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Fly in the Ointment



Fly in the Ointment 

(Far Eastern Economic Review)
Asean's decision to make Burma, Cambodia and Laos members from July will 
present multiple dilemmas for the grouping itself and for its relations with 
the West. 

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By Murray Hiebert in Kuala Lumpur, Nigel Holloway in Washington and Michael 
Vatikiotis in Bangkok 

------------------------------------------------------------------------
June 12, 1997 


F or Asean, the real work is only just beginning. The grouping's decision to 
embrace Burma despite protests over human-rights abuses along with Cambodia 
and Laos was only the first step. Now it faces the more formidable task of 
integrating the new members into a 10-nation bloc and managing its relations 
with the rest of the world. 

Asean won't have to wait long for its first challenge. American Secretary of 
State Madeleine Albright and several European foreign ministers all of whom 
opposed Burma's admission will hold talks with their Asean counterparts in 
Kuala Lumpur in late July, a day or two after the new members are admitted. 
The presence of the Burmese could put the Western foreign ministers in a 
ticklish position. 

Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who announced the May 31 
decision to admit the new members, tried to avoid giving the impression that 
Asean was thumbing its nose at the West. It was not a signal. We signal to 
nobody, he told journalists at the end of an Asean foreign ministers' meeting 
in Kuala Lumpur. 

But in an apparent attempt to limit the scope for dispute, Badawi said Asean 
would not assign the new members dialogue partners with nonmember nations. The 
United States, the European Union, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and 
South Korea hold a series of dialogues with Asean members after the bloc's 
annual meeting. The decision not to give the new members dialogue partners 
will tend to marginalize them and essentially make them second-string members 
of Asean, at least for several years. 

Another hurdle is the Asia Europe summit in London next year. The British 
government bars visas to Rangoon's military leaders, which means a dispute may 
arise over whether Burma will be allowed to attend the summit. A senior 
European diplomat in Bangkok says the European Parliament is also unlikely to 
amend the EU's protocol with Asean to recognize Burma's membership in the 
grouping. This could complicate future dealings between the two blocs. 

Other countries such as Canada and Japan provide aid to Asean but refuse or 
restrict bilateral assistance to Burma. Asean, however, doesn't allow donors 
to exclude any of its members from aid programmes for the grouping. But no 
Canadian politician will risk signing an agreement with Slorc, predicts Abdul 
Razak Baginda, head of the Malaysian Strategic Research Centre. (Slorc stands 
for the State Law and Order Restoration Council, Burma's ruling military 
junta.) Integration of the new members into Asean could prove equally 
daunting. Admission is easy, says Razak. But when the hullabaloo ends will the 
new members be able to send personnel to 280 meetings a year? Observers 
believe this will be easier for Burma, which has more English speaking 
diplomats, than poorer, smaller Laos and Cambodia. 

Economic cooperation could pose additional problems. Badawi said the three new 
members would be given 10 years from January 1998 to comply with the 
tariff-reduction schedule mandated by the Asean Free Trade Area, or Afta. The 
other members have until 2003 to lower tariffs on 98% of their traded goods to 
below 5%. Vietnam, which joined Asean in mid-1995, has been given until 2006. 

Asean's membership explosion could also result in internal political tensions. 
It will be more difficult to maintain the cohesion of 10 disparate countries, 
says Lee Poh Ping, an international-affairs specialist at the University of 
Malaya. He points out that Asean's six older members are more developed and 
have long practised market economics, whereas Burma, Cambodia and Laos have 
long been isolated from international markets. There's bound to be a clash of 
cultures, Lee says. 

Burma's growing economic and military ties with China could be one of the 
first tests for an enlarged Asean. China is very close to Myanmar, says 
another analyst in Kuala Lumpur, using the military leadership's name for 
Burma. If the Spratlys become a problem, he says, referring to islands in the 
South China Sea claimed by China and several Asean members, what will 
Myanmar's position be? 

Burma did nothing to help Asean rebut American opposition in the run up to the 
foreign ministers' meeting. In recent months, Rangoon has restricted the 
activities of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and detained more than 300 
members of her National League for Democracy, most of whom were only released 
on June 3. In a videotape smuggled out of Burma just before the Asean meeting, 
Suu Kyi said that Asean membership would make Rangoon's military leaders even 
more obdurate and oppressive. 

Asean officials insist that their decision to embrace Burma had nothing to do 
with giving Rangoon a good-housekeeping seal of approval. Instead, they say, 
it is a continuation of their policy of constructive engagement, which 
emphasizes economic cooperation and downplays political issues. 

And what if the human-rights situation in Burma worsens after its Asean 
membership? Now that Myanmar will be a member of Asean, Asean's policy of 
constructive engagement, which we will continue to pursue, will be more 
effective, I hope, Malaysia's Badawi told journalists. 

The three countries will be formally admitted at an Asean foreign ministers' 
meeting hosted by Malaysia in July. Observers say this year, the 30th 
anniversary of Asean's founding, provided a convenient peg for expanding 
membership. It's very symbolic, says Razak. If you have no fixed criteria for 
admitting new members, you have to fall back on certain events. 

Washington had been working behind the scenes for months to persuade Asean 
governments to proceed slowly on Burma's admission. On April 25, State 
Department spokesman Nicholas Burns told reporters that the U.S. was trying to 
use our influence to make the point that Burma should be given a stiff message 
that it is not welcome. His words provoked a strong reaction from Asean, 
prompting Washington to soften the wording of its opposition by acknowledging 
that membership was a matter for Asean to decide. 

Analysts and diplomats differ on the impact of Washington's lobbying efforts 
on Asean's decision to admit Burma. A senior Asean official says American 
opposition was only a minor consideration. He says delaying the decision until 
December, as some had suggested, was ruled out because it wouldn't have made 
the issue any less sensitive. 

Others believe Washington's tactics speeded up Rangoon's admission. The 
attempt by the U.S. to pressure Asean got the opposite result, says Razak of 
the Malaysian Strategic Research Centre. Asean became more resolved to unite 
Southeast Asia. 

In the U.S., analysts downplay the extent of the damage. Some argue that the 
American cause was lost because Washington hadn't tried hard enough to 
coordinate its Burma policy with Asean. The Clinton administration could have 
done better working with Asean by saying: ÔWe will delay sanctions if you 
delay membership,' says Douglas Paal of the Asia-Pacific Policy Centre, an 
independent think tank. 

A Democratic staffer in the House says that some American congressmen may ask 
Secretary of State Albright to boycott the Asean meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 
July. But even though she described Slorc as an ugly acronym for an ugly 
government in 1995, most analysts believe she will attend because of the 
importance Washington places on its ties with Asean. 

Still, no one expects the criticism of Rangoon to end after it joins Asean. 
Asean countries made a big mistake, but this is by no means the end of the 
battle over Burma or the end of our relations with Asean, says a Republican 
congressional aide in Washington. 

Since the decision on the new members, American officials have stressed that 
Washington and Asean have the same objectives with regard to Burma, but differ 
on how to achieve them. According to John Dinger, a State Department 
spokesman, We now look to Asean to use its good offices to urge the Slorc to 
seriously address our mutual concerns and urge the Slorc to enter into a 
productive dialogue with democratic forces in Burma. 

Robert Manning of the Progressive Policy Institute, a Washington think tank, 
believes that U.S. Asean relations will be tense for a while, but foresees no 
long-term damage. When push comes to shove and they dial 911, who're they 
gonna call? he asks. America is Asean's only option, he says. 

Singapore's ambassador to Washington, Chan Heng Chee, puts it differently: The 
U.S. sees Asean as an important strategic friend. Now the Asean-10 is 
Southeast Asia and it's inconceivable that the U.S. would not want a 
relationship with Southeast Asia. We share a congruent interest in maintaining 
peace and stability.