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USCR REPORT ON THE REPATRIATION OF



Subject: USCR REPORT ON THE REPATRIATION OF ROHINGYAS (PART 2 OF 4)

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The Rohingya as Refugees and asylum
Seekers in Bangladesh
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Refugees  are  recognized by the international community as being worthy of
and when necessary, entitled  to,  protection  from  the  causes  of  their
flight.  Through  consistent state practice and opinion juris (i.e. a sense
that a practice is legally obligatory), norms have evolved into  principles
of  customary  international  law. These norms binding upon all states, set
forth certain minimum obligations that countries incur when refugees  cross
thier borders in search for asylum.

Consequently,  states  are,  at a minimum, obligated and obliged to respect
the principle of nonrefoulement;  that  is,  states  are  constrained  from
forcing  back  refugees  to  a country where their life or freedom would be
threatened. Similarly, states are obligated to ensure that the  fundamental
human rights of refugees and asylum seekers are respected. Such rights , as
set forth in UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusions, include "the  right  to
life,  liberty,  and  security  of  person, " and the right to be free from
subjugation "to torture or to cruel , inhumane or  degrading  treatment  or
punishment."  Beyond  these  and other "basic minimum human standards" that
all human beings are entitled to states have obligations that, in the  case
of  humanitarian  refugees,  "may be limited to the provisions of temporary
refuge and material assistance, and the pursuit of voluntary repatriation."

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Bangladesh's response to the Rohingya Exodus
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At the beginning of the Rohingya exodus, the Bangladesh government  allowed
the refugees to seek temporary asylum in Bangladesh, through it opposed the
involvement  of  UNHCR and Western humanitarian relief organizations in the
relief operation. For a short time, Bangladeshi public opinion was  largely
sympathetic  to  the  Rohingya's  plight  --  but  both  the public and the
government's attitude quickly changed.  In  december  1991,  a  Bangladeshi
paper  quoted a government official as saying, " our hands are already full
with many issues. We don't like to have a new problem [sic.] The sooner  we
get  rid of the Rohingya refugee problem the better." In mid-February 1992,
Bangladesh allowed UNHCR to assume a formal role in the relief operation as
a result of deteriorating health conditions in  the  camps  and  increasing
international pressure. Bangladesh continued, however,  to characterize the
refugee  influx  as  a short-term problem, and to demand repeatedly for the
Rohingya's prompt return to Burma. Bangladesh Foreign Minister  Mostafirzur
Rahman,  for  example,  stated in April 1993 that the repatriation would be
completed in six months.

The eventual return of the Rohingya, in principle, has not been an issue of
debate. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of the  rohingya  interviewed  by
the  author  indicated a willingness and desire to return to their homes in
Burma when the Burmese government  demonstrates  a  commitment  to  respect
their basic human rights. The means by which repatriations are achieved are
the  real  point of contention. During 1992 and 1993, human rights monitors
and the  UNHCR  repeatedly  alleged  that  the  Bangladesh  government  was
coercing,  and at times physically forcing, the refugees to return to Burma
in violation of the principle of voluntary repatriation. As detailed below,
these allegations were well founded and disputed only in terms of degree.

On April 28 1992, the Bangladesh government and SLORC signed Memorandum  of
Understanding  (MOU) under which Burma agreed to accept the return of those
refugees who could "establish  bonafide  evidence  of  their  residence  in
Burma."  The  agreement  lacked  mechanisms  for  monitoring  the safety of
returnees.  Similarly,  UNHCR's  role  in  the  process  was  not   clearly
delineated.  The  Agreement  merely  stated  that  Bangladesh  "would fully
associate the representatives of the UNHCR to assist them in the process of
safe and voluntary repatriation." The MOU did  not  mention  any  role  for
UNHCR  in  Burma.  Furthermore, evidence indicated that human rights abuses
were continuing in Arakan. According  to  a  UNHCR  cable,  at  that  time,
refugees were still arriving in Bangladesh "at a rate about 1,500 per day."

On September 22, 1992, the first repatriation took place. The government of
Bangladesh  effectively  precluded  UNHCR from monitoring the return of the
refugees; UNHCR was notified only after the repatriations had taken  place.
Prior  to  and following the repatriations, the refugees held large protest
demonstrations. They demanded a halt to the repatriations, saying that they
were involuntary, and that the refugees were not in fovor of  returning  to
Burma.  In  the course of these demonstrations, 15 refugees were killed and
100 other wounded; 119  refugees  were  arrested.  Bangladesh  subsequently
blocked UNHCR's and private relief groups' access to the camps.

On  October  8,  1992,  UNHCR and Bangladesh agreed that UNHCR would play a
role in verifying the voluntary  nature  of  the  return  movements.  UNHCR
subsequently  reported that repatriations on October 12 and October 31 were
voluntary, although UNHCR officials were only allowed access to  the  first
batch  of  refugees on the night prior to their repatriation. It is unclear
how freely refugees were able to speak to UNHCR.

According to a UNHCR situation report, 84  percent(4814  refugees)  of  the
repatriations   in  MOvember  and  December  1992  occurred  without  UNHCR
supervision. Refugee protests continued to erupt  in  opposition  to  these
repatriations.  Bangladeshi  authorities responded by beating and arresting
refugee leaders.

The methods used by  the  Bangladesh  government  to  return  the  refugees
prompted  UNHCR  to  withdraw from the repatriation program on December 22,
1992. A UNHCR press release indicated that  Bangladesh  had  been  coercing
refugees  to  return  and  that  UNHCR  had been "prevented from conducting
private interviews to ascertain whether those  returning  [were]  doing  so
voluntarily."  The  U.S.  State  Department expressed similar condemnations
about  "coerced  repatriations."  According  to  refugee  witnesses,  UNHCR
officials,  and  UNHCR  situation  reports,  the Bangladesh government used
overt physical force to carry out many of the  unsupervised  repatriations.
In  such  cases,  camp  officials  and  police forcefully herded designated
refugee families into cattle trucks; they were  then  driven  to  the  land
border,  or  ferried  across  the Naaf River, where they were expelled into
Burma. Overt physical force was also reportedly used to move refugees  from
the  regular  refugee  camps  into  the transit camps. An additional 11,216
repatriations occurred after UNHCR's withdrawal. USCR has asserted that  in
the  absence  of  UNHCR  involvement these repatriations must be considered
involuntary.

In late January 1993, Dhaka suspended the repatriation program,  saying  it
would  discuss  the  program's future with UNHCr. Shortly thereafter, UNHCR
agreed to take part again in  the  repatriation  process,  and  discussions
regarding  a  Bangladesh  UNHCR MOU ensued. In retrospect, a UNHCR official
told the author that UNHCR's withdrawal and protest  resulted  in  only  "a
slight improvement" in the Bangladesh government's repatriation practices.

During   the   next   feew   months,  the  rate  of  repatriation  declined
significantly from December 1992 and January 1993 levels. Dhaka  reportedly
continued pressuring refugees to repatriate. Such pressure included threats
of  imprisonment  for minor violations of camp rules; imprisomment could be
avoided by volunteering to repatriate. The government did, owever,  release
several hundred detaained refugees, and stopped blocking NGOs from carrying
out  their  relief  activities. Nevertheless, tensions between refugees and
local  people  remain  high.  IN  late  april,  the  police  clashed   with
demonstrators  protesting  against  the  Rohingya's  continued  presence in
Bangladesh; 26 local people were injured.

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The Bangladesh-UNHCR
Memorandum of Understanding
----------------------------
On May 12, 1993, Bangladesh and UNHCR signed a Memorandum of  Understanding
setting  forth  the  criteria  and  modalities  for the repatriation of the
Rohingya refugees. According to the MOU, Bangladesh was  to  move  refugees
identified as volunteers to one of several transit camps where UNHCR was to
conduct  "independent  interviews  with  [the]  prospective  returnees  for
certifying the voluntary nature of the repatriation." The MOU also  granted
UNHCR full daytime access to the refugee camps and transit centers.

The  MOU  also  contained clauses that established a voluntary repatriation
process. As such,  the  MOU  stood  as  a  formal  acknowledgement  by  the
government of Bangladesh of the right of the Rohingya refugees to voluntary
repatriation.  The  MOU  stated,  "the  two sides shall cooperate with each
other to prevent any attempt by any side to interfere with the exercise  of
freedom of option by the refugees."

Teh  MOU  also  stated,  "The  two sides shall cooperate with each other to
ensure safe and voluntary repatriation of ... refugees who  opt  to  return
under  existing conditions." The MOU added, "a refugee wishing to return to
Myanmar can do so at any time, and none can  prevent  him  from  exercising
this  right.  No  refugees,  likewise,  will  be forced or coerced to leave
Bangladesh ..."(Emphasis added.)

However, at the time  of  the  signing  of  the  MOU,  there  had  been  no
appreciable  improvement  in  the  human  rights situation in Burma. As set
forth above, a refugee has the right to return to his country  whenever  he
wishes,  but principles of voluntary repatriation require that repatriation
be promoted only when the safety of refugees can be assured.

At the time, the Bangladesh government seemed to be  intent  on  continuing
repatriations  and  indeed  continued  to  promote  repatriations after the
signing of the MOU. In this sense, the MOU was flawed; it did  not  contain
clauses  that  predicated  the  carrying  out  the promotion sessions on an
appreciable improvement in the conditions that caused the refugees to  flee
or on UNHCR's presence in Arakan.

>From  the  signing  of the MOU through JUly 1994, 42,900 repatriations took
place under the authority of this  agreement.  However,  the  repatriations
that  occurred  during  this  time  cannot  all be considered voluntary, as
coercion and forced repatriations continued in contravention of  principles
of voluntary repatriation.

Repatriations  were  induced  through  repeated beatings of refugees, which
fostered an extreme climate of fear. According to refugees, camp  officials
have  used  this  fear,  as  well  as  inflicting  actual abuses, to compel
refugees to present themselves to UNHCR as "volunteers"  for  repatriation.
When  UNHCR  interviewed  refugees  to  ascertain  if  they  were returning
voluntarily, many refugee felt that they had to say they  were  volunteers;
othewise,  they  could  have  faced  retribution by camp officials. On high
ranking UNHCR official estimated that as  many  as  fifty  percent  of  the
repatriations  that  occurred  prior  to  August  1994 were effected either
through overt force or other coercive methnod. Others say that  this  is  a
conservative estimate.

According  to  UNHCR  staff  and  refugees  residing  in the transit camps,
Bangladeshi officials made life in the transit camps purposefully difficult
as a means of coercing the refugees to return. Human rights abuses were the
most severe in the transit camps, including at times shed-to-shed  beatings
by camp officials.

UNHCR  situation  reports  indicate that when refugees told UNHCR that they
were not willing to return to Burma, Bangladeshi officials kept them in the
transit camps (that is, did not return them to a regular camp, as  required
by  the  MOU).  At the transit centers, the refugees were forced to live in
substandard conditions - shelters were smaller than  usual,  unstable,  and
often  provided inadequate protection from the elements. The minutes of the
FEbruary 18 1993, Relief Coordination meeting , for example, state,  "Fifty
families  (were  )  living  under  open  sky'  after  saying  no [at] UNHCR
interview."

Another means of coercing  refugees  to  return  and  preventing  organized
dissent  is  through  the broad powers of arrest that camp officials enjoy.
One UNHCR official in Cox's Bazaar told the author that camp officials have
sought out and neutralized, either by arrest or (at  MOricha  Palong  Camp)
force,  vocal  or  educated refugees who had, or might in the future, focus
opposition to repatriations. At times, two hundred or  more  Rohingya  have
been  in  jail.  According  to a UNHCR protection officer and a Bangladeshi
advocate for the refugees, many of the charges against  the  refugees  have
been  un substantiated or for violations of the law that would not normally
result in incarceration. Often, the  refugees  have  been  detained  for  a
period  prior  to a trial that exceeds the maximum sentence that could have
been imposed for the charge. For example, the  119  refugees  arrested  for
taking  part  in the demonstrations in September 1992 remained in jail more
than eighteen months after they were arrested.

Refugees living in Dua Palong, Shalerdeba, and Balukhali II refugee  camps,
as  well  as a refugee in Cox's Bazaar jail, stated to the author that they
had been singled out,  arrested,  and  sentenced  to  jail  for  acting  as
spolepersons for the refugees. One of the most vocal of the refugee leaders
remains  in  jail  two  years  after  he  led  demonstrations  opposing the
repatriations in September  and  NOvember  1992.  His  case  has  not  been
decided.  He  said  that he was singled out and arrested because he opposed
the forced repatriations that were occurring. His assertion is supported by
notices that appeared in Bangladeshi papers in mid-NOvember 1992, in  which
a  local  group  pushing  for  the prompt repatriation of the rohingya, the
Rohingya Repatriation Action Committee, offered a  reward  of  10,000  taka
[approximately  U.S. $250] for information leading to his arrest. According
to  government  statements  in  Bangladeshi  papers,  he  was  subsequently
arrested for illegally possessing a firearm.

The   MOU   states,   "The   Goernment   of  Bangladesh  shall  retain  the
responsibility for safety and security for  the  Myanmar  refugees  in  the
camps  and  outside." By failing to prevent the repeated abuses of refugees
by camp officials, Dhaka failed to fulfill  its  responsibilities  for  the
secrity  of the refugees under the MOU. In so doing, the government allowed
conditions to evolve in the refugee  camps  that  effectively  negated  the
"freedom of option" clause of the MOU.

Problems  have not been limited to Rohingya refugees residing in the camps.
Significant numbers of Rohingya asylum seeders were denied  admitance  into
the  camps.  In  addition,  many  refugees  who  have  atttempted  to enter
Bangladesh after the initial influx have been subject to arrest, detention,
and deportation.

Bangladesh also failed to fulfill clause 4.f of the MOU, which reads:

     The Government of Bangladesh assures that no refugee will  be  coerced
     into  leaving  against  his/her  will . any allegation in this respect
     that is brought to the attention of the government  of  Bangladesh  at
     the local level and at the capital level will be promptly investigated
     and remedial action taken where appropriate.

Despite  protestations and documented evidence presented by UNHCR and human
right sorganizations, the government has not prosecuted any  of  those  who
have  been  implicated  for serious and repeated human rights abuses in the
camps. In only a few circumstances  have  camp  officials  responsible  for
particularly  egregious  abuses been removed from the camps. However, these
officials retained their prestigious government jobs --  they  were  merely
transferred to other government posts.

Despite  the  problems  in  the  camps,  most  refugees  opt  to  remain in
Bangladesh and face the human rights abuses in the camps rathe rthan return
to a far more uncertain fate in Burma. According to one  refugee,  "We  are
suffering  in bangladesh, but I don't want go back. How can I go back after
what they have done to us [in Arakan] and what they will do to us ?"

In mid-April 1994, a UNHCR survey revealed that  only  27  percent  of  the
refugees   were  willing  to  return  to  Burma.  This  reportedly  created
consternation among bangladesh officials. Shortly after the results of  the
survey became public, Abdul Matin Chowdhury, the Bangladeshi Home Minister,
stated that the Rohingya would be returned to Burma by the end of 1994.  On
April  25,  Dhaka informed UNHCR that it would not be renewing the MOU that
was due to expire on May 12 but that it would extend the MOU up to June  11
and  allow  time  for   a new MOU to be negotiated. On June 11, the MOU was
again renewed for an additional month. Since the expiration of the  MOU  on
JUly   11,  the  Bangladesh-UNHCR  relationship  has  been  based  only  on
"gentlemen's  agreements."  It  is  helpful  to  view  the  shift  to  mass
repatriation  in  light of this mounting pressure that Dhaka was placing on
UNHCR.

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The Process of Mass Repatriation
--------------------------------
In  mid-August 1994, Bangladesh and UNHCR instituted a program to acclerate
substantially the repatriation of Rohingya refugees to Arakan. The case  by
case  interview  approach  was  abandoned  and  arrangements  were  made to
repatriate the refugees directly from their camps rather than  via  transit
camps.

The  registration  procedure  for  mass  repatriation  entils the following
elements: promotion sessions, registration, and individual case assessments
of refugees who allege that they will be singled out for persecution should
they be returned to Burma.

Promotion Sessions: In general, UNHCR's promotion sessions seem to be aimed
at dispelling refugee fears about returning to  Burma.  Promotion  sessions
take  several  forms.  For  example,  refugees stated that there were notes
hanging in front of the UNHCR offices in the different camps  saying."There
is peace in Myanmar. You can return."

Promotion  sessions were also conducted orally by UNHCR international staff
through an interpreter. According to refugees present  at  these  sessions,
UNHCR  told  them:"the  situation  is  normal  in  Burma".  "It  is time to
return","UNHCR is  in  Burma  and  we  will  receive  you  in  Arakan";  or
alternatively "UNHCR cannot establish itself in Burma until you return."

Refugees  said that UNHCR also stated that there would not be any "no"case.
The refugees understood this to mean that they didn't have  the  option  of
not  returning  to  Arakan.  A  refugee from Dua Palong paraphrased a UNHCR
field officer as having said, "To sum everything up, the whole idea is that
Bangladesh and Bulrma have signed a treaty. In accord with that treaty, the
Burmese government is accepting you." while  the  refugees'  versions  were
obviously  not  verbatim  restatements, they do, at the very least, reflect
the refugees' understandings of these sessions.

Camp  officials  conducted  separate  promotion  sessions  in  which   they
reportedly  used  a  melange  of  persuasion  and  threats to encourage the
refugees  to  return.  Examples  of  statements  reportedly  made  by  camp
officials  include:  At MOishkum Cmmp:"You will go or will be arrested." At
dua Palong Camp:" Within two to three weeks you must leave. If you  do  not
volunteer,  you  must  leave  serially (house by house)." At dechusa Palong
camp: "The situation will not be good if you don't return to  Burma.  "  At
Moricha  Palong  CampL  you  must  go,  you  can  not stay. Your country is
peaceful now." In Kutu Palong Camp, people were pulled out of their shed at
night by police who yelled, "Will you bo back?" Will you go back ?"

Registration: UNHCR portrays the Rohingya refugees' cooperation during  the
registration  as  evidence  of  the  voluntary  nature of that process. For
example, a UNHCR September 1994 Progresss report refurs to the registration
process as a " massive voluntary repatriation  registration."  This  report
said,  at the end of this first round of registration in September, 165,000
refugees out of the total remaining camp population of 176,000 persons have
come forward to put their names down."

However, a number of refugees indicated that they  did  not  associate  the
registration  process  with  the  repatriation, and that the fact that they
registered did not commote, at least to them  ,  and  expression  of  their
willingness  to return to Burma. In factBangladesh government officials had
told the refugees that the purpose of the registration process was to  make
corrections  in  their  family  books  and  not  that  it was a part of the
repatriation process. Consequently, refugees  could  not  opt  out  of  the
registration process -- in order to do so , they would nave needed to  know
that  they  were  participating in one. Many refugees believed that if they
did not register, they would be sebsequently denied food rations.

Rather than register and risk repatriation, many refugees have simply  left
the  camps.  According  to  february  1995  press report, as many as 20,000
refugees may have fled the camps and either settled among local  people  in
Bangladesh  or  obtained  fraudulent  travel  documents  and moved to other
countries.

Pending cases:  According  to  Stephano  Severe,  the  head  of  the  UNHCR
sub-office  in  Cox's Bazaar, all refugees are assumed to be candidates for
repatriations, unless, on thier own  initiative,  they  present  compelling
evidence that they will be subject to arrest upon their return to Burma. In
general,  UNHCR  indicated  that it would accept only those persons who are
able to establish that they  have  been  members  of  political  opposition
groups  such as the National League for Democracy (NLD), and those who are,
or are reputed to be,  members  of  insurgent  groups  (i.e.  the  Rohingya
Solidariy  organization  (RSO) or the Arakan Rohingya Islamic Front(ARIF)).
UNHCR considers persons who meet the avove criteria to be 'pending  cases'.
Refugees  who  suffered  human  rights abuses or other forms of persecution
before fleeing, or those who  fear  future  persecution  because  of  their
religious  belief,  political beliefs, or membership in a particular social
group, are not eligible to remain in Bangladesh.


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