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Part.1 - Burma Discussion on the U.



Subject: Part.1 - Burma Discussion on the U.S. Senate floor (July 25, 1996)

Attn: Burma Newsreaders
RE: Part.1 - Burma Discussion on the U.S. Senate floor (July 25, '96)

Dear Friends,

On July 25, before voting Burma sanction amendment which was offered by Senator Williams 
S. Cohen (R-Maine) into the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Act, 1997 (HR.3540), several U.S. Senators debated on the Burma sanction 
amendment on the senate floor.  The following are the complete text of their discussion 
and the list of the voting. Since the discussion was long, I have divided it into five 
parts.

***  Burma and the U.S. Congress web site: http://www.clark.net/pub/burmaus/

In peace and solidarity,
Zaw Zaw

-----------
July 25, 1996

  The Discussion on Burma Sanction Amendment on the Senate Floor (Part. 1)

AMENDMENT NO. 5019
(PURPOSE: TO PROMOTE THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE LIVES OF THE PEOPLES OF BURMA THROUGH 
DEMOCRATIZATION, MARKET REFORMS AND PERSONAL FREEDOM)

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I have an amendment I send to the desk, and ask for its 
immediate consideration. 

The legislative clerk read as follows: 

The Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen], for himself, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Chafee, and Mr. 
McCain, proposes amendment numbered 5019. 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment 
be dispensed with. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

The amendment is as follows: 

On page 188, strike lines 3 through 22 and insert the following: 

POLICY TOWARD BURMA 

Sec. 569. (a) Until such time as the President determines and certifies to Congress that 
Burma has made measurable and substantial progress in improving human rights practices 
and implementing democratic government, the following sanctions shall be imposed on 
Burma : 

(1) Bilateral assistance: There shall be no United States assistance to the Government 
of Burma , other than: 

(A) humanitarian assistance, 

(B) counter-narcotics assistance under chapter 8 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961, or crop substitution assistance, if the Secretary of State certifies to the 
appropriate congressional committees that: 

(i) the Government of Burma is fully cooperating with U.S. counter-narcotics efforts, 
and 

(ii) the programs are fully consistent with United States human rights concerns in Burma 
and serve the United States national interest, and 

(C) assistance promoting human rights and democratic values. 

(2) Multilateral assistance.--The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United 
States executive director of each international financial institution to vote against 
any loan or other utilization of funds of the respective bank to or for Burma . 

(3) Visas.--Except as required by treaty obligations or to staff the Burmese mission to 
the United States, the United States shall not grant entry visas to any Burmese 
government official. 

(b) Conditional Sanctions.--The President shall prohibit United States persons from new 
investment in Burma , if the President determines and certifies to Congress that, after 
the date of enactment of this act, the Government of Burma has physically harmed, 
rearrested for political acts, or exiled Daw Aung San Suu Kyi or has committed 
large-scale repression of or violence against the democratic opposition. 

(c) Multilateral Strategy.--The President shall seek to develop, in coordination with 
members of ASEAN and other countries having major trading and investment interests in 
Burma , a comprehensive, multilateral strategy to bring democracy to and improve human 
rights practices and the quality of life in Burma , including the development of a 
 dialogue between the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and democratic 
opposition groups within Burma . 

(d) Presidential Reports: Every six months following the enactment of this act, the 
President shall report to the Chairmen of the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
Committee on International Relations and the House and Senate Appropriations Committees 
on the following: 

(1) progress toward democratization in Burma ; 

(2) progress on improving the quality of life of the Burmese people, including progress 
on market reforms, living standards, labor standards, use of forced labor in the tourism 
industry, and environmental quality; and 

(3) progress made in developing the strategy referred to in subsection (c). 

(e) Waiver Authority.--The President shall have the authority to waive, temporarily or 
permanently, any sanction referred to in subsection (a) or subsection (b) if he 
determines and certifies to Congress that the application of such sanction would be 
contrary to the national security interests of the United States. 

(f) Definitions.-- 

(1) The term `international financial institutions' shall include the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, the 
International Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, the 
Asian Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. 

(2) The term `new investment' shall mean any of the following activities if such an 
activity is undertaken pursuant to an agreement, or pursuant to the exercise of rights 
under such an agreement, that is entered into with the Government of Burma or a 
non-governmental entity in Burma , on or after the date of the certification under 
subsection (b): 

(A) the entry into a contract that includes the economical development of resources 
located in Burma , or the entry into a contract providing for the general supervision 
and guarantee of another person's performance of such a contract; 

(B) the purchase of a share of ownership, including an equity interest, in that 
development; 

(C) the entry into a contract providing for the participation in royalties, earnings, or 
profits in that development, without regard to the form of the participation; provided 
that the term `new investment' does not include the entry into, performance of, or 
financing of a contract to sell or purchase goods, services, or technology. 

Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, this is one of the so-called Burma amendments. I will take a 
few moments to explain the nature of what I am seeking to achieve. 

I am offering this amendment on behalf of myself, Senator Feinstein, and Senator Chafee, 
and Senator McCain. Let me begin, Mr. President, by stating that nothing that we do or 
say on the floor of the Senate today is going to magically bring democracy, freedom and 
prosperity to the long-suffering people of Burma . 

Burma 's history, since gaining independence after World War II, has been a series of 
oppressive regimes unable to set the Burmese economy on its feet, unwilling to grant the 
peoples of Burma the democracy and justice that motivated their heroic struggle for 
independence in the years leading up to the British withdrawal. 

When decades of isolation and economic mismanagement gave way in the late 1980's to a 
transitional period under military rule, there was a slight glimmer of hope that Burma 
might finally be moving toward a more bright and democratic future. But stolen 
elections, student riots, and the jailing of democratic politicians, including the Nobel 
Prize winning leader of the democracy movement, Aung San Suu Kyi, soon made clear 
freedom's day had not yet arrived for Burma . 

Over the past 5 years, Burma 's military junta, the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council, or SLORC, as it is called--its acronym--has pursued policies of economic 
restructuring, leading to economic growth. But its continued oppressive tactics and the 
oppression of the forces of democracy, the use of conscripted labor, and the quest to 
pacify ethnic unrest in various parts of the country have all brought us to where we are 
today. 

Mr. President, the amendment that I am offering seeks to substitute language that the 
Foreign Operations Subcommittee has offered in this bill. 

While I disagree with the subcommittee's approach to the issue, I would like at this 
time to pay personal recognition to Senator McConnell for his longstanding dedication to 
the issue of Burmese freedom. It is an issue little discussed in the Senate until 
recently. I think that the considerable attention the issue now receives owes a great 
deal of credit to Senator McConnell's persistence to this issue. So I want to commend 
him for his untiring efforts, drawing our attention to this issue. 

I want to also recognize Senator McCain and Senator Kerry of Massachusetts for their 
sustained involvement in the debate over America's Burma policy. 

Mr. President, the choice today is not whether the subcommittee's approach or the one 
that I am offering in this amendment is going to turn Burma into a functioning democracy 
overnight. Neither will accomplish that. And it is not a question of who is more 
committed to improving the lives of the Burmese people or who has greater respect for 
the tireless eloquence and courage of Aung San Suu Kyi. All of us involved in this 
matter respect Suu Kyi immensely and share her aspirations for a democratic and
prosperous future for the Burmese people. 

But the question is, does the approach laid out by the subcommittee increase America's 
ability to foster change in Burma and strengthen our hand and allow the United States to 
engage in the type of delicate diplomacy needed to help a poor and oppressed people 
obtain better living standards, political and civic freedoms, and a brighter future as a 
dynamic Asian economy--one of the next of the so-called Asian Tigers? 

I think, Mr. President, with all due respect, the answer is no. By adopting the 
subcommittee language the Senate will be sending the follow message: 

That the United States is ready to relinquish all of its remaining leverage in Burma; 

That America is shutting every door and cutting off all of its already-depleted stake in 
Burma 's future; 

That the Congress is ready to further bind the hands of this and any future 
administrations, taking away those tools of diplomacy--incentives, both in a positive 
and negative sense--which are crucial if we are ever going to hope to effect change in a 
nation where our words and actions already carry diminished clout. 

All of us deplore the behavior of the Burmese junta. We all sense the plight of the 
Burmese people. We know the United States must support the forces of democratic change 
in Burma . 

I fully support the appropriation in this year's foreign operations bill to aid the 
democrats in the struggle. 

I think we have to recognize the reality of the situation in Burma and our influence 
over there. Burma is not identical to previous situations in which the United States has 
successfully pressured governments who are antithetical to our values of democracy and 
freedom. 

First, let me say Burma is not South Africa. Burma is not South Africa. Back in the 
1970's and 1980's, the oppressive nature of the apartheid regime in South Africa led the 
Senate to impose heavy sanctions and isolation to end the regime. In order to do that, 
we had the support of not only our Western European allies but of the front-line 
nations, those surrounding South Africa, who also lent their support and joined
in the effort to bring an end to apartheid. 

Unlike South Africa in the 1970's and 1980's, Burma is not surrounded by nations ready 
to shun it. As a matter of fact, Burma 's neighbors and other states in the region 
reject the view that isolating Burma is the best means to encourage change. They are 
pursuing trade and engagement, and will do so regardless of what we do or say. Those 
nations over there who are closest and in closest proximity are maintaining their 
relations with Burma , seeking to bring about change over a period of time. Isolating 
Burma is simply not going to work, and we will not have the support of our allies. We 
will not have the support of our Asian friends. 

Second, Burma is not Iran. Do not make that comparison to Iran. The Revolutionary 
Islamic Government of Iran is known as a sponsor of terrorism and promoter of sectarian 
unrest throughout the Middle East and beyond. Not only does Iran flout the rights of its 
own citizens, it sponsors international terrorism, works to undermine neighboring 
governments and pursues the development of nuclear weapons. As a result of this, Iran is 
largely a pariah state. While we might have disagreements with our friends and allies
around the world regarding our Iranian policy or our policy toward Iran, there is 
general recognition that the revolutionary government there is pursuing policies 
contrary to the interests of regional stability and peace. 

There is no such consensus on the Burmese junta. While many of their neighbors express 
irritation about the refugee flow caused by the SLORC's ongoing battles with the various 
ethnic groups, they view the efforts to oust SLORC as a threat to peace and stability in 
the region. The subcommittee's proposal will not make American policy more effective or 
make possible a more cooperative policy or regional consensus in dealing with SLORC. 

Let me say that Burma is not China. I do not happen to be a particular supporter of the 
Clinton administration's China policy in general. A central tenet of the policy is that 
the United States can threaten sanctions on Chinese exports to the United States in 
order to convince the government of Beijing to live up to its agreements. We have had a 
longstanding debate over our policy with respect to China. I know many people might 
disagree with the administration's proposal. 

I recall, for example, when President Bush was in the White House, there was strong 
opposition coming from the Democratic side to having anything to do with China, because 
we wanted to impose sanctions because of their terrible record on human rights. I recall 
many Members stood on this floor and talked about the butchers of Beijing, kowtowing to 
the Chinese, and imposing this policy of sanctions. President Clinton, when he was 
candidate Clinton, adopted that policy. Then, when he took office, he saw it was
not going to work. We did not have the support of our allies. We did not have the 
support of our other friends in Asia. 

So the administration changed its policy toward China, and it is because of that we have 
some leverage; we have considerable leverage because the Chinese export many billions of 
dollars of goods to this country. So now, by engaging the Chinese, we are able to 
exercise some influence in some areas of concern to the United States, including human 
rights, but also with respect to our intellectual property rights, which we feel have 
been violated time and time again. 

So we cannot compare this to China because we do not have that kind of policy leverage 
over Burma. We do not have the kind of export-import relationship with Burma that we 
have with China, so we do not have the leverage to help in bringing about change. 

For all of the reasons I am suggesting, it is important we create a Burma policy in tune 
with the realities of Burma today and not the examples of South Africa, Iran or China. 
The alternative that I offer today sets a course for a coherent American Burma policy 
which upholds our values and, at the same time, expresses our interests in regional 
stability. It does, however, make American values and interests clear in a way that 
gives the administration flexibility in reacting to changes, both positive and negative, 
with respect to the behavior of the SLORC. 

In addition, I hope that the amendment I propose would not only allow for exceptions to 
the subcommittee's proposal, but I want to create some conditionality here, Mr. 
President. I propose to allow exceptions to the policy of no assistance to Burma in 
three critical areas. 

First, humanitarian assistance: We do not want to impose sanctions that are basically 
going to be directed against the people, the Burmese people. That is only going to 
impoverish them more. So I would have no sanctions across the board in terms of 
including humanitarian assistance. 

Second, there is an exception for counternarcotics effort. The counternarcotics 
provision, I think, is important, because, as Senator McCain has pointed out on so many 
occasions, the real victims of a failure to crack down on the narcotics trade in Burma 
are the millions of Americans who are harmed, both directly and indirectly, by our 
Nation's epidemic drug abuse. 

Burma is estimated to be the source of two-thirds of the world's production of heroin. 
So, does it make sense for us to eliminate all efforts to have a counternarcotics 
program in Burma ? Are we not serving our national interests by at least maintaining 
some policy consistent with trying to stop the flow, interdict the flow, find other 
alternatives for the Burmese people to replace their crops with other types of crops? 

My amendment would allow a limited counternarcotics effort in Burma . It is certified to 
be in our national security interests in accord with our human rights concerns. 

The subcommittee's bill would prohibit all counternarcotics efforts in Burma . My 
amendment would not end the flow of heroin, but I think at least it does not throw in 
the towel in an effort to stem that poisonous stream. The amendment I offered recognizes 
that, to be effective, American policy in Burma has to be coordinated with our Asian 
friends and allies. This is not the case of the unilateral actions offered by the 
subcommittee. 

Mr. President, I have traveled in recent years throughout Southeast Asia, and I have 
discussed foreign policy, certainly, with many of the leaders there. Frankly, they do 
not see eye to eye with our policies. That does not mean that we have to necessarily 
conform our policies to the way in which they view the situation in Burma , but it does 
mean that we should look on each and every occasion to consult with and, when possible, 
cooperate with the other nations of ASEAN, if we hope to effect change in Burma . 

It seems to me that we can get on the floor, point to the oppression of the Burmese 
junta, and we can satisfy ourselves that we are seeking to punish them. But if, in fact, 
we do not have the support of our allies, and we do not have the support of those 
neighbors in the region friendly to us who are seeking to work us with on a multilateral 
basis, then we can stomp on this stage here and produce no visible effect or improvement 
on behalf of the Burmese people. 

Burma is located in one of the most dynamic regions of the world. It is the most dynamic 
region of the world. I suggest, Mr. President, that we have seen the flowering of 
democracy and freedom in parts of the world where values were quite alien to those that 
we support. We have seen developments, for example, in South Korea and Taiwan that have 
proven democracy can evolve out of formally authoritarian regimes. The same thing can 
happen in Burma . The best way to do that is to adopt a policy which gives the President 
some tools to influence the situation. The subcommittee's proposal is all sticks, no 
carrots. What we seek to do is give the President some limited flexibility to improve 
the situation on behalf of the Burmese people. 

I hope my colleagues will recognize this is not an effort to contradict what the 
subcommittee seeks to achieve, but rather provides the President with flexibility. It 
does not matter whether you support this President or not. 

Someone asked me whether or not I was carrying the water of the administration. Let me 
say, Mr. President, I have never considered myself to be a waterboy for anybody. I have 
never carried water for any administration, if I thought it was simply seeking to 
accommodate the administration. I think there is only one team. There is not a 
Republican or Democratic team; there is only one team when it comes to foreign policy. 
We all ought to be on the same side. 

We ought to try to develop a bipartisan approach to foreign policy. I am not seeking to 
carry the water of the administration, any more than I have in the past, when I was 
accused of not acting on behalf of an administration. What we need to have is a policy 
which this President or, what I hope to be President Dole after the next election, has 
the flexibility to achieve the goals that we all desire, and that is the promotion
of democracy and humanitarian relief. 


Mr. McCONNELL. I thank my colleague from Maine for his thoughtful presentation. 

I know there are some others on the floor who would like to speak. Let me make a few 
observations here at the outset of the debate. My good friend from Maine mentioned that 
we had consulted with leaders in the area. The one leader that we have not consulted 
with is the duly elected leader of Burma , Aung San Suu Kyi. Her party won 82 percent of 
the vote in 1990. She is the legitimately elected head of a Burmese Government that has 
not been allowed to function. It has not been allowed to function because the State
Law and Order Restoration Council simply disallowed the election, put her under house 
arrest until July 1995, and she still effectively is in that state. They say she is not 
under arrest anymore, but, in fact, she stays at home most of the time. That is the 
safest place to stay. She has to sort of smuggle out messages to the rest of the world. 

So the one leader we have not consulted, Aung San Suu Kyi, has an opinion about the 
proposal in the foreign operations bill. The duly elected leader of Burma , receiving 82 
percent of the vote, thinks that the approach in the underlying bill is the way to go. 
Maybe the other people in Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, and other places do not think 
it is the way to go, but the one who won the election, the Western-style supervised 
election in 1990, thinks that the only thing that will work are sanctions. 

Mr. JOHNSTON. Will the Senator yield at that point? 

Mr. McCONNELL. Not yet. Mr. President, let me say that in terms of the pain to American 
business, there are only two companies, both of them oil companies, that are in there 
and plan to stay. Everybody else is pulling out. One oil company decided not to deal 
with this regime. Eddie Bauer pulled out, and Liz Claiborne pulled out. The retailers do 
not want to have anything to do with this crowd, which exists for the sole purpose of 
terrorizing its own citizens. They have a 400,000-person army, armed to the teeth, not
because of any expansionist goal, but to suppress and abuse their own citizens. That is 
all they do. So if you want to do business in Burma , you cut a deal with the State Law 
and Order Restoration Council and you enrich them. 

So in terms of the pain to American business, if this sanctions measure went into 
effect, it would affect only two companies--not like South Africa, in which my friend 
and colleague from Maine supported the South African sanctions bill, as did I. My friend 
from Maine voted to override the President's veto, as did I. A lot of others did, too, a 
good number of Senators who are still in the Senate on both sides of the aisle.
That was actually a painful decision because there was a lot of American investment in 
South Africa that had to pick up and leave. There is no question about whether South 
African sanctions worked. They worked. Now, I know there is a feeling around here on the 
part of some that sanctions never work. The truth of the matter is that sometimes they 
do and sometimes they do not. We have to pursue these issues one at a time, in a 
pragmatic way, and consider what is appropriate in a given country. 

I say to my friend from Maine, and others, that we did not start proposing unilateral 
sanctions the first year. I have been working on this issue for a couple of years, most 
of the time sort of by myself, because there are no Burmese-Americans to get us all 
interested in this. America is a melting pot, and a lot of Americans who came from other 
places get interested in foreign assistance bills. Whether they are Jewish-Americans, 

Ukrainian-Americans, Polish-Americans, they take an interest, or Armenian-Americans. 
There are not many Burmese-Americans. So this issue has not been on the radar screen 
here. But, as a practical matter, this is one of the most, if not the most, because it 
ranks up there with North Korea, repressive regimes in the world. 

It has been 6 years since the election. The Bush administration did not pay any 
attention to the election, and neither is the Clinton administration. The problem I have 
with the proposal of my friend from Maine--and I know it is well-intentioned and popular 
with the other countries in ASEAN--is that I do not think it will have any impact, I say 
with all due respect, because the present administration has shown no interest in doing 
anything significant. 

As I understand the proposal of my friend from Maine, it would, in effect, mean 
increasing aid to SLORC, since the Senate voted 50 to 47 in November to put off aid for 
narcotics. We all understand that the American interest in Burma is not because we have 
a lot of Burmese citizens; it is because we have a lot of Burmese heroin. If you wanted 
to look at it from a purely domestic point of view, that is the interest in Burma . 

So I guess the question is whether there would be a serious narcotics enforcement effort 
by this crowd running Burma . 

Mr. LEAHY. If the Senator will yield, I think I know the answer. 

Mr. McCONNELL. I yield for a quick observation. 

Mr. LEAHY. I think it would be safe to say that if past performance is any 
indication--and I think it is an indication --there would not be any help in stopping 
the heroin traffic by the group that runs it. I think the indication is that a number of 
them are benefiting very directly from this heroin traffic, as the Senator from Kentucky 
has pointed out before. 

Mr. McCONNELL. The Senator from Vermont is right on the mark. Since SLORC seized power, 
opium production has doubled and seizures dropped 80 percent. The warlord, Khun Sa, has 
had a complete safe haven. That is the kind of cooperation we are getting from the State 
Law and Order Restoration Council, which runs Burma with an iron hand. 

Now, some will suggest that unilateral sanctions are a radical step. Well, there is 
precedent for it, and my friend from Maine mentioned some of the other countries. In 
many of them, we subsequently had help from others. I think it is reasonable to assume 
that if the United States takes the lead, we will not be alone. We will not be alone. 
Things are beginning to stir in the European Union, the European Parliament, and 
European companies. Two European companies pulled out just in the last week or so. So 
the movement is beginning. 

If America will lead, there will be a lot of followers, not initially with ASEAN, I 
agree with my friend from Maine. They have the biggest investment there. I can see why 
they do not want to change the status quo. They are doing just fine. It is probably a 
lot easier for countries that do not have huge investments there to choose not to invest 
if they do not already have big investments. Certainly, it is not going to be much of a
hit to U.S. business to take this step. But it is a beginning. It is a beginning. 

We have pursued unilateral sanctions against Libya, Iran, and Cuba. So we have done this 
before. It is not completely unique. It is not a radical step. It has been 6 years, Mr. 
President, 
since the election over there--6 years of terrorism and murder, and the ASEAN 
countries are doing business and everybody else is ignoring it. 

It seems to me, at this point, it is not reasonable to assume that this sort of 
constructive engagement is going to improve. There has been no improvement--none in 6 
years. First, the Bush administration and then this administration either (a) has 
ignored the problem or (b) tried to engage in constructive engagement. 

There are plenty of other Senators who would like to speak. I just wanted to lay out for 
the Senate, as we begin the debate, what the committee position suggests is not a 
particularly radical step. This is truly one of a handful of pariah regimes in the 
world. If the United States doesn't lead, who will? 

I yield the floor. 

Mr. THOMAS. Mr. President, I rise in full support of the Cohen amendment to the Burma 
provisions of H.R. 3540. 

As the chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, I strongly object 
to the present language in the committee substitute amendment. My problems with the 
provision are both procedural and substantive. 

First, on the procedural issue, this matter is clearly one for an authorizing committee 
to consider, not--with all due respect--an appropriating committee. The subject matter 
of the provision is clearly legislative in nature; it has absolutely nothing to do with 
funding. Consequently, it has no business being included in an appropriations bill. In 
the House, this provision would be subject to a point of order on that grounds alone, 
and would have been formerly in the Senate too until the recent Hutchinson precedent. 

Second, if enacted into law, the provision would create a significant change in our 
relationship with Burma . Although I will readily admit that our present relationship 
with Burma is not especially deep, the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions would 
certainly downgrade what little relationship we have. Moreover, it would affect our 
relations with many of our allies in Asia as we try to corral them into following our 
lead. Finally, and I have heard precious little from the manager of the bill on this, it 
would have a substantial and detrimental impact --to the tune of many millions of 
dollars--on several United States businesses with investments in Burma . 

Consequently, the provision and its possible ramifications are a matter which should be 
carefully considered by the authorizing committees of jurisdiction: the Committee on 
Banking and the Committee on Foreign Relations. To date, Mr. President, neither 
committee has had that opportunity. The Banking Committee held a hearing on Burma 
sanctions several weeks ago. At that hearing, the committee heard from only the first of 
three witness panels; the first panel consisted of supporters of the legislation, while
the second and third consisted of the administration--which is opposed to the bill--and 
sanctions opponents. The remainder of the hearing has been indefinitely postponed. Under 
those circumstances, I do not believe that it can be said that the Banking Committee has 
had an opportunity to fully consider the matter. 

As for the Foreign Relations Committee, neither the full committee nor my subcommittee 
has held a hearing on Burma or the sanctions provisions in this Congress. We were 
prevented from holding hearings on the Burma sanctions bill [Mr. McConnell] Senator from 
Kentucky because the Parliamentarian ruled it was referable only to Banking. Yet despite 
the fact that the provision strikes at the very heart of bilateral relations with 
Burma, neither Senator McConnell or his staff has ever even discussed this matter with
me or the chairman of the full Foreign Relations Committee. When Congress acts it should 
do so only after careful and considered deliberation, something lacking in this case, 
and not by a last-minute attachment to appropriations legislation. 

Substantively, I believe the sanctions provided for in the bill are a completely 
ineffective way to get Burma 's attention. We all know very well that economic sanctions 
only work if they are multilateral. We've seen that proven time after time. 

It is clear that in this case, we would be the only country imposing sanctions. All of 
the ASEAN countries, especially those which border Burma , have told us point blank that 
they will not join us in imposing sanctions. They will continue their policy of 
constructive engagement with Burma , and they told a recent United States mission to the 
area that imposing sanctions would be foolish. In fact, Mr. President, no other country 
I know of has agreed to go along with proposed sanctions--no other country, Mr. 
President. 

Therefore, we are left in a position of imposing unilateral sanctions, and unilateral 
sanctions are just like no sanctions at all. If we prohibit United States companies from 
doing business in Burma , foreign business with no similar handicap will be more than 
happy to step in and take our place. There is very little I can think of that we are in 
a position to supply to Burma which couldn't be supplied by a foreign country were we 
removed from the arena. This was a principal argument put forward by many Senators 
against imposing sanctions against the People's Republic of China. I wonder how many of 
those Senators are now arguing in favor of sanctions against Burma?

In addition, the Burma provisions strike me as somewhat hypocritical. The Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, in same region, is a Communist country that routinely violates 
human rights and suppresses democracy; free speech is forbidden, opponents of the 
government are locked up for years, just like in Burma . But Mr. President, I don't see 
anybody moving to impose sanctions against that government. 

On the contrary, we're doing everything we can to increase U.S. business there because 
we believe that's the best way to effectuate change. We've seen that increased business 
contacts are the best way to influence China; this seeming truism is the principal 
reason why we continue to renew China's most-favored-nation status each year. Most 
Senators have apparently concluded that the same is true for Vietnam. Why, then, are we 
taking a different position with regards to Burma ? 

Mr. President, I am the first to agree that democracy needs to be restored in Burma , 
that SLORC has to go, and that Daw Aung Sun Suu Kyi and her party are the rightful 
government of that country. Unfortunately, this bill is not going to bring us one step 
closer to bringing that about. All it is going to do is hurt U.S. companies, put us out 
on a limb without the support of our allies or other countries in the region, and make 
us look somewhat foolish. 

For these reasons, I oppose the committee amendment and support the Cohen amendment. I 
strongly urge my colleagues to do likewise. 

Several Senators addressed the Chair. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana. 

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I rise in support of the Cohen amendment. I was part of a 
group that perfected an amendment and put out a `Dear Colleague' letter. It was similar 
in many respects to the Cohen amendment. It had some significant differences, and we had 
a broad support I believe for that amendment. But, Mr. President, we have 
determined--Senator Nickles and I, and other supporters of this amendment--that the 
differences between the Johnston-Nickles amendment and the Cohen amendment were not 
sufficient so as to divide our forces. And we believe that essentially this amendment 
incorporates what we think is the central thrust of our amendment. So, therefore, we 
support it, and I urge my colleagues to do so. 

Mr. President, this is a difficult question. No one defends the SLORC, the group that is 
running Myanmar, or Burma . It is true they are a bad regime. They are not an Iran in 
the sense that they do not practice state terrorism. They are not a Nazi Germany in the 
sense that they engage in genocide. But they are plenty bad, Mr. President, and we do 
not defend them. 

The question is: Would it be effective to do what Senator McConnell has proposed? Would 
it be effective? Would it help achieve the end? Mr. President, I think it would do 
precisely and exactly the opposite. 

Mr. President, to cut off American participation in Burma --not foreign participation 
but American participation--would be exactly the wrong thing. First of all, it is no 
sanction because Americans are less than 10 percent of foreign investment in Burma today 
and the total of foreign investment is less than Burmese send back--Burmese expatriates 
from around the world send back to their own country. The reason for this is because 
under the former leader of Burma , General Ne Win, who was there for over two decades, 
Burma was one of the most hermetically sealed countries on the face of the Earth. People
did not go outside Burma . People did not come inside Burma . It was a totally closed 
not only economy but society that practiced the most cruel kind of repression; no doubt 
about that. It has only been in the last few years, Mr. President, that Burma has opened 
up at all. They have begun to let a little bit of light in. Indeed, Unocal, which is an 
American company, is in there together with Total, which is a French company, to develop 
the gas fields. Actually they want to send the gas to Thailand. The Thais are very
strong supporters of this, as you might suspect. 

And the question is: Is it good to have an American company, or would it be better to 
have Total, the French company, have the contract? Really that is the question proposed 
by the McConnell approach. I submit it is better to have an American company there. 

Mr. President, I talked to the President of Unocal. He personally have been talking to 
these people in what we call the SLORC, the State Law and Order Restoration Council, the 
group that is running Burma. Whether or not he has been successful, or whether or not he 
is beginning to be successful, you can argue. But I can tell you, Mr. President, that 
the President of Unocal --an American--it is better to have him in there than to have 
only the French because the French and the Europeans have never really helped on human 
rights matters. I mean they never helped on China. They never helped on other countries 
around the world. It is always the United States who does the propagation of democracy 
and human rights. We have a Louisiana company that has a subcontract there. 

The South Koreans are ready, willing, and able. And, as a matter of fact, it is grooming 
to take their place in Burma . I ask you, Mr. President. Do you think that the South 
Koreans are going to be in talking about human rights and democracy? Mr. President, it 
is much more likely that Americans will do so. When you have a country that has been so 
sealed off from Western influences, from civilizing influence, from moderating 
influences all these years, it is important to let the light in--the cleansing light of 
democracy, the cleansing light of Western civilization, the dynamic forces of the free 
market. It is better to let those in. Then you have something with which to sanction. 
If, just as they are letting the light in, you suddenly shut the light off, there is 
neither a sanction to be had nor a loss for the Burmese in continuing with their
course of conduct. 

My colleague from Kentucky says that there has been no improvement at all; that they 
have not responded at all. Mr. President, I would say that is debatable. We asked the 
Burmese to do a couple of things, both of which they did. We asked them to release Aung 
San Suu Kyi. They did, as my colleague from Kentucky says. She is not under house 
arrest. She stays at home because it is the safest place. Maybe so. But we asked them to 
do that, and they did that. She is not in prison. That is not much but it is something
we asked them to do, and they did it. 

We asked them to release the Members of Parliament. Most of them have been released. 
Several hundred have been released. There are a number which remain in prison. They say 
there is no Member of Parliament in prison, and rather cynically they are able to 
justify that by saying they decertified those Members of Parliament. 

So I do not mean to make the case that the Burmese are responding completely, or 
responding in good faith, or that there is great reason to hope. But, Mr. President, 
there is some progress and some measurable progress where there was none before. When Ne 
Win was running that country, you could not even get American news media in; a member of 
the news media. Now, Mr. President, there is at least reason to hope. 

My friend from Kentucky says Aung San Suu Kyi, that brave woman who did in fact win the 
election, has backed his position. Mr. President, I tried to read everything that she 
has said. I stand second to none in my admiration for her. She is a very brave woman. 
She has risked her personal safety to stand up for freedom and democracy in Burma . And 
I hope eventually that she will be successful.  

But I am not aware--I was going to ask my colleague from Kentucky--if she has endorsed 
the specific language of the McConnell amendment. Has she endorsed this specific 
language? 

Mr. McCONNELL. I would say to my friend from Louisiana that I believe the answer to that 
is yes. 

Let me read the quote. I have not shown her the language. She said that `Foreign 
investment currently benefits only Burma 's military.' These are direct words from Aung 
San Suu Kyi. `Foreign investment currently benefits only Burma 's military rulers and 
some local interests but would not help improve the lot of the Burmese in general.' She 
says, `Investment made now is very much against the interests of the people of Burma .' 
She said further, these are direct quotes in May 1996, this year: `Burma is not
developing in any way. Some people are getting very rich. That is not economic 
development.' All of those are direct recent quotes. 

I think it is safe to say that she hopes that we will begin these kinds of sanctions. 

A further direct quote from the New York Times of July 19, 1996, direct quote: `What we 
want are the kind of sanctions that will make it quite clear that economic change in 
Burma is not possible without political change.' 

So I would say to my friend from Louisiana, the answer is no. I have not shown her the 
actual language. I am totally confident that she supports the approach that I have 
recommended.
 
Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, I thank the Senator for responding on that. I think the 
answer to my question is--and I think the Senator was honest in saying--that Aung San 
Suu Kyi has neither seen nor endorsed this language, that she in fact endorsed 
sanctions, as the Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen] has in his amendment. It is sanctions. 
One of the central questions is this. I made up a little poem. I am not as good at 
poetry as the Senator from Maine is, but my little poem is this: 

A sanction will not a sanction be if it hurts the sanctioner and not the sanctionee. 

What that means is if all you do is cost American jobs and influence by substituting, 
for Unocal, Total, a French company, when Unocal is trying its best to influence the 
SLORC, influence the government, doing what it can, and all you are doing is getting the 
Americans out and putting in the French, getting the Americans out and putting in the 
South Koreans, then I submit that is no sanction at all. 

Now, we are told by my friend from Kentucky that there is precedent for this because we 
have taken unilateral sanctions against Iran and Libya and Cuba. 

First of all, I think these three countries are greatly distinguishable, the first two 
practicing terrorism all around the world, and in the case of Cuba, shooting down 
American planes over international airspace. Whatever else you may say about Burma , 
they do not practice state terrorism, nor do they threaten their neighbors. 

Moreover, my friend from Kentucky says that sanctions sometimes work and sometimes do 
not, and he talks about the example of South Africa. They did, in fact, work in South 
Africa where you had a united world. The whole world was united against South Africa. In 
the case of Burma , the United States, to my knowledge, has not one single ally. The 
nations of the area, the ASEAN countries, actively oppose sanctions and actively hope 
that we will engage Burma not just because they want to trade with Burma, and they do, 
but because they believe that the best way to sanitize that regime, to encourage a 
dialog, to bring democracy to Burma is by beginning to engage that country. 

The European Union 2 weeks ago voted not to impose unilateral sanctions. Not even the 
Danes, whose diplomat there died in prison under very suspicious circumstances, are 
willing to engage in sanctions against Burma . 

The Cohen amendment seeks to have our administration get other nations of the world to 
engage in multilateral sanctions. Multilateral sanctions will work. If we can engage the 
other countries of the region and of the world to cooperate with us in sanctions, that, 
in fact, will be a sanction and will not be what we call friendly fire. Friendly fire, 
as we found out in Desert Storm and as we have always known, never hurts the other side. 
It hurts yourself. It decreases our influence with Burma . 

So, Mr. President, I strongly urge that we pass the Cohen amendment and that we seek to 
help bring democracy to Burma. 

Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair. 

Mr. BOND addressed the Chair. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Thomas). The Senator from Kentucky. 

Mr. McCONNELL. Very briefly, I just wanted to make a couple of observations with regard 
to the comments of my good friend from Louisiana. 

Aung San Suu Kyi has a cousin, an official spokesman, who resides in the United States 
and heads an organization called the National Coalition of Government of the Union of 
Burma . He is, in effect, Aung San Suu Kyi's spokesman in our country. He is here 
because he has to be here. He cannot be over there and continue to breathe. I have a 
copy of a letter dated July 12, 1996, from him on the very issue that we are debating 
here this morning. Dr. Sein Win says: 

The immediate imposition of economic sanctions against the ruling military junta is 
urgently needed. I do not take the impositions of sanctions on my country lightly. 

He understands what we are talking about here. 

I and the democratic forces working to liberate our country know that foreign investment 
serves to strengthen SLORC. It is providing SLORC with the means to finance a massive 
army and intelligence service whose only job is to crush international dissent. 

He goes on to say: 

The situation in my country has deteriorated into free fall. 

He concludes by saying: 

I urge you to stand on the side of 42 million freedom-loving Burmese and support 
economic sanctions against this rogue regime. 

I certainly agree with my friend from Louisiana that the State Law and Order Restoration 
Council is no threat to its neighbors. It is not. It is a threat to its own citizens. 
That is what this is, a regime of terrorism against the Burmese people. If we do not 
impose sanctions unilaterally, who is going to start this? Who is going to take the lead 
if the United States does not? Sooner or later, if the international community is going
to notice what is going on there and take some steps, it is going to happen because of 
American leadership. 

Mr. President, I know the Senator from Missouri is anxious to speak. I will come back to 
this later. I yield the floor. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Missouri. 

Mr. BOND. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the amendment by my colleague from 
Maine. I am very much concerned about the impact of the provisions in the underlying 
bill. Like most, if not all, of my colleagues, I would agree and agree wholeheartedly 
that the present conditions in Burma , or Myanmar, are deplorable. The conditions of 
SLORC cannot and should not be condoned. As I have said in the past on many occasions, 
their claim to govern is an illegitimate claim. Their hold on power through oppression
and denial of human rights is one that I and, I believe, everyone else in this body 
would like to see come to end as soon as possible. 

Aung San Suu Kyi and her party won an election in 1990 and I am confident would win 
again if another election were held today. SLORC came to power solely due to its ability 
to coerce. Period. End of story. 

The question that we are now trying to answer is, how do we respond to the situation? 
How can the United States influence the activities of SLORC to bring about change in 
Burma and to bring the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi back to 
Burma? 

One approach that is taken in the foreign operations appropriations bill is to try to 
achieve change in Burma through total unilateral sanctions--unilateral sanctions. This 
approach assumes that such actions will influence and pressure SLORC to change its 
behavior. 

I have to commend my colleagues for their eagerness, their dedication and the leadership 
of the Senator from Kentucky to 

try to see that we do something to bring about change in Burma , but I am not convinced 
that cutting off what little contact we do have with that country will serve the 
positive purpose we seek. That action, in my opinion, will do nothing to bring about 
change in Burma . Such sanctions would be ineffective in achieving their purpose and 
would solely deny the Burmese people, the ones we are trying to assist in this whole 
debate, the positive effect of closer and deeper American engagement. 

What would be accomplished by implementing sanctions unilaterally on a country where 
U.S. investment is relatively insignificant, minor, almost unimportant and would be 
quickly taken up by our competitors? We must remember that all of the nations of Asia 
and much of Europe, including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, disagree with 
this policy of sanctions.

Like the Senator from Maine, I have had the opportunity to visit with leaders in the 
ASEAN countries, and I can tell you that they are not going to impose sanctions. They 
believe in engagement. They are going to continue to engage in Burma . 

Is the progress toward peace, human rights, and the recognition of democratic principles 
more likely to be furthered by our withdrawing from the field? I think not. Sanctions 
did work in South Africa, but only because the United States was part of a much larger 
coalition. They do not work when we go in as the Lone Ranger and try to cut off our 
minuscule investment. 

The Senator from Kentucky has given us quotes from Aung San Suu Kyi and her 
spokesperson, in which they talk about foreign sanctions. If all countries who are now 
trading with Burma could be enlisted, then there could be a major impact. But I can tell 
you from talking to--and mostly from listening to--the leaders of the countries that are 
the neighbors of Burma , that is not going to happen. 

Burma is just beginning to open its doors to the outside world. There are neighboring 
countries and other countries in the world anxious and willing to go in. The opening is 
a unique opportunity that we have not seen before, an opportunity to help bring about 
change, to make things happen. Frankly, I am not so much concerned, not so much 
interested in the very small investment that our companies may now have in Burma . If we 
were part of an overall sanctions picture, I would say it would be worth it, if other
countries would get out as well. But I can see us having a positive effect in the entire 
region if we continue to be involved, if we continue to have the opportunity to exercise 
U.S. influence to bring U.S. values to that country. It just makes sense. 

How can we influence anything if we are the only ones outside the room while the rest of 
the world is carrying on without us, probably happy to see us play the self-righteous 
outsider and get out? I cannot see how punishing United States firms by threatening to 
keep them out of Burma is an effective way to bring about change. United States 
presence, U.S. firms are the ones on the ground who can help spread American values. 

Obviously, our global competitors and Burma 's neighbors see opportunities arising in 
Burma . I fear they are more interested in monetary gain, in many instances, from such 
change and not the opportunity to bring about the political change that we in the United 
States are seeking. I can imagine that European and Asian trade competitors would be 
wildly supportive and happy to see total sanctions unilaterally imposed by the United 
States on its own companies. 

Another possibility we must start considering is the security issue of continually 
isolating Burma . To do so could drive them into the arms of the Chinese. A strong 
security relationship between Burma and China is not, in my view, in the best interests 
of the United States. I fear to think what it would mean if such a relationship were to 
lead to a port in Southeast Asia for the Chinese Navy. 

At this time the United States does not do much for Burma . We purchase a mere 7 percent 
of all Burma's exports and provide an insignificant 1 percent of its imports. We provide 
them no aid. We limit international financing by continuing to vote against loans to 
Burma through international financial institutions. Frankly, these votes are likely to 
be overridden by other voting countries who seek the opportunities that large-scale 
projects in Burma would provide. We have very little leverage even now with Burma . To 
isolate ourselves even further from that country would be to give up what little
influence, what positive pressure for change we can bring. 

The United States can either be at the table and foster meaningful dialog and 
negotiations, or we can walk out of the room. I believe that, recognizing the
opportunity that SLORC is providing by opening Burma to foreign interests, staying and 
engaging the country's foreign leader is the best hope we have for fostering democratic 
change in Burma.

We all want to see change in Burma . We all feel that SLORC's actions are reprehensible 
and would like to see the legitimately elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi brought to 
power. I hope, while making efforts to bring about these results, we do not give up 
existing and future United States interests, not only in Burma but throughout Southeast 
Asia. I yield the floor. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The assistant majority leader. 

Mr. NICKLES. I compliment my colleague for an excellent statement. I echo his comments. 
I also compliment Senator Cohen for his amendment. 

Senator Johnston and I have been working on a comparable amendment. It is almost 
identical. We are not going to offer that. I think it is important for people to have 
one alternative to the language in the appropriations bill. 

On page 188 in the bill, it says we are going to have sanctions against Burma . All of 
us want to change policies in Burma . Burma has been repressive. It has denied human 
rights. We need to make changes. So, how does the committee, or how does the language 
that we have before us in the bill, do that? First, it says, `No national of the United 
States shall make any investment in Burma.' 

Some people, some companies, some U.S. citizens have already made investments. We are 
going to say no more investments; no investments, period. That is a very stark 
punishment. I am not sure it is punishment so much on Burma and officials in Burma as it 
is on officials of the United States and people of the United States. The language 
continues. It goes on and says we will deny United States assistance to Burma. 

The Cohen amendment does that as well, but it is a little more targeted. Under the 
language that we have in the bill, it says United States assistance to Burma is 
prohibited. Under the Cohen amendment it says assistance is prohibited except for 
humanitarian assistance. We are trying to help some people. There has been repression 
over there. It also says we could continue to have assistance in areas for
counternarcotics. Right now there are a lot of narcotics coming from Burma . Should we 
not have United States assistance, some undercover, some open, used to investigate 
sources of heroin and other drugs that might be leaving Burma and ultimately end up in 
the United States? The language that is in the bill before us would deny any assistance, 
including counternarcotics efforts. I think that would be a serious mistake. 

The idea of having a unilateral sanction, I think, is a mistake. I think, if we are 
going to have sanctions, they should be multilateral. If we are saying only the United 
States steps forward, no U.S. citizen shall invest, and no other country comes forward, 
there may not be any change whatsoever. Certainly, if we are going to have U.S. 
sanctions, I want my colleagues to consider--I will not be offering it at this time,
but I was considering an amendment that we should at least have a report on the economic 
impact and whether or not it had any positive impact on achieving our goal. 

If we have sanctions, certainly we want to know whether they are working or not working. 
We want to have the changes in Burma , but do we make those changes when we have 
unilateral sanctions affecting our very small investments? I doubt it. Certainly they 
can be offset by other countries. 

Can you have changes when you have multilateral sanctions? Possibly. Sanctions are 
difficult in this day and age. When the Carter administration imposed a wheat embargo on 
Russia for some serious abuses, what happened is we lost markets to one of our weak 
competitors. In Russia, it was replaced by a lot of other countries--Australia, 
Argentina and other countries. They expanded their wheat base. They exported to Russia. 
Russia now does not buy as much from the United States. They buy from other countries. 
We just created another group of competitors in this particular one commodity. Did we 
change policy in Russia? I do not think so. I do not think that had, really, a 
triggering impact in making policy changes. I want to make the policy change.

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