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BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS #23 (PAR (r)
Subject: BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS #23 (PART 2 OF 3)
/* posted 9 Nov 6:00am 1995 by DRUNOO@xxxxxxxxxxxx in igc:reg.burma */
/* --------------" HRSUB: Dept. of Foreign Affairs "----------------- */
[Subject: To inquire into and report on the human rights situation
and lack of progress towards democracy in Myanmar(Burma) by the
Human Rights Sub-Committee of the parliament of Australia.
Submissions made to this enquiry by various people and
organisations are re-posted here.-- U Ne Oo]
# SUBMISSION NO. 23.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE, AUSTRALIA
-----------------------------------------------------------
Part 2 of 3.
------------
(v) The executive
-----------------
19. According to the SLORC, ministers are to be appointed by the
president from within and outside the parliament. As noted, the
home/security affairs, defence and border affairs portfolios are to
be reserved to the tatmadaw. Moreover, the president cannot remove
a minister who is a member of the tatmadaw without "co-ordinating"
with the commander-in-chief of the tatmadaw. Major uncertainty
surrounds the prosed relationship between the executive and the
legislature, notably the accountability of the former to the
latter.
(vi) The judiciary
------------------
20. The SLORC's blueprint provides for the chief justice to be
appointed by the president. Other justices are also to be
appointees of the president, although there is an additional
requirement of consultation with the chief justice over these
appointments.
(vii) Special autonomous zones
------------------------------
21. In addition to the autonomy granted to minorities in the form
of state such as the Shan state and the Karen state, the SLORC
proposes that a special autonomous zone will be provided for any
ethnic monority which has over 50% of the population in two
adjoining townships. It appears that ethnic groups which already
have a state (such as the Shan, Kachin and Karen) will not also
have an autonomous zone. However, ethnic minority groups which are
unable to meet these threshold criteria will still, under the
SLORC'S proposals, receive a degree of representations at the state
or divisional legislative level, provided such groups have a
populations of more than 44,000 in a state of division (0.1% of
national population).
22. The SLORC's proposals do not seem to encompass the existing
"special regions" controlled by ex-insurgent groups who have
"returned to the legal fold" under ceasefire agreements with the
SLORC which give them substantial autonomy. It is not yet clear
what will happen to the "special regions"under the proposed new
structure.
23. While the SLORC's proposals outline the broad organisational
structure, the division of responsibilities between the centre and
regions is not spelt out. Doubts surround the degree of real
autonomy that will be vested in the zones and regions identified
for minorities. Indeed SLORC proposals for the National Convention
reveal a clear intention to maintain a centralised system in which
the Tatmadaw continue to provide guiding, if not controlling ,
influnece.
b. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
-----------------------
24. Over five years have elapsed since Aung san Suu Kyi was placed
under house arrest. She remains a potent symbol of opposition to
military rule as the former General Secretary of the National
League for Democracy, which whon almost 80 percent of the seats in
the 1990 election. The conditions of her detention have improved,
and the SLORC's decision to allow United States Congressman
Richardson to visit her on 14 February 1994 was a welcome
development. However, she has not been permitted international
visitors since then. The SLORC has been reluctant to release her
and allow her to remain in Myanmar prior to the establishment,
thorugh the new constitution, of institutional means of containing
her influence Under current Myanmar law, Aung San Suu Kyi's
detention cannot be extended beyond January 1995 unless she is
formally charged with an offence. The SLORC has the power to rule
by decree and it is possible that it will modify the law and thus
prolong her detention.
25. While our information on Aung San Suu Kyi's current views is
necessarily limited, we understand that she would be likely to
reject any proposal that she leave Myanmar as a condition for her
release. But she may be prepared to consider transitional
arrangements unde rwhich the armed forces would play a significant
role for a defined period, and be given due recognition thereafter.
26. Aung San Suu Kyi was detained on 20 July 1989, but still has
not been charged with committing offence. The SLORC claims that she
has not been charged out of respect ofr her father, Aung San, who
played a prominent fole in Myanmar's independence struggle. She is
held under the 1975 "law to safeguard the state against the dangers
of those desiring to cause subversive acts "which provides for the
"restriction of the fundamental rights of any citizen" if she or he
is deemed to be engaged in activity which "infringes the
sovereignty and security of the state of public peace and
tranquility". Persons may be detained and arrested, or restrained,
as is the case with Aung San Suu Kyi. Former Prime Minister U Nu
was also restrained under this law.
27. The powers of this law are vested in a "central body",
originally composed of the ministers of home and religious affairs,
defence, and foreign affairs. Originally this group could order the
arrest of a person for up to 160 days, and restranit for up to a
year. Moreover, the council of Ministers (now the SLORC) could
grant sanction to continue the restraing for "a period not
exceeding 180 days at a time up to a total of three years". On 9
august 1991, however, some eleven months short of Aung San Suu
Kyi's first three years of restraint, the law was amended to make
this last phrase read "a period not exceeding one year at a time,
up to a total of five years". At the same time, the right of appeal
to the courts was deleted, restrictiong appeals exclusively to the
Council of Ministers (now the SLORC).
28. Although no definitive official explanation have everbeen
forthcoming, we understnad Aung San Suu Kyi's additional six months
under string has been justified by the technical argument that her
first six month period was set by the "central body". The full
SLORC then approved the extension of restraint, to the maximum of
three (later five) years, and this period is considered additional
to the first six months. The full sentence is thus five years and
six months, which is due to expire in January 1995.
29. On 20 September 1994 the SLORC Chairman, Senior General Than
Shwe, accompanied by Secretary 1, Khin Nyunt, met Aung San Suu Kyi.
This meeting was followed by another on 28 Octiber when Khin Nyunt,
accompanied by the Judge Advocate General (Brigadier general Than
Oo) and the Armed Services Inspector General (Brigadier General Tin
AYe, held three hours of talks in Yangon wiht Aung San Suu Kyi.
Both meetings were officially described as "frank and cordial"; the
SLORC acknowledged that the second meeting had addressed the
current political and economic situation of the country.
30. While there has been no public statement from the SLORC
outlining details of the discussions (and we have not been able to
obtain substantive detail on them), the meetings may signal the
commencement of a dialogue on substantive political issues. The
fact that the meetings have taken place is in itself a positive
sign, sucstituting recognition by the SLORC of Aung San Suu Kyi's
domestic and internaitonal importance and her potential role in
national reconciliation. Such reconciliation would be in the
interests of all political groups in the country and should allow
Myanmar to rejoin the political and economic mainstream of the
region and the wider international community. It is expected that
further meetings will occur over the next few months. At this
stage, nowever, it is not possible ti predict the outcome of the
dialogue, and the SLORC seems determined to keep the contents of
the discussions confidential and to resist any suggestion that
outside pressure is bringing about change in Myanmar.
c. Other human rihgts issues
----------------------------
31. Human rights conditions in Myanmar remain a cause for intense
internationa concern. Myanmar has a history of firm military
control, ethnic insurgnecy and widespread human rights abuses. As
noted in the introduction, the military has played a dominant role
in Myanmar's political develipment since independence in 1948,
particularly since Ne Win came to power in 1962. The SLORC's
approach to human rights issues can thus be seen as part of a
continuum established by previous military-dominated regimes. At
the same time, the SLORC's seizure of power in 1988 was
characterised by an uncompromising brutality, which appalled the
international community. Over recent years, as the SLORC has
consolidated its control and negotiated ceasefire agreements with
a number of insurgent groups, a slight improvement in the human
rights situation has become discernible. This relative easing has
been most evident since Senior General Than Shwe's assumption of
the chairmanship of the SLORC in April 1992.
(i) Security of the person
--------------------------
32. "Arbitrary arrest, detention or exile": following the SLORC's
refusal to implement the results of the 1990 elections, in which
the NLD won almost 60% of the vote and 80% of the seats, the SLORC
undertook a campaign ot intimidation and arrests or NLD members and
of other political opponents.
33. While SLORC abuses in this area have decreased in frequency in
the last two years, political detnetions continue, and it appears
that particularly harsh sentences handed down recently against
dissidents (see next paragraph) may be designed to serve as a
warning against public expression of political dissent. These
recent arrests and convictions follow events in 1993 where at least
thirteen activists were goaled for 20 years each for peaceful
political activity. It is difficult to specify with precision the
number of political prisoners currently in detention in Myanmar;
given the lack of access by outside organisations to places of
detention; but we believe that there are many.
34. On 6 October 1994 five political activists, including a senior
NLD figure, who were arreated under the Emergency provisions act
were convicted and sentenced to lengthy prison terms for peaceful
political activity. U Khin Maung Shwe, a senior NLD figure, was
sentenced to a term of seven years imprisonment and U Khin Zaw Win,
a former UNICEF consultant, was sentenced to a total of 15 years
imprisonment for smuggling offences in addition to political
offences. The official press in Yangon reported that "in addition
to anti-governemt material seized form Dr Khin Zaw Win, the
authorities also seized 62 polished rubies and sapphires and 321
Singapore dollars." He was convicted of attempting to smuggle
forgegn currency into Myanmar and precious stnoes out of Myanmar. U
Sein Hla Oo was sentenced to seven years and Saw San San Nwe and
her daughter were sentenced to 10 years and seven years
respectively.
35. Both U Khin Maung Swe and U Sein Hla Oo were previously
sentenced to 10 years imprisonment each in April 1991 for
involvement in moves to form a "parallel" government. They were
released on 1 May 1992 under Declaration 11/92 of the SLORC. Daw
San San Nwe was involved in the NLD's "defy all authorities"
campaign and was arrested under the Law Protecting the State from
Dangers of disruptive and Destructive Elements on 22 July 1989,
being released on 10 April 1990.
36. On a more encouraging note, under the current SLORC leadership
over 2000 persons "arrested and detained politacally" have now been
released, although specific information on the offences of those
released is unavailable. The curfew has been lifted, the military
courts have been replaced by the civil legal system, and some
prominenet political prisoners have received international
visitors. While the all-embracing power of military tribunals was
abolished in 1992, the civil courts remain under firm SLORC
control. Family members can usuallly determine if a person has been
detained because authorities will confirm detentions, but provide
little additional infromation. Another positive sign is that the
SLORC is engaged in an active dialogue with the INternational
Committee of the Red cross on the exercise of the ICRC's mandate in
Myanmar.
37. "Political and other extrajudicial killing and disappearances":
In 1993 U Win Ko, a member of the NLD, was murdered in KUnming,
China; while U Hla Pe, a member of the NCGUG, was murdered in
Bangkok. While there is no evidence to identify who planned and
carried out the killings, it has been suggested that the SLORC
might have been involved. Cases of disappearance do not appear to
be prevalent. Professor Yokota's report mentions credible reports
of extrajudicial killing, mostly in border areas, and often
involving porters and insurgent prisoners. The prospect of a
further decrease in military activity between the tatmadaw and the
ethnic insurgent forces following a series of ceasefire agreements,
and the continuing negotiations over additional ceasefire
arrangements, suggest that the incidence of human rights abuses
should be expected to decline further.
39. "Forced labour:" The use of forced labour in infrastructure
development and in support of military activities continues
thorughout the countryside and is an area of particular concern.
There are three main types of forced labour: conscription of
porters to support military operations, use of compulsory public
labour for large infrastructure projects ("corvee labour" or
"labour contribution", as the SLORC described it), and prison
labour for public works. Both conscript porter labour and convict
labour are provided ofr in Myanmar law.
40. The use of civilian porters by the military has prompted
credible reports of serious human rights bouses. The conscription
of porters is primarily a response to the lack of logistics support
for army units operating in remote or inaccessible areas,
especially in the border regions where communications are poor and
the counter-insurgnecy operations and military operations have been
most intense. The proctice has been commonplace since independence
(and before), and has a basis in the Army ACt, which enables
District Commissioners and Army Commanders to approve the
recruitment of civilians to provide support for Armed forces. Under
the law, each porter is to be paid a daily wage, and is to be
provided with the same rations, privileges and right to
compensation in the case of injury as a private soldier. In
practice, howerer, porters receive neither the pay nor conditions
of soldiers. In addition to the forced labour, families or porters
are sometimes required to rpovide the military with sums of money,
ostensibly for food and medicine, which it is assumed is mostly
pocketed by the military.
41. The ranges of abuses committed against porters is well
documented, and includes beating, rape, and in some instances,
murder. There are also reports of porters being used as human mine
sweepers. The worst abuses appear to be committed against porters
recruited locally from ethnic minority villages that might be
suspected of sympathising with the insurgents.
42. Sentencing of convicted criminals to imprisonment with hard
labor is provided for in Myanmar law. The work is usually unskilled
and related to infrastructure projects. Political prisoners are not
generally required to undertake prison labour, even when sentenced
to perform it.
43. There is widespread abuse of "corvee labour". This description
covers both voluntary comunity work and the large-scale
conscription of labourers to work on public works projects. There
is considerable controversory over the term. The SLORC maintains
that long historical practice and lack of international development
assistance to fund infrastructure developmemt justufy current
practice, while critics claim that the historical precedent relatis
only to voluntary work performed at the village level. The process
is usually initiated by a demand that each family contribute a
member to work for a given number of days or perform a particular
task. Reports indicat that the treatment of people forced to
provide labour varies considerably between projects and locations.
44. In 1992-93, several thousand people were forced to work on the
Aungban-LOikaw railway in particularly harsh conditions. Workers
were not paid, food and shelter were not provided, and beatings
were reported. It seems that many workers died, mostly of malaria
and diseases associated with exposure. In contrast, at a project in
Mandalay in 1994 to clear the drained Mandalay moat where no
payment ofr labour was made, there were no reports of beatings,
death of serious illness among those involved. The harshest
conditions, and the worst abuses, are usually associated with
projects some distance from villages, as usual practice is that
villagers return home in the evenings after work.
45. Recent reports of serious abuses have concentrated on the
Ye-Tavoy railway. Recent public announcement in Myanmar claim that
"volunteers " who participated in the construction of this railway
were awarded over 900,000 kyat (USD 9,000) for their "labour
contribution" and 54,000 kyat for hire of hand-pulled tractors used
in the construction. It is not clear if the money was paid to
individuals or to local communities.
(ii) Freedom of speech, assembly, religion and movement
-------------------------------------------------------
46. "Freedom of speech and the media:" The UN Special Rapporteur
has reported on the general climate of fear, and the reluctance of
Myanmar citizens to discuss political issues. Informed, critical
discussion of political issues is not permitted by the state media
monopoly. These restrictions on political debate clearly inhibit
discussions at the National Convention, thus calling into question
the Convention's credibility.
47. All publications are strictly censored, as is the electronic
media. Legal restrictions on printing and publishing have led to
dissidents being sentenced to long gaol sentences for possession of
illegal pamphlets. For example, Dr Aung Khin Sint, a delegate to
the National Convention, was imprisoned in 1993 for illegal
distribution of material to other Convention delegates; much of
this material was speeches and papers already delivered at the
convention.
48. "Freedom of peaceful assembly and association:" The SLORC does
not respect the right of peaceful assembly. The right of
association exists only for organisations permitted by law and
registered with the Myanmar government. The treatment of the NLD
and other political groups is indicative of the SLORC's
unwillingness to respect there human rights.
49. The maritial law prohibiting gatherings of more than five
persons remains in place, although it is no longer enforced in most
instances. Nevertheless, even the smallest of demonstrations have
been forcibly ended and participants sentenced to long prison
terms.
50. "Freedom of religion:" freedom of religion is provided for in
law and there is no organised persecution in Myanmar on religious
grounds. While Buddhism is the majority religion, Muslim mosques
and Christian churches operate freely.
51. "Freedom of movement and forced relocations:" Although the
majority of Myanmar citizens have the right to move and reside
within the country with relative freedom, significant areas of the
country remain off limits for most citizens for security reasons.
Widespread recourse to checkpoints and random questioning of
individuals over the reasons for their travel contribute to the
general climate of fear. A particular restriction applies to
returning Rohingyas, who receive identity documents which restrict
their freedom of movement to within Arakan state.
52. There have also been incidences where people have been subject
to forced relocation, usually in areas of significant insurgent
activity. The tatmadaw's counter-insurgency strategy is known as
"the four cuts", in which villagers within an area of military
operations are forced to relocate. The purpose of relocation is to
cut the insurgents's supply of food, finance, recruits and
intellignece. Forced relocation, used both to clear slums and to
remove villagers sympathetic to the insurgents from areas where
they can provide support, has been common throughout the SLORC's
rule.
Part 2 of 3.