THE STICKY BUSINESS

[uneoo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

/* Written 18 May 10:30pm 1997 by drunoo@xxxxxxxxxxxx in igc:reg.burma */
/* -------------------" The Sticky Business "--------------------- */

THE STICKY BUSINESS
-------------------
Timeless wisdom direct the political advocates to adhere to making rational
analyses and professional judgements. This would be true especially for
those who interested to promote peace and human rights in a non-partisan,
impartial manner. In practice, however, one may find it impossible to keep
the non-partisan standards when dealing with a stubborn element like SLORC.

Burma's current struggle for democracy is often cited as the struggle for
"second independence". The two strugges, Burma's independence from Britain
in 1940s and current movement for democracy, are similar in that they
both seek totally new political order for the Burmese people. Like many
other movements in history, these two struggles of Burma have sought to
participate in global and regional politics so as to advance its own
causes. There are also dis-similarities in these two struggles. The
"second independence" is the cause of trying to liberate ourselves from our
own countrymen: No matter how we all may disliked of SLORC, this always
must comes to ones minds. The struggle clearly is to promote basic human
rights for all people of Burma in the post-Cold War environment. In this
context, we are correct in choosing the path of non-violence resistance to
the military regime and in seeking reconciliation. However, it becomes
increasingly clear that the SLORC is in no position to enter dialogue with
the opposition. We therefore are coming to a 'sticky point' of removing
SLORC from power and promoting an alternative government.

SLORC'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS POLITICS
---------------------------------
The SLORC attitude(and response) towards its political opponent may be
traced back to the time of Japanese occupation of Burma in second world
war. The response and treatment to its political opponent by the Burmese
military are matched by the General Aung San's discription of Japanese
military behaviour. Aung San wrote about his encounter with a Japanese army
officer as:

        "During the trip we were escorted by one Major-General Isomura who
        was Deputy Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army in Burma. He made
        his presence felt all the time. It was as if we were all his
        children, and we were subjected to numerous petty restrictions on
        the way...."

On another incident, Aung San went on to describe as:

        "The Japanese were very suspicious of us from the very
        beginning....... At first the Japanese dissected our troops into
        several sections and groups without proper training and equipment
        and widely dispersed them over the country.  I just looked on, for
        if I have my opinion (they asked us to give our opinion frankly
        which was their usual trick), they always did just the opposite of
        what I said, good or bad...."

The SLORC's political practices are pretty much the same as of those army
officers. To SLORC, compromising with opponent and adopting other's views
are the signs of weakness and therefore must at all cost be avoided. An
opinion or a plan from opposite side must be rejected, no matter how
wholesome and good may this plan be. In dealing with the opposition (and
also of SLORC's subordinates), the SLORC would always do just the opposite
to what others said in order to make the point of "Who is the boss ?".
These are the underlying logic of SLORC in its conduct with the opposition.
This stubborness of SLORC is fanned by its mis-readings about the political
issues and events.

Even the choice of word seems to be quite important for SLORC not to
have compromised with the opposition. For example, SLORC used the word
"reconciliation" with ethnic rebels prior to 1994 (We can check this on
General Than Shwe's speechs and U Ohn Gyaws address at the UNGA.). Soon
after the issue (and the word) reconciliation was taken up by the
oppositions, SLORC changed its phrase to "reconsolidation" with ethnic
rebels.

In SLORC's perspective, doing politics means making a contest with its
opponent. SLORC, for example, do not have a genuine desire to participate in
ASEAN. However ASEAN membership for Burma is politicized (& it is for good
reason too!) and the opposition is seen to have reservations about such
membership, the SLORC become quite interested in joining ASEAN simply to
prove that the opposition is ineffectual. It may seem that is a childish
way of thinking in responding to an international event. But for SLORC it
is of great importance to prove that the opposition is wrong.

Whenever there are concerns on the matters of national interest, such as
peace, one must be able to raise above the narrow spirit of sectional and
partisan interests. In professional politics, one also must takes into
account of the views that are believed to be truly representative of the
people.  It is not very important who you are - a Congressman or a Political
streetfighter - so long as your views are believed to be representative of
the situation, the view must be taken into account. To be able to
"do politics", one must be very open minded about accepting other people's
views. With SLORC, however, we obviously cannot rely on such
fair-mindedness and of political compromise: we must resort to exerting
substantive pressures.

SLORC'S INTERPRETATION OF MOVEMENTS
-----------------------------------
The SLORC's method of viewing of political movements and events also
appears to be fundamantally at fault. SLORC do not necessarily view
political events as of the causes and effects that are shaping up by
political forces. SLORC tends to view the political events as of being held
under a certain chain-of-command: a procedure much similar to the operation
of an army (The USDA is formed and operated with the same rationale.). Such
interpretation of political movements are often reflected in the SLORC
reports on opposition activities. For Example, the distribution of anti-
government leaflets in a street of Rangoon, "TO SLORC'S WAYS OF THINKINGS",
is linked to a Photocopy Shop, which financially supported 'possibly' by a
foreign embassy; and is done under the instruction of 'exiled-absconder'
ABSDF-TunAungGyaw Group, which is having the support of the 'expatriate'
CRDB-TinMaungWin - who is now under the influence of that non-violent
'political-monster' Gene Sharp. Although such a simplistic way of
interpreting the political events and movements may become quite hilarious
for some, it is of no doubt that the SLORC believed it. Such SLORC's way of
interpreting political movements can be found, for example, in the book
"THE CONSPIRACY OF TREASONOUS MINIONS WITHIN THE MYANMAR NAING-NGAN AND
TRAITOROUS COHORTS ABROAD". Simply by looking at a flow-chart named
"DIFFERENT STAGE OF ACTIVITIES...." in that book, one can understand the
SLORC's desperation to interpret political movements in this way.

HAITIAN SOLUTION: THE ULTIMATE RESOLVE
--------------------------------------
>From my point of view, the SLORC cannot get any better deal than that were
outlined in 29/4/97 Communication. Recent fresh attacks on Aung San Suu
Kyi and also from other indicators, however, are suggesting that SLORC is
not ready for a dialogue and therefore we must resort to alternative
programmes. To all our friends, please coutinue to help us in urging in
this regards to the international community and, especially, Government
of the United States.

With best regards, U Ne Oo.

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