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BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS #23 (PAR (r)
Subject: BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS #23 (PART 3 OF 3)
/* posted 11 Nov 6:00pm 1995 by DRUNOO@xxxxxxxxxxxx in igc:reg.burma */
/* --------------" HRSUB: Dept. of Foreign Affairs "----------------- */
[Subject: To inquire into and report on the human rights situation
and lack of progress towards democracy in Myanmar(Burma) by the
Human Rights Sub-Committee of the parliament of Australia.
Submissions made to this enquiry by various people and
organisations are re-posted here.-- U Ne Oo]
# SUBMISSION NO. 23.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE, AUSTRALIA
-----------------------------------------------------------
Part 3 of 3.
------------
Economic and Social Rights
--------------------------
53. An assessment of human rights in Myanmar should address the
economic and social rights of the people of Myanmar, as well as
their political and civil rights. Myanmar is traditionally one of
the most resource rich countries in Asia. Events in Myanmar since
independence have resulted in this potential remaining largely
unrealised. The people of Myanmar, especially those in remote rural
areas, notably the border regions, continue to suffer as a result
of a lack of economic development.
54. Some limited economic reforms has taken place under SLORC
leadership, such as privatisation of some state economic
enterprises and the introduction of a parallel currency which has
helped to circumvent the overvalued exchange rate. While the
official economic statistics, such as the claimed GDP growth rate
of 10.9 per cent for the fiscal year ending March 1993, are
generally regarded as overstated,(even taking into account the very
low base from which it was measured), most observers agree that the
economy has improved significantly in the last two years, and
should continue to improve. Total direct foreign investment has
also grown considerably ( to a claimed cumlative total of a little
over US $ 1 billion). At the same time, residual uncertainty about
Myanmar's political future, its lack of infrastructure, and
ambiguities in the foreign investment law continue to hamper growth
and discourage more substantial foreign investment.
55. While the quickening pace of economic development and
liberalisation is encouraging , there are substantial humanitarian
needs throughout Myanmar, especially in the mountainous areas and
the border areas. Myanmar's under-five mortiaily rate, at 150 every
thousand live births, is unacceptably high. Literacy rates have
fallen dramatically (as indeed has fluency in English), and there
is a severe shortage of educational materials. Primary health needs
include malarial prevention and treatment, improved water and
sanitation, further extension of child immunisation, improved
treatment of respiratory infection, leprosy and HIV/AIDS.
Significantly, health currently attracts only seven per cetn of the
national budget.
56. Recent public statement by senior SLORC officials have
recognised that the border regions have particular development
needs and lag behind the rest of the country when assessed against
economic and social indicators. In response to these needs, the
SLORC has released its national plan for development of border
areas over the next ten years. The plan provides for the investment
of 13 billion kyat (USD 130 million) in infrastructure projects and
socio-economic development measures, opium eradication, and
preservation of culture in areas accounting for 7% of population.
The aim of the plan is to close the gap between selected border
areas and the rest of the country. The plan covers all border
states and divisions comprising of 63 ethnic groups, including
areas still under the control or administration of particular
ethnic groups such as the Kachin Independence Organization. The
plan also extends to areas where the SLORC has yet to reach an
accomodation i.e. the Karen, Mon, and Karenni insurgent groups.
57. The SLORC plan provides for the implamentation of fifteen
projects in infrastructure and socio-economic development. The
primary emphasis is on the provision of roads, transport,
construction and communications which , of course, also have
obvious military implications. Education, health services, mineral
exploration and agriculture are key themes in socio-economic
development plans.
58. The SLORC clearly sees expanded foreign investment and aid as
essential in promoting exonomic development in Myanmar. AIDAB's
submission to the Sub-Committee provides more detail on these
issues.
Minority rights
---------------
59. The challenge of handling the rights and aspirations of the
ethnic minorities in Myanmar has been high on the courtry's agenda
since independence. The SLORC now has ceasefire agreements in place
with all but three of the ethnic insurgent groups, but SLORC
actions to date and the proposals now before the National
Convention do not give a clear idea how this central issue of
national reconciliation will be resolved.
60. In the Thai/Myanmar border region, there has been a reduction
in the level of conflict and the opening up of a dialogue with the
insurgent groups. Of the various ethnic insurgent groups which make
up of the Democratic Alliance of Burma, only the Karen, Mon and
Karenni have yet to enter into ceasefire agreemtnts with Yangon
(these groups have held some preliminary - but so far fruitless
talks with SLORC). The Karen is one of the largest of the ethnic
minorities, and poses the most significant military threat. The Mon
has a more modest sized army, while Karenni is smaller again. All
sides have been required to make significant concessions in the
course of the negotiations leading to these agreements. Most of the
former insurgent groups which have reached agreements with the
SLORC have been allowed to keep their arms and all have been
permitted to retain a degree of administrative autonomy in their
areas.
61. On 9 October the SLORC announced the "return to the legal
fold" of the Shan State Nationalities Peoples Liberation
Organisation(SSNPLO). In reaching the ceasefire agreement, the
SSNPLO publically renounced armed struggle and the possibility of
secession, and surrendered its weapons. The surrender of weapons
marked a departure of previous practice, in which other armed
groups, particularly those which controlled territory, were allowed
to retain their arms. With the exception of Khun Sa's Mong Tai
Army, which the SLORC does not include amongst the armed groups
covered by its appeal for political settlements, the return to the
legal fold of the SSNPO should bring to an end ethnic insurgency in
Shan State. This agreement brings to thirteen the number of ethnic
insurgent groups joining the process of national reconciliation.
62. The achievement of ceasefires will need to be transformed into
broader and deeper political reconciliations if lasting peace is to
be achieved. The SLORC will have to provide a genuine response to
the aspirations of the ethnic minorities for substantial degree of
autonomy. As discussed above, the SLORC has sought to address these
aspirations by proposing the concepts of states and autonomous
"special areas" with unspecified power for ethnic groups in the
National Convention process. It remains to be seen whether the
SLORC's constitutional blueprint will satisfy the aspirations of
Myanmar's diverse ethnic minorities.
63. The Myanmar Government moved to address the situation of the
Rohingya refugees who fled to Bangladesh in 1992, agreeing in
NOvember 1993 to UNHCR monitoring of their repatriation and
reintegration. The repatriation and resettlement process has
proceeded well, with ober 75,000 people being repatriated in the
two years between September 1992 and September 1994. Approximately
170,000 people remain in camps in Bangladesh awaiting repatriation
which is continuing. Approximately 95% of those Rohingya currently
in bangladesh have registered to return to Myanmar.
People from Myanmar in Thailand
-------------------------------
64. The presence of an estimated 400,000 Myanmar citizens currently
in Thailand raises human rights concerns. The vast majority of
these people , approximately 300,000 are illegal workers drawn to
Thailand in pursuit of economic opportunities. Approximately 76,000
are people displaced by or fleeing fighting, or seeking refuge from
the repressive political climate in Myanmar. Most of these
individuals are in camps along the Thai-Myanmar border, the largest
groups being the Karen (over 55,000) and the Mon (over 10,000).
there are approximately 2,300 students and other dissidents who
have been recognised as persons concern by UNHCR. There are an
unknown number of other political dissidents from Myanmar in
Thailand.
65. Thailand has generously provided temporary shelter for many
Myanmar citizens. Nevertheless, there have been recent indications
that Thailand is seeking to toughen its policy. The Thai
Authorities have taken action that has resulted in people displaced
from Myanmar being forced to return to Myanmar against their will.
The most recent incident occurred in August 1994 when the Thai
authorities suspended food aid distribution to agroup of Mon people
in a border camp, thereby forcing them to return across the border
to Myanmar. However, the Thai military soon recommenced
distributing food aid directly to the Mon, and then permitted NGOs
access to resume their welfare activities.
66. Thailand has not acceded to the UN Convention or the Protocols
relating to refugees and does not have a refugee determination
process to distinguish those asylum-seekers in genuine need of
protection from illegal immigrants.
67. The SLORC has commenced a dialogue with the UN on political
developments in Myanmar. While in New York in October 1994 to
attend the UN General Assembly, Myanmar Foreign Minister U Ohn Gyaw
held a series of meetings with representatives of the UN Secretary
-General. It is hoped that this marks the commencement of greater
UN involvement in the discussion about Myanmar's political
development.
68. In October 1993 the Government of Myanmar withdrew previous
reservations on key articles of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, to which it acceded in July 1991. Specifically, Myanmar
withdrew reservations to Article 15 (regarding freedom of
association) and Article 37 (regarding the prohibition of torture,
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of children during
interrogation).
69. It has also agreed to begin working with the Interantional
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to train military officers in
international humanitarian law following Myanmar's ratification in
1992 of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. These improvements and
reforms have been welcomed in various United Nations resolutions
and by a range of international NGOs.
Australia's approach
--------------------
70. Australia has interests in a politically stable and more
democratic Myanmar which is not aligned in a way that adversely
affects regional security; in promoting economic reform in Myanmar;
in improving living conditions for its people; and in seeing
greater respect for human rights in that country. The high
proportion of narcotics entering Australia from Myanmar, and the
presence of a substantial Myanmar community in Australia, are
important other factors.
71. Australia's approach to Myanmar gives particular weight to the
fundamental objectives of encouraging Myanmar to develop a more
particapative system of govrnment, to improve the lot of its people
and to observe internationally recognized standards of human
rights. The main strands of Australia's current policy in relation
to Myanmar are conditioned by these aims. There is a ban on defence
exports to Myanmar and a suspension of defence visits from
Australia; the government continues the suspension of Austrade
visits to Yangon, while maintaining a locally-staffed Austrade
office with guidelines to "neither encourage nor discourage" trade.
While the Government has suspended direct bilateral aid, it
continues to provide humanitarian assistance to displaced people
from Myanmar, in Bangladesh and Thailand, as needs dictate. In
addition, we use our best endeavours to confine assistance programs
of UN organisations in MYanmar to grassroots activities.
72. While direct bilageral development assistance has been
suspended, in 1994/95 a total of $1,000,000 is budgetted in the
Myanmar program for humanitarian aid delivered through NGOs. This
aid delivery has a number of dimensions: assistance to Myanmar
students in Thailand enabling them to undertaken tertiary studies
in Australia; AIDS education, prevention and control programs; a
maternal and child health program; an funding of a position under
the UN Drug Control Program in Myanmar. Relief assistance is also
provided; in 1993;94 a totals of $1.5 million was provided through
Australian NGOs to Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. It is expected
that a similar amount will be provided in 1994/95. Support for
people displaced from Myanmar, sheltering in Thailand, has been
provided since 1989/90. In 1993/94 $300,000 was provided for these
displaced people and this form of assistance is continuing in the
current financial year. We have dedicated $200,000 in 1993/94 for
HIV/AIDS prevention in Myanmar. Mr Bilney has recently approved
continuation of this program in 1994/95, and introduction of a new,
additional $200,000 program in 1994/95 for maternal and child
welfare. These funds are to be channelled through Australian NGOs.
73. We also remain concerned about the situation of people from
Myanmar currently sheltering in neighbouring Thailand. The
government has provided approximately A$1 million in humanitarian
assistance to people from Myanmar located on the thai-myanmar
border since 1989/90, largely in support of relief activities
undertaken by international and Australian NGOs. This include
$300,000 package of assistance announced in April this year by Mr
Bilney. These funds will be used for the purchase of medical
supplies, the provision of immunisation and other medical services,
water supply and sanitation, rice and other food items, mos2quito
nets, and transportantion. AIDAB will provide the Sub-Committee
with more detain on aid delivery in its submission.
74. We also have a program to assist displaced Myanmar students in
Thailand to study in Australia, and a Special Assistance Category
(SAC) for Burmese in Thailand under the immigration program. The
number of places allocated under the SAC has recently been
increased from 50 to 100. It will be noted from the above that the
bulk of humanitarian and other assistance is currently expended
outside Myanmar.
75. In pursuit of our human rights objectives, Australia seeks to
apply a range of measures in promoting human rights observance
including public statements, diplomatic representations, efforts to
sterngthen the UN's human rights mechinery and the promotion of
legal and human rights infrastructure in general.
76. Australia has been prominent in international efforts to
pressure the SLORC to implement political reforms and adhere to
universally accepted standards of human rights. We have condemned
the detention of political leaders in Myanmar, and encouraged our
international partners to use their influence and contact with
Myanmar to promote change in that country. Other measures have
included active support for strong resolutions at the UN General
Assembly and UN commission on Human Rights, support for ICRC
objectives,and encouraging the continuation of the UNHCR program
which manages the safe return and reintegration of the Rohingya
refugees from Bangladesh into Myanmar. We have also promoted
reconciliation between the various parties to conflict in Myanmar;
and in January 1994 arranged the Experts Workshop with Griffith
University as a means of identifying fresh and creative approaches
to the situation in Myanmar.
77. The Australian Government has a continuing dialogue with
Myanmar authorities on human rights and kinderd issues. The
Government's concern on human rights issues are regularly conveyed
through our Embassy in Yangon. Moreover, Senator Evans has met
Myanmar Foreign Minister U Ohn Gyaw on a number of occasions, most
recently in Bangkok in Jyly 1994 and again at the UN General
Assembly in New York in October 1994. AT these meetings Senator
Evans conveyed the hope that the meeting between the SLORC and Aung
San suu Kyi would lead to a dialogue of real substance on the
constitutional and political future of Myanmar and take forward the
process of national reconciliation.
78. At his meeting with U Ohn Gyaw in October 1994, Senator Evans
sought clarification about the direction of the National
Convention, registering concerns about deficiencies of form and
substance in relation to this process. While recognising some
positive strands in the SLORC's proposals for the country's
political future, such as greater recognition of the rights of the
minorities, we are concerned about other elements, notably those
which entrench the military's dominant place in the political
affairs. We are also concerned that there is no timetable for the
Convention process and no evidence of transitional arrangements for
a return to a more participative and genuinely representative
system of government in Myanmar. Senator Evans has also ex0pressed
the view that free participation by the full range of elected
representatives in the Convention's deliberation, and easing other
restrictions which inhibit debate on constitutional and political
reform, would significantly enhance the credibility of the
convention process.
79. At the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference in Bangkok in Jyly
1994, there was general acceptance among ASEAN countries and
dialogue partners that any progress in Myanmar would be achieved
through dialogue and engagement by the international community,
rather than through confrontation and isolation. Senator Evan's
idea that "benchmarks" provided a means of guaging movement in
Myanmar achieved widespread acceptance; and it was also agreed that
there should be a relationship between concessions to the SLORC an
d progress in Myanmar.
80. At the ASEAN PMC Senator Evans identified a series of possible
benchmarks:
- the unconditional release of Aung San suu Kyi;
- the commencement of a serious dialogue between the SLORC and Aung
San Suu Kyi about the political and constitutional evolution of the
country;
- access to political prisoners by the International Committee of
the Red Cross, UN Special Rapporteur and other outsiders;
- a review and reduction of sentences imposed for political
activity;
- significant progress in the proposed dialogue between the SLORC
and the UN;
- a clear timetable for the constitutional process with delegates
able to participate more freely;
- agreement by the SLORC to the inclusion of transitional
provisions in the new constitution permitting further
constitutional development;
- the provision of legal guarantees for the rights of the ethnic
minorities;
- the cessation of forced labour and porterage beyond what are
traditional practices; and
- the repeal of censership and state protection legislation.
81. The Australian Government will continue to engage the SLORC in
dialogue to explain our concerns. We will also continue to stress
that progress on political development and human rights issues is
critical to Myanmar returning to the international mainstream, and
to urge progress against the identified benchmarks.
Conclusion
----------
82. Australia remains committed to the pursuit of political reform
and respect for human rights in Myanmar. While an early, smoothe
transition to democratic governemnt in Myanmar would be consistent
with Australia's values and interests in the region, Australia does
not realistically expect Myanmar to introduce a Western-style
democracy overnight given the history of the country since 1948:
apart from a brief period of parliamentary government between
independence and the military's taking of power in 1962, there has
been no established tradition of parliamentary democracy in
Myanmar. While the political problems facing Myanmar are undeniably
complex and difficult, the approach taken by the SLORC to date
reflects disturbingly little commitment to democratic principles.
The SLORC continues to argue that Myanmar needs a strong central
government with a significant military component to ensure national
security an stability. While the SLORC claims that its role is
temporary, and that power will be transferred to a new government
following the National Convention, indications are that the SLORC
is determined to entrench the role of the military in the political
system.
83. There have also been some significant shifts in the region over
the past twelve to eighteen months which have implications for
international approachs to Myanmar, including Australia's position.
The ASEAN countries have clearly decided that developments in
Myanmar are sufficient to warrant a form of engagement with the
SLORC, with consequent more extensive high level bilateral contact,
and the decision to invite Myanmar to the 1994 ASEAN Ministerial
Meeting as a guest of Thailand. Key ASEAN members are promoting the
long-term idea of a South East Asian community taking in all ten of
the South East Asian countries, which would include Myanmar. At the
same time, ASEAN has appeared willing to embrace the "benchmarks"
approach prososed by Australia at the 1994 ASEAN PMC , and is in no
rush to accelerate its embrace of Myanmar at this stage.
84. In our dealings with Myanmar, we see a firm but graduated and
nuanced approach as having the greatest chance of success. In
seeking to advance the situation in Myanmar, we see the best way
forward as to encourage the Governmet of that country to
accommodate democratic and other concerns on a step-by-step basis,
by combining a judicious mix of pressure and persuasion on our part.
Ther is clearly no point in continuing to call for economic or
other types of sanctions against the SLORC, as it has not been
possible to mobilise significant international support for them.
Nor is it clear how effective such measures, if set in place, would
actually be in bringing about positive change in isolationist
Myanmar. At the same time, measured pressure on the SLORC,
bilaterally and through multilateral institutions, to open itself
to dialogue and adhere more closely to internationally accepted
human rights standards, offers the best prospect of achieving
progress.
85. The limited progress that has taken place in the political and
human rights situation in Myanmar suggests that this approach of
dialogue with SLORC is yielding some dividends. The Myanmar
leadership is increasingly interested in being part of the regional
and internaitonal community. Moreover, the prospective link between
economic and political liberalisation provides a substantial
argument in favour of greater dialogue and contact on the part of
the international community with the Government of Myanmar. However
the SLORC must also continue taking further tangible steps in the
right direction.
86. WE recognise that Australia on its own lacks decisive leverage
vis-a-vis the SLORC. Given its legitimate interests in Myanmar,
however, Australia will continue to strive to inject new approaches
and creative thinking into regional consideration of this
significant regional problem.
87. In our view, against this background, the best option for
Australia, regional countries and the international community is a
sustained exercise requiring patience and determinatioon,with a
focus on confidence-building and the gradual phasing out of
military authority over the longer term. The Australian Government
will continue to work hard, in concert with the international
community, to promote positive change in Myanmar. In pursuit of
these aims, we will maintain contact with, and seek input from
concerned NGOs and other groups such as the Parliamentary Friends
of burma.
Part 3 of 3.
ENDREPORT\