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KHRG #96-07 Part 1 of 6 (Offensives
Subject: KHRG #96-07 Part 1 of 6 (Offensives)
REFUGEES FROM THE SLORC OCCUPATION
An Independent Report by the Karen Human Rights Group
May 25, 1997 / KHRG #97-07
*** PART 1 OF 6 - SEE SUBSEQUENT POSTINGS FOR OTHER PARTS OF THIS REPORT ***
[Some details omitted or replaced by 'XXXX' for Internet distribution.]
In mid-February 1997, SLORC launched two new major offensives against
the Karen National Union (KNU). Both were in areas formerly strongly
controlled by the KNU: on 12 February they attacked Dooplaya District of
central Karen State, known as KNLA (Karen National Liberation Army)
6th Brigade area and which also contained KNU Headquarters area, and
on 8 February they began attacking KNU-held areas along the upper
Tenasserim and Paw Kloh rivers in Tenasserim Division, also known as
KNLA 4th Brigade area.
This report attempts to give an idea of the situation faced by villagers in
the midst of these offensives through interviews with those who have fled
their villages, both before and after the occupation by SLORC. It is
important to note that if it was only fighting that these people wanted to
avoid, they could easily have hidden in the forest during the usually brief
period the fighting lasted, then returned after SLORC had occupied the
village. The reason these people didn't do so is clear from their
testimonies: it is not fighting which most of them have fled, but the forced
labour, arbitrary arrests, looting, extortion and other abuses which they
know occur whenever SLORC occupies an area, particularly an area
which has not been occupied before. For many of these people this
offensive has brought SLORC to their villages for the first time in recent
memory. These interviews are only with some of those who have fled their
villages so far. While they do not constitute a full chronicle of the
situation, they should help give some idea of what villagers are going
through in these newly occupied areas. We hope to continue reporting on
the situation in these areas as it develops and new information becomes
available.
This report is divided into two main parts: the Dooplaya offensive and the
Tenasserim offensive, each part consisting of a summary of some aspects
of the offensive followed by interviews with some of the people who have
fled their villages. All the names of those interviewed have been changed
to protect them, and some other names and details have been omitted. All
false names are shown in quotes.
Abbreviations
SLORC State Law & Order Restoration Council, military junta ruling Burma
KNU Karen National Union, main Karen opposition group
KNLA Karen National Liberation Army, army of the KNU
KNDO Karen National Defence Organisation, militia/police wing of the KNU
DKBA Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, Karen group allied with SLORC
IB Infantry Battalion (SLORC), usually about 500 soldiers strength
LIB Light Infantry Battalion (SLORC), usually about 500 soldiers strength
LID Light Infantry Division (SLORC); one Division consists
of 10 LIB battalions
Kyat Burmese currency; US$1=6 Kyat at official rate,
180 Kyat at current market rate
Kaw Thoo Lei The Karen homeland, also used to refer in general
to KNU/KNLA/KNDO people
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ......................................... 1
The Dooplaya Offensive
Summary ...................................... 3
Interviews with initial refugees ............. 7
Interviews with Muslim refugees .............. 15
Interviews with later refugees ............... 19
Refugees from far southern Dooplaya .......... 29
The Tenasserim Offensive
Summary ...................................... 41
Interviews with initial refugees ............. 44
Map .................................................. 50
INTERVIEW TOPIC SUMMARY
(D = Dooplaya, T = Tenasserim)
Destruction/burning of villages (Interviews #D1,D17,D18,T3,T4), shelling
of villages (#D4,T1, T3), destruction/looting of belongings and food (#D4,
D8,D10,D15-22,D24,D26), looting/killing of livestock (#D1,D15-16,D18-19,
D22,D26), calling people back to villages (#D2,D7,D10,D17,D26),
capturing villagers and forcing them back to villages (#D4,D10,D15,D17,D22,
T3,T4), shooting at villagers (#D4,D15,D23,D27,T1),
life under SLORC occupation (#D11, D15-27),
killings/executions of villagers (#D2,D10,D12-15,D22,T4,T6),
torture/beatings of villagers (#D15-16,D18-25,D27), arrest/detention of
villagers (#D4,D9-10,D18-22,D25), abuse of women (#D10,D15,D18),
persecution of Muslims (#D11-14), 'deportation' of Muslims (#D11, D13-14),
destruction of mosques (#D11-13), looting of a monastery (#D16),
extortion (#D11, D27), movement restrictions (#D16,D19-20,D26),
confiscation/rationing out of rice supplies (#D21-22,D24), SLORC
soldiers on drugs (#D8,D17), beating of SLORC soldiers by officers (#D15),
SLORC propaganda (#D16,D27), DKBA (#D16,D21,D27),
looting/abuse by KNU forces (#D26-27), selection of new village heads (#D15,
D20), forced relocation (#D21,T4,T6), death of villagers during
flight (#D2,D4,D10,T4), civilian landmine casualties (#D2,D4), births
during flight (#D3,D4,D10,T3), family members left behind (#D5,D21-22,T2,T4),
Thai treatment of refugees (#D15,T3,T4), SLORC plans to attack Noh Po
refugee camp (#D16,D18).
Forced labour: Porters (#D8,D10-11,D15-18,D20-23,D25-27),
guides/human shields (#D18), Army camps (#D14-15,D19-22,D24,D26),
hauling loot (D15-16,D18-19,D24-25), roads (#D15, D18), women porters (#D15),
abuse/forced labour of children (#D15,D17,D27), of the elderly (#D15,D21).
_____________________________________________________________________________
The Dooplaya Offensive
The offensive against Dooplaya District was launched on 12 February, with
over 20,000 SLORC troops from at least 6 different Light Infantry
Divisions (#22, 44, 55, 77, 88 and 101; each Division contributed several,
but not all, of its 10 Battalions) and other non-Divisional battalions moving
in rapidly from several directions at once. One force consisting largely of
troops from #88 and #101 Divisions sped down the Thai border from
Thingan Nyi Naung/Myawaddy towards Kyo G'Lee and Sakanthit (Dta
Law Thaw), with part of the force heading further east to KNU
headquarters at Tee K'Pler. A second force came south from Kyone
Doh/Kawkareik area and was joined by a third force from Kya In Seik Gyi
in the west, and this combined force of #22 and #44 Divisions then swept
southeastward through the fertile and heavily populated Han Thayaw river
plain, taking Kyaikdon, Saw Hta (Azin), Kwih Kler, and pushing on to the
Thai border at Lay Po Hta/Ber Kler. Another force, mainly #55 and #77
Divisions, headed up along the border from Three Pagodas Pass in the
south. The clear objective was to race for the Thai border, take the border
and then work back in, consolidating control over the civilians trapped
inside.
The conquest of this entire region of several hundred square kilometres was
done in little over a week. Karen forces were so grossly outnumbered that
rather than make a stand they only fought delaying actions, constantly
withdrawing and then regrouping into guerrilla units. Their situation was
made worse by the surrender (apparently prearranged) of Tha Muh Heh,
commander of KNLA #16 Battalion which operated in the central part of
the District.
The civilian population of the newly-occupied region is at least 50,000.
Most villagers in the northern and northwestern areas (Kawkareik and Kya
In townships) could only stay in their villages or briefly flee to the
forests
as SLORC troops passed through with Karen forces already on the retreat; for
these people there is almost nowhere to run to, as the Thai border is several
days' walk away. In the central parts of the district and in areas closer to
the border, all of which had been quite strongly KNU-controlled, almost all
of
the villagers tried to flee to the forests and hills, but often they found
their escape already cut off by SLORC troops because the advance was so fast.
In many villages people only learned of the offensive when they heard
shooting, or when SLORC troops arrived a half-hour's walk from their
village. Many farmers, surprised in their fields by a SLORC column, tried
to run and were shot on sight. The troops opened fire on any villager seen
running.
Over 10,000 villagers made it to the Thai border and crossed, often after
spending a week or more in hiding in the forest and dodging SLORC
columns. However, the vast majority were trapped in the newly-occupied
areas, rounded up in their villages or in hiding at their remote farmfields
or
in the forest. Upon occupying their villages, the first action of the SLORC
troops was to capture any villagers they could find in the area, round them
up in the village and send some of them out with orders to bring back the
others - sometimes holding their family members as a guarantee. The
troops then arrested, tortured and in some cases executed any villagers they
felt looked like KNU sympathisers, and any villagers who had been pointed
out to them (usually by other villagers under torture) as having any
knowledge of KNU activities in the area or the location of KNLA arms
caches. In each village the troops then began systematically looting the
houses, shooting the livestock for food and stripping the fruit and coconut
trees. They said that anyone who had fled must be KNU, so they looted
everything from any house which was abandoned. They took as much rice
as they wanted, and if there was more they poured it in the streams or
spread it on the ground and walked on it. They took valuables, clothing and
other items to keep or to send to their families in the cities, and what they
did not want they destroyed or threw away in the forest, even the cookpots
and sleeping mats. They even stripped the houses of useful building
materials to be sent to their camps. In many cases, the abandoned houses
were then burned. Where the entire village was abandoned, such as in Meh
Tharoh Kee, they burned every house in the village.
The troops then began forcing villagers who had remained or returned to
stand by with their bullock carts to haul the loot to new SLORC camps,
particularly the major new SLORC Army camp being built at Saw Hta
(Azin). Villagers, usually men, are now taken as porters whenever needed
by the troops. Thousands of people had already been rounded up in
Moulmein and other coastal towns and brought as porters for the offensive,
along with convicts trucked in from several prisons. At one point
Moulmein market was surrounded and all able-bodied men were taken. Many
had already died, then when the fighting was over many of the non-convicts
were released to find their own way home, so now when the troops need people
to carry their supplies or loot they often take the local villagers.
The villagers are also being forced to do shifts of labour building barracks,
bunkers, trenches and fences to establish new Army camps in the area. The
principal village of Saw Hta (known by the Burmese as Azin) is being
turned into a military base. The high school ground has been turned into a
helicopter pad, and movement is restricted even within the village. Other
key posts have been set up at Lay Po Hta and Sakanthit (known in Karen as
Dta Law Thaw or Tee Hoh Kee), both adjacent to the Thai border, and at
Kyun Chaung in the southern part of Dooplaya. Independent observers
from Thailand have witnessed large groups of porters, including women,
being herded at gunpoint as they haul loot from Lay Po Hta back to Kwih
Kler and Saw Hta.
In most of the newly-occupied villages, everyone has been forced to hand
over their entire rice supply to the local SLORC Army camp, then go once
every few days to receive a small rice ration based on the number of people
in their family. The amount given is not enough for what they would
usually eat, and the Army units also dip into the villagers' rice supply for
their own consumption. Villagers needing to go to their farmfields must
obtain a movement pass from the Army, valid for only 1 to 3 days. In
many villages, people are allowed to go out in the morning but must return
by sunset. If you must cross areas controlled by several Army units to
reach your field, then you need a pass from each and every unit. As one
villager says in this report, "To go work your field you need one pass, and
to search for your cattle you need another pass. If we go to search for our
cattle in #22 Division's area [very close by] we have to go and get a pass
from them as well, one from #44 and another from #22." The penalty for
exceeding the limits of a pass or not having one is being shot on sight or
arrested and beaten on return.
SLORC has also launched a campaign to drive Muslims out of the area,
particularly out of Kyaikdon, which is a principal trading village on the Han
Thayaw river. Upon occupying Kyaikdon the SLORC troops tore down
the mosque, burned the Muslim school, then blew up and bulldozed the
mosque (it was strongly built of concrete). They also tore up the copies of
the Koran and scattered them in the village streets. Muslims attempting to
return to the village were told to get out and "go back to your country",
that they would not be allowed there anymore. One villager claims that a
signpost has now been erected on the outskirts of Kyaikdon reading, "No
Entry for Indians" (meaning Muslims). Most of their families have lived in
the area for generations. Most speak Burmese as a first language but also
speak Karen. Some even speak Karen as a first language, and some refer to
themselves as "Black Karen". A large group of about 100 Muslims was
"deported" from the Kyaikdon area on bullock carts to Kwin Kalay. On
arrival at Kwin Kalay, they were robbed by SLORC troops and told they
could not stay there either.
Prior to this offensive there was no notable presence of DKBA (Democratic
Karen Buddhist Army, a Karen group which allied itself to SLORC in 1995
and now operates essentially as a SLORC militia) in Dooplaya. SLORC
brought some along with them on the offensive, but there are not enough of
them to merit much notice and most villagers have seen no sign of them.
The initial intention was partly to have them act as guides and to point out
KNU people. SLORC has now posted some of them at newly-occupied
locations right on the border, particularly Sakanthit and possibly Lay Po Hta
as well. SLORC probably intends to use them to attack the new refugee
camp at Noh Po in Thailand, where over 10,000 of the new Dooplaya
refugees are staying. A similar approach has been used to destroy Karen
refugee camps further north; this allows SLORC to deny responsibility, and
the Thai authorities to claim that the attacks were conducted by "Karen
rebels" and not SLORC forces. Some new refugees crossing into Thailand
from Dooplaya claim that SLORC has already told them they will go to
Thailand to burn Noh Po refugee camp. On 27 April 1997 a force already
crossed the border and attacked Ta Per Poo, a camp somewhat further
north for refugees from SLORC's 1995 offensive in Dooplaya. The market
was looted, about 20 houses were burned and one refugee was shot dead.
Ta Per Poo is supposed to be moved to Noh Po shortly.
As soon as SLORC began occupying villages in mid-February, refugees
began flooding across the border into Thailand. At least 8-10,000 crossed
in the first 10 days, at Tee K'Pler, Sakanthit, Htee Sgaw Sghi, Lay Po Hta,
Meh Tharoh Kee, Kwih Law Der/Lay Taw Ko, Tee Hta Baw, and many
points between covering a stretch of border at least 100 km. long. Most of
these first arrivals had managed to get out of their villages before SLORC
arrived and fled either directly to the border or into the forest, gradually
making their way to the border. Some died on the way, shot by SLORC
patrols or stepping on Karen landmines which were lain in a futile attempt
to slow the SLORC troops. Many arrived not knowing where their family
members were due to the sudden flight. Some had left children or parents
behind, while others had given birth in the forest on the way. Some
newborns and others died on the difficult journey over the mountains.
On arrival these groups of people were treated in various ways by Thai
authorities. At Tee K'Pler and Sakanthit, they were allowed to stay in
Thailand but pushed back to sites within easy range of SLORC mortars and
held there. Over 1,000 refugees from Sakanthit area were in straw lean-to's
in a farmfield with no decent water. The bulk of the refugees, who had
crossed in the Lay Po Hta/Tee Sgaw Sghi area, were allowed to stay along
the roadsides at Ka Hee Pa Leh, which is a safe distance from the border,
but forced to stay on the ground in the dirt and gravel and in the
raingutters
right along the edges of a dusty heavily-travelled road for over a month.
Over 1,000 Muslim refugees with this group were separated out and moved
1 km. up the road toward the border by Thai authorities who simply said,
"Muslims are troublemakers". Fortunately, all of these refugees have now
been allowed to build a new refugee camp at Noh Po, over 10 km. from the
border. Twenty kilometres further south at Lay Taw Ko at least 1,500
Telekoo refugees crossed from Kwih Law Der area, but SLORC and
DKBA units across the border issued a warning that they would burn down
Lay Taw Ko and other Telekoo villages in Thailand if the refugees were not
handed back [the Telekoo are a strict religious sect, believing in a second
Buddha, practising quite differently from other Buddhists, and leading a
religiously disciplined lifestyle. There are many Telekoo in Dooplaya
District, particularly in Kwih Law Der area, and in Lay Taw Ko area of
Thailand]. Some of the refugees returned, while others fled to Noh Po
because local Thai authorities had made it clear that they would not defend
Thai soil against attack. Further south at Tee Hta Baw (on the border 40-
50 km. northeast of Three Pagodas Pass), several thousand refugees
crossed but were forced back at gunpoint by the notorious Thai 9th
Division, which controls this area and areas further south and has extensive
business dealings with SLORC (the other Dooplaya refugees arrived in
areas controlled by a different division of the Thai Army). A game of cat
and mouse ensued for more than a month, as the Thai 9th Division kept
forcing new refugees back only to have them come across again at a new
place every time SLORC advanced further. Some of these refugees are
now in Burma, some have finally been allowed to stay by the 9th Division
due to considerable international pressure and have been moved south to a
new refugee camp near Sangklaburi, while others have escaped and made
the difficult journey northward to Noh Po.
Over 10,000 refugees are now at Noh Po refugee camp, and more continue
to arrive. Most of the new arrivals had either stayed in their villages
willingly or were captured and forced back to their villages by SLORC, and
have now fled because of the forced labour, looting and other abuses by the
occupation troops. At the same time, some of the refugees at Noh Po have
gone back to Dooplaya for various reasons: they have heard that SLORC is
taking all belongings and destroying the houses of those who have left, so
they hope to save their land and belongings by returning; they believe that
SLORC will attack and destroy the refugee camp; they believe that the Thai
authorities plan to force them back to Burma and hope they'll be treated
better by SLORC if they go back willingly; and some hope that conditions
will get better in their villages.
It appears unlikely that conditions will improve in Dooplaya. For the
moment, SLORC has been minimizing some of its abuses, such as forced
labour and extortion, in villages very close to the border in hopes that
refugees will be drawn back. However, further from the border this is not
the case. New refugees already report that SLORC has begun using
villagers as forced labour to improve some of the roads in the area, such as
the road between Saw Hta and Kwih Kler. Convicts are also being brought
in for this forced labour from Rangoon and Moulmein. These prisoners
have been seen on the road between Saw Hta and Paw Taw Mu, some in
white uniform (longer sentences) and some in blue (shorter sentences).
They are not shackled but are closely guarded. Every morning they have to
sweep this stretch of road (for mines, in case any were planted overnight).
On the road between Kyo G'Lee and Sakanthit, villagers are being forced to
sweep regularly for mines.
It is easy to predict what is likely to happen in Dooplaya by looking at the
pattern of SLORC activity in other areas it has newly occupied over the past
2 years, such as Papun District and northern Pa'an District, and areas where
it is trying to consolidate its control, such as southern Pa'an District,
Karenni and Shan states. SLORC's first priority is likely to be the
establishment of a road network into the area, and there are already
indications of this - the advancing troops even brought a bulldozer to push a
quick road from Kya In Seik Gyi eastward to Kyaikdon. Over the next two
years, it is likely that all villagers in the region will be forced to work
on an entire network of roads, including strategic roads from Kawkareik and
Kyone Doh southward to Kyaikdon; Kya In Seik Gyi eastward to Kyaikdon
or Saw Hta (Azin); Kyaikdon to Saw Hta, Kwih Kler and Lay Po Hta/Ber
Kler; Saw Hta eastward to Sakanthit; Wah Lay southward to Sakanthit;
possibly Sakanthit eastward to Tee K'Pler, and other roads throughout 'the
hump' on the border which protrudes into Thailand; Lay Po Hta / Ber Kler
southward along the border to Tee Hta Baw and joining with the Three
Pagodas Pass - Thanbyuzayat road; and probably many other local roads as
well. All such roads will be built with forced labour. They will wash out
every rainy season and have to be rebuilt with forced labour every October
to January. Their main purpose will be to extend military access and
control through the region, and as a result new military camps will be set up
all over the area. Villagers will have to provide all the materials to build
these camps, do all the forced labour to build and maintain them, stand
sentry and act as servants at them, and pay extortion money to each and
every camp.
SLORC cannot continue to support the mass number of troops it has sent
into the area for the offensive, so many of these are already being rotated
out and replaced with lower numbers of new troops. As the situation
stabilises, the villagers and the remaining KNLA units will get to know the
movement patterns of these troops. This will make movement and flight
easier for the villagers, but it will also probably result in the resumption
of KNLA guerrilla-style attacks. SLORC will retaliate with the usual waves
of
arrests, torture and execution of villagers, and will also probably conduct a
forced relocation campaign (this may happen even without KNLA activity,
as it is SLORC's favourite control tactic). There are already reports of
SLORC telling villagers that their villages are to be moved to Saw Hta. At
least 8 villages including Kyaik Hta, Wah Ko Law, Tee Nu Ko, Kway Nya
Taw, Kway Toh Kay, Thay Hoh Kee, Pa Yeh Kee and Pa Yeh Hta were
ordered to move to an area near Pa Yeh Hta on 16 February and had to pay
100,000 Kyat to SLORC Lt. Col. Tay Aung to cancel the order. All small
villages and all villages not close to an Army camp will probably be ordered
to move to large villages such as Saw Hta and Kyaikdon and sites along the
roads, where the relocated villagers will be used constantly as forced labour
and will have no way of providing food for themselves. While all of this is
speculation, it is consistent with patterns in all other SLORC areas of
operation, and we can expect to see a continuing flow of internally
displaced people and new refugees fleeing these conditions.
The interviews below were conducted with 4 different groups of people:
firstly, people who fled their villages during the SLORC advance and
managed to make their way to Thailand, interviewed at the end of February;
secondly, Muslim refugees who describe the particular persecution of
Muslims; thirdly, refugees who stayed in their villages or were captured and
lived under the SLORC occupation for a short time before fleeing in mid to
late March; and finally, a group of refugees from the far south of Dooplaya
District just north of the road from Three Pagodas Pass to Thanbyuzayat,
whose villages were also occupied by SLORC troops and who fled to
opposition-held areas further to the south.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Interviews with Initial Refugees
#D1.
[This brief interview was conducted with a group of new refugees in a
roadside shelter at Ka Hee Pa Leh, Thailand, on 26/2/97.]
Q: How many days have you been here?
A: We arrived here over a week ago. Our village is Tee Wah Klay. Close
to Meh Tharoh Kee. The Burmese have already arrived there by now.
The villagers are no longer there.
Q: What do you think the Burmese did when they arrived in your village?
A: I really can't say. When they came we ran.
Q: If you were in your village when the Burmese arrived then what do you
think they would do?
A: I can't say - we don't dare stay there!
2nd man: They'd kill us.
3rd man: They'd kill, and torture the men.
[The following interview was conducted with a group of women sitting on
the roadside at Ka Hee Pa Leh with their few remaining belongings on
26/2/97.]
Q: Auntie, how many days did you say you've been in Thailand?
A: 4 days. Our village is Kyaw Kee.
Q: Do you think the Burmese have arrived in your village?
A: They've arrived. We didn't see them. We were afraid and we ran into
the forest.
Q: Afraid of what? What did you think they would do?
A: They'll kill us! I thought they'd kill us so we had to run. We couldn't
bring anything! Only one bag, we couldn't bring anything else.
Man in group: Our cattle and buffalos they ate all.
Q: How many days was your trip here?
A: 6 days' trip. We slept in the forest ...
Man: At the top of the big mountain.
Q: Now where have you built your houses?
A: We haven't built houses yet. I sleep over there ... People give us rice
-
and fishpaste - and salt. We can't get any blankets.
Q: Oh! Isn't it cold at night?
A: It's cold all right! I don't have to tell you, it's so cold!
[in February, nightly temperatures at Ka Hee Pa Leh drop to about
10 degrees Celsius]
Q: How soon do you think you can go back to your village?
A: I can't say yet, but it will be a long time, I think 2 or 3 years anyway.
Q: We heard last night that a Thai general met with a Burmese general and
the Burmese general said if people want to go back you can go.
A: We don't dare go back!
[The following interview was conducted with a group of new refugees in a
roadside shelter at Ka Hee Pa Leh on 26/2/97.]
Q: Where is your village?
Woman: Meh Tharoh Kee. [Note: Meh Tharoh Kee was completely
burned by advancing SLORC troops.] It's been over 10 days already since
we arrived.
Q: Yesterday we arrived there and it was all burned. When they burned it
were you there?
W: We weren't there, we had run away already.
Man: The Burmese are there.
Q: Do you think you can dare go back and stay in Meh Tharoh Kee?
M: I can't say - it's all burned already, we can't dare go and stay there.
We don't dare go back. If the Burmese are there how can we dare go back?
Q: When you fled to here could you bring along your things?
M: We could, just a little.
W: We couldn't bring most of it. Our rice we couldn't bring.
M: Our rice was left behind.
Q: Do you think you'll have to be here long?
M: I don't know. We don't know anymore.
_____________________________________________________________________________
#D2.
NAME: "Saw Wah" SEX: M AGE: 68 Sgaw Karen Christian hill rice farmer
FAMILY: Married, one son
ADDRESS: Meh K'Tee village, Dooplaya District INTERVIEWED: 26/2/97
["Saw Wah" was interviewed shortly after his arrival at Ka Hee Pa Leh in
Thailand.]
Q: Here is a man who just arrived here 3 days ago. Which village are you
from?
A: Meh K'Tee is my village. We came through Tee Yu Kee, up to Hto
Kaw Kee, then to Meh Kwih Kloh, and from there we crossed the car road
and reached Hto Kaw Kloh [river] at Hta Kaw, then we went down to
Meh Kwih Lah Per. One of our friends died there because of a landmine.
His leg was blown off and he died. So we didn't dare continue and we slept
there. He was about 20 years old. He was a villager but I don't know the
name of his village.
The next morning we climbed up the mountain. There were about 300 of
us altogether including women and children, from various villages - some
from Plaw Kee Pa, some from Meh K'Tee Hta, some from Htee Meh Wah
... Many people ran with their children on to Htee Sgaw Sgee. But I don't
know what happened there because we were behind the others. The
Burmese didn't see us because we came through at nighttime. In the
daytime we stayed in hiding. It was 3 days to travel to here, but if I count
from when we first ran from our village it took us 10 days, going step by
step from place to place. We arrived here 3 days ago.
Q: What did the Burmese do when they arrived in the villages?
A: They chased us and tried to see us, and they ordered some villagers to
go and call back those who were hiding. They said they would give written
passes for those who went back, but they shot at those who ran away from
them. People here have seen quite a few villagers killed just because they
ran away from the Burmese. The Burmese shot them with no questions asked.
It's impossible for us to go back to our village as long as they are like
this. If we went back they would divide us into 2 groups - those who have
money and those who have no money. This is my understanding. [i.e. they
would divide the villagers into those who could pay extortion and those
who would have to do forced labour.]
Q: Do you think the villagers staying far from the border can come here?
A: The people staying farther inside have to flee around from place to
place, because there's no easy way for them to make it here.
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- [END OF PART 1 - SEE SUBSEQUENT POSTINGS FOR PARTS 2 THROUGH 6] -
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