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Part.2 - Burma Discussion on the Se



Subject: Part.2 - Burma Discussion on the Senate floor (July 25, 1996)

The Discussion on Burma Sanction Amendment on the Senate Floor (Part. 2)
                     July 25, 1996
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Another important segment of the Cohen amendment is that it does give the President some 
discretion, some leverage, which will have influence on future decisions on Burma . Do 
we just want to punish them for past decisions, punish them or punish American citizens? 
I am afraid we will be punishing Americans more than we will be punishing the Burmese 
officials. 

But more important, how do we change future behavior? I think the Cohen amendment does 
more toward changing future behavior because it says we are actually giving some 
discretion. If we do not see improvements, then some sanctions will come about, but the 
President and the diplomatic efforts can be using those for leverage. There is not a lot 
of leverage when it says no national of the United States can make any investment, the 
United States can give no assistance whatsoever. I am afraid that will not influence 
anything toward the positive. 

Frankly, it will cost the United States. It will be taking investments away from 
American citizens, I think unquestionably, and I doubt it would have the economic impact 
desired by my colleague from Kentucky. 

I respect greatly the efforts of the Senator from Kentucky. I know he believes very 
sincerely in trying to effect change in Burma . I happen to share the goal of my 
colleague from Kentucky. I just think the method toward best achieving that would be 
through the amendment offered by my colleague from Maine, Senator Cohen. I compliment 
him on that amendment, and I urge its adoption. 

Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, if I can say quickly to my friend from Oklahoma before he 
leaves, I appreciate his kind words about my work on this issue. If I heard him 
correctly--and I don't want to misstate his position--did I hear my friend from Oklahoma 
say that he thought assisting the regime there was a good idea? Maybe I misheard him. 

Mr. NICKLES. Mr. President, no, I did not. I say to my colleague, I was referring to the 
section that says no assistance whatsoever. I would conclude that to prohibit U.S. 
contributions involved in any way dealing with, I think--we have exceptions for drug 
interdiction. Can we spend money in Burma for drug interdiction, drug identification, 
undercover or otherwise? I think we should have an opportunity. 

Mr. McCONNELL. The current law forbids that. We just last year imposed a prohibition on 
dealing with SLORC. So this would, in effect, weaken existing law. 

I wanted to make sure my friend from Oklahoma knew that. Existing law says no U.S. 
cooperation with SLORC on the drug issue, frankly because we don't trust them. So the 
Cohen amendment would actually weaken existing law in terms of the U.S. relationship 
with SLORC. I just wanted to make that clear. 

Let me make a few observations about the argument that the approach we are recommending 
is inevitably going to be unilateral in nature and nobody will follow us. 

Already there is action in the European Parliament. Let me point out to my colleagues 
what action has been taken this month in the European Parliament. 

First, the European Parliament has condemned torture, arrests, detentions, and human 
rights abuses perpetrated by SLORC. Obviously, that is an easy thing to do. 

It supports the suspension of concessional lending to SLORC, a little tougher step. 

Third, the European Parliament has called upon members to suspend GSP for exports to 
Burma because of forced labor conditions. 

And fourth, Mr. President, and most important, the European Union has called upon its 
members to suspend trade and investment with Burma . 

The July 1996 European Union resolution restricts visas to SLORC officials and their 
families, something that is in the underlying bill and I hope we adopt. 

The resolution restricts the movement of SLORC diplomatic personnel, suspends all 
high-level visits, demands full investigation and accountability for the death in 
custody of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Switzerland's consul, Leo Nichols. Let me talk 
about Leo Nichols. Leo Nichols was Aung San Suu Kyi's best friend. He was the European 
consul who represented a number of European countries in Burma as a sort of local 
consulate official. Leo Nichols was arrested a few months ago for the crime of 
possessing a fax machine, Mr. President. In Burma , if you are on the wrong side of this 
issue, you can be arrested for such things as possessing a fax machine. So Leo Nichols 
was arrested for possessing a fax machine and turned up dead. They had a hard time 
getting the body. He was denied medication. 

All of a sudden, Europe discovered Burma , because a European citizen got treated the 
same way the Burmese citizens are treated on a daily basis--on a daily basis. All of a 
sudden, a European citizen got treated that way, and Europeans have all of a sudden 
gotten more interested in this issue. 

So I raise this point to suggest that if America has the courage to take this step 
unilaterally, we will not be alone for very long. As a matter of fact, the rest of the 
world is getting interested in this issue. Secretary Christopher called me from 
Indonesia the day before yesterday to talk about this issue. Obviously, he supports the 
amendment of the Senator from Maine, and that is certainly OK. 

Mr. COHEN. If the Senator will yield, I don't believe he does. He does not express 
support for this amendment. 

Mr. McCONNELL. I am sorry, I retract that. Let's put it this way. The Secretary of State 
would like a proposal, I think, that gives the administration wide latitude to manage 
this issue as they see best, and I hope it is not a misstatement of the Senator's 
amendment that it does give the administration a good deal of latitude. 

Mr. COHEN. It gives the administration some flexibility. They would like more. Mine does 
not give them quite as much as they like. 

Mr. McCONNELL. I certainly would not want to misstate the position of the 
administration, but I am confident in saying the Secretary of State would prefer not to 
have unilateral sanctions. I think the Senator from Maine would agree with that. 

I have been a little surprised the administration has not gotten interested in this 
issue, but I think they are getting more interested in the issue. 

The point I was going to make before my friend from Maine stood up was what Secretary 
Christopher pointed out to me is it was discussed for an hour the other night at the 
ASEAN meeting. Previously, they acted like Burma was not there. Nobody talks about it. 
It is being forced on to the agenda, even in the part of the world that is least 
interested in doing anything about the regime, for all the obvious reasons. They have 
the biggest investment there. 

So this is not going to go away, Mr. President. I don't know what is going to happen on 
the vote on the Cohen amendment, but it is not going to go away until SLORC goes away 
and until the results of the election in 1990 are honored. 

I don't want to misrepresent at all the position of the administration on the Cohen 
proposal. All I can say is it is exactly what the administration and the National 
Security Council asked me to accept on Monday, but they will have to speak for 
themselves. This amendment, by the way, is not directed at the Clinton administration. 
The Bush administration was worse, from my point of view, on Burma than this
administration has been. At least they discuss it occasionally. 

So, Mr. President, let me just conclude this segment by saying I don't think we will be 
alone very long if we have the courage to take this step. 

I yield the floor. 

Mr. LEAHY addressed the Chair. 

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that John Lis, a Javits fellow 
currently working on Senator Biden's personal staff be extended the privilege of the 
floor for the debate. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. 

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I am perfectly willing to yield to whomever wants the floor. 
If no one is seeking the floor, I will suggest the absence of a quorum. 

Mr. COHEN. Could I just indicate for the record, during the course of the debate this 
morning the question of the administration's position was raised. I have since been 
apprised that the administration does lend its support to the Cohen amendment, which 
prior to the beginning of the discussion of this matter it did not. So perhaps they have 
been watching C-SPAN and have tuned in to see the better part of wisdom in supporting 
the Cohen amendment. 

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter, signed by Barbara Larkin, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs be printed in the Record. 

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the Record, as 
follows: 

U.S. Department of State, 
Washington, DC. 

Hon. William Cohen, 
U.S. Senate, 
Washington, DC. 

Dear Senator Cohen: The Administration welcomes and supports the amendment which you and 
others have offered to Section 569 (Limitation on Funds for Burma ) of H.R. 3540, the 
Foreign Operations Appropriations bill. We believe the current and conditional sanctions 
which your language proposes are consistent with Administration policy. As we have 
stated on several occasions in the past, we need to maintain our flexibility to respond 
to events in Burma and to consult with Congress on appropriateresponses to ongoing and 
future development there. 

We support a range of tough measures designed to bring pressure to bear upon the regime 
in Rangoon. We continue to urge international financial institutions not to provide 
support to Burma under current circumstances. We maintain a range of unilateral 
sanctions and do not promote U.S. commercial investment in or trade with Burma . We 
refrain from selling arms to Burma and have an informal agreement with our G-7 friends 
and allies to do the same. 

On the international level, we have strongly supported efforts in the UN General 
Assembly and the International Labor Organization to condemn human and worker rights 
violations in Burma . At the UN Human Rights Commission this month, we led the effort 
against attempts to water down the Burma resolution. We have urged the UN to play an 
active role in promoting democratic reform through a political dialogue with Aung San 
Suu Kyi. 

The Office of Management and Budget advises that from the standpoint of the 
Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of this report. We 
note, however, that the working of two of the sanctions as currently drafted raises 
certain constitutional concerns. We look forward to working with you and the conferees 
to address this. 

We hope this information is useful to you. Please do not hesitate to call if we can be 
of further assistance. 

Sincerely, 
BARBARA LARKIN, 

Assistant Secretary, 
Legislative Affairs. 


Mrs. FEINSTEIN. Mr. President, I rise to urge my colleagues to support the
Cohen-Feinstein-Chafee-McCain amendment with respect to Burma . 

Before I begin, I want to express my admiration for the distinguished manager of the 
bill, Senator McConnell, who has almost singlehandedly brought this issue to the floor. 
He has been doggedly pursuing adjustments to our Burma policy for many months, and has 
focused the attention of the Senate and the administration on this issue in a way that 
would not have happened otherwise. 

There is clearly no division, I think, at least, in this body, on the nature of the 
SLORC regime in Burma. It is an oppressive antidemocratic regime, and it has 
systematically deprived the people of Burma of the right to govern themselves. There is 
no disagreement on that point, I think, nor on the desirability of restoration of 
democracy in Burma . 

The key question, though, we need to ask, is what is the most effective way to advance 
the goal? In order to answer that question, we need to have a clear understanding of 
what leverage we have, or lack of, on Burma . We also need to have a clear understanding 
of how other interests in the region will be affected. The key problem with the Burma 
provision, as I view it, in the bill before the Senate, is that it presumes we can 
unilaterally affect change on Burma . 

I have come, as I have watched world events, to doubt that unilateral sanctions make 
much sense. It is absolutely essential that any pressure we seek to put on the 
Government of Burma be coordinated with the nations of ASEAN and our European and Asian 
allies. If we act unilaterally, we are more likely to have the opposite 
affect--alienating many of these allies, while having no real impact on the ground. 

One of the key aspects of the amendment offered by the Senator from Maine is that it 
requires the President to work to develop, in coordination with members of ASEAN and 
other nations having major trading and investment interests in Burma, a comprehensive 
multilateral strategy to bring democracy and to improve human rights and the quality of
life in Burma. 

This strategy must include the promotion of dialog between the SLORC and democratic 
opposition groups in Burma . Only a multilateral approach is likely to be successful. 
Knowing that the ASEAN nations, who are moving now toward more engagement with Burma , 
not less, will not join us in sanctions at this time, it is clear that such a policy 
will not be effective. For example, on the Unocal pipeline, if we apply unilateral 
sanctions, the Unocal pipeline, which is now a joint venture between France and the 
United States company, will only be taken over by either Japanese interests--I am told 
Mitsui is interested--or South Korean interests. Therefore, what point do we really 
prove? 

The Cohen-Feinstein amendment does recognize that there are steps we can and should take 
at this time. It does ban bilateral assistance to Burma , but it does so with three 
important exceptions. First, it allows humanitarian assistance, which is clearly a 
reasonable exception in the case of natural disaster or other humanitarian calamity. 
Second, it allows assistance that promotes human rights and democratic values,
which clearly makes sense, since that is what we are trying to promote in Burma . 
Finally, it allows an exemption for counternarcotics assistance, if the Secretary of 
State can certify that the Government of Burma is fully cooperating with the United 
States counternarcotics effort, and that such assistance is consistent with United 
States human rights concerning Burma. 

This last exemption goes to perhaps, I believe, our most important interest in Burma . 
Sixty percent of the heroin coming into the United States comes from Burma today, and it 
is a growing scourge on our cities. The Burmese Government is not cooperating with the 
United States counternarcotics interests and is benefiting from the drug trade. The 
President has decertified Burma on these grounds. But this exemption does recognize that 
if conditions change, it would be in our interest to be able to engage a cooperative 
Burmese Government in a counternarcotics policy. It is clearly in our interests to have 
this ability. 

The Cohen-Feinstein amendment also directs the United States to oppose loans by 
international financial institutions to Burma , and it prohibits entry visas to Burmese 
Government officials, except as required by treaty obligations. 

In addition, the amendment requires the President to report regularly to the Congress on 
progress toward democratization in Burma , improvement in human rights, including the 
use of forced labor, and progress toward developing a multilateral strategy with our 
allies. 

The amendment gives us some leverage by making clear that the United States is prepared 
to act unilaterally if SLORC takes renewed action to rearrest, to harm, or to exile Aung 
San Suu Kyi, or otherwise engages in large-scale repression of the democratic 
opposition. The courage and dignity of Aung San Suu Kyi and her colleagues deserves 
respect and support from all of us. This provision may provide some measure of 
protection against increased oppression against them. We may be able to have the effect 
of nudging the SLORC toward an increased dialog with the democratic opposition. That is 
why we also allow the President to lift sanctions if he determines that Burma has made 
measurable and substantial progress toward improving human 

rights and implementing democratic government. We need to be able to have the 
flexibility to remove sanctions and provide support for Burma if it reaches a transition 
stage that is moving toward the restoration of democracy, which all of us support. 

Mr. President, I thank my distinguished colleague from Maine for his leadership in 
crafting this amendment. He has worked closely with the administration, which supports 
his language. It represents the best policy, I believe, for us to play a role in moving 
Burma toward democracy. I urge my colleagues to support this amendment. 

I yield the floor. 

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, with all due respect to the able Senator from Maine, whom I do 
respect, I have a problem with his amendment. His amendment is based on the premise that 
the United States should wait until a future time--nobody knows when--a future time to 
impose tougher sanctions against the illegal SLORC regime in Burma . The Cohen amendment 
for conditional sanctions provides for a ban on new investment only `if the President 
[of the United States] determines and certifies to Congress that, [at some future date,] 
the Government of Burma has physically harmed, rearrested for political acts, or exiled 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi or has committed large-scale repression of or violence against the 
democratic opposition.' 

Mr. President, the Government of Burma , the SLORC, S-L-O-R-C, as it is known, has 
already done enough to Ms. Suu Kyi, has already committed large-scale repression and 
violence, not only against the democratic opposition, but against the people of Burma . 

We know there is forced labor in Burma . There is no question about that. We know that 
Burma is the source of more than 60 percent of the heroin finding its way into the 
United States, and we know that the SLORC regime is implicated in this trade. No 
question about it. However, we know that the people of Burma elected the National League 
for Democracy overwhelmingly in elections 6 years ago, and that it has been straight 
downhill ever since that time. 

The Cohen amendment also provides a waiver to the administration. I have to ask the 
question--I do so with all respect--are we serious or are we not serious about Burma? 

I support Chairman McConnell and my other distinguished colleagues who have said, enough 
is enough. Let us stop allowing U.S. investment to prop up the SLORC regime's 
repression. I hope that colleagues will vote in that direction when the vote is taken. I 
thank the Chair and I yield the floor. 

Mr. McCONNELL addressed the Chair. 

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky. 

Mr. McCONNELL. I want to thank the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee for his support for the sanctions against Burma . We have been very patient. 
The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and I have been hoping since the Bush 
administration that some administration would take this matter seriously. 

I do not know whether the chairman agrees with me, but it seems to me if there were a 
bunch of Burmese-Americans, we would have gotten interested in this a long time ago---- 

Mr. HELMS. That is right. 

Mr. McCONNELL. A long time ago because this is a country that ranks right up there with 
Libya, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. 

The proponents of the Cohen amendment will say they are no threat to their neighbors. I 
expect that is the case. But 400,000 of these highly armed, mean-as-a-snake troops, 
terrorizing their own citizens and locking up, as the Senator from North Carolina 
pointed out, the duly elected leader of this country in internationally supervised, 
Western-style real elections in 1990--they are a real pariah regime. Yet the crux
of the Cohen amendment is, as the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee pointed 
out, that it gives the President total discretion to keep on doing what he has been 
doing, which is nothing. 

Mr. HELMS. That is right. 

Mr. McCONNELL. Nothing. So I thank the chairman for his support for this cause. 

Mr. HELMS. I thank the distinguished Senator from Kentucky for the very great work he is 
doing. I thank the Chair. 


BURMA SANCTIONS

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senator Cohen as an original cosponsor 
of his amendment to improve the language on Burma sanctions contained in the foreign 
operations bill. This amendment is constructive and a better approach to addressing the 
problem that Burma posses for American foreign policy. 

All of us in this body want the people of Burma to enjoy their human rights. But we must 
avoid a policy that will only make us feel good, but that is unlikely to achieve the 
goals it is intended to serve. The approach advocated by the Appropriations Committee, 
while well-intentioned, is too precipitous. Imposing unilateral sanctions on Burma 
immediately and lifting them only at such time as the SLORC allows a democratically 
elected government to take power may even provoke a reaction from the Burmese regime
which is the opposite of what the committee intends. 

Burma 's regional and investment partners do not share the intensity of our concern for 
democracy and definitely do not agree with the committee imposition of sanctions. 

The New York Times Monday reported the attitudes of nations attending the weekend 
meeting of the Association of South East Asian Nations [ASEAN]. The Indonesian Foreign 
Minister is quoted as saying, `ASEAN has one cardinal rule, and that is not to interfere 
in the internal affairs of other countries.' Far from agreeing with those in the United 
States pushing for sanctions, ASEAN took the first step in admitting Burma as a member, 
giving it official observer status. 

ASEAN's reaction is important because these are the nations, along with the People's 
Republic of China and the other nations of Asia, whose views most concern the ruling 
authorities in Burma. The United States accounts for less than 10 percent of foreign 
direct investment in Burma . It receives only 7 percent of Burma 's exports and United 
States imports account for only 1 percent of Burma 's total imports. Both Thailand and 
Singapore are bigger investors in Burma than the United States, as are France
and Britain. Given these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that United States 
opinion carries less weight in Burma than it does elsewhere in the world. 


Proponents of immediate and sweeping sanctions on Burma have often invoked the example 
of South Africa. Indeed, Burma may actually exceed South Africa in its repression. After 
all, as repugnant as the system of apartheid was, South Africa did provide at least a 
minority of its people with democratic rights while Burma systematically denies these 
rights to all its citizens. Burma certainly deserves the condemnation of all freedom 
loving people. 

However, Burma is unlike South Africa in a number of ways which make sanctions unlikely 
to yield the same result. 

First, United States policy toward South Africa was coordinated with our allies and that 
nation's most important trading partners. It was multilateral. There was no serious 
prospect that when our companies pulled out of the South African economy others would 
readily take their place, thereby undermining the effect of sanctions and making their 
chief victim American companies. Second, South Africa was much richer than Burma is 
today. Per capita income in South Africa was $2,000 when we imposed sanctions.
In Burma today it is $200, one of the lowest rates in the world. South Africa had a 
stake in the world economy. Burma has just begun to develop an interest in attracting 
foreign trade and investment. Third, Burma is an overwhelmingly rural economy, with 
manufacturing accounting for 9.4 percent of GDP and 8.2 percent of employment. Fourth, 
the South African regime and the elite that supported it had historical connections to 
the nations censuring it. It was not only affected materially by the sanctions imposed 
on it, but many in South Africa who treasured their ties to the West were dismayed by 
their international isolation. 

Burma has a long history of self-imposed isolation. Beginning in 1962, the leaders of 
Burma believed that their interests were best served by rejecting the pressures of the 
outside world. Even today, after Burma began an economic opening to the world, that 
opening is decidedly modest. Tom Vallely of Harvard has pointed out that Vietnam, a 
nation struggling with its own market reforms, approved more investment in 6 months than 
Burma did in 6 years. 

We are right to call for the institution of the democratically elected government of the 
National League for Democracy. In 1990, the people of Burma participated in a democratic 
election, and overwhelmingly supported the National League for Democracy. The Burmese 
military thwarted that victory and remains in place today as a standing insult to the 
proposition of democratic self-rule. They have since ruled the nation with an iron fist. 
But as despotic as they are, the generals who now control Burma constitutes the
de-facto government. 

The amendment offered by Senator Cohen is an attempt to recognize both the rights of the 
Burmese people and the realities of power and history. It attempts to narrow the focus 
of our legislative efforts, and give the President, who, whether Democrat or Republican, 
is charged with conducting our Nation's foreign policy, some flexibility. This amendment 
has the explicit support of the administration. 

It has a number of specific advantages beyond giving the administration more 
flexibility. Conditioning an investment sanction on a significant deterioration in the 
human rights situation in Burma, namely the arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi or a general 
crackdown on the democratic opposition, is a key element which commends the alternative. 
I know that the committee is greatly interested in the safety and welfare of Aung San 
Suu Kyi. However, I believe it may have erred in not including such a targeted sanction 
in his own bill. If the language in the bill were signed into law, a ban on U.S. 
investment would come into effect immediately. If the prospect of a United States 
investment sanction is restraining them at all, I see no reason why the Burmese 
authorities would not rearrest Suu Kyi once the sanction is imposed. What would they 
have to lose? What would they have to lose in once again rounding up prodemocracy 
activists by the hundreds? The Cohen approach preserves our options while at the same 
time making perfectly clear the action that the United States would take if the 
situation deteriorates. 

In the meantime, the Cohen amendment imposes three out of the four McConnell sanctions: 
prohibition of foreign assistance except humanitarian and counternarcotics assistance, 
U.S. opposition to multilateral lending, and the denial of U.S. visas to members of the 
regime. While doubts remain about the efficacy of even these limited sanctions, they 
will at a minimum demonstrate American displeasure with the situation in Burma . More 
importantly, a Senate vote in favor of the administration-supported Cohen amendment
will demonstrate the unity and resolve of American policy toward Burma . 

The two exceptions made by Senator Cohen to the prohibition on foreign assistance are, I 
believe, very constructive. 

Last year, Senator Kerry and I fought to permit counternarcotic assistance for Burma . 
Ultimately, we failed, but the Cohen substitute, if passed, will once again permit this 
vital assistance. As my colleagues know, the United States has not provided assistance 
of this type to Burma since 1988, despite the fact that Burma is the source of more than 
60 percent of the heroin on United States streets. Burma is the largest opium producer 
in the world. If we are ever to get a handle on the heroin problem in our own country, 
in addition to addressing demand, we will have to work with the Burmese. Engaging in the 
battle and achieving some degree of success will result, at the very least, in driving 
down the supply of opium and driving up the price. 

To address the concerns of those who point to the possibility that counternarcotics 
assistance in the hands of the SLORC might give them the means to subdue its ethnic 
minorities, Senator Cohen's amendment requires the Secretary of State to certify that 
any proposed counternarcotic program is consistent with United States human rights 
concerns. 

The other exception to a ban on assistance in Senator Cohen's amendment is humanitarian 
assistance. The committee amendment makes no allowance for humanitarian assistance. If 
the intent of the sanction on humanitarian assistance is to withhold legitimacy from the 
regime, I believe its limited value in this respect would be vastly outweighed by the 
practical ineffectiveness of unilateral sanctions. I am unconvinced that gutting funding 
for Feed the Children and World Vision is going to make Burma any more disposed toward 
democracy. 

I know that many Senators would rather not impose any sanctions on Burma . But the 
committee has decided to weigh in on the formulation of United States-Burma policy. The 
SLORC's repression of the Burmese people's pursuit of their God-given rights have made 
congressionally imposed sanctions on Burma inevitable. Senator Cohen has formulated an 
approach which is constructive and respectful of the prerogatives of the President, and 
more likely to positively influence the situation in Burma than will the sanctions 
adopted by the committee. I commend him for his work on this issue and encourage my
colleagues to vote for the Coehn amendment. 

I ask unanimous consent that a letter from the State Department to Senator Cohen in 
support of his amendment be printed in the Record. 

 
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