Four Articles from Burma Issues, Ma

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Subject: Four Articles from Burma Issues, March 1996

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BURMA ISSUES
March 1996

I.  POLITICS

GENTLE AND SLOW PERSUASION?

N. Chan

While many countries in Asia and a growing number in Europe
are proclaiming a "constructive engagement" policy towards
Burma, it may be the military dictatorship of Burma itself
which is most clearly defining and acting upon a "constructive
engagement" policy towards the rest of the world.

By definition, a policy of "constructive engagement" used by
one country to relate to another country must satisfy three
conditions:

1. Rather than dealing with sensitive issues, such as human
rights abuses and/or dictatorship, in a confrontational and
immediate way, a long - term strategy to slowly encourage
democratic change and respect for human rights is carried out;

2. Important economic and political relationships between the
two countries are established and strengthened; and

3. Conditions are placed on the country in question, and these
conditions must be met within a specified time - frame for the
good relationship to continue. In other words, one country tells
another, "We will encourage investments and greater political
dialogue with you if, and only if, you meet these specific
conditions by a specific date."

ASEAN countries, in particular Thailand, have long claimed
that their policy towards Burma is one of constructive
engagement and that it is, in fact, proving to be successful.
These countries do not deny that Slorc's record on human rights
is atrocious, but they claim that time is required to bring about
necessary changes and that Slorc can be encouraged to create
democratic reform through more contact, both economically
and politically, with the outside world. They fulfill two of the
three conditions required for a "constructive engagement"
policy. Yet these ASEAN countries have never set out any
conditions which Slorc must meet to qualify for continued
economic and political support.

In fact, Slorc is the one which has imposed the conditions on
ASEAN countries, especially Thailand, for the right to exploit
Burma's vast natural resources. Burma is one of the poorest
countries in the world, and thus logically would be the one to
give in to conditions set by other countries for aid and
investments. Yet it is the Slorc which is saying, "lf you want our
resources, you will do exactly as we say or get out." And people
are listening to them.

A case in point is the fishing concessions which Slorc gave to
Thai companies shortly after the 1988 military coup. The
fishing concessions bring Slorc hundreds of thousands of dollars
in much needed cash. In August of 1995, after an incident in
which several Burmese fishermen were killed by Thai
fishermen, Slorc closed border check - points with Thailand and
revoked concessions for Thai boats to fish in Burmese waters.
Thailand is anxious to get the border opened again, but Slorc
has stubbornly refused to agree to such a cooperative action.
Last month a Thai military spokesman said that before they will
agree to reopen the border and allow Thai fishing boats into
Burmese waters, Burma [Slorc] is now demanding $109
million in compensation for the death of the Burmese fishermen.
It seems that Thailand is prepared to pay.

"The Burmese side told us that border relations, including trade
and fishing, will only resume after Thailand pays compensation
of $109 million," the spokesman said.

Who really is welding the club of "constructive engagement" is
further emphasized by the fact that several Thai fishermen were
also killed by Burmese fishermen in mid - 1995, and there has
been no talk of Thailand demanding compensation and an
apology from the Slorc officials.

Logic would suggest that, because of all the terrible criticisms
Slorc has received from the international community, they
would bend a little to gain some international favour. That does
not seem to be the case at all. Early this month, Assistant UN
Secretary-General Alvaro de Soto requested a visit to Rangoon
and meetings with Slorc Foreign Minister Ohn Gyaw and Lt.
Gen Khin Nyunt to collect information for the UN General
Assembly and the Human Rights Committee which convenes on
March 18. Slorc turned the visit down, saying they were not
ready to host him and that the meeting should be re - arranged
for August, several months after the Human Rights Committee
meeting.

Slorc also seems to be establishing severe conditions for any
NGO contemplating opening an office inside the country. The
extreme poverty of their people, a medical system which is
basically bankrupt and totally inefficient and malnutrition
which is rampant throughout the country, are not sufficient
reason for Slorc to open their doors to international NGOs
willing to assist in these fields.

Conditions are once again laid down. One condition seems to be
that the NGOs cannot have any contact with Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi - a condition which NGOs presently in the country
appear willing to accept. Another condition is that they agree to
confine their activities to carefully Slorc - selected geographical
areas and that they make no public statements about human
rights abuses or lack of democracy within the country.

The NGOs, themselves, have placed few if any conditions on
continuing their presence in the country, obviously fearful that
they would be asked to leave.

The one inspiring exception to this is the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which officially closed
down their Rangoon office on August 15 last year. ICRC
requires access to all political detainees in the countries in
which they operate. Slorc refused to grant this condition. Rather
than compromise their principles ICRC chose to close their
office - a definite loss for Slorc and a further blot on their record 

If all countries, companies and NGOs would have the courage
to establish clear conditions for their involvement in Burma,
Slorc might finally find themselves so isolated that they would
be forced to acquiesce to at least some of these demands. That
would provide some of the space the people of Burma need to
begin building their own foundations for democracy.

The purpose of a constructive engagement policy is to gently
and slowly persuade change. In Burma, the only body
effectively carrying out such a policy is the Slorc which has
successfully managed to get most governments, companies and
even NGOs involved there to soften their positions with regards
to the importance of human rights and democracy.

Sources: 
TN 950831 
TN 950618
BP 960305
TN 960216
Interviews with visitors to Burma


II.  ENVIRONMENT

CEASE-FIRES: THE FORESTS ARE STILL UNDER FIRE

by Alice Davies

East Asian prosperity threatens the environment, denuded
forests result in death and destruction, forests: nature's living
reservoirs, environmental refugees: a new growing class,
squandering our soil, scientist warns of failing food supplies,
Asia faces water shortage, water wars...

Why are these headlines relevant to Burma, particularly in light
of the cease-fire agreements over the past year?

'Denuded forests result in death and destruction' and 'Forests:
nature's living reservoirs are particularly pertinent as it appears
that what remains of Burma's forests, which once covered 80%
of the country and are now estimated to be less than 20 %, are
at risk from the cease-fires. Not only is it estimated that 1/8 of
total forest area was lost during the 1980's, with a further 1 %
annually since 1985, but it appears that logging on a massive
scale will continue.

A 6/3/96 report indicates that 'Khun Sa expects SLORC to clear
up border pass problems to facilitate his logging interests.
SLORC permitted the MTA to process teak in its area to
generate income during the initial stages of integration. Wood
and 100s of millions of baht of logs and processed wood have
been hauled...' [across the Thai border].

In June 1995, it was reported that the NMSP was seeking the
right to export 70,000 tons of timber already felled by Thai
logging companies. During cease-fire negotiations, the Mon
delegation reportedly received no official reply to requests to
conduct economic activities, such as logging and fishing, and
did not touch on the question of the pipeline, but were offered
the comment that 'When the gas project begins to operate, the
Mon State will be richer than other regions.'

Under the terms of their cease-fire, the Mon control 19 small
areas of about 10 square kilometres each in Mon State. In
1988, about 41 Thai companies were allocated logging rights
over some 18,800 square kilometers. By October 1995, it was
reported that the 'cease-fire deal has had a positive impact on
the construction of the gas pipelines' - at the cost of already
documented social and environmental dislocation. 

In July 1995, KNPP leaders were quoted as saying that 'the
timber supply will last only a few more years. But Kayah State
also has lots of valuable mineral deposits: antimony, marble and
tungsten. And, of course, there is lots of water in the Salween
River. That is our most valuable natural resource.'
It is the Salween River the Thai authorities wish to dam - a 100
km stretch of the river, which reservoir would flood back up
into the Shan state, now also quelled. This 'would break the
Karenni's rice pot' (and that of the Karens) and have disastrous
environmental and social effects south through to Mon State.

The questions which remained unanswered about the Salween
and Moei river diversions to serve the Chao Phraya basin are
thrown open to answer again.

The Karenni and Shan cease-fires will also facilitate EGAT's
plans to dam the Salween. The effects of large hydroelectric
dams are well documented, as is the problem of reservoirs
behind hydroelectric dams in tropical forests contributing far
more to global warming than fossil burning power plants and
increasing seismic activity in their region. 

In January 1995, Khun Sa had threatened to disrupt any
hydropower project in his territory, if his Shan resistance
movement was not consulted prior to the implementation of the
project. The Shan resistance is now doused, if not quenched.

Last year, the Thai Foreign ministry questioned the possibility
of political changes in Burma affecting the contract for the
purchase of gas from the Yadana field. Construction of the
pipeline is due to begin in 1996. An article, around the same
time, commented that 'while [other ethnic groups]... had entered
into cease-fire agreements for purely economic reasons, others
have been pressured by the changing global and regional geo-
political environment. Also, the West's growing interest in
resource rich Burma [estimated to be some $4 billion, by the
end of 1995], which prompted many developed countries to
soften their stance towards the regime in Rangoon and to
weaken their support for the Burmese Opposition and armed
ethnic fighters, was a contributory factor.'

Not only the West (France's total investment is believed to be
some $455 million. The social and environmental effects of the
gas pipeline and off - shore drilling is well documented
elsewhere and in previous issues) is interested in Burma's
resources. Its closest neighbour, Thailand, is already heavily
involved in both logging and the gas pipeline and has ongoing
border disputes to resolve. Singapore remains the highest
foreign investor.

The Economist, in its article, 'The Natural Resources Myth',
advised resource rich countries to 'invest the proceeds from
natural resources cautiously and productively, that is, in
education or essential infrastructure .... living off resources is all
too likely to corrupt the business of government - and so the
functioning of the entire economy .... Corruption in the natural
resources sector spreads across the whole public sector - and
frequently suborns the government.  Instability follows.'

In Burma, it is the civil servants (army) who receive subsidized
rice and petrol, there is galloping inflation, questions over the
price of rice (which questions sparked the initial uprising of this
present strife), there is a latent democracy movement and an
overt one in the border regions where the ethnic minorities are /
were fighting for recognition - and the rights to logging and
mineral development to sustain their people until they can be
self - sufficient in the commodities necessary to feed themselves.

The Economist further warns that 'natural resources don't come
for free. Exploiting them often requires considerable investment,
which diverts capital and labour away from productive
investments...' They further indicate that 'commodity prices
swing more than the prices of goods and services; natural
resource economies are more vulnerable to external shocks and
it is more difficult for them to recover.' That the resources are fi-
nite is borne out by the above Karenni comment.

A report from September 1995, states that 'there are a number
of troubling problems, which could, taken together, cause a
crisis. One is the continuing decline in the coverage and quality
of forests [impacted by both logging and dams]. A second is the
implications of the virtual disappearance of mangroves in the
Irrawaddy delta, the rice bowl of the nation. The third is the
deforestation and depletion of organic matter in the
deteriorating soils of the dry zone. A fourth is the tendency for
farmers in the mountainous states to exploit steep hillsides,
causing soil loss and siltation of lakes and irrigation systems.
All of these will tend to decrease the carrying capacity of the
farming system over time and also to increase the problems
associated with floods, droughts and erosion.'

The final warning - both environmentally and economically -
from the cease-fires is that they are simply that - a stand-off:
there is no lasting peace. The headline, warning investors of a
rising Asian activism, should be heeded, as the hunger could
again boil over. One of the catalysts for the general strike in
August 1988 was the price of rice. Now, with rampant inflation,
Burma again faces high rice and commodity prices and
increasingly degraded land.

MESSAGE FROM AN OLD RED INDIAN CHIEF

Only after the last tree has been cut down 
Only after the last river has been poisoned 
Only after the last fish has been caught 
Only then will you find that money cannot be eaten..

Sources:
Bangkok Post
The Nation
The Economist
Prospects for Sustainable Growth in Myanmar/Burma, 
a report for UNDP, by Dr David Dapice, Harvard Institute
12/9/1995
Images Asia

III.  ROHINGYAS

WHEN YOU'RE NOT WANTED, WHERE DO 
YOU GO ... HOME?

by Alice Davies

A report by Professor Abrar, of the University of Dhaka,
investigates the continuing repatriation of the Rohingya
refugees from Bangladesh. He deals with the root causes of the
refugee problem, the treatment of refugees by the Government
of Bangladesh (GOB) and the actual repatriation

Leaving aside the questions, also briefly addressed, posed by
MSF France and Holland of whether or not the repatriation is
voluntary and taking both a legal and a liberal approach,
Professor Abrar argues that 'a marginal improvement in the
human rights abuse situation', which caused the Rohingyas to
flee and be classified as refugees, 'does not mean a change in
circumstances', the necessary criteria by which the UNHCR
may divest them of their refugee status.

He then lists the three elements, under international law,
specific to defining 'change in circumstance', these being: 'a
relative calm', 'a substantial political change which is truly
effective' and 'a durable change in circumstances'. Taking a
legalistic view, he argues that defacto executive authority
remains in the hands of the oppressors, but, under a more liberal
interpretation, states that recent SLORC decisions to
discontinue forced labour, payment for communal labour and
the suspension of relocation of villages indicates major steps
forward in human rights practices.[see also The Guns May
Have Stopped..., this issue]

Yet, Arakan Forum, January 1996, reports that 'Inflation leaves
Burmese families with nothing to eat' and details an attack on
Meewa village, Kyauktaw township, on the 23rd of August
1995. There, a pregnant woman and one who had given birth
two days before were shot at point blank range. Five other
women, two old men and 7 children were also shot.

Professor Abrar voices the concerns of the UNHCR that neither
they nor UNDP are involved in the reintegration program (only
WFP is involved in the area) and that economically anchoring
the people in a region that is economically depressed is crucial.
He also cites this as a reason why the GOB was so anxious to
repatriate the refugees - their negative impact on the local
economy.

In summary, he argues that, 'given the peculiar history of the
Rohingyas within the Myanmar Union, the unresolved question
of their citizenship [particularly as many lack identity, their citi-
zenship papers stripped from them by SLORC soldiers, when
they crossed the border] and associated discrimination as a
national minority over the last hundreds of years, the Myanmar
government's perception of them as 'illegal immigrants' and a
possible concomitant implicit national agenda of driving them
out to their 'home' country (ie Bangladesh) make it a
compelling case that any opportunity to send them back to
Myanmar by ensuring their personal safety is to be availed.
Delay in their repatriation would only weaken these people's
rights to live there and further complicate their claim to land
and homes ....The denial of Bangladesh authorities to open
schools and income generating activities in the camps only
reflects their firm determination to accept the refugees as a tem-
porary phenomenon...'

Which way to go? Where?...Home?

Finally, the Professor writes that the UNHCR, possibly mindful
of donor fatigue, states that 'the improvement in the human
rights situation in Arakan, its presence in the region and its
access to returnees to monitor protection matters...[believes this
is]... the right time to promote repatriation in an active way.'

Sources:
Arakan Forum, January 1995
C.R. Abrar, Repatriation of the Rohingya Refugees, University
of Dhaka 1995

IV.  FORCED PORTERS

WELL ... THE GUNS MAY HAVE STOPPED

by CAC
Despite the June 1995 cease-fire between SLORC and the New
Mon State Party (NMSP), conditions for villagers in the Ye -
Tavoy area continue to worsen and people continue to flee the
area. This is primarily due to increasing demands for forced
labour on the Ye - Tavoy railway construction. SLORC has
apparently sped up its schedule for completion of the railway
and slightly changed its strategy. In the 1994 - 95 dry season,
SLORC focussed almost all forced labour on one stretch of the
railway, instead of the whole line. As a result, the southernmost
twelve mile stretch from Tavoy to Yepyu was officially
'completed' in May 1995. SLORC is now employing this
strategy to other portions of the line. For example, on the 20th
of November 1995, villagers in Ye Township were suddenly
informed that they were to complete the entire 18 mile stretch
from Ye to the Tenasserim border in only 15 days. Much more
intensive calls for labour - whole families, rather than one
member per household - occurred right at harvest time, forcing
families to risk losing their entire rice harvest. Another result of
this strategy is that some villagers have to travel l00 - 200 kms
to work, rather than taking assignments on the nearest section of
the line. At least l/3 to l/2 of the labourers are women and
children, either because SLORC has demanded several people
from each family, because it takes a whole family to complete
the work quota in the allotted 15 days, or because the men stay
at home to harvest the family's rice crop.

SLORC claims that labourers on the railway are paid --  but
there is no evidence to support this. Villagers even have to
provide their own food and tools. Anyone who cannot work
must pay 3 - 4000 kyat to SLORC, or hire someone to replace
them for 700 - 2000 kyat. There are some itinerant day
labourers, both in the villages and at the worksites, who are
willing to be hired. As a result, it is true that some people are
being paid for their work but the payment comes from other
villagers, not the military. It appears that the Railway Ministry
officials on site have cash budgets, which may be intended to
pay labourers, but the Ministry officials simply hand this money
over to the local army battalions, as payment for guarding the
workers. 

SLORC has also increased the rice quotas being confiscated
from farmers by up to 55% this year, from 2 to 10 tins per acre.
SLORC pays only 70 kyat per tin, while the market price is
now 410 kyat per tin. This increase is caused in part by the need
to feed the expanding army and, in part, to support the 500 % 
increase in rice exports  from Burma this year, projected at 1.2
million tonnes for 1996. This export increase is intended for the
military's profit and international public relations advantage,
but it is causing an extremely serious rice shortage throughout
Burma.

Rice prices have doubled in many areas and people are
subsisting on rice soup or are starving. Traders from coastal
towns in Southern Burma are even coming to hard - pressed
Mon revolutionary areas looking to buy rice 

At the same time, as SLORC continues to send more military
force into the area, forced labour at army camps and extortion
of money from villagers continues to increase. Many new bat-
talions are being sent in to secure Total and Unocal's proposed
natural gas pipeline from the Gulf of Martaban to Thailand.
Troops protecting the area are now extorting 'gas pipeline fees'
from all the villages in the area, including villages 15 - 20 km
north of the proposed route. The cost is 150 kyat per month per
family and villagers are threatened that anyone who does not
pay, has to go for 3 days of forced labour on the pipeline survey
work.

Under the terms of the cease-fire between SLORC and the
NMSP, SLORC is supposed to cease taking all forced porters
and porter fees from villages. Villagers confirm that all these
things continue, at least as much as before the cease-fire.
SLORC has answered all NMSP's complaints by stating that
porters are being collected by Township LORC's, not by the
army and that this is acceptable, because only the army is bound
by the cease-fire terms.

Refugees continue to flee their villages to the Thai border. Due
to the cease-fire agreement, the Thai government now plans to
force all Mon refugees back to Burma by May 1996. There
continue to be very serious concerns for their safety once back
in Burma. The UNHCR is negotiating with SLORC to try to
have a presence on both sides of the border to monitor the
repatriation. SLORC is unlikely to grant permission and even if
it does, UNHCR's behaviour in Arakan State and Bangladesh
has made it clear that UNHCR is more interested in helping the
governments involved to whitewash a forced repatriation, than
it is in protecting returnees.

Source:
Ye - Tavoy Area Update, KHRG #96-01, 960105

Burma Issues
PO Box 1076
Silom Post Office
Bangkok 10504
Thailand

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