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BA(SA) REPORT ON BURMA REFUGEE POLI
Subject: BA(SA) REPORT ON BURMA REFUGEE POLICY IN THAILAND-93.
FOLLOWING REPORT WAS WRITTEN IN 1993 FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY WITH REGARDS TO BURMA REFUGEE SITUATION IN THAILAND.
IT IS HERE POSTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION (NOT FOR DIRECT ACTION, THANK YOU).
WITH BEST REGARDS, U NE OO.
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/* Written 14 Dec 6:00am 1996 by DRUNOO@xxxxxxxxxxxx in igc:reg.burma */
/* ---------" 1993: BA(SA) Report for refugees in Thailand "--------- */
BURMA ACTION(SOUTH AUSTRALIA)
6 October 1993
TO:
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RE: The United Nations protection for the Burma's displaced people in Thailand.}\\
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Concerned with the lack of progress towards the transfer of power to the
elected National League for Democracy (NLD) and continuing human rights
abuses on un-armed civilian population in Burma, the Burma Action (South
Australia) call upon the international community to (1) address the
humanitarian needs of the internally displaced people in Burma and, (2) to
join in calling for the United Nations and The Government of Thailand to
give protection for Burmese refugees in Thailand.
Despite the international community's demands to respect the result of the
election in 27-May-1990, Burma's first multi-party election in 26 years,
the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), the military junta,
who staged a military coup in 1988, shows no sign of transferring power to
the elected civilian government.
SLORC's repression on the un-armed civilian population continues in spite
of condemnations by United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the
international community. Unlawful detention of hundreds of political
prisoners, including 1991 Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi,
continues this year despite a release of 2000.
The Military Government of Burma(SLORC) clearly continues to show its
intention to keep the strangle-hold on state power. SLORC's strategies
which weaken the strength of the opposition, enables it to stay in power.
SLORC used modest concessions as a buffer for the international criticism
and, at the same time, trys to find ways to establish its legitimacy.
As the political conflict in Burma has dragged into its 5th year, the the
situation for Burmese refugees in Bangladesh and Thailand has
deteriorated. Within the country, the number of internally displaced people
has increased due to SLORCs counter insurgency campaign. The muslim
refugees in Bangladesh are living in an egregious conditions while Burmese
dissidents and ethnic Karen/Mon refugees in Thailand live in constant fear
of arrest, detention and deportation. A new influx of refugees have crossed
the Thai border because of the humanitarian situation for the internally
displaced people worsens.
While the political settlement of the conflicts in Burma still seems
remote, we call upon the international community to address the
humanitarian needs and protection of Human Rights for the displaced people
of Burma. We also urge the Government of Thailand and the United Nations to
provide protection for the Burmese refugees in Thailand.
I. Introduction
---------------
Following the brutal crackdown on the nationwide pro-democracy
demonstrations in 1988, Burma's military assumed state power and continues
ruling in the name of State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).
SLORC promised to hold a multi-party election in order to form a
democratic government. It also promised to carry out economic liberalizations
to revitalize the economy. The promised election was held in 27-May-1990
and the opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won a
majority of seats. The military then refused to transfer the state power to
NLD and rephrased that elected parliamentarians are to draw a new
Constitution [1].
SLORC's move on the Constitutional restructure was found to be an attempt
to legalize the military's role on the state power [2]. The guideline for a
new Constitution was set by SLORC to secure a leading role for the armed
forces in future politics. Furthermore, the constitution framed under the
control of SLORC is illegitimate and will not guarantee to meet the
democratic aspirations of the people of Burma [3].
The SLORC also fails to liberalize the economy [4]. In addition to the
obvious political instability within the country, the Burma military is
simply incompetent to enact a genuine economic reform. SLORCs invitations
for free trade and investments only attract those who try to exploit
Burma's natural resources for a quick and easy profit. Most of the
multinational oil companies which joined in search for Burma's possible oil
reserve in 1989 have abandoned the military, further weakening the SLORC's
financial position.
The people of Burma bear all the sufferings that are caused by the economic
mis-managements of the previous military regime(BSPP) and SLORC. There are
signs of moral decline in a traditionally conservative Burmese family due
to destitution and poverty . The unemployment situation, combined with high
inflation, make impossible for many families to feed their children. There
is increase in trafficking of children, especially young girls, into
Thailand as sex-slaves [5,6]. The humanitarian situation within the country,
especially of women and children, is said to have been in a state of silent
emergency [7].
Despite SLORC having made a few changes in its conduct with the international
community, the actual transfer of power to NLD still seems remote.
We therefore call upon the international community to give attention to the
displaced Burmese people in Thailand. We also urge the international
community to join in calling for SLORC to rectify its human rights
violations against internally displaced people.
II. Armed Conflict in Burma: the Karen State.
---------------------------------------------
There have been armed conflicts between the Rangoon central government and
the ethnic minorities since Burma's independence in 1948. The underlying
reasons of ethnic armed revolts has been the most complex issue in Burmese
politics. A common objective among various ethnic insurgent groups is to
establish Burma as a state of federation in order to allow greater freedom
for the ethnics nationalities. When General Ne Win took over power in 1962,
there were nationwide armed insurgency from the political groups as well as
ethnic minorities including the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), the Karen
and Kachin ethnic groups. The nationwide armed insurgency which threatened
the security of Burma was, according to Burma military, an emergency
situation that justified the military to seize state power.
By mid-1970, the armed insurgency within the country had been eliminated by
the government forces [8]. The ethnic rebels and CPB only operate in the
mountainous and unaccessible border areas. The renewed offensive on Karen
guerrillas in the eastern part of Burma was launched in 1984 and the first
influx of Karen refugees crossed the Thai border at that time. Following
the government crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrations in August/September
1988, Burmese refugees, mainly student activists, arrived at the Thai-Burma
border. Throughout 1988-1992, SLORC intensified its counter insurgency
campaign on Karen guerrillas, forcing students and ethnics population
further into Thailand.
The struggle for ethnic freedom reached a new phase when a group of 8
parliamentarians, who were elected in May-1990 election, fled to Thai-Burma
border and formed a parallel government in December-1990 [9,10]. These
parliamentarians, who claimed to have support of other 250 parliamentarians
under SLORC, joined the ethnic freedom fighters, formed the government in
exile and work towards the establishment of the federal union of Burma
[11]. This government in exile, known as the National Coalition Government
of the Union of Burma, certainly meet the aspirations of all ethnic
minority groups. The parallel government in exile enjoy the sympathetic
support from various countries and expatriate Burmese abroad.
To establish Burma as a federation of states has been a sensitive political
issue even since the time that Gen. Ne Win took over power in 1962. There
is a perception among older Burmese leaders that the establishment of a
federal union may leads to a secession. The Burmese military always claimed
itself as the saviour of Burma from disintegration and ethnic rebels as
separatists. Following the 1989 collapse of CPB [12], there has been no
ethnic insurgency left to challenge the military and no external forces
threatening Burma. To date, the issue of the non-disintegration of the
union, in fact, is the only issue that is left to justify the military's
role in Burmese politics.
The Burma Army under Gen. Ne Win therefore discourages the federalism in
Burma and suppresses any movement towards establishment of a federal union.
In dealing with the ethnic insurgency issue, the Burma Army prefers to
solve it by military means rather than making political concessions. The
emergence of NCGUB/DAB as a political alliance, therefore, becomes a
concern to SLORC.
As noted by observers [13], SLORC changed its tactics in dealing with its
opponents after the leadership changes in April 1992. For the emergence of
the NCGUB/DAB political alliance, SLORC used dividing and conquering tactics.
The rebel groups within DAB are coerced to sign separate peace agreements
with SLORC leaving the NCGUB/DAB alliance weakened [14]. It is widely
believed that SLORC is responsible for the death and disappearances of some
members of parliament of NCGUB.
In dealing with the Karen insurgents, SLORC uses a special counter insurgency
strategy known as``{\em four-cuts strategy}''[15] which has been
successful in eliminating communist rebels in Burma since the early 1970s.
This four-cuts strategy is responsible for the increase in the number of
internally displaced people and consequently the increase of refugees in
Thailand.
III. SLORC's four-cuts strategy and forced relocations[16]
----------------------------------------------------------
After the 1992 changes in leadership, SLORC also changed its tactics in
dealing with the Karen insurgency. To avoid the international criticism,
SLORC refrained from making a direct offensive on the Karen rebels. In an
attempt to isolate rebels from the Karen ethnic population, villages within
the rebel operated area are ordered to relocate. The area is then
declared as the free-fire zones in which anyone seen is considered rebel
and shot on sight. Crops and villages within the area are destroyed [17].
Relocation sights are guarded concentration camps which villagers are not
allow to leave except to do slave labour, as witnesses have reported [18].
Such incidences were reported on the 49th section of Human Rights
Commission as follows [19]:
74. [T]he Special Rapporteur was informed that if military suspected
villagers were insurgents or were providing aid to insurgents, the
entire village was given order to relocate by township level Law and
Order Restoration Council(LORC). In a number of cases reported to the
Special Rapporteur, civilians were executed when either refuse to
relocate upon order or when they attempted to avoid relocation.
The villagers have to leave food, land and all possessions in relocations.
The Burmese army gave no compensation to the the villagers. All villages
are reported to have a shortage of food [20]. As a result, those villagers
cross the Thai border looking for food, at a reported rate of 1000 per day
[21] to escape starvation and forced conscription by the army [22].
IV. The Royal Thai Government's response to the refugee problem.
----------------------------------------------------------------
It appears that the Royal Thai Government acknowledged the conflict between
Karen guerrillas and the Burmese army as Burma's internal problem. When
first influx of Karen refugees arrived in 1984, the Royal Thai Government
call on the non-government organizations to care for the welfare of Karen
refugees [23]. The Royal Thai Government appears to have a policy of
non-interference towards Burma's internal politics prior to 1988.
The Royal Thai Governments policy on Burma became more complex after the
SLORC seized state power in September 1988. Outraged by the military's
brutal treatment of pro-democracy demonstrators, Burma's major donor
countries: Japan, Germany and other Western countries- withdrew their
financial support. SLORC at that time was reported to have foreign reserve
of less than US$ 20 million. In December 1988, the Thai army chief, Gen.
Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (now Minister of the Interior), visited Burma and
signed trade agreements with SLORC on fishing and logging in Burma [24].
The Thai logging companies, mainly owned by the Thai Generals, trades at an
estimated $100 million each year. The investments of oil companies are also
substantial. By mid 1990, Burma's foreign reserve rose to $550 million,
facilitating SLORC to buy $ 1.2 billion worth of arms from China [26].
The Royal Thai Government has always been in favour of the policy of a
constructive engagement for Burma. By which it means the economic
liberalization and support of foreign capital would induce social and
political changes. This policy of constructive engagement fell through when
the government responsible lacked the will to implement change. Such is
the case of Burma, SLORC spends most of its foreign exchange solely to buy
arms and are used in oppressing the unarmed civilian population.
The Royal Thai Government's treatment of Burmese refugees and displaced
people is also controversial [27]. The Royal Thai Government is unwilling
to acknowledge the events developing in Burma. It also trys to prevent the
conflict between the Burmese military and the ethnic minority being
addressed at the international level. The displaced people along the
Thai-Burma border are considered a result of violence in Burma and their
existence on Thai territory has been informally tolerated. The international
observers, UNHCR and ICRC, are not allowed permanent presence on these
refugee camps, leaving the refugees to negotiate their own safety with local
authorities. The shortcomings of such a policy are evident due to the
persistent abuse on refugees having been reported. The abuse and
mis-treatment to Burma's ethnic refugees by Local Thai Authorities for
commercial interests was reported in Asia Watch as:
[I]n April 1991, Sangklaburi officials cut all delivery of food and
medicines to the more than 10,000 Mon refugees residing in five camps
in their district. The cut was at a crucial time when stockpiling was
a imperative, prior to the May-August rains which prohibits access to
the camps. The threat of starvation that this posed forced Mon leaders
to agree to a fine of 800,000 Baht, in logs from the Mon State, to the
Phathumthani logging company. The fine was compensation for the
destruction of a logging truck and death of its driver in February
1991 which the Mon claimed had illegally entered their territory. Once
the agreement between Phathumthani and the Mon was reached, the
District authorities allowed food and medicine to be transported to
the refugee camps.
The collusion of the Thais and Burmese army to capture the rebel outposts
has also been reported.
... The reported use of Thai soil by Burmese troops in their recent
attack on Nai Et Thaung, once captured the uncontested replacement of
a Thai border flag with a Burmese and a new road under construction
for the past 10 months from Thai side leading directly to Nai Et
Thaung, leaves no illusions at the collaboration and vested interests
of Thai and Burmese officials.
Burmese dissidents within Thailand are also subject to arrest, detention
and deportation. For example, after General Chavalit visited Burma for
trade talks in December 1988, Burmese students were deported as was
reported in Asia Watch [28]:
[F]ollowing these events, 8-10,000 Burmese dissidents fled to the
Thai-Burmese border seeking shelter and support from the ethnic minorities
and the international community. In a meeting on November 22, 1988, the
cabinet of Royal Thai Government decided to offer asylum to Burmese
student dissidents. On December 22, however, the government reversed
its policy and announced the establishment of the Tak Repatriation
Center. From this Center, located in Tak province on the Thai Burmese
border where the large number of dissidents had fled, the Thal
military with the cooperation of the provincial office of Thai Red Cross
(but with the concern raised by the national office) began flying
these asylum seekers back to Rangoon and into hand of SLORC. During
the months between December 1988 and February 1989, some 328 Burmese
dissidents were repatriated. There were no international observers
involved and claims of forced repatriation were frequent....}
Since Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees or to its 1967 Protocol, the UNHCR in Bangkok is unable to give
protection to the Burmese students dissidents. There were incidences where
Burmese students who registered with UNHCR (persons of concern to UNHCR)
are treated inhumanely by Thai police:
[T]hat vulnerability was illustrated when, in the latter half of 1991,
two Burmese ``persons of concern to UNHCR'' were shot and killed by
Thai police upon arrest. Min Thein was fatally shot in the back on
July 31, while attempting to run away from Thai immigration officers.
Ye Soe Aung was brutally beaten, stabbed and then shot twice by Thai
police on November 4, 1991. His body was recovered on November 10
approximately 10 km from the place of arrest. Both incidences had
numerous witnesses and yet to date no officer have been indicted.UNHCR
has reportedly pressed for such an incident.}
As of June 1992, the Royal Thai Government has set up a refugee camp in
Ratchaburi province known as 'Safe Area'. Under this arrangement, the
Burmese dissidents who registered with the Ministry of Interior(MOI) will
be permitted to go to the `Safe Area'. In early 1993, Asia Watch reported
that Burmese students in Bangkok are persuaded by UNHCR to go to the `Safe
Area' [29].
V. Illegal entrants and Prostitutes
-----------------------------------
There are people whose homes are deep inside Burma and have enter
neighbouring Thai provinces and worked illegally [30]. These new arrivals
are not absorbed by minority groups at the Thai-Burma border camps and Thai
authorities designate them as 'Burmese illegal immigrants'. Their numbers
significantly increase after the 1990 election crackdown. The reason for
their flight has been: opposition party support, unreasonable taxation and
price fixing, bribery, and forced conscriptions. In fact, as the authors of
Asia Watch noted and can be seen in (III), there is no clear distinction
that can be drawn between these groups, but all are suffering from
persistent and gross violations of Human Rights in Burma.
The deteriorating economy is also mounting pressure on the Burmese people
as their social and moral life declines. Under SLORC, the economy in Burma
is deteriorated to a point where many will do anything to survive. There
have been reports of an increase in prostitution inside Burma [31]. The
trafficking of Burmese woman, especially young girls, into Thailand as
sex-slaves has also increased [32,33].
The Royal Thai Government responds to this influx of illegal entrants and
prostitutes by rounding them up, detaining and deporting them
immediately [34]. There are frequent reports of inhumane detention and
mistreatment of Burmese prostitutes. There is no screening procedure to
check whether those deportees have well founded fears of persecution.
VI. Recent developments
-----------------------
Thailand presently accommodates an estimated 80,000 Burmese dissidents and
ethnic refugees[35], in addition to 500,000 illegal immigrants[36]. Despite
the presence of such a high number of Burmese refugees, the people of
Thailand - Thai students in particular - appear to have sympathy and
tolerance towards Burmese refugees.
The Royal Thai Government, on the other hand, continues with its dubious
policy on Burmese refugees and Burma. The Royal Thai Government's
unwillingness to address Burma's ethnic refugee problem could be seen as a
gesture that reflects the Thais neutral policy towards Burma's internal
politics. However, it must be stressed that such neutral policy is
responsible for Burma's displaced people's vulnerability and abuse by the
Royal Thai Government's own members. Therefore, Thailand must change its
Burmese Refugee Policy and give the UNHCR and ICRC access to the refugee
camps along Thai-Burma border.
With regards to Burmese dissidents in Thailand, the UNHCR in Bangkok have
no mandate to protect refugees, even if they are registered with UNHCR,
since the Royal Thai Government has not prepared any special legislation.
The Royal Thai Government's arrangement of a Safe Area is an attempt to
give justification of its generosity and sympathy towards Burmese students
[37]. At the same time, however, the Royal Thai Government continues its
practice of rounding up ``Burmese illegal immigrants'' and deported them
immediately [38]. There have been no independent observers present at those
deportations. In fact, all Burmese Refugees in Thailand are technically
illegal and there are no screening processes for the deportations. Burmese
dissidents are therefore concerned of arbitrary detention and deportations.
As a consequence, some Burmese students choose not to report to the MOI,
and do not register with UNHCR. There were recent reports of conflicts
between the Burmese students and the Thai Authorities [39]. Therefore, the
Royal Thai Government would need to enact a legislation similar to the
Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indochinese Refugees to prevent further
tragedy.
In July 1993, SLORC announced that the logging deals with Thailand would
not be renewed [40]. This was interpreted by expatriate Burmese and NGOs as
SLORC applying pressure on the Royal Thai Government for better
cooperation in eliminating ethnic rebels along Thai-Burma border [41].There
have also been fear that refugee villages in the vicinity of the proposed
natural gas pipeline between Thailand and Burma being attacked in an
attempt to clear the area [42].
VII. Conclusion.
----------------
Clearly, the constructive engagement policy doesn't work for a better Burma
as the Burmese Military Government have no will to enact genuine social and
economic reform. In past 5-years, SLORC used most of its resources to built
up military power. Unless there is a change in this attitude, the Royal Thai
Governments constructive engagements with Burma simply amounts to
collusions with an evil power. The Royal Thai Government's policy of
constructive engagement as well as policy on Burmese refugees need to be
rectified.
Presently, there is not enough political will among the members of the
international community to impose an effective trade embargo on Burma.
However, the international community and Thailand must not overlook the
implications of doing trade with Burma. The international community must
ensure that the Burmese unarmed civilian population is protected from Human
Rights abuses. The measure must be taken to ensure the economic development
and establishment of a democratic government with a just constitution being
fulfilled. The United Nations and international community must therefore
actively seek for the implementation of an international arms embargo.
As trading between Thailand and Burma continues, the Royal Thai Government
must ensure the safety of Burmese dissidents and ethnic refugees and that
they are protected. The Royal Thai Government must consider granting
political asylum to the Burmese refugees and also give full access to the
UNHCR to protect ethnic refugee camps.
The attention must be drawn on the plight of the internally displaced
people in Burma, which is the root cause of the influx of refugees into
Thailand. The plight of internally displaced people can be seen as
consequences of SLORC's four-cuts strategy. Sadly, SLORC will continue its
counter insurgency campaign unless rebels surrender to the government-
which is a most unlikely scenario. Therefore, the international community
must actively seek to implement an effective cease-fire between SLORC and
ethnic rebel forces.
As the military governments effort to eliminate rebels sets to continue,
the international community need to give attention to the protection of
basic Human Rights to the unarmed civilian population. In the case of
forced relocations, we must address the arbitrary deprivation of property
from the villagers. SLORC's insensitivity for the basic humanitarian needs
of villagers must also be condemned. We must ensure that SLORC compensates
the villagers for their property and deliver the basic humanitarian needs
of the villagers.
PROPOSED ACTION: Write to Ms Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees, and Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, The Prime Minister of
Thailand, for protection for displaced Burmese people in Thailand. Also
write to Professor Yozo Yokota, The United Nations Special Rapporteur for
Human Rights in Myanmar, for the compensation and welfare of the internally
displaced people.
Ms Sadako Ogata, UNHCR, CASE POSTALE 2500,
CH-1211 GENEVA 2-DEPOT, SWITZERLAND
Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai, Office of the Prime Minister,
Government House, Nakorn Pathom Road, Dusit,
Bangkok 10300, THAILAND. Fax:001-66-280-1443
Professor Y. Yokota, The Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Myanmar,
Palias des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, SWITZERLAND.
Attached with this letter are collected news items concerning situation of
Burmese refugees in Thailand. Please contact the secretary regarding your
action and also further information. This report is written by Dr.U Ne Oo,
a member of Burma Action(SA).
FOOTNOTES
---------
[1] SLORC Declaration 1/90, Far Eastern Economic Review, 9 July 1992.
[2] Janelle M. Diller, Constitutional Reform in a Repressive State: The
Case of Burma, ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XXXIII, No. 4 pp 393-407.
[3] The author concluded in his paper as, "In sum, the control of the
constitution making process defeats any attempt to create a genuine
constitution reflecting the will of the people. SLORC rules in violation of
former constitutional provisions, has proclaimed itself above the rule of
law, and imposed its form of constitution-making process on the people
without their free consent. Only when SLORC cedes its governing power to
the elected People's Assembly can truly genuine constitution-making process
begin." ibid, pp 407.
[4] Far Eastern Economic Review, 8 August 1991, pp 56-60.
[5] Bangkok Post, 16 July 1993 [B-1.3]
[6] Burma Information Group reports, January 1993, 14 July 1993 [B-1.1,1.2]
[7] Russell Rollason et. al, International Council of Voluntary Agency,
Mission to Burma Report, 28 May 1993.
[8] Bertil Lintner, "Outrage: Burma's struggle for democracy", White Lotus
UK (1990)
[9] Asiaweek, 4 january 1991
[10] Amnesty International, Myanmar,"No Law at all", Human rights
violations under military rule. , AI Index ASA: 16/11/92.
[11] The Government in exile, National Coalition Government of the Union of
Burma (NCGUB) signed an agreement to establish a Federal Union of Burma
with the umbrella organization of ethnic rebel and underground Burmese
groups, Democratic Alliance of Burma(DAB).
[12] Bertil Lintner, "The rise and fall of Communist Party of Burma",
Ithaca New York,(1990).
[13] Russell Rollason, etal, ICVA Mission to Burma Report, 28 May 1993.
[14] Far Eastern Economic Review, 1 April 1993 [A-1.5]
[15] The four-cut strategy: the military attempts to cut links of
intelligence, food, money and recruit between armed opposition groups and
local civilians (AI Index ASA: 16/11/92)
[16] These events are not only occured in the Daren State. As Burma have
various ethnic insurgency groups fighting with Rangoon central Government,
an estimated 12 million people suffers a result of counter insurgency
throughout Burma.
[17] The military make the area totally un-inhabitable for the rebels.
[18] U Saw BA Thin and Jack Dunford, ACFOA seminor on Burma, Sydney,
Australia, 28 May 1993.
[19] Professor Yozo Yokota, The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on
Human Rights. Document E/CN.4/1993/37, 17 February 1993.
[20] Bangkok Post, 27 June 1993 [A-1.4]
[21] FAr Eastern Economic Review, 29 July 1993, pp-9
[22] These are not an unprecedented events only occured in the Karen State.
Amnesty International in 1992, for example, reported similar events in
Dayah State. "... Some villagers went to Pruso town but thousands of other
were confined in poor conditions in the camps at Dorawkhu, Hoya and Delaco
villages. MOre than 40 people - particularly children and elderly - had
reportedly died from malnutrition in these camps by the end of July (1992).
Others, who were forced to do construction work for the army, were
reportedly beaten and shot by soldiers. During March and April 1992 over
1200 Karenni refugees from Kayah State fled into Thailand mostly from Pruso
township." (AI Index ASA: 16/11/92)
[23] The Burmese Border Consortium under the auspices of the Committee for
Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand. ICVA Mission to
Burma report, 28 May 1993.
[24] Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 February 1989 (see Appendix: A-1.1)
[25] South East Asian Information Network report, 28 April 1993; Far
Eastern Economic Review, Asia 1992 Year Book.
[26] Far EAstern Economic review, 8 August 1991, pp 56-60.
[27] Asia Watch, Abuses Against Burmese Refugees in Thailand, Vol. No 4
Issue No 7., 20 March 1992.
[28] See also Appendix: A-1.1, Far EAstern Economic Review, 23 February
1989.
[29] Asia Watch, 28 January 1993 [C-1.1]
[30] Asia Watch, Vol No 4 Issue No 7, 20 March 1992; Bangkok Post, 27 June
1993 [A-1.4]
[31] Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 February 1992, pp 31 [B-1.4]
[32] Bangkok Post, 16 July 1993 [B-1.3]
[33] Burma INformation Group Reports, January 1993, 14 July 1993
[B-1.1,1.2]
[34] Bangkok Post, 7 July 1993.
[35] See the map of refugee camps in Appendix: A-1.2
[36] Generally, people who fled from the fear of government persecution and
armed conflict are referred as refugees. Illegal immigrants are those who
try to escape from poverty in Burma and may not have fear of political
persecution. As the author of Asia Watch noted and as explained in III, the
distinction between these two groups are only arbitrary.
[37] Burma Action(SA) was recently informed by UN refugee orricers that the
Safe Area meets accepted international standards for the welfare and
protection of refugees.
[38] Bangkok Post, 7 July 1993.
[39] Burma Information Group report, 31 May 1993 [C-1.2]
[40] Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 July 1993 [C-1.3]
[41] B.U.R.M.A. Burma Rights Movement for Action, JUly 1993.
[42] Project Maje's Edith MIrante publication, August 1993 [C-1.5]
(Appendices are marked in here as [A/B/C- *.*], to be posted separately)
/* Endreport */