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FLY IN THE OINTMENT FEER 12/6
- Subject: FLY IN THE OINTMENT FEER 12/6
- From: moe@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 14 Jun 1997 22:08:00
Fly in the Ointment
Asean's decision to make Burma, Cambodia and Laos members from July
will present multiple dilemmas for the grouping itself and for its relations
with the West.
By Murray Hiebert in Kuala Lumpur, Nigel Holloway in Washington and
Michael Vatikiotis in Bangkok
June 12, 1997
F or Asean, the real work is only just beginning. The grouping's decision
to embrace Burma despite protests over human-rights abuses along with
Cambodia and Laos was only the first step. Now it faces the more
formidable task of integrating the new members into a 10-nation bloc and
managing its relations with the rest of the world.
Asean won't have to wait long for its first challenge. American Secretary of
State Madeleine Albright and several European foreign ministers all of
whom opposed Burma's admission will hold talks with their Asean
counterparts in Kuala Lumpur in late July, a day or two after the new
members are admitted. The presence of the Burmese could put the Western
foreign ministers in a ticklish position.
Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who announced the
May 31 decision to admit the new members, tried to avoid giving the
impression that Asean was thumbing its nose at the West. It was not a
signal. We signal to nobody, he told journalists at the end of an Asean
foreign ministers' meeting in Kuala Lumpur.
But in an apparent attempt to limit the scope for dispute, Badawi said
Asean would not assign the new members dialogue partners with
nonmember nations. The United States, the European Union, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Korea hold a series of
dialogues with Asean members after the bloc's annual meeting. The
decision not to give the new members dialogue partners will tend to
marginalize them and essentially make them second-string members of
Asean, at least for several years.
Another hurdle is the Asia Europe summit in London next year. The British
government bars visas to Rangoon's military leaders, which means a
dispute may arise over whether Burma will be allowed to attend the summit.
A senior European diplomat in Bangkok says the European Parliament is
also unlikely to amend the EU's protocol with Asean to recognize Burma's
membership in the grouping. This could complicate future dealings
between the two blocs.
Other countries such as Canada and Japan provide aid to Asean but refuse
or restrict bilateral assistance to Burma. Asean, however, doesn't allow
donors to exclude any of its members from aid programmes for the
grouping. But no Canadian politician will risk signing an agreement with
Slorc, predicts Abdul Razak Baginda, head of the Malaysian Strategic
Research Centre. (Slorc stands for the State Law and Order Restoration
Council, Burma's ruling military junta.) Integration of the new members into
Asean could prove equally daunting. Admission is easy, says Razak. But
when the hullabaloo ends will the new members be able to send personnel
to 280 meetings a year? Observers believe this will be easier for Burma,
which has more English speaking diplomats, than poorer, smaller Laos and
Cambodia.
Economic cooperation could pose additional problems. Badawi said the
three new members would be given 10 years from January 1998 to comply
with the tariff-reduction schedule mandated by the Asean Free Trade Area,
or Afta. The other members have until 2003 to lower tariffs on 98% of their
traded goods to below 5%. Vietnam, which joined Asean in mid-1995, has
been given until 2006.
Asean's membership explosion could also result in internal political
tensions. It will be more difficult to maintain the cohesion of 10 disparate
countries, says Lee Poh Ping, an international-affairs specialist at the
University of Malaya. He points out that Asean's six older members are
more developed and have long practised market economics, whereas
Burma, Cambodia and Laos have long been isolated from international
markets. There's bound to be a clash of cultures, Lee says.
Burma's growing economic and military ties with China could be one of the
first tests for an enlarged Asean. China is very close to Myanmar, says
another analyst in Kuala Lumpur, using the military leadership's name for
Burma. If the Spratlys become a problem, he says, referring to islands in the
South China Sea claimed by China and several Asean members, what will
Myanmar's position be?
Burma did nothing to help Asean rebut American opposition in the run up
to the foreign ministers' meeting. In recent months, Rangoon has restricted
the activities of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and detained more
than 300 members of her National League for Democracy, most of whom
were only released on June 3. In a videotape smuggled out of Burma just
before the Asean meeting, Suu Kyi said that Asean membership would
make Rangoon's military leaders even more obdurate and oppressive.
Asean officials insist that their decision to embrace Burma had nothing to
do with giving Rangoon a good-housekeeping seal of approval. Instead,
they say, it is a continuation of their policy of constructive engagement,
which emphasizes economic cooperation and downplays political issues.
And what if the human-rights situation in Burma worsens after its Asean
membership? Now that Myanmar will be a member of Asean, Asean's
policy of constructive engagement, which we will continue to pursue, will
be more effective, I hope, Malaysia's Badawi told journalists.
The three countries will be formally admitted at an Asean foreign ministers'
meeting hosted by Malaysia in July. Observers say this year, the 30th
anniversary of Asean's founding, provided a convenient peg for expanding
membership. It's very symbolic, says Razak. If you have no fixed criteria for
admitting new members, you have to fall back on certain events.
Washington had been working behind the scenes for months to persuade
Asean governments to proceed slowly on Burma's admission. On April 25,
State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns told reporters that the U.S.
was trying to use our influence to make the point that Burma should be
given a stiff message that it is not welcome. His words provoked a strong
reaction from Asean, prompting Washington to soften the wording of its
opposition by acknowledging that membership was a matter for Asean to
decide.
Analysts and diplomats differ on the impact of Washington's lobbying
efforts on Asean's decision to admit Burma. A senior Asean official says
American opposition was only a minor consideration. He says delaying the
decision until December, as some had suggested, was ruled out because it
wouldn't have made the issue any less sensitive.
Others believe Washington's tactics speeded up Rangoon's admission.
The attempt by the U.S. to pressure Asean got the opposite result, says
Razak of the Malaysian Strategic Research Centre. Asean became more
resolved to unite Southeast Asia.
In the U.S., analysts downplay the extent of the damage. Some argue that
the American cause was lost because Washington hadn't tried hard
enough to coordinate its Burma policy with Asean. The Clinton
administration could have done better working with Asean by saying:
ÔWe will delay sanctions if you delay membership,' says Douglas Paal of
the Asia-Pacific Policy Centre, an independent think tank.
A Democratic staffer in the House says that some American congressmen
may ask Secretary of State Albright to boycott the Asean meeting in Kuala
Lumpur in July. But even though she described Slorc as an ugly acronym
for an ugly government in 1995, most analysts believe she will attend
because of the importance Washington places on its ties with Asean.
Still, no one expects the criticism of Rangoon to end after it joins Asean.
Asean countries made a big mistake, but this is by no means the end of the
battle over Burma or the end of our relations with Asean, says a
Republican congressional aide in Washington.
Since the decision on the new members, American officials have stressed
that Washington and Asean have the same objectives with regard to
Burma, but differ on how to achieve them. According to John Dinger, a
State Department spokesman, We now look to Asean to use its good
offices to urge the Slorc to seriously address our mutual concerns and urge
the Slorc to enter into a productive dialogue with democratic forces in
Burma.
Robert Manning of the Progressive Policy Institute, a Washington think
tank, believes that U.S. Asean relations will be tense for a while, but
foresees no long-term damage. When push comes to shove and they dial
911, who're they gonna call? he asks. America is Asean's only option, he
says.
Singapore's ambassador to Washington, Chan Heng Chee, puts it
differently: The U.S. sees Asean as an important strategic friend. Now the
Asean-10 is Southeast Asia and it's inconceivable that the U.S. would not
want a relationship with Southeast Asia. We share a congruent interest in
maintaining peace and stability.