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SEC COHEN 11/6 REMARKS TO ASIA SOCI



Subject: SEC COHEN 11/6 REMARKS TO ASIA SOCIETY



11 June 1997 

TEXT: SEC. COHEN 6/11 REMARKS TO ASIA SOCIETY 

(U.S. seeks expanded engagement in Asia-Pacific)  (3490)

Washington -- One thing that is necessary for the future is expanded
U.S. engagement throughout the Asia-Pacific region, according to
Secretary Defense William Cohen.

In remarks to the Asia Society June 11, Cohen said: "More
specifically, we want a future where the nations of Southeast Asia
have assumed a place in our security thinking commensurate with their
importance to the world economy and their contribution to regional
stability."

"We need to do more to deepen our cooperation with these strategically
important nations, which are destined to play an increasingly
important role in shaping Asia Pacific stability," he said.

"No nation has benefited more from the regional stability provided by
America's engagement in the Asia Pacific than has China," Cohen said.
"One of the most important and difficult challenges in the coming
years will be to integrate China not only into the world economy, but
also into the security architecture of the region."

"It is in this overall strategic context that we must view Most
Favored Nation trading status for China," he said. "Denying MFN would
undermine the essential effort to encourage China to be a responsible
member of the international community."

"The United States and China each have a choice," Cohen said. "We can
work together toward our common interests, or we can work against each
other in a zero-sum game, driving our relationship into a spiral of
confrontation. As the world's most powerful, dynamic nation, the
United States will succeed in either world. But it is the first course
that promises the greatest advances for our security and prosperity,
as well as China's and the region's as a whole; while the second
course would be not only harder but more dangerous, without so much as
the saving grace of being necessary. It is China's choice to make."

Following is the official text of Cohen's remarks:

(begin text)

Remarks Prepared for Delivery
by William S. Cohen
Secretary of Defense
Asia Society
June 11, 1997

I first traveled to East Asia a quarter century ago and since the
early 1990s have visited the region several times each year. In recent
years, my trips even those separated by only a few months have
inevitably brought to mind Heraclitus' observation that you cannot
step twice in the same river. You cannot travel twice in the same
Asia.

The pace of change is dramatic. The buildings rising, the businesses
booming, the bustle of economic prosperity obvious in the city
streets. But more than the exchange of money has been the change of
mindsets of how the peoples of the region view themselves and their
relationships to each other and to the West, and of how we view these
matters, as well.

One purpose of my April trip to Northeast Asia was to ensure that in
the security arena our mindset is open to change; to ensure that while
we continue to deal effectively with the security challenges of today,
that we also build the foundation for preserving security well into
the next century.

On that visit, I saw the political cooperation. In Tokyo and Seoul,
from the conference rooms to the ceremonial halls, I could feel the
warmth borne of long friendship between the United States and our two
old allies.

I witnessed the danger. Just two hours before I visited the DMZ in
Korea and looked out across the Bridge of No Return, soldiers from
North and South exchanged warning shots.

But I also felt the quiet confidence of the Asia Pacific region -- a
confidence secured by America's stabilizing presence represented by
the capability of 100,000 U.S. forces forward-deployed at sea and
ashore. I met some of these troops. I was reassured by their
readiness. And I was gratified by the good relations they have built
with their hosts.

I also knew what was at stake in the region. I knew America's economy
is at stake -- with some $400 billion worth of trade in the region
each year, supporting three million American jobs. And I knew that
America's security is also at stake -- after three wars in the region
in this century claiming over 100,000 American lives, it is stating
the obvious that peace in the Pacific is a vital national interest.

By the end of my trip, I knew for certain that U.S. diplomat John
Hay's prediction at the turn of this century had finally come to pass.
Hay said: "The Mediterranean is the ocean of the past, the Atlantic is
the ocean of the present, and the Pacific is the ocean of the future."

The question is, what kind of future?  And how do we get there? 

The Department of Defense has been spending a lot of time thinking
about these kinds of questions in our Quadrennial Defense Review. We
looked at the world not only today but two decades out and developed a
defense strategy to protect and to promote our interests.

As we looked at the Asia Pacific, we saw that the United States has a
choice between different strategies -- which, in essence, reflects a
choice between two different futures.

Under one strategy, America heeds the siren call of those who say,
"come home," where we withdraw our troops and decide on an Asia
Pacific security strategy that ends on the shores of California or
Hawaii or Alaska.

We have rejected this strategy, for it would lead to a frightful
future -- a future in which the Asia Pacific would be known for its
perils, not its promise; where economic competition devolves into
military conflict; where would-be aggressors are left at liberty to
threaten their neighbors, and terrorists obtain and threaten to use
terrifying weapons; where America can no longer claim to be a Pacific
power -- and loses its influence to shape its destiny.

Such a strategy and future are unacceptable. We have chosen to remain
a Pacific power; to maintain a solid U.S. military presence of about
100,000 troops, forward deployed in the region, and to extend
America's engagement in the region not just to Tokyo and Seoul, but to
Hanoi, Jakarta, and Beijing. We have chosen this course because it
leads to the future we want -- a future of fair trade and fantastic
economic growth, of more freedom both political and economic, of more
cooperation, and less confrontation.

Having framed the future we want, what are its elements? What does it
look like? And how do we get there?

First and foremost, we see a future in which our engagement and
presence is guaranteed by strong, revitalized alliances across the
region.

No relationship has been more successful or important than the
U.S.-Japan alliance. It is a natural partnership of two of the world's
strongest democracies and strongest economies. During the "long
twilight struggle" of the Cold War and the transitional phase of the
post-Cold War period, our alliance has preserved the stability that
underlies the Asian economic miracle and that has benefited peoples
throughout the Pacific Basin, including our people throughout America.

And as we move into a new era and a new century, it would be an act of
folly to squander this global asset. The U.S.-Japan alliance is a
calming force for peace and stability, a cornerstone for the new era.
It was with this conviction that President Clinton and Prime Minister
Hashimoto reassured the region by reaffirming our mutual commitment to
the alliance -- and launched a process to retool and revitalize our
alliance by reviewing the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense
Cooperation.

These Guidelines were last revised in 1978 by a different generation,
for a different strategy, for different threats. Our ongoing review
will ensure they can meet the needs of the current and the next
generation.

The review is being conducted within the context of the Japanese
Constitution. But within this context we are looking at how we can
best work and plan together to be ready for the types of challenges we
will face in the future, not because these new challenges require more
forces, but because they require more flexibility.

We have peacetime challenges: How can we best cooperate in providing
humanitarian relief? How can we best work together on peacekeeping
missions? How can we implement confidence-building mechanisms with
other militaries in the region?

We have the challenge of responding to regional crises that affect
Japan's security. If there is a crisis in areas surrounding Japan, we
may have to turn to Japan for the use of military facilities to help
supply and support our troops, for sea and air patrols in the waters
in and around Japan, or for cooperation in intelligence sharing.

And, of course, if we have to be ready to defend Japan itself, we need
to examine how we can improve our joint readiness and
interoperability.

It is important to emphasize that the review is not directed against
anyone and that we are doing it in a transparent, out-in-the-open
fashion. That is why this past weekend, we issued an interim report on
the progress we have made, and why we are now briefing this interim
report to governments throughout the region. A final report will be
issued in the fall, and again we will act with full transparency and
provide full briefings to countries in the region.

The future we want also includes a Korean Peninsula that is united in
peace, security and democracy. Reaching this future Korean Peninsula
is like running a marathon -- it is a long, hard and arduous journey.
But while we are confident of the final outcome of the race, we must
be prepared for the last miles to follow any of several potential
routes from soft landing to other, more challenging possibilities. We
must plan for each possible path, and for the day after.

And that, indeed, is what the United States and South Korea are doing.
We are encouraged by the North's acceptance, in principle, of the U.S.
and South Korean proposal of four-party peace talks with South Korea,
the United States and China -- whose constructive role in this process
is also encouraging. We also are moving forward with the 1994
Framework Agreement for freezing and eventually dismantling their
nuclear weapons program. And South Korea and the United States are
offering food to alleviate starvation in the North -- not for
political reasons, but for humanitarian reasons.

But the fact remains that the Peninsula is still one of the most
dangerous places on earth -- a true hotspot, where large forces remain
on hair-trigger alert, and where the situation in the North is raising
the tension still further. That is why we are maintaining strong,
ready and vigilant forces on the Peninsula -- ready for any
contingency.

During my trip we also looked out further into the future, and agreed
that the presence of U.S. forces in Korea will remain an important
element of stability even after unification. This reflects the broad
consensus among the United States and all of our regional allies that
our presence in the region is not directed at any single foe, nor
keyed to any single threat or scenario. Rather, our presence is
directed toward enhancing stability and shaping the overall strategic
environment. As the environment changes, the United States is always
open to examining the implications for our strategy and our force
structure, but only in close consultation with our allies, and only
with the assurance that our decisions reinforce confidence and
forestall uncertainty during an era of transition.

The greatest transition now in progress in the region is the emergence
of China. We want a future where China is not only a great economic
actor, but a great contributor to regional and world stability, where
China has preserved its unique cultural heritage, but is more open
about security matters, more open in its markets, and more respectful
of the rule of law and human rights.

No nation has benefited more from the regional stability provided by
America's engagement in the Asia Pacific than has China, and, thus,
none should have a greater interest in our sustaining and revitalizing
those security structures that are the basis for the stability that
underlies the region's economic dynamism. One of the most important
and difficult challenges in the coming years will be to integrate
China not only into the world economy, but also into the security
architecture of the region.

This integration has just begun, and there are still areas where the
United States and China's neighbors should expect more from China's
leadership.

We look for China to resolve disputes peacefully in accordance with
international norms; to be more transparent and open about military
affairs; to stop the transfer of dangerous technologies to unfriendly
nations in the Gulf. China has gone from being a net oil exporter in
1994 to a net importer today, and its reliance on oil imports,
especially from the Gulf, is expected to rise rapidly. This gives
China a strong interest in stability in the Gulf, and there are signs
that Chinese officials increasingly recognize this.

We also support China's membership in the World Trade Organization
based on commercially meaningful terms and on the WTO's principles; a
transition in Hong Kong that preserves Hong Kong's high degree of
autonomy, prosperity and civil liberties in accord with the Sino-UK
Joint Declaration; and an institutionalization of the rule of law that
enhances the freedom of China's citizens, the vitality of China's
economy, and the constructiveness of China's diplomacy.

The United States also understands that these goals are best achieved
by constructive relations with China. That is why today the United
States is pursuing a strategy of engagement with China. Our engagement
strategy says, "We will work with China where we can -- such as on the
Korean Peninsula; and we will disagree where we must -- as we do with
Chinese arm sales and other dealings with Iran." This strategy of
engagement recognizes China for what it is -- an emerging power,
poised to either contribute to, or detract from, the tides of economic
dynamism, cooperation and trust that are filling the Pacific Basin.

As part of our overall engagement strategy, we are building a
relationship with China's military. The PLA is a key player on key
issues that we care about: military transparency, regional security
cooperation, proliferation. We seek to both understand and influence
the PLA. We seek to increase mutual confidence and decrease
miscalculation. That is why we are exchanging military personnel,
working out procedures for U.S. Navy ship port calls to Hong Kong
after reversion, and pursuing "rules of the road" for our ships as
they operate in the same seas. That is also why we are engaging in
high-level strategic discussions. General Shalikashvili visited
Beijing last month to meet with his counterparts. And I hope to go in
the fall.

It is in this overall strategic context that we must view Most Favored
Nation trading status for China. MFN is not a favor to China or any
other nation -- it is simply a recognition of normal trading
relations. Denying MFN would undermine the essential effort to
encourage China to be a responsible member of the international
community. It would obviously hurt our economic interests.

But from my seat as Secretary of Defense, it is equally obvious that
it would damage our strategic influence and interests. Our friends and
allies throughout Asia would question our ability to carry out a
coherent policy toward China and thus toward the region as a whole.
And it would play into the hands of those who might wish to see U.S.
power in the region displaced.

The United States and China each have a choice: we can work together
toward our common interests, or we can work against each other in a
zero-sum game, driving our relationship into a spiral of
confrontation. As the world's most powerful, dynamic nation, the
United States will succeed in either world. But it is the first course
that promises the greatest advances for our security and prosperity,
as well as China's and the region's as a whole; while the second
course would be not only harder but more dangerous, without so much as
the saving grace of being necessary. It is China's choice to make.

One thing that is necessary for the future that we seek is expanded
U.S. engagement throughout the region.

More specifically, we want a future where the nations of Southeast
Asia have assumed a place in our security thinking commensurate with
their importance to the world economy and their contribution to
regional stability. Today, ASEAN is our third largest overseas market
after the European Union and Japan, and is our fastest growing market
in the world. We need to do more to deepen our cooperation with these
strategically important nations, which are destined to play an
increasingly important role in shaping Asia Pacific stability.

We are already doing this with Thailand -- a long time treaty ally
that has quietly and reliably helped support our forward presence in
the region. But other nations in the region -- such as Indonesia,
which has the world's fourth largest population and is home to key
strategic waterways -- hardly register on the U.S. radar screen, and
seldom do we see the whole picture.

For decades, the nations in Southeast Asia have benefited from the
stability provided by America's forward-presence and engagement and we
have benefited from their stability. In the coming years, it will be
in our mutual interest for Southeast Asia to take additional concrete
steps to facilitate our military presence.

ASEAN is also playing a positive key role in building greater security
dialogue throughout the region. Today, the ASEAN Regional Forum is the
most significant multilateral security forum in the Asia Pacific
region. For the first time ever in Asia, we are seeing serious
multilateral dialogue on security issues -- everything from
proliferation on the Korean Peninsula to conflicting territorial
claims in the South China Sea. The Forum is also introducing greater
confidence-building and transparency to the region, facilitating the
regional exchange of defense white papers, and fostering cooperation
on issues such as peacekeeping and search and rescue.

Through these and other efforts we are creating new regional security
structures to confront common challenges. As President Clinton noted,
these arrangements are like overlapping plates of security armor,
working individually and together to protect our mutual interests and
reinforce peace.

The future that we seek for the Asia Pacific region will not fall
fortuitously into our laps. Building it will involve hard work and
heavy lifting, and some of the hardest work ahead of us in our own
minds.

More than a century ago, John Nevius began his classic portrait of
China by noting that, "Seldom have two parties been suddenly brought
together who so thoroughly misunderstood each other as have we and the
Chinese. Their ignorance of other countries is truly remarkable, but
hardly more so than (our ignorance of them)." Nevius blamed Chinese
and American mutual misperceptions on the "want of reliable
information."

Today, our quest to build on President Clinton's call for a Pacific
community based on "shared efforts, shared benefits and shared
destiny" faces a different challenge. It is the challenge not so much
of reliable information but what we do with it.

For technology has miniaturized the globe, reducing our vast Pacific
Ocean to a mere pond. Our voices and our thoughts travel at the speed
of light, our bodies at the speed of sound. And information pours into
our Western minds, filling in what Yeats called the "vague
immensities" of Asia. Our task is to comprehend this information. For
the bullet trains of photons that race across the Pacific on the rail
lines of modern telecommunications still pass through the tunnel of
cultural prejudice, and more and more shared information can lead to
less and less understanding, leaving us with T.S. Eliot's question:
"Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge? Where is the
understanding we have lost in information?"

In Nevius' day, such misunderstanding represented a loss of
opportunity, but in today's miniaturized world much more is at stake.
Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that our mutual peace and
prosperity depend on us being able to minimize the risk of
misperception, misinterpretation and miscalculation. Our job is to
shrink the vast cultural ocean separating the peoples of the Pacific.
And if we do so, we can and will build a Pacific future as great as
the ocean that links our shores, and whose waves reverberate well
beyond: from Tokyo to Tacoma; from Bangkok to Baltimore; and from
Kuala Lumpur to Cleveland for in the new era and the new century, the
security and prosperity of the Asia Pacific region is central to the
security and prosperity of all Americans.

(end text)