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BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT OCT 95 (6 (r)
Subject: BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT OCT 95 (6.82-6.107)
/* posted Sun 10 Mar 6:00am 1996 by DRUNOO@xxxxxxxxxxxx
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/* -----------" BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, OCT 95 (6.82-6.107) "---------- */
CHAPTER SIX: (6.82 - 6.107)
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The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia
Joint Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMOCRACY
IN BURMA (MYANMAR) October 1995
CHAPTER SIX: ENGAGEMENT OF ISOLATION (6.82 - 6.107)
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Assistance to NGOs for Human Rights Training, Legal And Other Services.
6.83 A number of witnesses suggested to the Committee that because of the
long history of authoritarian government in Burma there is a paucity of
civil society and a poor understanding of what democracy means in practice.
It was suggested that a valuable contribution could be made to the future
civil society of Burma if, on the border regions, Australia provided aid
through NGOs for training in the domestic or international legal and
administrative systems which underlie democracy. The Committee has looked
at such programs in its human rights reports tabled in 1992 and 1994.
6.84 The Committee recommends that:
33. AUSAID SET ASIDE SOME OF ITS FUNDING TO BURMA FOR EDUCATIONAL
PROGRAMS DIRECTED AT THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND AN
UNDERSTANDING OF DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES AMONGST THE PEOPLE IN THE
BORDER CAMPS.
6.85 Students. A valuable if limited program has been the student program
which provides tertiary education in Australia for students displaced
following the military coup in 1988. Many students fled to the border and
into Thailand. Their residency there has been tenuous. They have no refugee
status. A number have reported violent attacks [48] and there is little
prospect of their returning to Burma in the short term. They constitute a
limited number of people; it was estimated that approximately 2,300 remain
in Thailand. Australia provided 10 places in 1993-94 and intends to take
another 10 students in 1994-95. Other small student programs have been
provided by Japan, the United Kingdom and the UNited States but the nature
of these programs is not known.
6.86 Given the limited numbers involved, this is a program which could
humanely be expanded. The Australia-Burma Council argued that there was
very great need and danger for the people on the border and that therefore
there should be an expanded student program.
[P]eople of Burma residing in Thailand - either on the streets of
Thailand or in the so-called safe camps - are in constant danger of
deportation. Many have stated publicly that if they are sent back
to Burma, they hope they are simply shot outrignt, as the option is
simply too hideous to contemplate. The Thais have been
accommodating up to now - however as their trade and diplomatic
status improves with Burma, the pro-democratic forces are creating
a situation of embarrassment for them, and this is goint to further
risk reprisals to the Burmese illegally residing in Thailand. ... I
understand the conditions in the special detention centre and the
immigration detention centre are .. horrific. ... The fact that
there are so few should be seen as an advantage, not a
disadvantage. ... It is a stable number of people that are at risk,
and at great risk [49].
6.87 The Committee recommends that:
34. THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT
(A) INCREASE THE INTAKE OF STUDENTS FROM BURMA IN THIS CATEGORY TO
AT LEAST 12 PER YEAR; AND
(B) ENCOURAGE STUDENTS TO UNDERTAKE, POSSIBLY THROUGH THE TAFE
SYSTEM, SKILLS BASED COURSES RELEVANT TO THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
NEEDS OF BURMA.
6.88 Similar claims of risk affecting Burmese on the Thai-Burmese border
were made by the Tribal Refugee Welfare Organisation. Tehy cited the
Amnesty International Report, 'Thailand: Burmese and other Asylum Seekers
at Risk', September 1994, which expressed concern at the lack of legal
recognition as refugees of the Burmese in Thailand, their routine arrest,
prosecution and detention as illegal immigrants and the inability of UNHCR
to offer them the full range of protection. The Amnesty International
report documented claims of ill treatment at the Immigration Detention
Centre in Bangkok - overcrowding, insufficient food, lack of water,
extortion and forcible deportation to Burma.
6.89 The intake of Burmese from Thailand under the Special Assistance
Category (SAC) is 200 for 1995-96 [50]. The Tribal Refugee Welfare believed
that there was good reason for Australian Government to increase the number
of places allocated to this group.
6.90 The Committee recommends that:
THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT INCREASE NUMBERS IN THE SPECIAL
ASSISTANCE CATEGORY FOR PEOPLE FROM BURMA RESIDING IN THAILAND TO
BRING IT UP TO THE LEVEL OF THE INTAKE FROM RANGOON.
Multilateral Institutions
6.91 World Bank: Perhaps the most important leverage on the SLORC regime at
present is the non-involvement of the World Bank and the Asian Development
Bank in loans to the country. In 1994 a mission was sent to review the
economic reforms being undertaking by the Government.
6.92 Asian Development Bank: The Asian Development Bank has one outstanding
loan with Burma, but no new loans have been made since the uprising in
1988. Thirty-two loans had been approved prior to 1986. As with the World
Bank they sent a fact finding mission to Burma in late 1994 to review
economic and social conditions in Burma, focusing on a) recent
macroeconomic and structural developments and on b) the state of education
and health in the country. The Board is currently considering the report of
the visit.
6.93 The Committee recommends that:
36. THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES
AND WITH THE WORLD BANK AND THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK TO
DISCOURAGE REINVESTMENT IN BURMA UNTIL POLITICAL REFORMS IN LINE
WITH THE BANKS' GOOD GOVERNANCE POLICIES HAVE BEGUN, IN PARTICULAR
THE END TO FORCED LABOUR, THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONERS,
DIALOGUE WITH AUNG SAN SUU KYI AND CHANGES TO THE STRUCTURE AND
PROCEDURES OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION.
Isolation Vs Engagement
6.94 Those who promote the countinuing isolation of Burma argue that the
policy has worked. They say that the election of 1990 and particularly
agreement to allow international observers at that election would not have
happened with the suspension of aid and accompanying international outrage
over the killing in 1988. Despite the failure to implement the results of
the election, it was important in establishing the political will at the
time. World criticism over the failure to implement the election results
pressured the SLORC to establish the National Convention, an achievement
limited by teh fradulent nature of its procedures. The SLORC cares enough
about its international image to use the Convention as its chief propagenda
weapon when confronted with its failure to hand over power. Supporters of
continuing pressure on Burma also argue that it was the suspension of aid
and the consequent rapid deterioration in Burma's health and education
services and overall economic indicators which forced the open door
economic policy after 1992.
6.95 ASEAN countries, particularly Thailand, claim as achievements for the
policy of constructive engagement the ceasefires and the release of Aung
San Suu Kyi. While it is true that the Government of Thailand is said to
have brought diplomatic pressure on the SLORC over these two matters, the
release of Aung San Suu Kyi has been a world wide demand. And moreover, the
ceasefires are military and not political settlements. The cessation of
hostilities is important but the long term prospects for peace are marred
by the lack of structural political change. The end of human rights abuses
can only come with progress towards democracy. For the most part, the
ASEAN countries have made no demands on the SLORC for changes in the worst
features of teh regime.
6.96 The core of ASEAN's argument then is that engagement through trade and
the delivery of aid will bring about structural political change. This is
premised on the belief that you have to live with what you cannot change
and that economic growth has an automatic liberalising effect.
6.97 Here the isolationists argue that, with a policy of engagement, change
is not guaranteed and engagement without political reform will entrench the
regime in power. Tehy believe that the weakness lies in the fact that ASEAN
does not make demands on the SLORC to ameliorate its practices. And they
argue that the limited reforms implemented so far have not even led to
significant growth as the SLORC claimed. They say that the statistics are
doubtful, particularly taking into account the difference between the
official exchange rate and the black market, that the vaunted economic
progress is illusory as it is based on rises in consumption, unequally
distributed and that the underlying indicators are poor. Inflation is high,
the money supply has increased at an annual rate of 53 per cent and violent
social dislocation in the countryside does not make for good economic
development. This case is put by Harne Yawnghwe in an article in Burma
Debate, July/August 1994, where he likens the current economic changes to
those of the 1970s. At that time, he said:
The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, Japan and other nations
increased foreign aid to at least half a billion dollars. Then, as
now, the reforms were superficial and the aid was absorbed by the
56 state enterprises and the corrupt system until, by the mid-80s,
Burma was again facing an economic crisis and became a Least
Developed Country. ... The question is not whether foreign
investment and aid will make a difference, but whether or not there
is a will to intriduce real reforms [51].
6.98 On her release Aung San Suu Kyi argued for this case. She urged
caution and restraint on investment in particular. She rejected the policy
of constructive engagement as not constructive for either democracy or
Burma. She believes that further engagement with Burma should be
conditional on democratic reform.
Benchmarks - Qualified Engagement
6.99 Since the ASEAN Ministerial Conference in 1994, the policy of the
Australian Government towards Burma has sought to affirm the desire of
Australia for engagement with Burma and at the same time accommodate
ASEAN's constructive engagement policy by clarifying the basis on which the
engagement might become truly constructive. This was to be achieved by
specifying particular aspects of Australia's foreign policy goal of a more
democratic Burma. Underlying the benchmarks of the Government is the
assumption that the best opportunity for peace and stability in Burma lies
in reconciliation.
6.100 At the 1994 ASEAN meeting Senator Evans identified a series of
possible benchmarks which might govern Burma's reentry into international
forums. The benchmarks represent those things which are perceived to be
either the cause of human rights abuses in Burma or the abuses themselves.
They are the basic obligations of Burma as a good international citizen
and a member of the United Nations. They also represent the major areas of
international objection to Burma's policies. At the last hearing of the
Committee the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade reported on the
extent to which Burma had met these concerns.
1. THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF AUNG SAN SUU KYI;
Aung San Suu Kyi was released apprently unconditionally on 10 July 1995.
2. THE COMMENCEMENT OF A SERIOUS DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SLORC AND AUNG SAN
SUU KYI ABOUT THE POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION OF THE COUNTRY;
Two meeting took place in 1994 between Aung San Suu Kyi and the SLORC.
Since her release and at the time of writing no further dialogue had
begun.
3. ACCESS TO POLITICAL PRISONERS BY TEH INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS, UN SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR AND OTHER OUTSIDERS;
No agreement was reached between the ICRC and the SLORC on access to
political prisoners. The ICRC has closed its Rangoon office.
The UN Special Rapporteur was granted access to some political prisoners
(but not Aung San Suu Kyi nor all those he requested to see).
4. A REVIEW AND REDUCTION OF SENTENCES IMPOSED FOR POLITICAL ACTIVITY;
Heavy sentences were imposed on a group of five dissidents in late 1994
for peaceful activity critical of the Government of Burma.
On 15 March 15 political prisoners were released. The release was
significant in that it included U Tin Oo and U Kyi Maung, the two most
prominent prisoners after Aung San Suu Kyi. However in early June U Kyi
Maung was deteined for a week, before being released, for reportedly
having a secret meeting with Congressman Richardson.
Severe goal sentences were imposed on 28 April on nine students who
shouted pro-democracy slogans at the funeral of U Nu. The nine were
sentenced to seven years goal, while two other students who had escaped
arrest were sentenced to twenty years in absentia.
SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN THE PROPOSED DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE SLORC AND THE
UN;
Approximately nine months after the invitation was issued, Burma
commenced a dialogue with the UN at the General Assembly in November
1994; representatives of the Secretary-General have since made two
visits to Burma; they report little willingness on the part of the SLORC
to engage in genuine dialogue. A further visit was planned for August.
A CLEAR TIMETABLE FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS WITH DELEGATES ABLE TO
PARTICIPATE MORE FREELY;
The SLORC has rejected all suggestions that a timetable be imposed on
the National Convention process.
Management of the Convention remains heavy-handed, with no indication
that the SLORC will tolerate open debate and counter proposals which
challenge its basic principles.
5. AGREEMENT BY THE SLORC TO THE INCLUSION OF TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS IN
THE NEW CONSTITUTION PERMITTING FURTHER CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT;
This has not been considered by the Convention and there is no
indication that the SLORC would acknowledge the usefulness of
transitional powers.
THE PROVISION OF LEGAL GUARANTEES FOR THE RIGHTS OF THE ETHNIC
MINORITIES;
Ceasefire agreements have not been negotiated with the Karen National
UNion and Khun SA's Mong Tai Army.
Ceasefire agreements with the other ethnic minorities have concentrated
on purely military matters and have not addressed political concerns and
the desire for economic development.
The issue of minority rights is under consideration by the National
Convention; it is not clear what degree of autonomy (if any) will be
given to the minorities; however, it seems clear that the SLORC
blueprint remains, a strong central government under military control.
6. THE CESSATION OF FORCED LABOUR AND PORTERAGE BEYOND WHAT ARE TRADITIONAL
PRACTICES;
These abuses continue unabated both ininfrastructure development and in
support of military operations (reports of forced porterage increased in
preparation for the recent Karen offensive).
The repeal of censorship and state protection legislation.
There has been no relaxation in these areas.
CONCLUSION
6.101 If political reform, embodying transparency, accountability and
participation, is the vital ingredient in creating the conditions for real
economic growth, a sound basis for investment in the country and
guaranteed, productive use of aid, then political reform must be a central
objective of Australia's foreign policy towards Burma. The benchmarks
encompass this principle. The Committee believes that the benchmarks
represent useful guides towards democratic development. Obviously it is not
intended that all benchmarks will be absolutely achieved before there is
some reestablishment of official contacts with Burma.
6.102 The Committee believes however that more genuine progress in
establishing a dialogue with Aung San Suu Kyi and the NLD and a change to
the procedures of the National Convention are an esstntial starting point
before any further concessions are made to the SLORC. In this regard it is
important that Australia continue to seek the support of regional
neighbours in urging change in Burma.
6.103 Therefore the Committee draws attention to recommendation 26 in this
Chapter urging regional countries to use their good offices to press the
Government of Burma towards democratic change.
6.104 In line with this the Committee recommends that:
37. THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD SUGGEST THE VALUE OF A REGIONAL
FORUM FOR THE EXAMINATION OF THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH MODERN
GOVERNMENT WITH A VIEW TO DEVELOPING STRATEGIES AND PROGRAMS OF
ASSISTANCE FOR THE ENHANCEMENT OF GOOD GOVERNMENT. SUCH ISSUES AS
SYSTEMS OF BUREAUCRACY AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICES, LEGAL SERVICES
AND COURT SYSTEMS, PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE OR POLICING MIGHT BE
ADDRESSED IN THIS WAY.
6.105 The latest statements from the SLORC that they do not need to
negotiate with any one are not reassuring. They appear to reveal that the
regime has no commitment to democratic development in Burma. Such hardline
attitudes offer little scope for confidence on the part of the
international community that there will be any change to the practices,
outlined in this report, that have been so widely condemned. While such
contempt is directed at the consensus resolutions of the United Nations,
there should be no change to the policies of major international
institutions, whether financial or political, to include Burma more fully.
6.106 The Committee hopes that the SLORC will take up the offer of Aung San
Suu Kyi for dialogue and so recognise the will of the Burmese people so
clearly expressed in 1990.
6.107 Finally the Committee recommends that:
WHEN ANY DECISION IS MADE IN THE FUTURE TO BEGIN DEVELOPMENT
ASSISTANCE TO BURMA IT SHOULD BE IN THE FORM OF PROJECT ASSISTANCE
WHICH HAS AS ITS OBJECTIVES THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS AND THE
PRINCIPLES OF OPENNESS AND ACCOUNTABILITY BEING SOUGHT IN THE
BENCHMARKS.
ROGER PRICE, MP
CHAIRMAN
Footnotes:
---------
[48] See evidence reported in Chapter 4 p.
[49] Evidence, 5 May 1995, p. 104.
[50] The number in the Special Assistance Category for Burmese from Burma
for the same period is 500.
[51] Harn Yawnghwe, 'Engaging the Generals', Burma Debate, July/August
1994, p.7.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Above materials are reproduction from the findings of Human Rights
Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Trade of the Parliament of Australia, published in October 1995.
Anyone wishing to inquire about the book may contact Ms Margaret
Swieringa, Secretary, Human Rights Sub-Committee, Parliament House,
Canberra A.C.T. 2600, AUSTRALIA.
Best regards, U Ne Oo.
ENDS(6.82-6.107)\