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USCR SAYS THAI-BURMESE ECONOMIC INT



Subject: USCR SAYS THAI-BURMESE ECONOMIC INTERESTS THREATEN BURMESE  REFUGEES IN THAILAND

U.S. Committee for Refugees NEWS

May 16, 1997

USCR SAYS THAI-BURMESE ECONOMIC INTERESTS THREATEN BURMESE REFUGEES IN THAILAND

U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) Asia Policy Analyst Hiram A. Ruiz
traveled to Thailand and Burma in April and May to assess the situation of,
and prospects for, Burmese refugees in Thailand. The following are USCR's
preliminary findings and recommendations.

For many years, Thailand quietly granted refuge to tens of thousands of
Burmese refugees who fled their homeland to escape widespread human rights
abuses at the hands of Burma's State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC) and its military. Although Thailand barred the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) from extending its internationally conferred protection
mandate to the refugees, it did permit the refugees to remain safely in
Thailand and to receive international assistance through nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs).

Recently, Thai economic interests in Burma have expanded markedly. To smooth
the way for the development of those economic interests, the Thai
government, like others in the region, has sought to improve its relations
with SLORC. SLORC has been pleased with these developments, not only because
it benefits from the economic links, but also because increased
international interaction with SLORC furthers SLORC's efforts to boost its
legitimacy.

Although SLORC has achieved considerable success in its pursuit of
legitimacy - its likely admission into the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) is a notable example - several obstacles remain. One is
Burma's continuing democracy movement, which SLORC attempted to crush in
1988. The democracy movement has remained alive under the leadership of
Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi, and with the encouragement of
supporters in the international community.

Another obstacle to SLORC's pursuit of legitimacy is its ongoing conflict
with the Karen National Union (KNU), the largest of the ethnic minority
insurgent groups that have battled SLORC and its predecessors for decades.
SLORC, which in recent years has strengthened its military capacity with
arms from China and income derived from its increased economic ties with
other countries, including Thailand, has succeeded in imposing cease-fire
agreements on all of the ethnic insurgent groups except the KNU (although
several new splinter groups that oppose the terms and conditions of the
cease-fire agreements have emerged and resumed armed opposition to SLORC).
SLORC has also greatly weakened the KNU, capturing most KNU-controlled
territory inside Burma during a recent military offensive. But although the
KNU has held talks With SLORC, it has not acceded to a cease-fire agreement.

Many people with whom USCR met in Bangkok and at the Thai-Burmese border
said that SLORC perceives a third obstacle to increased economic development
and political legitimacy: the estimated 100,000 ethnic minority Burmese
refugees remaining in Thailand. Those whom USCR interviewed said that SLORC
wants the refugees to return to Burma because their presence in Thailand is
evidence of SLORC's continuing, systematic abuse of human rights in Burma,
and because through their contacts with international NGOs and the media,
the refugees help keep the international community informed of these human
rights abuses and of other developments inside Burma.

Those interviewed added that SLORC also undoubtedly considers the refugees a
source of aid and support to the KNU and other insurgents. Many said they
believe that SLORC has increasingly pressed Thailand to return the refugees
in order to eliminate them as a thorn in SLORC's side and to force Thailand
to demonstrate publicly its support for SLORC over the insurgents. SLORC's
pressure has had effect.

Although in years past the Thai authorities tacitly - if not actively -
supported the insurgents by permitting them (and their arms and supplies)
access through Thailand to the areas they controlled in Burma, more
recently, the Thai authorities have allegedly pressed the insurgent groups
to accede to cease-fire agreements with SLORC. Thai authorities have
reportedly restricted the movement of insurgents and their supplies in and
through Thailand, and have used other direct political pressure to force the
insurgents to conclude cease-fire agreements with SLORC.

USCR's FINDINGS

Thai authorities along some stretches of the Thai-Burmese border have
increasingly yielded to SLORC pressure to return the refugees and not permit
new refugees to enter Thailand. Their primary motivation is said to be their
desire to promote Thai business interests in Burma (in which some observers
speculate that some Thai authorities may have stakes). Major Thai business
and economic interests in Burma, both current and proposed, include the
construction of a gas pipeline from the Burmese coast to Thailand; a
deep-sea port in Tavoy and the improvement of the road linking Tavoy to
Thailand; development of another deep-sea port on the Burmese coast near
Kalegauk Island; potential development of various tourist sites along the
Burmese coast; logging
concessions; and numerous other projects and ventures.

Many of these projects are, in fact, partly to blame for new refugees'
flight. SLORC is relying heavily on the use of forced labor in the
construction of these projects. Because the projects are largely located in
ethnic minority areas, ethnic minority villagers have borne the brunt of the
forced labor (although Burmese throughout the country also suffer this
abuse). Also, SLORC used ethnic minority villagers as porters extensively in
the course of its military offensive against the KNU.

Recently arrived refugees whom USCR interviewed in Thailand stated that
their frequent subjection to both forced porterage and forced labor was one
of the main reasons for their flight. The new refugees also pointed to
forced relocations, armed conflict, and fear of other human rights abuses,
such as rape, as reasons for their flight. Ethnic minority villagers whom
USCR interviewed in Burma confirmed that SLORC took a large number of men as
porters during the recent offensive, that forced labor continues unabated,
and that many people are fleeing because of
these abuses.

SLORC's 1997 offensive against the KNU has resulted in more than 7,000 new
refugees entering Thailand. The Thai authorities prevented hundreds of other
asylum seekers from entering, some of whom were subsequently attacked by
SLORC forces. Many remain displaced inside Burma near the Thai border and
face difficult circumstances.

Specific actions by Thai authorities in recent years (and particularly in
recent months) indicate that Thailand is yielding to SLORC pressure on the
refugee question. These actions include:

+ forcing residents of various refugee camps to relocate their camps to
sites within Burma;

+ pressing for the inclusion of a clause in the cease-fire agreement between
SLORC and Mon insurgents calling for the repatriation of Mon refugees, and
forcing the Mon refugees to repatriate following the cease-fire. (Mon
villagers interviewed by USCR in Burma said that they do not believe that
the cease-fire agreement between SLORC and the New Mon State Party has
benefitted the Mon people, and that the Mon refugees whom Thailand forced
back into Burma following the cease-fire are no better off - and many are
worse off - than they were before they fled to Thailand. They also said that
human rights abuses such as forced porterage, forced labor, and forced
relocations continue in Mon areas.)

+ preventing thousands of new Burmese asylum seekers from entering Thailand
and forcibly returning some who managed to cross the border;

+ failing to protect the refugees adequately from cross-border attacks by
armed Burmese forces;

 + regularly keeping the refugees uninformed about plans being made
regarding their future and forcing refugees whose homes and camps have been
destroyed during the above attacks to live in unsatisfactory conditions for
months at a time.

CONDITIONS FOR THE REFUGEES

USCR visited and met with Burmese refugees at five sites along the
Thai-Burmese border, including Wangka and Mae La camps near Mae Sot, Nu Pho
camp near Umphang, Tho Kah camp near Thong Pha Phum, and Phu Muang camp near
Kanchanaburi. The refugees' situation, including both the physical
conditions in which they are living and their security, vary from camp to
camp (some of which are reportedly only temporary sites) and region to
region. Conditions range from satisfactory to intolerable. Refugees in the
9th army division areas regularly face the greatest difficulties. Refugees
in Thailand experience a number of problems. USCR found that the most
pressing of these include:

+ Thai authorities have not protected refugees from attack by the Democratic
Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and/or SLORC troops. In some camps the Thai
authorities have taken steps to provide some protection, but in many camps
they provide little or no protection. Reportedly, when DKBA and/or SLORC
forces have attacked, Thai guards have vacated their posts in advance, and
remained away throughout the attacks. Many refugees live in fear because the
DKBA has threatened to attack their camps and they have little confidence
that Thai authorities will protect them.

+ Thai authorities have kept the newly arrived refugees in a desperate
situation. At Phu Muang camp, temporary home to some 2,400 recent arrivals,
virtually all families are living under plastic sheets that only serve to
intensify the blazing heat of the sun. The authorities have not told the
refugees whether they will be moved to a more suitable site farther from the
border or even if they will be permitted to remain in Thailand. Despite the
approach of the monsoon rains, the authorities have prevented the refugees
from building sturdier shelters.

+ DKBA and/or SLORC troops attacked two camps in late January, burning
hundreds of huts and leaving thousands of people homeless. Since then, many
of the refugees in those camps have been living in deplorable conditions,
largely because of the actions of the Thai authorities. The authorities
initially promised to move them to a safer site, but have since refused to
do so. Although local officials reportedly blame the authorities in Bangkok,
observers noted that it is more likely the local authorities themselves
blocked the move, largely because they may benefit from the refugees
remaining where they are (for example, because the refugees provide cheap
labor for local businessmen).

+ The refugees suffer from inconsistencies in attitudes and policies toward
them among different sectors of government, such as the Ministry of
Interior, the military, the National Security Council, local government
officials, and the border patrol. Policies and attitudes within these
groups, including the military, also differ from Bangkok to the provinces,
and from province to province, further confusing and complicating the problem.

+ Occasionally, the Thai military arbitrarily cuts off food deliveries to
some camps. USCR visited Tho Kah camp several days after the military had
suspended food delivery. Many of the camp's residents were finishing their
last stocks of rice on the day USCR visited. They had no idea when they
would receive rice again nor why the military had cut off their food
supplies. NGOs and even the local authorities also did not know why the
miliary had taken this measure.

In contrast to the conditions above, the Thai authorities have moved more
than 10,000 refugees to Nu Pho, a safer site away from the border. At Nu
Pho, refugees have been able to construct adequate shelters, they have
access to medical and sanitation services, they are is well guarded, and,
overall, their conditions are quite satisfactory. Nu Pho bears witness to
how well the Thai authorities can respond when they choose to do so.

It is also important to note that Thailand does continue to permit more than
100,000 Burmese ethnic minority refugees to remain, that it allows
international NGOs to assist them most of the time, and that it has
responded positively following expressions of concern by members of the
international community over the forced return of refugees (Thailand stopped
pushing back refugees to Burma and permitted many new refugees to enter
Thailand). Also, the problems noted above are not equally present in all
areas of the border; most - although not all - of the problems have been
concentrated in border areas in Kanchanaburi and Ratchaburi provinces, which
are in the area of operation of the Thai military's 9th army division.

Thai government foreign affairs officials assured USCR that Thailand remains
concerned for and committed to assisting the refugees, and that the Thai
government respects the right to seel asylum. However, they emphasized that
refugee protection should be short term, and that the Burmese refugees
should return home as soon as it is safe to do so (presumably, as soon as
the Thai authorities determine that it is safe to do so).

The officials emphasized Thailand's strong concern over the presence of
hundreds of thousands of undocumented workers from Burma and other
neighboring countries in Thailand. They appeared concerned that the refugees
might not want to return home at any time, but rather would try to remain in
Thailand permanently, as the officials appeared to believe most undocumented
workers want to do.

USCR RECOMMENDATIONS

TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THAILAND:

1. Thailand should continue to provide safe haven to Burmese ethnic minority
refugees already in Thailand and to those who continue to flee human rights
abuses at the hands of SLORC and its military.

The Thai government and people have done much to be proud of on behalf of
refugees. Although Thailand's record as a refugee-hosting country has by no
means been perfect. It has offered refuge to hundreds of thousands of
refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, most of whom are now back home or
have been resettled in other countries. Until recently, Thailand also
permitted many ethnic minority Burmese to remain safely in Thailand.

Now, economic interests threaten to tarnish Thailand's record. The Thai
authorities have prevented Burmese asylum seekers from entering Thailand,
and have told those it has permitted to enter that they must return home as
soon as fighting ends in their home areas. However, USCR found that the
refugees are not fleeing primarily because of the fighting. Rather, they are
fleeing SLORC's human rights abuses. Refugees and villagers in Burma say
that even if the fighting stops, human rights abuses will not end.

2. The Thai authorities must provide greater security to the ethnic minority
Burmese refugees. They should move refugee camps away from the border, which
is within easy reach of SLORC soldiers and DKBA paramilitaries. Sites at
least ten kilometers from the border would be preferable. Thailand should
provide an adequate number of military personnel to protect these sites. The
Thai government should also ensure that these steps are implemented
uniformly in all areas of the border.

3. The Thai government should permit UNHCR a full-time presence at the
border so that it may carry out its internationally delegated mandate to
protect refugees. 

Although Thailand regrettably is not a signatory to the 1951 UN Refugee
Convention, it is a member of UNHCR's Executive Committee and therefore
undoubtedly understands and recognizes the crucial role UNHCR plays in
traditional refugee protection. Yet, Thailand refuses to allow UNHCR to
carry out its vital protection function on behalf of ethnic minority Burmese
refugees in Thailand. Reportedly, Thailand does not want to
"internationalize" the situation by involving UNHCR. It also does not want
the refugees' stay to be prolonged. 

However, refugees are inherently of international concern. It is precisely
because refugees are outside of their own country and in need of
international protection that the international community created UNHCR.
Thailand should welcome UNHCR involvement. UNHCR can help ensure that only
genuine refugees are present in refugee camps, and thus help mitigate
concerns that refugee camps may be used as a source of support for insurgent
groups or that Thailand somehow supports the insurgents by permitting the
refugees to remain. UNHCR's presence along all stretches of the border can
also help deter cross-border attacks. 

Most importantly, of course, UNHCR can help ensure refugees' basic rights,
including the right to seek asylum and the right to nonrefoulement, i.e.,
the right not to be forcibly returned to a place where one could face
persecution. UNHCR can also help ensure that policies and practices
affecting refugees are consistent in all areas of the border. 

Should repatriation of the refugees become appropriate, UNHCR's presence on
both sides of the border could help facilitate that process and help
returnees rebuild their lives. 

Without UNHCR involvement, there exists a risk that the governments
concerned may reach accords and take actions regarding the refugees that are
politically expedient, but that threaten refugees' basic rights and their
future safety and well-being.

TO SLORC:

1. SLORC should cease abusing the human rights of Burmese civilians.

Ethnic minority Burmese refugees whom USCR interviewed in Thailand, as well
as villagers whom we interviewed in Burma, asserted that the main reason
Burmese refugees continue to flee to or remain in Thailand is to escape
SLORC human rights abuses such as forced porterage, forced labor, and forced
relocation. Refugee women whom USCR interviewed also reported fear of rape
by SLORC soldiers and detailed several incidents of rape of women whom they
knew.

TO THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS:

1. The United States and other concerned governments should continue to
monitor the well-being of ethnic minority Burmese refugees in Thailand and,
when necessary and appropriate, press the Thai authorities to abide by
internationally accepted principles of refugee protection.

The government of Thailand remains sensitive to the views and concerns of
friendly governments and business and military partners in the international
community. The international community's forthright expressions of concern
over Thailand's recent denial of refuge to some Burmese refugees and its
refoulement of others apparently encouraged Thailand to rethink its actions.
Consequently, Burmese refugees and asylum seekers are safer today than they
were several months ago.

That safety could be short-lived, however, as SLORC will undoubtedly
continue to press Thailand to "resolve" the refugee issue. If the
international community's interest appears to diminish, the Thai authorities
may be more likely to acquiesce to SLORC's demands. It is therefore
essential that the international community maintain its interest and
willingness to speak out on refugee protection issues in Thailand.

2. Donor governments and organizations (including the U.S. government and a
number of U.S.-based NGOs) that have been providing the Burmese refugees
indispensable assistance both directly and through the Burmese Border
Consortium (BBC) should maintain that assistance.

Even if Thailand permits UNHCR to carry out its protection mandate fully,
UNHCR, which is financially stretched by its many commitments worldwide,
should not be asked to assume the care and maintenance of Burmese refugees.
That has been satisfactorily done for many years by the international
community through the BBC and international and local NGOs. USCR urges those
who have provided that assistance to continue doing so.

TO THE MEMBER STATES OF ASEAN

1. All ASEAN members should sign the 1951 UN Refugee Convention (only the
Philippines is presently a signatory) and invite UNHCR to work closely with
ASEAN to ensure that refugee issues are handled collegially and do not
become divisive, while ensuring that refugees' rights are safeguarded
throughout the region.

2.  Should ASEAN admit a SLORC-ruled Burma, it is vital that ASEAN
governments (some of whom have poor human rights records themselves) not
explicitly or implicitly support or endorse SLORC's abusive human rights
practices.

3. ASEAN members should commit, as a region, to safeguarding the right to
asylum. They should forge an agreement declaring that member states will not
discriminate against refugees fleeing fellow ASEAN member states. They
should also pledge that they will interpret fellow ASEAN members' granting
protection to refugees from their countries as a non-political, humanitarian
gesture, rather than an act of ill will.

Thailand and its ASEAN partners should, rather, press SLORC to improve its
treatment of Burmese civilians. ASEAN members, including Thailand, have
argued that bringing Burma into ASEAN will help improve economic conditions
in Burma as well, which should reduce the outflow of Burmese seeking work in
Thailand. It seems appropriate, therefore, for ASEAN members to press for
political changes and an improvement in SLORC's human rights practices,
which would help end refugee flows from Burma (and undoubtedly also
contribute to reducing the flow of Burmese purportedly only "seeking work"
in Thailand).

TO UNHCR AND THE UN SYSTEM

1. UNHCR should continue to urge the Thai authorities, at the highest levels
and as emphatically as possible, to permit UNHCR to carry out its protection
mandate on behalf of ethnic minority Burmese refugees in Thailand. The UN
Secretary General and other UN agencies should do likewise.

The United Nations has a fundamental role to play in the protection of
refugees and victims of human rights abuse. However, if the UN is kept at
bay, it is impotent. It is incumbent on all UN bodies, not only UNHCR, to
urge Thailand to welcome UNHCR as a constructive, beneficial partner.

- End -

U.S. Committee for Refugees
1717 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Suite 701
Washington, D.C. 20036-2003
Tel: (202) 347-3507
Fax: (202) 347-3418
E-mail: uscr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx

For further information: 
Hiram A. Ruiz 
(202) 347-3507 


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