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CHAVALIT'S FOREIGN POLICY



Chavalit's foreign policy: seeking leadership 



 John Funston examines Thai foreign policy under Prime
                Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh 



AFP 

IN a meeting with Thai jounalists in March, Prime Minister Chavalit
Yongchaiyudh lamented that
his country was no longer a regional leader and pledged to correct this. In
his view -- and that of
most Thai commentators -- during the 1980s Thailand enjoyed a golden age of
foreign policy,
when the rest of Asean followed its lead on issues such as Indochina and
Myanmar. In the
1990s, others have taken the initiative. 

In some respects, this viewpoint is puzzling. It glosses over numerous
occasions in the 1980s when
Thailand had difficulty getting other Asean members to support its firm
opposition to Vietnam's
invasion of Cambodia. Late in the decade, Cambodian policy lost all
coherence when Prime
Minister Chatichai Choonhavan and his advisers were in constant conflict
with Foreign Minister
Siddhi Sawetsila and his ministry. 

And in the 1990s, Thailand has frequently been at the forefront of Asean
diplomacy. The proposal
for the Asean Free Trade Area (Afta) was an initiative of former Prime
Minister Anand
Panyarachun. Bangkok also hosted inaugural meetings of the Asean Regional
Forum and the
Asia-Europe Meeting, along with the 1995 Asean summit. 

Still, Chavalit's critical view of Thai foreign policy is close to the mark.
Influence within Asean is
based on the development of close personal ties at all levels, most
importantly at the ministerial and
head of government level. With Thai prime ministers and foreign ministers
changing frequently after
the military coup in 1991, Thai leaders did not have time to develop
relations with their
counterparts, or even devise well-thought-out policy positions. 

In the 1980s, Thailand benefited from being the "front line" state in
relation to Cambodia, but
long-running Foreign Minister Siddhi also earned the respect of his Asean
colleagues, and his
views were always taken into account. In the 1990s, apart from Anand's Afta
proposal -- very
much a personal initiative -- Thailand made few attempts to take part in
Asean decision-making.
Hosting meetings -- which admittedly Thailand does extremely well -- is not
the same as exercising
influence. 

Chavalit is better-placed to give Thailand a foreign policy role than his
immediate predecessors.
As a former military supremo, he has an entree in countries such as
Indonesia and the Philippines,
and indeed other Asean countries are often more at ease with Thai leaders
from a military
background. 

He has also had extensive practical involvement in regional relationships
going back to the early
1980s. This has not been entirely error-free -- he had to retreat on a
proposal for a
Thailand-based Chinese arms stockpile in the late 1980s, and did not pursue
his 1989 suggestion
for creation of a suwannaphume (golden land) because neighbouring states saw
connotations of
Thai hegemonism. 

But, generally, Chavalit has managed to be all things to all people,
establishing influential ties in
Beijing, Hanoi, Phnom Penh, Vientiane and Yangon. 

Chavalit's declared plans to restore Thailand's former glory rest largely on
improving relations with
neighbouring countries, and acting as an intermediary between Asean and China. 

All Thai prime ministers must give priority to neighbouring countries in
early travel, but Chavalit has
done more than his predecessors. He has made the mandatory tour of Asean
countries, starting in
Jakarta in January and completing the round in Hanoi late March. Two days
later, he journeyed to
Beijing and in mid-May he toured Yangon. Trips are planned to Cambodia and
Laos in June. His
first visit outside Asia will be the United States in July. 

Chavalit has been well-supported by Foreign Minister Prachuab Chaiyasarn, a
political veteran
with broad ministerial experience. Unlike many of his predecessors he has an
interest in the
portfolio, and previous ministerial appointments have given him experience
in international affairs. 

Prachuab has been involved in a hectic round of diplomacy, including visits
to Laos and Vietnam,
in particular, and hosting a range of regional activities in Thailand. A
frequent focus of diplomatic
attention has been on aspects of regional cooperation in the Mekong basin
area, particularly in
relation to improving land transport links with Thailand's impoverished
Northeastern region --
heartland of support for Chavalit's National Aspiration Party and Prachuab's
Chart Pattana. 

In a rare case of Thailand's taking the initiative, Prachuab hosted a golf
course meeting with foreign
ministers from Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos (Vietnam was unable to accept) in
late-April -- a
cautious signal of Thai support for these countries joining Asean later this
year. 

A novel element in the government's thinking is a "Look West" policy, aimed
at strengthening ties
with South Asia. As part of this Thailand is seeking membership of the
Indian Ocean Rim
association, and a new group comprising initially India, Sri Lanka and
Thailand. 

Foreign policy under Chavalit has not been without shortcomings. The Thai
media was quick to
note that on some issues Chavalit has not been as proactive as he might
have. Visiting Vietnam
after it had clashed with China over oil drilling in a disputed offshore
area, Chavalit failed to offer
Thailand's good offices to address the issue. Even more puzzlingly, he
reportedly failed to suggest
joint development of an offshore area disputed between Thailand and Vietnam,
which had been
billed as a primary objective for the visit. 

Chavalit's visit to China had a distinctive military thrust that would have
troubled Asean
neighbours, rather than enhancing Thailand's objectives of becoming an
intermediary between
Asean and China. For the first time, all Thailand's top military leadership
were together on an
overseas visit. On return to Bangkok, military leadership spoke fulsomely
about their reception,
highlighting China's willingness and capability to provide military hardware
on highly favourable
terms -- buy now, pay 10 years later. Chavalit has played down possible
purchases, but the
Supreme Commander and service chiefs will be returning to look again in June. 

And Chavalit's apparent determination to improve relations with Myanmar, and
welcome it into
Asean, flies in the face of determined opposition from the US, and some
domestic critics. While
keeping all sides happy is not an option, some last-minute efforts to keep
America on-side cannot
be ruled out. 

But overall, Chavalit's foreign policy balance sheet after six months in
office is a relatively
favourable one. While Thailand's relations with neighbouring countries
remain beset with myriad
problems, many drawing on centuries of hostility and contest, they are now
as good as they ever
have been. 

The number of meetings on issues such as border demarcation, roads, customs,
communications
and energy has expanded enormously -- unspectacular issues, but critically
important for good
bilateral relations. The main reason for progress in such areas has been the
general improvement in
regional relations after the Cold War, and in particular the move to
incorporate Indochina and
Myanmar in Asean. But Chavalit's government has carried the process forward. 

The following are illustrative. Notwithstanding their dispute over sea
boundries, Thailand and
Vietnam have reached agreement on joint naval patrols. Construction of a
Thai-Myanmar
friendship bridge that was stopped about three months short of completion in
June 1995, was
resumed in March. And Thailand and Laos signed an agreement in March to
demarcate the 1,800
kilometre border -- border disputes led to armed clashes in the 1980s. 

Still, for Thailand to acquire the influence that Chavalit would like, his
government has to stay in
power for more than just a few months. Chavalit has a daunting programme of
economic and
political reform ahead of him, ranging from overcoming immediate economic
woes to ushering in a
new constitution. So far, his coalition of traditional, money-based parties
has been accident-prone
and unimpressive. That makes his task a difficult one, but not unreachable
-- no-one gets to the
top of the Thai military, and then becomes an elected prime minister,
without learning a great deal
about holding on to power. 

Dr John Funston is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.