1/2) PROF.SILVERSTEIN'S PAPER ON FE

[uneoo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]

Subject: 1/2) PROF.SILVERSTEIN'S PAPER ON FEDERALISM(1995)

/* posted 30 Jun 6:00am 1997 by drunoo@xxxxxxxxxxxx in igc:reg.burma */
/* -------------" Prof.Silverstein's paper (1/2) "--------------- */

Following is paper by Professor Silverstein published by Australian
National University, Dept. of Political and Social Change. For those
who interested to have Dr Silverstein's papers (include this article)
can order a copy at the cost of Aust$7.0 (plus postage for Overseas
subscribers), e-mail your order to "bevley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" -- U Ne Oo.
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FEDERALISM AS A SOLUTION TO THE ETHNIC PROBLEM IN BURMA
*******************************************************
[This paper was prepared for an International Conference of Experts, on
'Federalism Against Ethnicity? Institutional, Legal, and Democratic
Instruments to Prevent or Resolve Violent Minority Conflicts', sponsored by
the Swiss Peace Foundation in Basel, Switzerland, in September 1995. The
editors are grateful to the Swiss Peace Foundation for allowing the
publication of the paper in this series.]

>From 4 January 1948, the day the Union of Burma came into existence as an
independent nation, the Burmese people and their leaders have been divided
over how to achieve national unity and structure their state. Until 1988,
Burma was federal in name and theory, but unitary in practice. After nearly
five decades of political discussion, peaceful movements for secession or
autonomy, and warfare, the majority Burmans and most of the ethnic
minorities remain disunited. From time to time efforts have been made by
the government of Burma and the minorities, either alone or in groups, to
end revolt and disunity, but none has succeeded.

Today, the basic problem is the same as that which the nation's founding
father faced nearly fifty years ago: how to construct a political system
wherein diverse peoples feel free and equal, able to govern themselves in
their own areas, and to protect and preserve their languages, cultures and
traditions, while at the same time give their political loyalty to the
nation-state.

But today's political conditions are different from those when the state
was created. In 1947, the Burman leaders made a sincere effort to win the
participation of the minorities in a common political union. Both at the
Panglong Conference and, later, at the constitutional convention, the
participants came as equals, seeking each other's help and agreement; the
participants thought they found the answer in the idea of a federal union.
But the state they erected was soon challenged by misunderstandings and
mistrust as faulty draftmanship, fundamental disagreements about how power
was divided, the degree of local authority, and the threat of Burmanization
led to disunity, discontent and rebellion. In 1962, the military overthrew
the government arguing that such a move was necessary because the
minorities were bent on breaking up the union and creating independent
states. The coup leaders set aside the constitution and, under their
decrees, created a centralized state with all power located in Rangoon.
Twelve years later, in 1974, they institutionalized the unitary state in a
new constitution while retaining a nominal federal form; under the
principle of democratic centralism, they concentrated authority at the
apex, made all subunits of government subordinate, and placed the whole
system under a single political party created and controlled by the
military.

The new constitution did not bring peace and national unity; instead, it
brought wider revolution and new demands by some minorities for the right
to leave the union.

In September 1988 Burma's military leaders seized power from the government
they had created fourteen years earlier, abrogated the constitution they
had written, and set the nation on a new course. Following their
dissatisfaction with the outcome of a free and fair election in 1990, which
would have handed power to the representatives of the people, the
soldier-rulers wrote wrote a charter (Declaration 1/90) empowering
themselves to govern by martial law and began erecting a new state
structure. Through force and negotiations, they created the illusion of
peace by crushing all opposition in the Burman heartland and by signing
ceasefire agreements with fifteen ethnic groups, leaving, at the time of
writing (August 1995), only two in open revolt.

Today, the military rulers, the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC) are in the process of imposing their ideas about how to solve
Burma's long-festering national unity problem. While the soldier-rulers
have given the appearance of consulting some of the minorities and have
brought then into the formal process, the majority of ethnic groups --
those who have  been at war with the state and have entered into ceasefire
agreements -- have not been included. They have been working, since the
beginning of the decade, to develop their ideas about a state structure
based on the principles of equality, federalism, democracy and human
rights. They look to the future when a constitution-making process, like
that of 1947, will emerge and they will be able to engage in full and open
discussion with the leaders of the military and the Burman people;
together, they hope a new constitution will be written which all will
support, making it possible for the peoples of Burma to live peacefully
together and solve problems by parliamentary means.

Since 1990 SLORC has slowly revealed its ideas about the constitution and
the political structure of Burma it wants to put in place. From its several
statements about why it seized power and what it wants to see established
before it transfers power, there is a number of implied as well as
expressed assumptions.

1. THERE MUST BE AN END TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL DISUNITY AND THE THREAT TO
THE INTEGRITY OF THE STATE. SLORC never tires of reminding the people that
its primary purpose in taking and holding power in 1988 stemmed from the
'Three Causes': prevention of the disintegration of the Union; prevention
of the disintegration of national unity; and perpetuation of sovereignty.
Its leaders speak frequently of the threats to Burma posed by the
rebellions of the Burma Communist Party (BCP), the ethnic minorities, the
invasion of foreign forces, the breakdown in law and order in 1988, and the
interference in internal affairs by foreign governments. With the demise of
the BCP, the end of the threat of foreign invasion, the reestablishment of
law and order in the heartland and the ceasefires with most of the
minorities, the military now is putting all its energies into writing a
constitution which will eliminate forever the three causes and establish
permanent peace and unity in the nation.

2. THERE MUST BE RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF THE SEVERAL
MINORITIES AND THEY MUST APPROVE OF THE CONSTITUTION BEFORE IT CAN BE
IMPLEMENTED. Under the two previous constitutions the rights and interests
of several minorities, especially the smaller ones, were not clearly stated
and this led to misunderstanding, discontent and revolt. The military wants
allminority groups recognized, and wants their participation in the
drafting of the constitution and approval of the final draft. In the past,
the larger ethnic minorities spoke for the smaller ones living amongst
them; for many this was unsatisfactory. To avoid a repetition of the past,
the military is determined to win minority support by granting ethnic
minorities nominal control of local administration in their areas and
allowing them to preserve their cultures and traditions.

3. THE FUTURE CONSTITUTION MUST BE BASED ON A MULTIPARTY POLITICAL SYSTEM.
After fulfilling a promise to hold multiparty elections, the military talks
about the creation of a 'multiparty democratic system' as a goal for the
new constitution. It makes no mention of a federal union. It is clear
that SLORC, rather than establish democracy on the Western model used in
the past, intends to create a directed state in which elected
representatives will be able to ratify the policies, legislation and
actions of the leaders. It looks to the military-led polity of Indonesia as
one model.

4. THE MILITARY MUST BE GIVEN A PERMANENT ROLE IN GOVERNING THE FUTURE
STATE OF BURMA. In the past, when national and territorial unity and
sovereignty were threatened, the military, as a last resort, was called
upon to save the situation. SLORC argues that it paid a heavy price in
personnel loses as it fought to save the nation in the face of opposition
forces which had been allowed to grow strong and entrenched. This cycle can
be broken, it believes, only if the military has a leading role in the
government during normal times and can shape national policies which will
settle disputes before any threat matures.

Acting under the authority it has given itself in Declaration 1/90, the
military created a National Convention to draw up the principles for the
new constitution. It began its work in January 1993 following the selection
and invitation of 702 delegates, representing political parties, the ethnic
minorities, social classes and distinguished individuals, to carry out the
task under its guidance. With the exception of delegates who were elected
in 1990 to the national parliament, the delegates neither have a popular
mandate nor head groups for whom they are authorize to speak. Amongst the
minorities invited, there are none from those who entered into ceasefires
after the Convention began. The members of the National Convention are
restricted in discussing with people outside what happens at meetings; they
also are restricted in discussing with other delegates the issue under
consideration in meetings, except in accordance with the narrow rules
imposed by the convenors. Some of the delegates, dissatisfied with the
process, left and have either sought refuge among the minorities still
outside SLORC's control or gone abroad; others have been arrested and
imprisoned. After more than tow years, the National Convention still has
not complete its mission.

On two important issues, the National Convention has finished its work: the
state structure, and the role of the military in the political leadership
of the nation. The National Convention has agreed that there will be a
nominal federal union consisting of a national government and fourteen
states and regions. Within the states and regions there will be
self-administered areas for the ethnic groups. The larger of these areas
will be designated as self-administered divisions and the smaller as
self-administered zones. Although it remains for the constitutional
convention to define the powers and limits of these divisions and zones, it
is agreed that the various ethnic groups should be able to practise and
preserve their traditions and cultures, while the state will have
responsibility for helping develop local languages and literature, find
arts and cultures of the national races; the state also will help promote
social and economic development. One representative from each of the
self-administered divisions and zones will be sent to the National
Parliament.

Thus far, the National Convention has adopted no principles to guide the
authors of the future constitution on how the states, regions, and
self-administered divisions and areas will finance their governments and
programs. Since land and economic resources have been designated as
belonging to the state, the power to tax residents and businesses, if
granted, will provide limited income, especially in the smaller and poorer
subdivisions. Thus, as under the previous two constitutions, the subunits
of government will be dependent upon the national government for  most
funding and this willopen the door to interference in local affairs.

The principles adopted regarding a leading role for the military reflect a
great concern for the security of the state from enemies both within and
without. The future president of the nation must have extensive military
experience and have resided in Burma continuously for twenty years; the two
houses of the legislature must reserve 25 per cent of seats for the
military representatives chosen by the Minister of Defence. The budget and
administration of the military will be under the control of the Minister of
Defence and beyond the scrutiny of the civilian-dominated legislature. In
times of national emergency, the head of armed forces can take all state
power and exercise it for as long as necessary.

In this buleprint for a garrison state the National Convention is planning
to erect, the military will have a permanent role in the subunits of the
state through participation in administration at all levels and
responsibility for defence, security and border administration; in times of
national emergency it will have  the same powers in the subunits as it has
at the national level.

If it is the military's objective to create a multiparty democratic
system,. it is hard to see what powers and responsibilities remain for the
people to exercise.

If the adopted principles for the new constitution are compared with the
structure of the government and the powers of the Burma Socialist Program
Party under the 1974 constitution, it is clear that SLORC intends to
recreate the earlier model; only this time, it has replaced the party with
the military and has given the military all powers necessary to overcome
popular opposition wherever and whenever it occurs.

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