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KHRG #96-07 Part 1 of 6 (Offensives



Subject: KHRG #96-07 Part 1 of 6 (Offensives)

		    REFUGEES FROM THE SLORC OCCUPATION

	  An Independent Report by the Karen Human Rights Group
		    May 25, 1997     /     KHRG #97-07
 
*** PART 1 OF 6 - SEE SUBSEQUENT POSTINGS FOR OTHER PARTS OF THIS REPORT ***

[Some details omitted or replaced by 'XXXX' for Internet distribution.]

In mid-February 1997, SLORC launched two new major offensives against 
the Karen National Union (KNU).  Both were in areas formerly strongly 
controlled by the KNU: on 12 February they attacked Dooplaya District of 
central Karen State, known as KNLA (Karen National Liberation Army) 
6th Brigade area and which also contained KNU Headquarters area, and 
on 8 February they began attacking KNU-held areas along the upper 
Tenasserim and Paw Kloh rivers in Tenasserim Division, also known as 
KNLA 4th Brigade area.

This report attempts to give an idea of the situation faced by villagers in 
the midst of these offensives through interviews with those who have fled 
their villages, both before and after the occupation by SLORC.  It is 
important to note that if it was only fighting that these people wanted to 
avoid, they could easily have hidden in the forest during the usually brief 
period the fighting lasted, then returned after SLORC had occupied the 
village.  The reason these people didn't do so is clear from their 
testimonies: it is not fighting which most of them have fled, but the forced 
labour, arbitrary arrests, looting, extortion and other abuses which they 
know occur whenever SLORC occupies an area, particularly an area 
which has not been occupied before.  For many of these people this 
offensive has brought SLORC to their villages for the first time in recent 
memory.  These interviews are only with some of those who have fled their 
villages so far.  While they do not constitute a full chronicle of the 
situation, they should help give some idea of what villagers are going 
through in these newly occupied areas.  We hope to continue reporting on 
the situation in these areas as it develops and new information becomes 
available.

This report is divided into two main parts: the Dooplaya offensive and the 
Tenasserim offensive, each part consisting of a summary of some aspects 
of the offensive followed by interviews with some of the people who have 
fled their villages.  All the names of those interviewed have been changed 
to protect them, and some other names and details have been omitted.  All 
false names are shown in quotes.

			    Abbreviations

SLORC   State Law & Order Restoration Council, military junta ruling Burma
KNU     Karen National Union, main Karen opposition group
KNLA    Karen National Liberation Army, army of the KNU
KNDO    Karen National Defence Organisation, militia/police wing of the KNU
DKBA    Democratic Karen Buddhist Army, Karen group allied with SLORC
IB      Infantry Battalion (SLORC), usually about 500 soldiers strength
LIB     Light Infantry Battalion (SLORC), usually about 500 soldiers strength
LID     Light Infantry Division (SLORC); one Division consists 
	of 10 LIB battalions
Kyat    Burmese currency; US$1=6 Kyat at official rate, 
	180 Kyat at current market rate
Kaw Thoo Lei     The Karen homeland, also used to refer in general 
		 to KNU/KNLA/KNDO people


			    TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Introduction .........................................  1

	The Dooplaya Offensive
		Summary ......................................  3
		Interviews with initial refugees .............  7
		Interviews with Muslim refugees .............. 15
		Interviews with later refugees ............... 19
		Refugees from far southern Dooplaya .......... 29

	The Tenasserim Offensive
		Summary ...................................... 41
		Interviews with initial refugees ............. 44

	Map .................................................. 50



			INTERVIEW TOPIC SUMMARY

		    (D = Dooplaya, T = Tenasserim)

Destruction/burning of villages (Interviews #D1,D17,D18,T3,T4), shelling 
of villages (#D4,T1, T3), destruction/looting of belongings and food (#D4,
D8,D10,D15-22,D24,D26), looting/killing of livestock (#D1,D15-16,D18-19,
D22,D26), calling people back to villages (#D2,D7,D10,D17,D26), 
capturing villagers and forcing them back to villages (#D4,D10,D15,D17,D22,
T3,T4), shooting at villagers (#D4,D15,D23,D27,T1), 
life under SLORC occupation (#D11, D15-27), 
killings/executions of villagers (#D2,D10,D12-15,D22,T4,T6), 
torture/beatings of villagers (#D15-16,D18-25,D27), arrest/detention of 
villagers (#D4,D9-10,D18-22,D25), abuse of women (#D10,D15,D18), 
persecution of Muslims (#D11-14), 'deportation' of Muslims (#D11, D13-14), 
destruction of mosques (#D11-13), looting of a monastery (#D16), 
extortion (#D11, D27), movement restrictions (#D16,D19-20,D26), 
confiscation/rationing out of rice supplies (#D21-22,D24), SLORC 
soldiers on drugs (#D8,D17), beating of SLORC soldiers by officers (#D15), 
SLORC propaganda (#D16,D27), DKBA (#D16,D21,D27), 
looting/abuse by KNU forces (#D26-27), selection of new village heads (#D15,
D20), forced relocation (#D21,T4,T6), death of villagers during 
flight (#D2,D4,D10,T4), civilian landmine casualties (#D2,D4), births 
during flight (#D3,D4,D10,T3), family members left behind (#D5,D21-22,T2,T4),

Thai treatment of refugees (#D15,T3,T4), SLORC plans to attack Noh Po 
refugee camp (#D16,D18).

Forced labour:  Porters (#D8,D10-11,D15-18,D20-23,D25-27), 
guides/human shields (#D18), Army camps (#D14-15,D19-22,D24,D26), 
hauling loot (D15-16,D18-19,D24-25), roads (#D15, D18), women porters (#D15),

abuse/forced labour of children (#D15,D17,D27), of the elderly (#D15,D21).
_____________________________________________________________________________

			 The Dooplaya Offensive

The offensive against Dooplaya District was launched on 12 February, with 
over 20,000 SLORC troops from at least 6 different Light Infantry 
Divisions (#22, 44, 55, 77, 88 and 101; each Division contributed several, 
but not all, of its 10 Battalions) and other non-Divisional battalions moving

in rapidly from several directions at once.  One force consisting largely of 
troops from #88 and #101 Divisions sped down the Thai border from 
Thingan Nyi Naung/Myawaddy towards Kyo G'Lee and Sakanthit (Dta 
Law Thaw), with part of the force heading further east to KNU 
headquarters at Tee K'Pler.  A second force came south from Kyone 
Doh/Kawkareik area and was joined by a third force from Kya In Seik Gyi 
in the west, and this combined force of #22 and #44 Divisions then swept 
southeastward through the fertile and heavily populated Han Thayaw river 
plain, taking Kyaikdon, Saw Hta (Azin), Kwih Kler, and pushing on to the 
Thai border at Lay Po Hta/Ber Kler.  Another force, mainly #55 and #77 
Divisions, headed up along the border from Three Pagodas Pass in the 
south.  The clear objective was to race for the Thai border, take the border 
and then work back in, consolidating control over the civilians trapped 
inside.

The conquest of this entire region of several hundred square kilometres was 
done in little over a week.  Karen forces were so grossly outnumbered that 
rather than make a stand they only fought delaying actions, constantly 
withdrawing and then regrouping into guerrilla units.  Their situation was 
made worse by the surrender (apparently prearranged) of Tha Muh Heh, 
commander of KNLA #16 Battalion which operated in the central part of 
the District.

The civilian population of the newly-occupied region is at least 50,000.  
Most villagers in the northern and northwestern areas (Kawkareik and Kya 
In townships) could only stay in their villages or briefly flee to the
forests 
as SLORC troops passed through with Karen forces already on the retreat; for 
these people there is almost nowhere to run to, as the Thai border is several

days' walk away.  In the central parts of the district and in areas closer to

the border, all of which had been quite strongly KNU-controlled, almost all
of 
the villagers tried to flee to the forests and hills, but often they found 
their escape already cut off by SLORC troops because the advance was so fast.
 
In many villages people only learned of the offensive when they heard 
shooting, or when SLORC troops arrived a half-hour's walk from their 
village.  Many farmers, surprised in their fields by a SLORC column, tried 
to run and were shot on sight.  The troops opened fire on any villager seen 
running.

Over 10,000 villagers made it to the Thai border and crossed, often after 
spending a week or more in hiding in the forest and dodging SLORC 
columns.  However, the vast majority were trapped in the newly-occupied 
areas, rounded up in their villages or in hiding at their remote farmfields
or 
in the forest.  Upon occupying their villages, the first action of the SLORC 
troops was to capture any villagers they could find in the area, round them 
up in the village and send some of them out with orders to bring back the 
others - sometimes holding their family members as a guarantee.  The 
troops then arrested, tortured and in some cases executed any villagers they 
felt looked like KNU sympathisers, and any villagers who had been pointed 
out to them (usually by other villagers under torture) as having any 
knowledge of KNU activities in the area or the location of KNLA arms 
caches. In each village the troops then began systematically looting the 
houses, shooting the livestock for food and stripping the fruit and coconut 
trees.  They said that anyone who had fled must be KNU, so they looted 
everything from any house which was abandoned.  They took as much rice 
as they wanted, and if there was more they poured it in the streams or 
spread it on the ground and walked on it.  They took valuables, clothing and 
other items to keep or to send to their families in the cities, and what they

did not want they destroyed or threw away in the forest, even the cookpots 
and sleeping mats.  They even stripped the houses of useful building 
materials to be sent to their camps.  In many cases, the abandoned houses 
were then burned.  Where the entire village was abandoned, such as in Meh 
Tharoh Kee, they burned every house in the village.

The troops then began forcing villagers who had remained or returned to 
stand by with their bullock carts to haul the loot to new SLORC camps, 
particularly the major new SLORC Army camp being built at Saw Hta 
(Azin).  Villagers, usually men, are now taken as porters whenever needed 
by the troops.  Thousands of people had already been rounded up in 
Moulmein and other coastal towns and brought as porters for the offensive, 
along with convicts trucked in from several prisons.  At one point 
Moulmein market was surrounded and all able-bodied men were taken.  Many 
had already died, then when the fighting was over many of the non-convicts 
were released to find their own way home, so now when the troops need people 
to carry their supplies or loot they often take the local villagers.  
The villagers are also being forced to do shifts of labour building barracks,

bunkers, trenches and fences to establish new Army camps in the area.  The 
principal village of Saw Hta (known by the Burmese as Azin) is being 
turned into a military base.  The high school ground has been turned into a 
helicopter pad, and movement is restricted even within the village.  Other 
key posts have been set up at Lay Po Hta and Sakanthit (known in Karen as 
Dta Law Thaw or Tee Hoh Kee), both adjacent to the Thai border, and at 
Kyun Chaung in the southern part of Dooplaya.  Independent observers 
from Thailand have witnessed large groups of porters, including women, 
being herded at gunpoint as they haul loot from Lay Po Hta back to Kwih 
Kler and Saw Hta.

In most of the newly-occupied villages, everyone has been forced to hand 
over their entire rice supply to the local SLORC Army camp, then go once 
every few days to receive a small rice ration based on the number of people 
in their family.  The amount given is not enough for what they would 
usually eat, and the Army units also dip into the villagers' rice supply for 
their own consumption.  Villagers needing to go to their farmfields must 
obtain a movement pass from the Army, valid for only 1 to 3 days.  In 
many villages, people are allowed to go out in the morning but must return 
by sunset.  If you must cross areas controlled by several Army units to 
reach your field, then you need a pass from each and every unit.  As one 
villager says in this report, "To go work your field you need one pass, and 
to search for your cattle you need another pass.  If we go to search for our 
cattle in #22 Division's area [very close by] we have to go and get a pass 
from them as well, one from #44 and another from #22."  The penalty for 
exceeding the limits of a pass or not having one is being shot on sight or 
arrested and beaten on return.

SLORC has also launched a campaign to drive Muslims out of the area, 
particularly out of Kyaikdon, which is a principal trading village on the Han

Thayaw river.  Upon occupying Kyaikdon the SLORC troops tore down 
the mosque, burned the Muslim school, then blew up and bulldozed the 
mosque (it was strongly built of concrete).  They also tore up the copies of 
the Koran and scattered them in the village streets.  Muslims attempting to 
return to the village were told to get out and "go back to your country", 
that they would not be allowed there anymore.  One villager claims that a 
signpost has now been erected on the outskirts of Kyaikdon reading, "No 
Entry for Indians" (meaning Muslims).  Most of their families have lived in 
the area for generations.  Most speak Burmese as a first language but also 
speak Karen.  Some even speak Karen as a first language, and some refer to 
themselves as "Black Karen".  A large group of about 100 Muslims was 
"deported" from the Kyaikdon area on bullock carts to Kwin Kalay.  On 
arrival at Kwin Kalay, they were robbed by SLORC troops and told they 
could not stay there either.

Prior to this offensive there was no notable presence of DKBA (Democratic 
Karen Buddhist Army, a Karen group which allied itself to SLORC in 1995 
and now operates essentially as a SLORC militia) in Dooplaya.  SLORC 
brought some along with them on the offensive, but there are not enough of 
them to merit much notice and most villagers have seen no sign of them.  
The initial intention was partly to have them act as guides and to point out 
KNU people.  SLORC has now posted some of them at newly-occupied 
locations right on the border, particularly Sakanthit and possibly Lay Po Hta

as well.  SLORC probably intends to use them to attack the new refugee 
camp at Noh Po in Thailand, where over 10,000 of the new Dooplaya 
refugees are staying.  A similar approach has been used to destroy Karen 
refugee camps further north; this allows SLORC to deny responsibility, and 
the Thai authorities to claim that the attacks were conducted by "Karen 
rebels" and not SLORC forces.  Some new refugees crossing into Thailand 
from Dooplaya claim that SLORC has already told them they will go to 
Thailand to burn Noh Po refugee camp.  On 27 April 1997 a force already 
crossed the border and attacked Ta Per Poo, a camp somewhat further 
north for refugees from SLORC's 1995 offensive in Dooplaya.  The market 
was looted, about 20 houses were burned and one refugee was shot dead.  
Ta Per Poo is supposed to be moved to Noh Po shortly.

As soon as SLORC began occupying villages in mid-February, refugees 
began flooding across the border into Thailand.  At least 8-10,000 crossed 
in the first 10 days, at Tee K'Pler, Sakanthit, Htee Sgaw Sghi, Lay Po Hta, 
Meh Tharoh Kee, Kwih Law Der/Lay Taw Ko, Tee Hta Baw, and many 
points between covering a stretch of border at least 100 km. long.  Most of 
these first arrivals had managed to get out of their villages before SLORC 
arrived and fled either directly to the border or into the forest, gradually 
making their way to the border.  Some died on the way, shot by SLORC 
patrols or stepping on Karen landmines which were lain in a futile attempt 
to slow the SLORC troops.  Many arrived not knowing where their family 
members were due to the sudden flight.  Some had left children or parents 
behind, while others had given birth in the forest on the way.  Some 
newborns and others died on the difficult journey over the mountains.

On arrival these groups of people were treated in various ways by Thai 
authorities.  At Tee K'Pler and Sakanthit, they were allowed to stay in 
Thailand but pushed back to sites within easy range of SLORC mortars and 
held there.  Over 1,000 refugees from Sakanthit area were in straw lean-to's 
in a farmfield with no decent water.  The bulk of the refugees, who had 
crossed in the Lay Po Hta/Tee Sgaw Sghi area, were allowed to stay along 
the roadsides at Ka Hee Pa Leh, which is a safe distance from the border, 
but forced to stay on the ground in the dirt and gravel and in the
raingutters 
right along the edges of a dusty heavily-travelled road for over a month.  
Over 1,000 Muslim refugees with this group were separated out and moved 
1 km. up the road toward the border by Thai authorities who simply said, 
"Muslims are troublemakers".  Fortunately, all of these refugees have now 
been allowed to build a new refugee camp at Noh Po, over 10 km. from the 
border.  Twenty kilometres further south at Lay Taw Ko at least 1,500 
Telekoo refugees crossed from Kwih Law Der area, but SLORC and 
DKBA units across the border issued a warning that they would burn down 
Lay Taw Ko and other Telekoo villages in Thailand if the refugees were not 
handed back [the Telekoo are a strict religious sect, believing in a second 
Buddha, practising quite differently from other Buddhists, and leading a 
religiously disciplined lifestyle.  There are many Telekoo in Dooplaya 
District, particularly in Kwih Law Der area, and in Lay Taw Ko area of 
Thailand].  Some of the refugees returned, while others fled to Noh Po 
because local Thai authorities had made it clear that they would not defend 
Thai soil against attack.  Further south at Tee Hta Baw (on the border 40-
50 km. northeast of Three Pagodas Pass), several thousand refugees 
crossed but were forced back at gunpoint by the notorious Thai 9th 
Division, which controls this area and areas further south and has extensive 
business dealings with SLORC (the other Dooplaya refugees arrived in 
areas controlled by a different division of the Thai Army).  A game of cat 
and mouse ensued for more than a month, as the Thai 9th Division kept 
forcing new refugees back only to have them come across again at a new 
place every time SLORC advanced further.  Some of these refugees are 
now in Burma, some have finally been allowed to stay by the 9th Division 
due to considerable international pressure and have been moved south to a 
new refugee camp near Sangklaburi, while others have escaped and made 
the difficult journey northward to Noh Po.

Over 10,000 refugees are now at Noh Po refugee camp, and more continue 
to arrive.  Most of the new arrivals had either stayed in their villages 
willingly or were captured and forced back to their villages by SLORC, and 
have now fled because of the forced labour, looting and other abuses by the 
occupation troops.  At the same time, some of the refugees at Noh Po have 
gone back to Dooplaya for various reasons:  they have heard that SLORC is 
taking all belongings and destroying the houses of those who have left, so 
they hope to save their land and belongings by returning; they believe that 
SLORC will attack and destroy the refugee camp; they believe that the Thai 
authorities plan to force them back to Burma and hope they'll be treated 
better by SLORC if they go back willingly; and some hope that conditions 
will get better in their villages.

It appears unlikely that conditions will improve in Dooplaya.  For the 
moment, SLORC has been minimizing some of its abuses, such as forced 
labour and extortion, in villages very close to the border in hopes that 
refugees will be drawn back.  However, further from the border this is not 
the case.  New refugees already report that SLORC has begun using 
villagers as forced labour to improve some of the roads in the area, such as 
the road between Saw Hta and Kwih Kler.  Convicts are also being brought 
in for this forced labour from Rangoon and Moulmein.  These prisoners 
have been seen on the road between Saw Hta and Paw Taw Mu, some in 
white uniform (longer sentences) and some in blue (shorter sentences).  
They are not shackled but are closely guarded.  Every morning they have to 
sweep this stretch of road (for mines, in case any were planted overnight).  
On the road between Kyo G'Lee and Sakanthit, villagers are being forced to 
sweep regularly for mines.

It is easy to predict what is likely to happen in Dooplaya by looking at the 
pattern of SLORC activity in other areas it has newly occupied over the past 
2 years, such as Papun District and northern Pa'an District, and areas where 
it is trying to consolidate its control, such as southern Pa'an District, 
Karenni and Shan states.  SLORC's first priority is likely to be the 
establishment of a road network into the area, and there are already 
indications of this - the advancing troops even brought a bulldozer to push a

quick road from Kya In Seik Gyi eastward to Kyaikdon.  Over the next two 
years, it is likely that all villagers in the region will be forced to work 
on an entire network of roads, including strategic roads from Kawkareik and 
Kyone Doh southward to Kyaikdon; Kya In Seik Gyi eastward to Kyaikdon 
or Saw Hta (Azin);  Kyaikdon to Saw Hta, Kwih Kler and Lay Po Hta/Ber 
Kler; Saw Hta eastward to Sakanthit; Wah Lay southward to Sakanthit; 
possibly Sakanthit eastward to Tee K'Pler, and other roads throughout 'the 
hump' on the border which protrudes into Thailand; Lay Po Hta / Ber Kler 
southward along the border to Tee Hta Baw and joining with the Three 
Pagodas Pass - Thanbyuzayat road; and probably many other local roads as 
well.  All such roads will be built with forced labour.  They will wash out 
every rainy season and have to be rebuilt with forced labour every October 
to January.  Their main purpose will be to extend military access and 
control through the region, and as a result new military camps will be set up

all over the area.  Villagers will have to provide all the materials to build

these camps, do all the forced labour to build and maintain them, stand 
sentry and act as servants at them, and pay extortion money to each and 
every camp.  

SLORC cannot continue to support the mass number of troops it has sent 
into the area for the offensive, so many of these are already being rotated 
out and replaced with lower numbers of new troops.  As the situation 
stabilises, the villagers and the remaining KNLA units will get to know the 
movement patterns of these troops.  This will make movement and flight 
easier for the villagers, but it will also probably result in the resumption 
of KNLA guerrilla-style attacks.  SLORC will retaliate with the usual waves
of 
arrests, torture and execution of villagers, and will also probably conduct a

forced relocation campaign (this may happen even without KNLA activity, 
as it is SLORC's favourite control tactic).  There are already reports of 
SLORC telling villagers that their villages are to be moved to Saw Hta.  At 
least 8 villages including Kyaik Hta, Wah Ko Law, Tee Nu Ko, Kway Nya 
Taw, Kway Toh Kay, Thay Hoh Kee, Pa Yeh Kee and Pa Yeh Hta were 
ordered to move to an area near Pa Yeh Hta on 16 February and had to pay 
100,000 Kyat to SLORC Lt. Col. Tay Aung to cancel the order.  All small 
villages and all villages not close to an Army camp will probably be ordered 
to move to large villages such as Saw Hta and Kyaikdon and sites along the 
roads, where the relocated villagers will be used constantly as forced labour

and will have no way of providing food for themselves.  While all of this is 
speculation, it is consistent with patterns in all other SLORC areas of 
operation, and we can expect to see a continuing flow of internally 
displaced people and new refugees fleeing these conditions.

The interviews below were conducted with 4 different groups of people: 
firstly, people who fled their villages during the SLORC advance and 
managed to make their way to Thailand, interviewed at the end of February; 
secondly, Muslim refugees who describe the particular persecution of 
Muslims; thirdly, refugees who stayed in their villages or were captured and 
lived under the SLORC occupation for a short time before fleeing in mid to 
late March; and finally, a group of refugees from the far south of Dooplaya 
District just north of the road from Three Pagodas Pass to Thanbyuzayat, 
whose villages were also occupied by SLORC troops and who fled to 
opposition-held areas further to the south.
_____________________________________________________________________________
 
		    Interviews with Initial Refugees

				   #D1.
[This brief interview was conducted with a group of new refugees in a 
roadside shelter at Ka Hee Pa Leh, Thailand, on 26/2/97.]

Q:  How many days have you been here?
A:  We arrived here over a week ago.  Our village is Tee Wah Klay.  Close 
to Meh Tharoh Kee.  The Burmese have already arrived there by now.  
The villagers are no longer there.
Q:  What do you think the Burmese did when they arrived in your village?
A:  I really can't say.  When they came we ran.
Q:  If you were in your village when the Burmese arrived then what do you 
think they would do?
A:  I can't say - we don't dare stay there!
2nd man:  They'd kill us.
3rd man:  They'd kill, and torture the men.

[The following interview was conducted with a group of women sitting on 
the roadside at Ka Hee Pa Leh with their few remaining belongings on 
26/2/97.]

Q:  Auntie, how many days did you say you've been in Thailand?
A:  4 days.  Our village is Kyaw Kee.
Q:  Do you think the Burmese have arrived in your village?
A:  They've arrived.  We didn't see them.  We were afraid and we ran into 
the forest.
Q:  Afraid of what?  What did you think they would do?
A:  They'll kill us!  I thought they'd kill us so we had to run.  We couldn't

bring anything!  Only one bag, we couldn't bring anything else.
Man in group:  Our cattle and buffalos they ate all.
Q:  How many days was your trip here?
A:  6 days' trip.  We slept in the forest ...
Man:  At the top of the big mountain.
Q:  Now where have you built your houses?
A:  We haven't built houses yet.  I sleep over there ...  People give us rice
- 
and fishpaste - and salt.  We can't get any blankets.
Q:  Oh!  Isn't it cold at night?
A:  It's cold all right!  I don't have to tell you, it's so cold!  
[in February, nightly temperatures at Ka Hee Pa Leh drop to about 
10 degrees Celsius]
Q:  How soon do you think you can go back to your village?
A:  I can't say yet, but it will be a long time, I think 2 or 3 years anyway.
Q:  We heard last night that a Thai general met with a Burmese general and 
the Burmese general said if people want to go back you can go.
A:  We don't dare go back!

[The following interview was conducted with a group of new refugees in a 
roadside shelter at Ka Hee Pa Leh on 26/2/97.]

Q:  Where is your village?
Woman:  Meh Tharoh Kee.  [Note: Meh Tharoh Kee was completely 
burned by advancing SLORC troops.]  It's been over 10 days already since 
we arrived.
Q:  Yesterday we arrived there and it was all burned.  When they burned it 
were you there?
W:  We weren't there, we had run away already.
Man:  The Burmese are there.
Q:  Do you think you can dare go back and stay in Meh Tharoh Kee?
M:  I can't say - it's all burned already, we can't dare go and stay there.  
We don't dare go back.  If the Burmese are there how can we dare go back?
Q:  When you fled to here could you  bring along your things?
M:  We could, just a little.
W:  We couldn't bring most of it.  Our rice we couldn't bring.
M:  Our rice was left behind.
Q:  Do you think you'll have to be here long?
M:  I don't know.  We don't know anymore.
_____________________________________________________________________________
				    #D2.
NAME:    "Saw Wah"   SEX: M   AGE: 68   Sgaw Karen Christian hill rice farmer
FAMILY:  Married, one son
ADDRESS: Meh K'Tee village, Dooplaya District          INTERVIEWED: 26/2/97

["Saw Wah" was interviewed shortly after his arrival at Ka Hee Pa Leh in 
Thailand.]

Q:  Here is a man who just arrived here 3 days ago.  Which village are you 
from?
A:  Meh K'Tee is my village.  We came through Tee Yu Kee, up to Hto 
Kaw Kee, then to Meh Kwih Kloh, and from there we crossed the car road 
and reached Hto Kaw Kloh [river] at Hta Kaw, then we went down to 
Meh Kwih Lah Per.  One of our friends died there because of a landmine.  
His leg was blown off and he died.  So we didn't dare continue and we slept 
there.  He was about 20 years old.  He was a villager but I don't know the 
name of his village.

The next morning we climbed up the mountain.  There were about 300 of 
us altogether including women and children, from various villages - some 
from Plaw Kee Pa, some from Meh K'Tee Hta, some from Htee Meh Wah 
 ...  Many people ran with their children on to Htee Sgaw Sgee.  But I don't 
know what happened there because we were behind the others.  The 
Burmese didn't see us because we came through at nighttime.  In the 
daytime we stayed in hiding.  It was 3 days to travel to here, but if I count

from when we first ran from our village it took us 10 days, going step by 
step from place to place.  We arrived here 3 days ago.

Q:  What did the Burmese do when they arrived in the villages?
A:  They chased us and tried to see us, and they ordered some villagers to 
go and call back those who were hiding.  They said they would give written 
passes for those who went back, but they shot at those who ran away from 
them.  People here have seen quite a few villagers killed just because they 
ran away from the Burmese.  The Burmese shot them with no questions asked.  
It's impossible for us to go back to our village as long as they are like 
this.  If we went back they would divide us into 2 groups - those who have 
money and those who have no money.  This is my understanding. [i.e. they 
would divide the villagers into those who could pay extortion and those 
who would have to do forced labour.]

Q:  Do you think the villagers staying far from the border can come here?
A:  The people staying farther inside have to flee around from place to 
place, because there's no easy way for them to make it here.
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   - [END OF PART 1 - SEE SUBSEQUENT POSTINGS FOR PARTS 2 THROUGH 6] -


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