[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index
][Thread Index
]
DRUG AND BURMA: HUMAN RIGHTS SUB-CO
Subject: DRUG AND BURMA: HUMAN RIGHTS SUB-COMMITTEE REPORT ON OCT-95.
/* posted Sat Mar 2 6:00am 1996 by DRUNOO@xxxxxxxxxxxx
in igc:soc.culture.burma */
/* -----------" BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT, OCT 95 (4.15-4.27) "---------- */
CHAPTER FOUR: (4.15 - 4.27)
**************************
The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia
Joint Standing Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMOCRACY
IN BURMA (MYANMAR) October 1995
CHAPTER FOUR: BORDER REGIONS (4.15 - 4.27)
-----------------------------------------
THE DRUG TRADE
The Extent of the Drug Trade
4.15 What has flourished in northern Burma since the ceasefires of 1989 is
not peace but the drug trade. Prior to the ceasefires the production of
opium was estimated at less than 1,000 tons; in 1992-93 it was more than
2500 tons. The area under cultivation in north eastern Burma has increased
from 92,000 ha in 1987 to 142,000 ha in 1989 to more than 165,000 ha in
1993.
The Nature of the Drug Trade
4.16 In the Shan State major Chinese narcotics traffickers have become
involved with the ethnic insurgent groups. Ex-members of the Communist
Party of Burma (CPB) have used the drug trade and the money it can generate
to establish themselves as warlords in the northern provinces. The peace
they have brokered with the military regime in Rangoon has left them with
their arms and their areas of control undisturbed. Conflicts within the
various Shan State organisations reflect disputes between those with
political objectives and those with illicit economic interests as well as
power struggles between the crime syndicates eying for control of the drug
trade.
4.17 Over the last ten years it appears that there ahs been a shift in the
centre of operations from the Thai border in the southern Shan State where
Khun Sa had most of his heroin laboratories to rival groups on the border
of Yunnan province. It is estimated that Khun Sa's share of the opium trade
has fallen from 80 per cent in the mid-80s to less than 50 per cent by
1993. This north eastern region is now largely under the control of
remnants of the CPB, chiefly the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Burmese
National Democratic Alliance (BNDA) and the Eastern Shan State National
Democratic Alliance (ESSNDA). Individual narcotics dealers such as the
Pheung brothers, the Wei brothers, the Yang clan and Lo Hsing Han and Lin
Ming Xian compete for a share of the heroin trade. The distribution network
has also shifted to routes through Yunnan and China to Hong Kong and Taiwan
or through Laos and Cambodia as well as the more traditional route through
Thailand. The ethnic armies protect the areas of cultivation and the
initial transport routes, but organised crime provides a distribution
network into the markets of China, Taiwan, United States, Europe and
Australia [11].
Corruption of Government
4.18 The drug trade corrupts every government and every region it touches.
It is an international problem requiring an international solution. It
leads to the bribery of officials who thwart the implementation by the
national government of any corrective policy; it distorts financial markets
through money laundering practices; it is attended by criminal activity -
murder, smuggling and the spread of private armies; it is accompanied by
addiction and the consequent debillitation of the population, prostitution,
the trafficking of people, illegal immigration and the spread of HIV/AIDS.
4.19 In Burma the Government of the SLORC has publicly and internationally
declared that it seeks to eradicate the cultivation of the poppy and opium
refining in the border regions. It seeks development assistance to provide
alternative to the border communities and it wishes to cooperate with the
UN and other international drug control agencies. Particularly, the
Government has claimed that the signing of ceasefire agreements provides an
opportunity to deliver economic development to these areas.
4.20 In September 1994, the Government announced a Master Plan for the
Development of the Border Areas and National Races. Drug control operates
through the central Committee for Drug Abuse Control (CCDAC). It has 17
narcotics task forces (NTF). Burma is a party to UN Conventions on Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. It passed a new law in 1994, teh
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance Law, which brings Burma's legal
code into compliance with the relevant UN conventions. In July 1993, three
year United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP) projects commenced. These
involve law enforcement training and very limited crop substitution
projects in the eastern Shan State and the Wa areas.
4.21 The US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has also maintained a presence in
Burma. Pressure from the DEA to target the 'kingpins' in the industry would
appear to be behind the attacks on Khun Sa [12]. This thrust is from
Thailand. (See the recommendation in Chapter 19 of the JSCFADT report into
Australia's Relations with Thailand dealing with AFP/DEA coordinaiton.
4.22 However, the Committee was told that a significant feature of the
Golden Triangle's narco-political situation was:
* the presence and role of major Chinese narcotics traffickers in
the upper echelons of ethnic minority independence movements within
the Shan State;
* the increasing involvement of major players tolerated by national
governments; and
* the continuing involvement of national security organisations and
intelligence agencies in narcotic enforcement and the associated
potential development of conflicts of interest this situation
presents [13].
4.23 In support of this, the view was put to the Committee that the attacks
on Khun Sa occurred at a time when his power was in decline and that the
prime objective of the SLORC was to crush the political opposition, not to
eradicate the drug trade. It was claimed that the burning of opium by the
SLORC was a sham public relations exercise as the amounts made no impact on
a rapidly expanding trade. Khun Sa was expendable.
4.24 Of more serious concern was the claim, put by a number of sources,
that, despite the statements of the SLORC to the contrary, the narcotics
trade was protected at the highest level of the Government. The Committee
was told that the involvement was evident at two general levels:
* on an individual basis for personal profit, covering areas of
responsibility for transport, protection and patronage; and
* as a matter of policy, either explicit or covert, in order to
raise government revenue [14].
There is a curious discrepancy in Burma's national accounts. The IMF
estimates of Burma's foreign exchange reserves for 1991 were $US 310
million; however they showed no decline in 1992-93 despite a trade deficit
of $US 406 million and a current account deficit of $US 112.7. Moreover
Burma has purchased arms to the value of $US 1.2 billion in this period
[15].
4.25 Witnesses went on to say:
In practical terms, the importance attached to the role of the
Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI) and the Burmese
Army has meant that these organisations have a greater interface
with ethnic minority groups than the police .... Representatives of
the ethnic minority groups claim that most Burmese Army officers in
the Shan State are corrupted by the opium trade. Opium is
warehoused at Burmese military bases, while trucks transporting
narcotics are sometimes escorted by military vehicles to avoid
inspection en route.
Allegations of corruption on the part of members of the junta
abound, with senior officers continuing to amass fortunes. ....
According to Burmese businessmen who have dealt with them, both
General Than Shwe [and] Lt General Khin Nyunt have accumulated
personal fortunes by manipulating the system and accepting millions
of dollars in kickbacks [16].
If these allegations are true, and the only way to dispel them would be
greater transparency in the system of government in Burma, then it is clear
why the SLORC is so reluctant to recognise the results of teh 1990
election. The biggest threat to their status, power and wealth is the
democracy movement. This committee believes that until there is
accountability in the system of government and a proper democratic base,
there can be no lasting solution to the problems of corruption, no end to
the drug trade and no end to the violence and abuse of those Burmese who
wish to speak out against the corruption in their midst.
4.26 The Committee recommends that:
THE AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT:
(A) CONTRIBUTE TO THE UNITED NATIONS DRUG CONTROL PROGRAM (UNDCP)
IN SUPPORT OF THE EXPANSION OF CROP SUBSTITUTION MEASURES;
(B) EXAMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF CONTRIBUTING TO THE UNDCP PROGRAM BY
OFFERING LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING; AND
(C) ENCOURAGE ITS DIALOGUE PARTNERS IN ASEAN TO PURSUE WITH THE
GOVERNMENT OF BURMA LONG TERM SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF
TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN AND DRUGS THROUGH FULLY NEGOTIATED POLITICAL
SETTLEMENTS IN THE BORDER REGIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE
CEASEFIRES.
4.27 The Committee also endorses the recommendation on a cooperative
regional training program in Chapter 19 of its report on Australia's
Relations with Thailand.
Footnotes:
---------
[11] This information came to the Committee from a number of sources.
Exhibit No 40, Confidential submission No. 35 and Jane's Intelligence
Review, Special Report No 5, The Drug Trade in South East Asia.
[12] In December 1993, the Burmese armed forces mounted an offensive
against the Golden Triangle warlord, Khun Sa and his army which is still
continuing. Thousands of Government forces have since blockaded the ferry
crossings on the Salween River and put an economic stranglehold on his
headquarters at Homong.
[13] Confidential submission
[14] Confidential submission/
[15] ibid.
[16] ibid.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Above materials are reproduction from the findings of Human Rights
Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence
and Trade of the Parliament of Australia, published in October 1995.
Anyone wishing to inquire about the document may contact Ms Margaret
Swieringa, Secretary, Human Rights Sub-Committee, Parliament House,
Canberra A.C.T. 2600, AUSTRALIA.
Best regards, U Ne Oo.
ENDS(4.15-4.27)\