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           ANALYSIS OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT For several years, many
countries in the international community have undertaken a policy of
constructive engagement with Burma.  This policy appears to have been
designed to promote the democratization of Burma through increased
business contacts and connections with the international community,
especially between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
Burma.  In reality, however, constructive engagement is an ambiguous
policy which presents no formal criterion by which to measure its
implementation or success.  This report considers the circumstances
surrounding this policy and analyzes the impact of constructive
engagement.  Under the policy of constructive engagement:  (a) Burma's
human rights record has not improved;  (b) Burma has made no progress
toward democracy;  (c) hundreds of thousands of individuals fleeing Burma
have not been able to enjoy legal status as refugees and have been
subjected to repatriation;  (d) troops of the State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC), disguised as members of the Democratic Karen
Buddhist Army (DKBA), have crossed the Thai/Burmese border to kill, kidnap
or rob refugees and threaten the citizens of Thailand.  These incursions
are a direct threat to the sovereignty of Burma's neighbor and have
increased tensions between the two nations;  (e) foreign investment in
Burma has only benefited the SLORC military elite.  The economic situation
of the common people has been steadily deteriorating despite this
investment.  (f) open unification between SLORC and drug king Khun Sa has
caused an increase in drug production, particularly opium and heroine.  In
order to bring about improvements for the people in Burma as well as to
benefit the trend toward democracy around the world, we encourage the
implementation of the following policies:  1. deny SLORC legitimacy;=20
=09(a) oppose the so-called National Convention and its results; and
=09(b) support the boycott of the so-called National Convention by the
National League for Democracy (NLD) which is led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,
the 1991 Nobel Peace Laureate;  2. pressure should be exerted upon SLORC
to establish a political dialogue with the ethnic groups and the
democratic forces led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi;  3.  extend humanitarian
and educational assistance to the common people of Burma by working with
democratic and ethnic organizations based in the border areas as well as
the NLD inside the country.  Avoid extending such assistance in
cooperation with SLORC; and 4. stop all current and future foreign
investments in Burma, bearing in mind that, right now, foreign investment
only supports SLORC, an illegitimate regime with a horrible human rights
record against its own people.  The Burmese people will definitely welcome
foreign investments when they have achieved liberation from this
oppressive regime.  Background Since her independence in 1948, Burma has
suffered from a civil war and poor political leadership which has caused
it to become one of the ten poorest countries in the world.  During this
period of turmoil which has lasted over 40 years, the military, which has
ruled the country since 1962, has used several different tactics to
eliminate the ethnic resistance groups and suppress all political
opposition. Burma was closed to foreign investment from 1954 to 1988 and,
economically, it relied heavily on international aid during this time. In
1988, nationwide student-led unarmed uprisings brought the general
dissatisfaction with the military regime into clear focus.  After
violently putting down the peaceful democracy movement in September 1988,
the ruling military elite renamed themselves SLORC and imposed a more
severe militarism on the people.  Since 1988, SLORC has practiced an open
door economic policy to attract foreign companies to invest in Burma.=20
Many companies, especially those from ASEAN countries, have rushed into
Burma at the expense of political change.  ASEAN countries have been
helping SLORC stay in power under the euphemism of constructive
engagement.  Constructive engagement has allowed these countries to take
advantage of Burma's natural resources while providing only lip service to
SLORC's human rights violations and desires to see democracy achieved.=20
Situation of the Ethnic Resistance Groups In early 1989, SLORC announced a
"ceasefire" policy aimed to end armed conflicts and carry out regional
development in ethnic areas.  SLORC's efforts to achieve ceasefire
agreements is widely seen as a ploy to extend its power without a fight.=20
Furthermore, it is important to note that though such agreements are
labeled "ceasefires", they are in essence surrenders.  In carrying out its
ceasefire program, the military first set a precondition that the talks
would be carried out only with individual ethnic groups rather than with a
unified ethnic and democratic alliance. Thus talks had to be held
separately.  Other restrictions were imposed on the ethnic groups after
they signed ceasefire agreements.  For example, the ceasefires barred them
from contacting Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and publicizing the agreement to the
international media.  The ceasefires have not resulted in improvements for
the people.  First, they have not led to political solutions.  For
example, political disagreements are only allowed to be discussed in the
National Convention which is not a neutral forum and resolves nothing.=20
Second, the ethnic organizations political infrastructures have been
weakened by the agreements which hurts the common people's ability to
voice their opinions against SLORC positions.  Finally, the ceasefire
policy has not resulted in any improvement in the common people's living
standards in the ethnic areas.  To force the ethnic armed organizations to
enter the ceasefire agreement, SLORC received support from neighboring
countries through their policy of constructive engagement.  For example,
SLORC and its neighbors put pressure on the following ethnic
organizations:  1. The Wa The strongest ethnic resistance organization in
Burma, the United Wa State Party (UWSP), composed of the ex-communist Wa
and Kokang ethnic groups, was pressured by having its food supply and
transportation routes threatened by China. For this reason, the UWSP was
forced to enter the SLORC-sponsored ceasefire in 1989.  As a consequence
of this ceasefire, many other small ethnic organizations based in
northeastern Burma close to the UWSP-controlled area had to follow a
similar path.  Despite seven years of ceasefire, no progress has been made
toward regional development in the Wa area. The ceasefire is still
relatively fragile, and hostilities are likely to resume should SLORC fail
to deliver regional autonomy to the various ethnic groups.  Because of the
lack of regional development and autonomy, eight ethnic groups which
agreed to the ceasefire led by the UWSP formed an alliance called the
Peace and Democracy Front (PDF).  One of the objectives of the PDF is to
achieve political solutions with SLORC which will result in improvements
for the people.  To date, the PDF has achieved no political agreements
with SLORC.  The PDF's formation and subsequent efforts clearly expresses
the dissatisfaction which the ethnic groups feel toward the ceasefire
agreement.  2. Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) Like the UWSP, the
Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) also was pressured by China to
reach a ceasefire agreement with SLORC.  A desire to promote
communications and trade links with Burma through Kachin state prompted
China to undertake a policy of constructive engagement with SLORC.  As
China accelerates its development, Burma has increasingly become an
important gateway to the sea for the southern Chinese provinces.  Even
though SLORC and the KIO signed a ceasefire in 1993, the ethnic
organization faced very limited opportunities to promote the living
standards of the Kachin people.  They have no chance to organize their
people because those who have contact with the KIO can be punished under
the Unlawful Association Act.  Moreover, the KIO has no right to collect
taxes from companies which invest in their lands but SLORC can collect
such taxes.  Likewise, the KIO can have no official relations with
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).  Finally, since the ceasefire, there
has been no further political dialogue or discussions on regional
development.  3. Karenni National Progressive party (KNPP) The Karenni
National Progressive Party (KNPP), also faced threats to its rice supply
from Thailand under its policy of constructive engagement with SLORC.  The
KNPP reached a ceasefire agreement with SLORC on March 21, 1995.  SLORC
state-owned radio announced that the KNPP, after realizing the "true
nature" of SLORC, had returned to the legalfold.  In contrast, a KNPP
statement issued on June 28 mentioned that the ethnic organization had
signed ceasefire because SLORC had agreed to the sixteen points it had put
forward.  Among the sixteen points agreed upon were:=20
=091. the present military status quo in both SLORC-designated and
KNPP-designated areas would be maintained;=20
=092. there would be an end to forcing civilians to become military
porters in Karenni state; and
=093. there would be an end to the collection of porter fees in
Karenni state.  Three months after the ceasefire agreement was signed,
SLORC broke the above mentioned agreements and launched a military
offensive against the KNPP.  4. The New Mon State Party ( NMSP ) A gas
pipeline project--worth more than half billion U.S. dollars in
infrastructure and ten billion baht (U.S. $400 million) per year in direct
payments for the gas--was finally formalized with the signing of a
contract and a memorandum of understanding on September 9, 1994.=20
According to the agreement, the majority of the estimated 5.8 trillion
cubic feet of gas in the Yadana gas field in Burma's Martaban Gulf will be
sold to Thailand at a rate of 525 million cubic feet of gas per day (525
mmcfd) for thirty years.  The first delivery will begin in 1998.=20
Thailand's electricity needs are expected to expand dramatically from the
9,730 megawatts produced in 1993 to about 20,000MW in the year 2000. The
gas pipeline route is close to the New Mon State Party (NMSP) and the
Karen National Union (KNU)-controlled area.  Fighting between SLORC and
these ethnic resistance forces endangers the completion of the gas
pipeline by threatening its security.  With a hunger for this source of
power, Thailand has articulated a policy of constructive engagement and
attempted to establish better relations with the Burmese junta to
guarantee its energy acquisition plans.  As a result of this policy,
Thailand has opted to put gradually increasing pressure on the ethnic
groups to induce them to negotiate ceasefire agreements with the SLORC.=20
Bowing to such pressure, the NMSP reluctantly entered a ceasefire on June
29, 1995.  Refugees and Constructive Engagement To overcome the resistance
of ethnic resistance groups to accept SLORC's divisive ceasefire terms,
the Thais have embarked upon a policy to coercively repatriate refugees
back to Burma.  The plight of Halockhani refugee camp stands out most
visibly as a sad and graphic example of this policy.  Halockhani also
illustrates how Thailand's liaison with SLORC has become less vocal and
how Western leaders are often more concerned with economics than with
human rights.  In early 1994, Mon refugees were coerced by Thailand to
relocate to a new site, New Halockhani camp, inside Burma.  On July 21,
1994, almost 6000 Mon refugees in the new camp fled back across the border
to Ban Ton Yang border checkpoint in Sangkhlaburi, Kanchanaburi Province,
Thailand when locally based SLORC troops attacked the newly repatriated
site and arrested some refugees.  Further north, a series of border
incursions and attacks by the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) has
caused numerous deaths to both Karen refugees and Thai citizens and is
threatening Thai national security.  The DKBA, a breakaway renegade group,
has raided Karen refugees camps and ordered the refugees to return to
Burma under their control.  Despite these above examples of human rights
abuses, Thai authorities are considering the repatriation of the Karen and
Mon refugees back to Burma.  It has become a significant concern of the
international community how and who will decide the "safe return" of these
refugees back to Burma where brutality and human rights violations
continue.  The refugees' lives will be in danger if Thai authorities
decide to send them back, proclaiming they are "safe" as a result of their
policy of "constructive engagement."  Economic Situation under the Policy
of Constructive Engagement At least 107 foreign companies already invest
in Burma totaling over two million dollars.  According to a SLORC
statement, the official Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate is 6.4
percent.  Nevertheless, the economic situation of the average person has
been steadily declining in recent years.  Currently, the average person
receives no benefits from the money flowing into the country.  The hotel
and tourist industries have become one of the main businesses for the
military elite, but this offers few high paying jobs or new skills for the
local people.  Estimates place the military budget as high as 60 percent
of the country's income, and as a result, all other sectors are suffering
severely.  The health care system, for example, lacks basicmedicines and a
medical workers.  It is now common for people to say they go to hospital
to die rather than to get well.  Furthermore, the rural areas are facing
even more desperate economic problems than the urban centers.  In short,
Burma's economy is a military monopolized economy which is having a
devastating impact on its own people.  The Asian Development Bank (ADB)
Mekong Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation Group--comprised of Thailand,
Burma, Laos, Cambodia, the Yunnan Province of China, and Vietnam--appears
to have been given a high priority by Thailand and its partners. The ADB
study stressed the construction of a transportation network and energy
cooperation among the countries in the region.  The ADB spent almost three
years drafting a master plan which was adopted by the participating
countries in November 1995.  This regional development plan was
highlighted again during the ASEAN Summit in mid-December 1995 in Bangkok.=
=20
The Maekhong Sub-Regional Plan affects Burma as follows:=20
=091. implementation of the Yadana gas pipeline project;=20
=092. Thanlwin (Salween) Basin Hydropower Development Study in Burma
and Thailand including transmission interconnection between the two
countries;=20
            3. Chiang Rai-Kunming Road Improvement Project through Burma
and Laos;=20
            4. Kunming-Lashio Road System Improvement Project; and
            5. Lashio-Lollen-Keng Tung Road Improvement Project, etc.=20
Economically, the most important of the above projects to SLORC is the
completion of the Yadana gas pipeline project in southeastern Burma.=20
Despite the opening of Burma to foreign investment and supposed
liberalization, the military still has control over vital aspects of the
economic system.  Prices of essential commodities in Burma are currently
controlled by the Committee for the Reduction of the Consumer Prices,
chaired by military generals.  The Committee suppresses inflation through
price restrictions.  In addition, farmers are compelled to sell portions
of their harvest to the state at a very low prices.  Transportation of
goods across township boundaries is also regulated and restricted by local
military authorities.  In Burma, the largest foreign investor is its
immediate neighbor, Thailand, which is responsible for 19.3 percent of all
foreign direct investment.  The largest foreign investments fall in the
areas of natural resource extraction, namely gas exploration, logging and
fishing, as well as the development of the tourist industry, such as the
construction of hotels.  Reports of inflation in the cost of rice need to
be carefully watched as prices recently reached Kyat 80 per pyi (small
basket which can feed a family of four for one day).  As rice is the
staple food of Burma, this price increase is particularly troubling.=20
Wages remain extremely low.  Generally, a civil servant earns between Kyat
750 and 2,000 a month (20 dollar at the black market rate).  At Kyat 80 a
day for rice, this is not a sufficient salary for a civil servant to feed
a family of four.  To exacerbate matters, prices of basic consumer goods
also continue to rise.  In some areas, imports are abundant, but most
people do not have the means to purchase them.  Economic growth is also
limited only to some towns and cities while most of population in the
countryside remains very poor.  Finally, inflation is running at 40-50
percent a year.  In short, trying to feed a family and provide them with
simple needs is extremely difficult in Burma today.  Individuals and
intellectuals which make up the small Burmese middle class also do not get
a chance to do business freely.  Despite foreign investment, the middle
class which is traditionally the source of democratic political change
will never have a chance to grow because of the strict supervision of the
ruling military regime over the economy.  As a result, under current
policies of constructive engagement, foreign investment is benefiting only
SLORC, not the common people or even the small middle class.  The mass
influx of illegal Burmese labors into neighboring countries and the
departure of Burmese academic and professionals to other countries is a
clear indication that the SLORC "economic boom" is not reaching an
overwhelming majority of the people of Burma.  People would not leave
their homes if they were enjoying economic stability in their own country.=
=20
One thing missing from foreign investment in Burma is a lack of
consciousness about who is benefiting from these investments.  In Burma,
foreign investors visit, sign memorandums of understanding and then give
money to SLORC.  Then, they conduct their business and proceed to return
back to their respective countries with the benefits they have earned from
their investment.  In the process, SLORC gets rich; the foreign investors
get rich; but the people in Burma still suffer the economic hardships of
living in poverty.  In a paper "Empowerment for a Culture of Peace and
Development", Daw Aung San Suu Kyi expressed her view on economic
development.  It is assumed that economic measures can resolve all the
problems facing developing countries, but this assumption is not always
correct.  Certain economics can be detrimental to the average person as is
currently the case in Burma.  Economics is described as the "most
important key to every lock of every door to the new Asia we wish to see,"
and "healthy economic development" is seen as "essential to successfully
meeting the challenge of peace, security, the challenge of human rights
and responsibilities, the challenge of democracy and rule of law, the
challenge of social justice and reform and the challenge of cultural
renaissance and pluralism."  Under the current regime, however, "healthy"
economic development is not being practiced, and as a result, most "doors"
remain "locked."  NGOs and Constructive Engagement NGOs play a significant
role in the international community as well as inside respective
countries.  We appreciate the wishes and intentions of NGOs to do
development work for the common people and to extend social assistance to
the average person.  The arguments for NGOs and United Nation agencies
involvement in Burma are:=20
=091. to relieve the evident suffering of the people and
=092. to help build a civil society which will slowly bring about
change.  The question remains, however, whether NGOs can accomplish these
goals without a change in the political situation in Burma occurring
first.  Currently, NGO and U.N. involvement give SLORC additional
opportunities to divert funds for modernizing and expanding their military
and thus increasing the militarization of the country.  In 1993, for
example, as UNICEF stepped up its programs in Burma, SLORC cut the health
and education budget significantly.  It should also be remembered that all
aid flowing into Burma involves political decision at the highest levels
of SLORC.  For example, Khin Nyunt, First Secretary of SLORC, recently
made himself chairman of a new education and health committee which will
oversee all aid programs.  Finally, NGO and U.N. involvement with SLORC
has another, often unintended effect.  By cooperating with SLORC, NGOs and
the U.N. provide the regime with political legitimacy which makes efforts
to move toward democracy more difficult.  Illegal Immigrants, Forced Labor
and Relocation Caused by Constructive Engagement Forced labor is rampant
in Burma.  Human Rights Watch/Asia estimated that since 1992 at least two
million Burmese civilians have been forced to work without pay on the
construction of roads, railways and bridges across the country.  Thousands
have died from beatings, exhaustion, accidents and lack of medical care
while doing such work.  For example, reports from inside Burma indicate
that the Burmese army has been forcing thousands of local people to build
a 169 kilometer railroad in southeastern Burma since the beginning of
1993.  The railroad links the two garrison towns of Ye in Mon state and
Tavoy in Tenasserim Division and will be used especially for security of
the Yadana gas pipeline project.  According to civilians returning from
the forced labor detention camps, the railway project has recently been
resumed and every township in the Tavoy district has been ordered to send
2500-3000 laborers for the construction on a rotation system.  People from
four townships along the route of the railroad are regularly conscripted
to work as "voluntary" laborers on the project.  According to reliable
sources, the total number of conscripted village laborers is between
20,000-30,000.  In addition, many households from the villages where the
railroad and gas pipeline cross have been forced to move to new sites
without any arrangement for their relocations.  Consequently, thousands of
villagers from these areas have escaped from their work sites and villages
into Thailand to survive and avoid forced labor.  According to the Thai
government's official estimates, illegal Burmese immigrants in Thailand
now number more than 350,000 of the country's 530,000 total illegal
immigrants; these numbers do not include the almost 100,000 refugees who
remain along the Thai/Burmese border.  Conclusion We would like to
conclude this analysis with a few comments based on the above mentioned
evidence.  It is very obvious that China and ASEAN's policy of
constructive engagement with the Burmese military junta has been
constructive only for SLORC.  The policy has focused almost exclusively on
current economic benefits at the expense of serious efforts to press for
political change and democratization.  A question, "constructive to whom?"
should be raised among the countries which strongly believe "constructive
engagement" can still lead Burma down the path of democratization.  At
this juncture, the ASEAN countries as well as all democratic countries
should not ignore the interests of ordinary people and democratization in
Burma because economics and politics are intertwined.  Lasting economic
development cannot be achieved when basic fundamental human rights are
completely denied and when there is no political development in the
country to ensure economic stability in the long run.  In conclusion, we
would like to call on the international community to support the following
policies toward Burma:  1. deny SLORC legitimacy;=20
=09(a) oppose the so-called National Convention and its results; and
=09(b) support the boycott of the so-called National Convention by the
National League for Democracy (NLD) which is led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,
the 1991 Nobel Peace Laureate;  2. pressure should be exerted upon SLORC
to establish a political dialogue with the ethnic groups and the
democratic forces led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi;  3.  extend humanitarian
and educational assistance to the common people of Burma by working with
democratic and ethnic organizations based in the border areas as well as
the NLD inside the country.  Avoid extending such assistance in
cooperation with SLORC; and 4. stop all current and future foreign
investments in Burma, bearing in mind that, right now, foreign investment
only supports SLORC, an illegitimate regime with a horrible human rights
record against its own people.  The Burmese people will definitely welcome
foreign investments when they have achieved liberation from this
oppressive regime.  Date: February 27, 1996 Contact:  ABSDF P. O. Box 151
Klong Chan P. O.  Bangkapi 10240 Bangkok, Thailand 6


























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