SECURITY ZONES AND RESOLUTION 688 (

[uneoo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

Subject: SECURITY ZONES AND RESOLUTION 688 (REPOST)

DISCUSSIONS ON THE INTERNET (31/7/95)

/* posted 31 July 6:00am 1995 by DRUNOO@xxxxxxxxxxxx(DR U NE OO) in igc:reg.burma */
/* ------------------" Security Zones and Resolution 688 "------------------- */

[There are significant numbers of Security Council resolutions
which affect the protection and repatriation of refugees. The
one which may have relevance to the Burmese refugees situation
is posted here. This resolution attempts to tackle the problems
associated with human rights abuses, internally displaced people
and refugee flows.

In regards to the policy of Royal Thai Government on Burmese
refugees, present humanitarian stand and care for refugees, on
an overall picture, must considered to be acceptable. We must
continue to humbly request temporary protection for all Burmese
on Thai soil, in order to be able to make a proper and organized
repatriations.

Although the organized and orderly repatriation is considered to
be the ideal situation for all concerned, there can be emergencies
that may force refugee to repatriate. SLORC has been pressuring on
Thai businesses in regards to Thai's stand on refugees. In case
of the Thai Government requests, or shows its intention for, the
Burma's refugee problem to be resolved in urgency, the UN Security
Council resolution may certainly be required. The security of
refugee and displaced population must be all the time given the
priority.

To speak of the truth, Burmese political conflicts including armed
insurgency, and that of refugee crisis are not comparable to the
level of violence - and that of media attention - occured in
the world's troubled places: Bosnia, Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda etc.
However, it will be quite unfair - and inhumane - to suggest such
violence are needed to receive the attention of the Security
Council. On the otherhand, that is what exactly we try to prevent
throughout the crisis - the escalation of conflict into a more
violent mode. We just hope that the UN Secretary-General understand
our intention and use his office to take measure to resolve
the problems. -- U Ne Oo]
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Repreduced from "The State of the World's Refugees"; UNHCR 1993.

Box 5.1 EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN IRAQ
----------------------------------

Around four million people were displaced in the 12 months
following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Between
August and Deceber, during the build-up to the Gulf WAr, more
than a million migrant workers and other foreign nationals fled
from Iraq and Kuwait into Jordan and other neighbouring
countries, while some 850,000 Yemenis living in Saudi Arabia
streamed back to their homeland.

It was not, nowever, until early April 1991, shortly after the
war had ended, that armed conflict between the Iraqi government
and disaffected groups within the country provoked one of the
largest and fastest refugee movements in recent history. In a
three-week period, over 400,000 Iraqis fled to the Turkish
frontier. By mid-May a further 1.4 million had taken refuge
either in the Islamic Republic of Iran or in the eastern border
area of Iraq. With the exception of some 70,000 Shi'ites from
the southern region around Basra, the overwhelming majority were
Kurds.

The sudden, massive outflow prompted a humanitarian relief
operation of unprecendented scope and intensity. On the Turkish
border, providing assistance to so many refugees scattered
across a dozen isolated and inhospitable mountain locations
presented an immense logistical problem. Relief was provided by
international agencies and also, on a much larger scale, by teh
13-nation coalition force, around 30 bilateral donors and over
50 NGOs. Employing more than 20,000 personnel and 200 aircraft,
the allied operation provided dramatic and unprecendented
evidence of the logistical and relief capacity of the
industralized states and thier military establishments.

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the industralized
countries were considerable less forthcoming with assistance
despite the much greater numbers of refugees, UNHCR mounted one
of the most ambitious airlifts it had ever under taken. Even so,
deliveries could not keep pace with the speed of the emergency.
By the end of April, only 12 per cent of the blankets, 9 percent
of the tents required had been delivered. Relief flights were
consequently increased to ten a day throughout May. In all, the
airlift delivered just under 6,100 metric tons of relief
supplies during April and May 1991.

The speed with which the refugees fled Iraq was matched by that
of their return. They started to trek home within six weeks of
the start of the exodus. On 18 April 1991, the UN and Iraq
signed an agreement allowing UN humanitarian centres to be
established on Iraqi territory. Coalition forces extended their
presence into the north of the country, creating a security zone
near the Iraqi-Turkish border designed to encourage refugees
back into more accessible areas of Iraq where they could be more
easily fed and sheltered. In mid-July, when the coalition forces
withdrew, responsibility for humanitarian assistance in the
security zone was transferred to UNHCR.

The massive movement backed down from the Turkish border region
began in the second half of April, and the last of the mountain
camps was closed in early June. Large-scale return from the
Islamic Republic of Iran also began in April . By Decembe4, only
70,000 Iraqis from the 1991 refugee population were left in the
Islamic Republic of Iran and some 10,000 in Turkey.

The refugees' return to a devastated landscape and continuing
insecurity presented a number of serious problems. At the end of
August, large numbers of people were still without adequate
shelter in northern Iraq and in danger form the rigours of the
oncoming winter. In a race against the clock, UNHCr launched one
of its largest ever shelter programmes. Distribution of building
materials was not started until 15 October, when the population
movements were sufficiently stabilized. To be effective against
winter, it had to be completed by mid-November. Although
security considerations delayed the implementation of the
programme, by 30 October some 1,600 trucks had crossed the
border from Turkey to Iraq over dangerous mountain trails to
deliver around 30,000 metric tons of winter construction
material to half a milion people. Between October and December
1991, reconstruction work was carried out in more than 1,500 of
the 4,000 villages that had been destroyed.

With the emergency relief phase completed and rehabilitation and
reconstruction under way, UNHCR handed over its operation to
other United Nations agencies in June 1992.

The Iraqi refugee crisis, exceptional though it may have been in
many ways - not least in the strategic interest that it held for
the industralized world - reflected the growing scale and
complexity of humanitarian emergencies and revealed serious
shortcomings in the ability of humanitarian organizations to
respond swiftly and effectively. It provoked a radical
reassessment of the UN emergency response systems.

Attempts to improve co-ordination, which lay at the heart of the
debate, resulted in the establishment of the United Nations
Emergency Co-ordinator and the creation of the Department of
Humanitarian Affairs at the beginning of 1992. The crisis also
resulted in and enhanced appreciation of the importance of early
warinig mechanisms and emergency response capacity in tackling
major humanitarian crises.

In addition, difficult questions were raised concerning mandates
and fundamental principles. How should the need for humanitarian
intervention be balanced against national sovereignty ? How can
the unparalleled capacity of the military be used most
effectively in humanitarian operations ? Who should be
responsible for the needs of mixed populations that include
refugees ? What is UNHCR's role in providing protection and
assistance to internally displaced people ? and what are the
principles governing repatriation into situations of continuing
conflict ? Although definitive answers to these questions have
yet to be found, they are of crucial importance if the
international community is to respond effectively to future
emergencies of this magnitude.

/* Endreport */