Asean needs to chart clearer path f

[ausgeo@xxxxxxx]

Subject: Asean needs to chart clearer path for ARF 

02 Jun 1997 

The Nation 
Asean needs to chart clearer path for ARF 

BY KAVI CHONGKITTAVORN 

What is the future direction of the Asean Regional Forum? This question needs 
a clear answer as the ARF enters its fourth year. When the ARF was first 
established in Bangkok in July 1994, it was acceptable that it be a talk-shop 
for addressing issues in general without any substance or direction. 

At that time, the founding members agreed that the ARF process should progress 
in three stages. It would start with confidence-building measures, to be 
followed up by a second stage involving preventative diplomacy. The final 
stage, if it ever came, was to be an ''elaboration of approach to conflict" ­ 
a euphemism for conflict-resolution. 

A strong feeling prevails among ARF members that as the only East Asian 
security forum, the ARF should move forward with concrete plans that go beyond 
the current confidence-building measures. But since not all the 20 countries 
and the European Union are in synch regarding the future direction of the ARF, 
any idea or plan to broaden the current agenda is viewed with scepticism by 
some observers. 

The ARF has held several inter-sessional meetings involving all members on key 
areas of confidence building such as search and rescue operations, 
peace-keeping operations, and disaster relief. In fact, some of these 
activities could be considered as preventative diplomacy. But while some ARF 
members believe the ARF process has already moved into the second stage, 
others are not comfortable with this interpretation. 

Within the ARF, the Western members ­ US, Australia, Canada, the EU and New 
Zealand ­ and Japan desire to see the ARF proceed with greater speed and more 
activities. But Asean, which continues to be the main driving force behind the 
forum, wants to make sure that any moves are welcomed by all its members. 

China and Russia, for different reasons, have stood alone. Since China's ARF 
membership is the only security link the Asian giant has with the world, 
Beijing is extremely careful not to lose control and move too fast in the ARF 
process. 

Having said that, it is not surprising that China's attitude to the ARF has 
been a mixture of enthusiasm and caution. Beijing's primary aim has always 
been to move slowly and stay engaged in the process at a level that other 
members would not complain about. Beijing's recent co-chairing of a 
confidence-building inter-sessional meeting was a case in point. 

Although Russia is an ARF founding member, its role is still marginal. This is 
partly due to the domestic crisis inside Russia that has weakened its 
international creditability. But the situation is changing. As President Boris 
Yeltsin consolidates power, and with the success of the Russia-Nato agreement, 
its security clout in the ARF could be boosted in the future. 

Against this background, there have been new developments in the ARF process. 
At the recent ARF senior officials meeting in the sea resort of Langkawi 
Island, defence and security officials accompanying the ARF delegations had an 
informal lunch hosted by Malaysia. It was the first time these officials had 
informally discussed security issues among themselves, separate from the 
plenary sessions. With defence and security personnel links moving closer, 
Washington has proposed defence or security officials be included in the 
plenary session. 

The ARF plenary session is normally restricted to a foreign minister and one 
senior official. If the coming ARF meeting in July approves the idea, defence 
and security officials would be included in the fifth ARF in the Philippines 
next year. 

Nonetheless, the future of the ARF is still far from clear. Various ideas have 
been discussed, but no consensus reached. For instance, as part of 
preventative diplomacy, a greater role for the ARF chairman in handling 
disputes or acting as a mediator has been sought. 

In fact, this was the outcome of the forceful role played by Indonesian 
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, who chaired the last ARF meeting in Jakarta last 
year. He used his chairmanship to prevent discord among members over the 
Burmese issue, and ushered in Rangoon as a member of the ARF. 

A proposal that ARF members designate a contact person in their respective 
embassies, who would meet with his counterparts as frequently as deemed 
necessary, has been discussed but no decision made. 

With the Asean decision to admit Laos, Cambodia and Burma as new members, the 
position of the regional grouping has been strengthened, but it also now 
carries new responsibilities. Though serious security hotspots such as the 
South China Sea, Burma and the Korean Peninsula have been highlighted in past 
ARF meetings, Asean has yet to play a leading role in these issues. 

For instance, on the South China Sea disputes, efforts have been made, mainly 
by Beijing, to move the discussion away from the ARF. China has argued that 
all the other claimants are members of Asean. In addition, the claimants are 
already holding annual consultations at senior officials level on this problem 
and other bilateral issues. 

Only in recent weeks have Asean members finally realised that to make the ARF 
an effective institution they need to learn and be more active in regional 
security, especially the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Malaysian Foreign 
Minister Abdullah Badawi's recent visit to Pyongyang was part of his 
familiarisation tour to learn first hand about the famine situation and the 
needs of North Korea. 

Foreign Minister Prachuab Chaiyasan has also said that Asean must adopt a 
higher profile in regional security and that Asean foreign ministers need to 
exchange information and views on regional issues more frequently. 

Asean still lacks knowledge and expertise in international security issues as 
well as management of conflicts. Asean's experience in managing regional 
conflicts has yet to be applied elsewhere. While it is accepted by ARF 
members, Asean's main regional instrument, the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation, has yet to make an impact on serious issues such as arms control, 
security cooperation and conflict prevention in the broader Asia-Pacific 
region. 

If Asean fails to lead and give a clear direction, its future role in the ARF 
will be inevitably diluted.