing the refugees to return. Human rights abuses were the
most severe in the transit camps, including at times shed-to-shed beatings
by camp officials.
UNHCR situation reports indicate that when refugees told UNHCR that they
were not willing to return to Burma, Bangladeshi officials kept them in the
transit camps (that is, did not return them to a regular camp, as required
by the MOU). At the transit centers, the refugees were forced to live in
substandard conditions - shelters were smaller than usual, unstable, and
often provided inadequate protection from the elements. The minutes of the
FEbruary 18 1993, Relief Coordination meeting , for example, state, "Fifty
families (were ) living under open sky' after saying no [at] UNHCR
interview."
Another means of coercing refugees to return and preventing organized
dissent is through the broad powers of arrest that camp officials enjoy.
One UNHCR official in Cox's Bazaar told the author that camp officials have
sought out and neutralized, either by arrest or (at MOricha Palong Camp)
force, vocal or educated refugees who had, or might in the future, focus
opposition to repatriations. At times, two hundred or more Rohingya have
been in jail. According to a UNHCR protection officer and a Bangladeshi
advocate for the refugees, many of the charges against the refugees have
been un substantiated or for violations of the law that would not normally
result in incarceration. Often, the refugees have been detained for a
period prior to a trial that exceeds the maximum sentence that could have
been imposed for the charge. For example, the 119 refugees arrested for
taking part in the demonstrations in September 1992 remained in jail more
than eighteen months after they were arrested.
Refugees living in Dua Palong, Shalerdeba, and Balukhali II refugee camps,
as well as a refugee in Cox's Bazaar jail, stated to the author that they
had been singled out, arrested, and sentenced to jail for acting as
spolepersons for the refugees. One of the most vocal of the refugee leaders
remains in jail two years after he led demonstrations opposing the
repatriations in September and NOvember 1992. His case has not been
decided. He said that he was singled out and arrested because he opposed
the forced repatriations that were occurring. His assertion is supported by
notices that appeared in Bangladeshi papers in mid-NOvember 1992, in which
a local group pushing for the prompt repatriation of the rohingya, the
Rohingya Repatriation Action Committee, offered a reward of 10,000 taka
[approximately U.S. $250] for information leading to his arrest. According
to government statements in Bangladeshi papers, he was subsequently
arrested for illegally possessing a firearm.
The MOU states, "The Goernment of Bangladesh shall retain the
responsibility for safety and security for the Myanmar refugees in the
camps and outside." By failing to prevent the repeated abuses of refugees
by camp officials, Dhaka failed to fulfill its responsibilities for the
secrity of the refugees under the MOU. In so doing, the government allowed
conditions to evolve in the refugee camps that effectively negated the
"freedom of option" clause of the MOU.
Problems have not been limited to Rohingya refugees residing in the camps.
Significant numbers of Rohingya asylum seeders were denied admitance into
the camps. In addition, many refugees who have atttempted to enter
Bangladesh after the initial influx have been subject to arrest, detention,
and deportation.
Bangladesh also failed to fulfill clause 4.f of the MOU, which reads:
The Government of Bangladesh assures that no refugee will be coerced
into leaving against his/her will . any allegation in this respect
that is brought to the attention of the government of Bangladesh at
the local level and at the capital level will be promptly investigated
and remedial action taken where appropriate.
Despite protestations and documented evidence presented by UNHCR and human
right sorganizations, the government has not prosecuted any of those who
have been implicated for serious and repeated human rights abuses in the
camps. In only a few circumstances have camp officials responsible for
particularly egregious abuses been removed from the camps. However, these
officials retained their prestigious government jobs -- they were merely
transferred to other government posts.
Despite the problems in the camps, most refugees opt to remain in
Bangladesh and face the human rights abuses in the camps rathe rthan return
to a far more uncertain fate in Burma. According to one refugee, "We are
suffering in bangladesh, but I don't want go back. How can I go back after
what they have done to us [in Arakan] and what they will do to us ?"
In mid-April 1994, a UNHCR survey revealed that only 27 percent of the
refugees were willing to return to Burma. This reportedly created
consternation among bangladesh officials. Shortly after the results of the
survey became public, Abdul Matin Chowdhury, the Bangladeshi Home Minister,
stated that the Rohingya would be returned to Burma by the end of 1994. On
April 25, Dhaka informed UNHCR that it would not be renewing the MOU that
was due to expire on May 12 but that it would extend the MOU up to June 11
and allow time for a new MOU to be negotiated. On June 11, the MOU was
again renewed for an additional month. Since the expiration of the MOU on
JUly 11, the Bangladesh-UNHCR relationship has been based only on
"gentlemen's agreements." It is helpful to view the shift to mass
repatriation in light of this mounting pressure that Dhaka was placing on
UNHCR.
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The Process of Mass Repatriation
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In mid-August 1994, Bangladesh and UNHCR instituted a program to acclerate
substantially the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Arakan. The case by
case interview approach was abandoned and arrangements were made to
repatriate the refugees directly from their camps rather than via transit
camps.
The registration procedure for mass repatriation entils the following
elements: promotion sessions, registration, and individual case assessments
of refugees who allege that they will be singled out for persecution should
they be returned to Burma.
Promotion Sessions: In general, UNHCR's promotion sessions seem to be aimed
at dispelling refugee fears about returning to Burma. Promotion sessions
take several forms. For example, refugees stated that there were notes
hanging in front of the UNHCR offices in the different camps saying."There
is peace in Myanmar. You can return."
Promotion sessions were also conducted orally by UNHCR international staff
through an interpreter. According to refugees present at these sessions,
UNHCR told them:"the situation is normal in Burma". "It is time to
return","UNHCR is in Burma and we will receive you in Arakan"; or
alternatively "UNHCR cannot establish itself in Burma until you return."
Refugees said that UNHCR also stated that there would not be any "no"case.
The refugees understood this to mean that they didn't have the option of
not returning to Arakan. A refugee from Dua Palong paraphrased a UNHCR
field officer as having said, "To sum everything up, the whole idea is that
Bangladesh and Bulrma have signed a treaty. In accord with that treaty, the
Burmese government is accepting you." while the refugees' versions were
obviously not verbatim restatements, they do, at the very least, reflect
the refugees' understandings of these sessions.
Camp officials conducted separate promotion sessions in which they
reportedly used a melange of persuasion and threats to encourage the
refugees to return. Examples of statements reportedly made by camp
officials include: At MOishkum Cmmp:"You will go or will be arrested." At
dua Palong Camp:" Within two to three weeks you must leave. If you do not
volunteer, you must leave serially (house by house)." At dechusa Palong
camp: "The situation will not be good if you don't return to Burma. " At
Moricha Palong CampL you must go, you can not stay. Your country is
peaceful now." In Kutu Palong Camp, people were pulled out of their shed at
night by police who yelled, "Will you bo back?" Will you go back ?"
Registration: UNHCR portrays the Rohingya refugees' cooperation during the
registration as evidence of the voluntary nature of that process. For
example, a UNHCR September 1994 Progresss report refurs to the registration
process as a " massive voluntary repatriation registration." This report
said, at the end of this first round of registration in September, 165,000
refugees out of the total remaining camp population of 176,000 persons have
come forward to put their names down."
However, a number of refugees indicated that they did not associate the
registration process with the repatriation, and that the fact that they
registered did not commote, at least to them , and expression of their
willingness to return to Burma. In factBangladesh government officials had
told the refugees that the purpose of the registration process was to make
corrections in their family books and not that it was a part of the
repatriation process. Consequently, refugees could not opt out of the
registration process -- in order to do so , they would nave needed to know
that they were participating in one. Many refugees believed that if they
did not register, they would be sebsequently denied food rations.
Rather than register and risk repatriation, many refugees have simply left
the camps. According to february 1995 press report, as many as 20,000
refugees may have fled the camps and either settled among local people in
Bangladesh or obtained fraudulent travel documents and moved to other
countries.
Pending cases: According to Stephano Severe, the head of the UNHCR
sub-office in Cox's Bazaar, all refugees are assumed to be candidates for
repatriations, unless, on thier own initiative, they present compelling
evidence that they will be subject to arrest upon their return to Burma. In
general, UNHCR indicated that it would accept only those persons who are
able to establish that they have been members of political opposition
groups such as the National League for Democracy (NLD), and those who are,
or are reputed to be, members of insurgent groups (i.e. the Rohingya
Solidariy organization (RSO) or the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front(ARIF)).
UNHCR considers persons who meet the avove criteria to be 'pending cases'.
Refugees who suffered human rights abuses or other forms of persecution
before fleeing, or those who fear future persecution because of their
religious belief, political beliefs, or membership in a particular social
group, are not eligible to remain in Bangladesh.
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