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USCR REPORT ON THE REPATRIATION OF (r)
Subject: USCR REPORT ON THE REPATRIATION OF ROHINGYAS (PART 3 OF 4)
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The Rationale for Mass Repatriation
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Although UNHCR has not stated that there has been a cessation of the
Rohingya refugee status, the nature of the mass repatriation program
suggests that is the agency's thinking. Essentially, all of the Rohingya in
Bangladesh are slated for return, except for those who fall within the
restricted categories enumerated above. In fact, neither a cessation of the
Rohingya's refugee status nor the promotion of mass repatriation appears
justified. A close examination of the rationale upon which mass
repatriation is predicated reveals a fundamental misreading of the
situation.
According to UNHCR, the shift to mass repatriation in August 1994 was
predicated on three developments:
a) Indications that a widespread sentiment existed among the refugees in
favor of repatriation;
b) an improvement of the situation in Arakan that would allow for the
refugees to return; and
c) the establishment of UNHCR's program in Arakan.
The three points are discussed individually below. As a preface, however,
it is relevant to note that UNHCR operations, including repatriations , are
governed by the Executive committee of UNHCR as expressed in its
conclusions. Conclusion number 40 is especially relevant here. It states:
The repatriation of refugees should only take place at their freely
expressed wish; the voluntary and individual character of repatriation
of refugees and the need for it to be carried out under conditions of
absolute safety, preferably to the place of residence of the refugees
in his country of origin, should always be respected.
a) Voluntariness: UNHCR has justified the shift to mass repatriation, in
part, on the basis of a ten day survey that was concluded in Kutu Palong
refugee camp on Jly 11, 1994. According to a JUly 1994 UNHCR situation
report, the survey initially indicated that 22.7 percent of the refugees
were willing to return. This figure is consistent with the survey that was
conducted in April 1994. ONe monthe later, however, UNHCR reported that 95
percent of the camp population had volunteered to return.
The author investigated this large-scale shift and found that following the
initial survey in KUtu Palong. the Camp Magistrate [the second highest
ranking official who resides in each camp]. had severlely beaten three male
refugees (Abdul Salam, NUrul Islam, and another refugee residing on hill
number 6) with a bamboo cane for allegedly engaging in "anti-repatriation
activities."
Witnesses told the author, through two different interpreters, that the
Camp Magistrate has canes of varying diameters that are numbered from one
through seven, according to their size. In this incident, the camp
magistrate used the largest of the canes, numbers seven, which is one and a
half to two inches in diameter. Several refugees stated that at one point
the cane with which the magistrate wsas hitting thre refugees broke and had
to be replaced. ONe of the victims reportedly had his arm visibly broken
above the elbow, and all three victims were severely wounded. The victim
were reportedly taken to Ukhia Government Hospital in transit to Cox's
Bazaar, where they were throught to have been hospitalized or jailed.
Refugees who witnessed UNHCR's meeting with camp officials the day after
the incident felt that the magistrate escaped with impunity. MOne of the
officials in Kutu Palong, including the Camp Magistrate, was punished or
removed from the camp for the beatings or for the threats that they
subsequently leveled at the refugees. According to the refugees in Kutu
Palong, after the incident, a pervasive sense of helplessness prevailed in
the camps.
While both UNHCR and Dhaka admitted that the Kutu Palong beatings occurred,
they told the author that the incident did not undermine the validity of
the later survey. They attribute tthe higher numbers willing to repatriate
found in that survey to a delayed bandwagon effect. In sharp constrast to
such a view, are the separate testimonies of twenty different refugees from
Kutu palong. They attributed the beatings, the impunity of the camp
officials involved, and the fear of future beatings as the primary reasons
for their decisions to "volunteer" to return to Burma.
The author received the above information during interviews with residents
of Kutu palong temporarily outside of the camp, and at the departure point
for repatriation. All of the refugees interviewed at the departure point
expressed extremen fears about returning to Burma and indicated very
clearly that they had been compelled to return by the beatings that had
occurred in Kutu Palong and the repeated threats that had been leveled by
camp officials. One refugee who was interviewed stated:
Whenever we went to get our rations, the Camp in Charge would
interrogate us, demanding, "Have you registered to re turn ?" When
refugees would reply that they hadn't , he would curse at them and
threaten to beat them or to stop their rations.
Another refugee at the departure point said, "even if we don't want to go,
we have to go. We don't have any choice. If I didn't volunteer to go, they
would be me with no mercy."
When a middle-aged women was asked if she believed she would be beaten if
she stayed behind, she stated, "I can see it right before my eyes, I know.
OUr body is going; our soul is staying here."
When another refugee was asked the same question, he stated:"What kind of
question is that? We've seen right before our eyes what has been happening,
and what is happening, and what will happen. Who wants to be the fourth
person to be beaten like that ?
An elderly man said,"We came to Bangladesh only for shelter from the
terrible torture and killing in Burma, but now they don't want to give us
any more shelter. Before, UNHCR accused the government of forcing us back.
NOw they are forcing us back." When the call camf for the refugees to pick
up their things and board the boats, many began to cry.
The fact that refugees often flee from the camps into the local villages
when they learn that they are slated to be repatriated also belies the
purpoted voluntary nature of the repatriation.
b) The Situation in Arakan: According to the statements made at the July
1994 Relief Coordination Meeting by Stephano Severe, the head of UNHCR's
sub-office in Cox's Bazaar, the shift to mass repatriation was instituted
following a determination that "the situation in Myanmar is conducive and
congenial for the refugees to return." In an interview with the author,
Severe said, "What UNHCR is trying to achieve is that returnees will not be
treated differently than other residents of the area." In the same
interview, he said that "forced labor continues bo be a fact of life."
A number of informed observers question the statement that the situation in
Burma is "conducive and congenial for the refugees to return." IN
fact, it fails to fulfil standards of safety necessary for the promotion of
voluntary repatriation as set forth in UNHCR Executive Committee decisions.
SLORC remains in power, and widespread and brutal human rights abuses
continue. According to the 1994 U.S. department of State Report, 'Burma
Human Rights practices', " The Burmese Authorities took only limited step
to correct long standing, serious human rights violations." The State
Department describes forced labor conditions as "inhumane" andwhen coupled
with the "forced resettlement of civilians [accounted for] hundreds of
deaths due to disease, harsh treatment , and over work."
The 1993 report by UN Special Rapporteur to Burma, YOzo Yokota, similarly
found that "forced relocation and forced portering has led to a systematic
pattern of torture (including rape), cruel, inhuman, and degrading
teratment, disappearance or arbitrary execution of MUslim and other
Rakhine ethnic minorities by the Myanmar authorities." The December 1994
HUman Rights Watch(Asia) report documents egregious human rights abuses
continue to be associated with the government's mass forced labor projects.
There are other credible reports that substantiate the Rohingya's fears
about returning to Burma. The preeminent concern that the refugee expressed
was the female returnees would be raped by Burmese military forces. IN the
1994 "Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar," the UN Special
Rapportuer for Burma stated that among other "atrocities", rape was "being
committed consistently and on a wide scale by the soldiers of the Myanmar
Army against innocent villagers (particularly those belonging to ethnic
minorities)". The 1994 State Department report on Burma similarly notes "a
consistent pattern of reports alleging rapes of ethnic minority women in
border areas by Burmese soldiers."
Refugees expressed related concerns about the Burmese government's
compulsory three-month training courses for Rohingya girls conducted in
military bases, which requires that 15 to 18 year old girls be separated
from thier families, placing them under the control of military forces that
are notorious for rape. ONe man from Maungdaw said theat his brother told
him that the Na-Sa-Ka [the SLORC border patrol force in Arakan] had
"forcibly taken away in the name of training for garment factories" and
subsequently raped a number of girls from his village, including his niece.
Reportedly, the young women at the training classes are not permitted to
wear their veils or given time to praya during the day time.
UNHCR's Severe acknowledged that "training classes are being promoted
still", but he asserts that they are not occurring because of any ill will
or neferious intent. He characterized the military's establishing of the
training classses for the girl as a "case of cultural naivete" on the part
of the Buddhist Blurmese who sought to "liberate the [Rohingya] women."
Peculiarly, UNHCR also refers to this program in its September 1994
Progress Report as an example of one of the returnee "reintegration
projects".
UNHCR has acknowldeged receiving credible reports that human rights abuse
continue in Arakan. A letter form UNHCR to the Bangladesh devisional
commissioner in January 1994, for example, cited the following as an
example of persecution experienced by a refugee who had recently arrived in
Bangladesh:
In late December, Zeaul Hakim, an Imam[religious leader], was told by
the local chairman that the military was instructing a number of
fathers in the area to take a daughter to the military camp for
training in handicrafts. He was informed that his daughter would need
to remain in a military camp for approximately 6 months for this
training. As this instruction was contrary to his religious practices,
he went to the camp without his daughter. He explained to one of the
military authorities why he did not bring his daughter. After being
asked if he was a mulna [also a religious leader], he was beaten
approximately 15 times with a wooden stick and his beard and head were
shaved. The military authority then made him and several other mulnas,
who had also been beaten and had their heads and beards shaved, stand
in front of the group of fathers and told the group that if they did
not bring their daughters the following day, they would have the same
thing done to them or worse. He fled with his family to Bangladesh
that evening.
The same letter said that two refugee women who had arrived in Bangladesh
in January 1994 reported that Burmese military personnel warned them that
they should leave. One woman was reportedly asked by the military
personnel, "Why are you staying here ?" and was "specifically told by the
military that she would be beaten by the military personnel."
As a part of their repatriation package, the Rohingya receive money from
UNHCR. Refugees in the camp in Bangladesh said that returnees are often
robbed of this money and other relief supplies that they receive as a part
of their repatriation packages.
Refugees in Bangladesh also said that some returnees have not been able to
return to their villages; in some cases, thier villages no longer contain
Rohingya because they have been occupied by populations of Rakhine or
Burmans. According to the December 1994 Human Rights Watch(Asia) report,
forced relocations continue unabated throughout Burma. Some estimate that
more than one million people have been displaced inside Burma as a result
of such practices.
As a result , the Rohingya in Afakan find themselves removed from their
places of livelihood, living on land that will not sustain crops, and often
living in small enclaves in Rakhine or Burman dominated areas where
communal tensions are often fierce. Refugees and Western expatriates who
have visited Arakan as recently as November 1994 indicate that there has
been no halt to these forced relocations.
IN August, border traders told the author that movement continues to be
restricted for Muslims in Arakan State, whereas Rakhine can reportedly move
about with less difficulty. According to the refugees, these restrictions
are significant because they severely hamper the ability of the Rohingya to
conduct business and to shop. As a consequence, Rohingya are forced to
depend on Rakhine and Burmese who, according to the Rohingya, "cheat them"
by demanding absurdly high prices for essentials.
Restriction on returnees' movement may consequently fuel communal tensions.
These restrictions may also violate an unclear clause of the SLORC/UNHCR
MOU that states: "Returnees will enjoy the same freedom of movement as all
other nationals in the Rakhine State, in conformity with the existing laws
and regulations." The alleged restrictions on returnees' movement appear to
contradict UNHCR's claim in its September 1994 Progress Report that
"Returnees are free to travel and will ben entitled to the same rights as
other residents of Myanmar."
SLORC and the governments that preceded it have consistently denied the
Rohingya citizenship rights in Burma. As a result, the Rohingya are
disenfranchised and denied many of their fundamental human rights. The
conferning of citizenship rights to those Rohingya who are long time
residents of Burma is arguably necessary for a durable solution to the
Rohingya exodus.
The 1982 Burma Citizenship Law does not recognize the Rohingya as nationals
of Burma. The in effect relegates the Rohingya at best to one of the two
lower tiers of citizenship: associate citizenship, or naturalized
citizenship. In contrast to "Burma citizens", persons classifled within
these lower tiers are denied "rights stipulated from time to time by the
Council of State." Such persons can also have their citizenship revoked for
a multitude of offenses including:
... committing an act likely to endanger the sovereignty and security
of the State or public peace and tranquility or giving rise to the
belief that he is about to commit such an act;
... showing disaffection or disloyalty to the State by an act or
speech or otherwise;
... committing an offense involving moral turpitude for which he has
been sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum term of one year or a
minimum fine of kyats one thousand.
SLORC has unremitttingly punished public dissent as a crime against the
state and as a threat to public order. It has prohibited gatherings of five
or more people, regularly imprisoned dissident politicians, and imposed
restrictions on free speech and free press. Within this context, any
Rohingya enjoying citizenship rights could easily be stripped of them.
Consistent with such a concern is a SLORC statement in January 1992 that
all Rohingya who had fled Burma were subject to a fine of 5,000 kyats and
rigorous imprisonment for three years for crossing the border illegally and
making defamatory statements in Bangladesh against SLORC. Furthermore, many
refugees indicated that when they fled Burma, the army or other military
forces confiscated and destroyed their citizenship papers. It is unclear
whether these were the acts of individuale or if the reflect SLORC policy.
In its official statements, however, SLORC portrayed the Rohingya as
"illegal immigrants from Bangladesh," "migrant workers", and "absconders."
In any event, many of the Rohingya refugees are not even eligible for
either of the lower tiers of Burmese citnzenship. To qualify for associate
citizenship, an individual or his or her direct ancestors must have applied
and been acknowledged prior to 1982 as associate citizens under the Union
Citizenship Act. In order to qualify under the 1948 act, a Rohingya would
have had to have been descended
from ancestors who for two generations at least have all made any of
the territories include [sic.] within the Union their permanent home
and whose parents and himself were born in any such territories shall
be deemed to be a citizen of the Union.
It is not clear what percentage of the Rohingya registered for citizenship
prior to 1982. Such a restriction is unfairly prejudicial, however, given
Arakan's isolation and lack of state infrastructure.
Rohingya qualify as a naturalized citizens only if they were born in Burma
and their parents "entered and resided in the State prior to 4th January,
1948," or if at least one of their parents is at least recognized as a
naturalized citizen. Furthermore, Rohingya who would otherwise qualify but
who failed to apply for citizenship prior to their twnety third birthday
cease to be eligible for naturalized citizenship. Similarly, if a person
doesn't have at least one parent with some form of Burmese citizenship
(e.g. one parent loses his or her citizenship and the other is a foreigner,
or both parents lose their citizenship), then the children lose their
citizenship.
The 1982 Burma Citizenship Law also sets forth additional qualifications
for naturalized citizens that could conceivably be applied indiscriminately
or prejudicially. These include the ability to "speak well one of the
national languages [Rohingya is not recognized as such]. "be of good
character." and be of sound mind."
The result of the exclusionary nature of the citizenship act and SLORC
policies toward the Rohingya is that a significant proportion of the
Rohingya, both refugees and those residing in Arakan State, are in fact
stateless persons. This leaves the Rohingya who do not qualify for some
tier of Burmese citizenship subject to future persecution in Burma under
the rubric of the Foreign Act and its various amendments.
In his 1994 report, the UN Special Rapporteur for Burma recognized this
problem and proposed a solution that SLORC has not, however, implemented.
He recommended that
The Government of Myanmar [SLORC] should consider the revidion of the
1982 Citizenship Law to abolish its burdensome requirements for
citizenship. The law should not apply its categories of second class
citizenship in a manner which has discriminatory effects on racial or
ethnic minorities, particularly Rakhine Muslims. It should be brought
into line with the principles embodied in the Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness of 30 August 1961.
c) UNHCR's Presence in Arakan: UNHCR has given assurances that it will see
to the safety of returnees and that they will not be jeopardy. However, it
is unclear what legal mandate UNHCR has to intervene on behalf of
returnees. UNHCR and SLORC signed a memorandum of UNderstanding on NOvember
5, 1993, but it has expired. In any event, the only clauses in the MOU
relating to protection state that SLORC will:
fully cooperate in the implementation of the voluntary repatriation
programme from Bangladesh to the Rakhine State, Myanmar, including the
reintegration of all those who return.
The GOUM (Government of the Union of Myanmar) [SLORC] is responsible
for the safety, reception and reintegration of the returnees from
Bangladesh and for the overall coordination and implementation of the
voluntary repatriation exercise.
Many observers question UNHCR's ability to protect the returnees. UNHCR has
failed to ensure the safety of the Rohingya in Bangladesh, despite the fact
that the government of Bangladesh is heavily dependent upon foreign aid and
consequently, the goodwill of donor governments. In Burma, UNHCR has no
substantive means of redressing abuses that occur, nor does UNHCR have
effective means to sanction the Burmese governemnt, which is already the
object of repeated censures by the international community.
IN Bangladesh, the refugees are confined in camps that are accessible by
road, and UNHCR has relatively unimpeded access to the camps. In Burma, the
geographic, logistical, and staffing constraints that UNHCR faces will
allow only a cursory monitoring of the welfare of returnees. UNHCR's
September 1994 Progress Report gave some indication of this; it states that
for goods sent from Rangoon, "delivery requires a minimum of three weeks,
as they must be transported by road, river and sea."
A UNHCR official in Dhaka candidly told the author in July that UNHCR
cannot adequately monitor human rights abuses in Burma and that "it is very
hard to see exactly what the human rights situation is." The UNHCR official
added, "It is easier to come by information about abuses (that take place
in Arakan ) outside of Arakan than (from) inside of Arakan." When asked
about the possibility of a future refugee influx into Bangladesh, the
official said, "I think they'll be back."
UNHCR has only twelve international staff in Arakan, five of whom are
techincal consultants. In the past, the SLORC has restricted their access
to returnees. UNHCR officials in Bangladesh have also acknowledged that
UNHCR personnel in Arakan were having problems securing objective
translators who could operate without fear of punishment given the
machinations of SLORC, its pervasive international security apparatus, and
the state of fear that existed in Burma. A high ranking UNHCR official
stated that in at least one case a Burmese interpreter was discovered to
have been a SLORC agent. An expatriate who has worked extensively in Arakan
acknowldeged that in fact all of the interpreters either work for the
government or report to government officials. As a consequence, some
returnees who have reported human rights abuses to UNHCR have been punished
severely.
Reports indicate that UNHCR is presently allowed to travel without an
escort. However, problems with obtaining objective interpreters persist.
The result is that UNHCR's ability to assess the situation with any detail
is severely hampered.
The reintegration of the Rohingya into Burma is presented as a joint
operation between UNHCR and the United Nations Development Program(UNDP).
According to the UNHCR/World Food Program(WFP) Joint Appeal for Assistance,
UNDP is to be responsible for water and sanitation, health, agriculture and
fisheries, other income-generating activities, and education. However, the
UNDP program is not working in any of the areas that the Rohingya are
returning to. In December 1994, NGO officials in Burma described the
reintegration projects "as practically non-exisistent." Western NGOs are
similarly absent from reintegration programs.
International aid to the Rohingya is disbursed largely to a SLORC agency,
the Immigration and Manpower Department, an agency dominated by military
officials. As a consequence, the Rohingya returnees find themselves
dependent upon, and constaantly in contact with the military -- the same
military that was responsible for the abuses that caused the Rohingya to
flee in the first place.
The repatriation is further flawed because the process in Arakan State is
not transparent. With the exception of the 1993 visit of the Special
Rapporteur , who was allowed to interview only three returnees, and only
with SLORC translators, no human rights monitors have been allowed to visit
Arakan State to assess the welfare of the returnees. There has been a
similar lack of confidence building among the refugees. Several
organizations, for example, have proposed that refugee representatives
should be allowed to make short visits to Arakan in order to assess the
situation for themselves and then to report back to the refugees in the
camps in Bangladesh. UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusion No. 18(1980) also
recognizes the importance of such visits. However, no such provision has
been made.
/* ENDOF PART 3 */