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Excerpts from "Shin Yuan Nin Gen" ( (r)



Typical example of " Kala Ma Naing Ya Kaing Meh ".

The author "  Kanbawza Win  " probably ran out of idea to unleash his
hatred towards his enemy that he had to resort to " displacement ".
Any new idea , pal ?






JS 


 
> 
> FROM: BURMA Research Journal Vol 2, No 1
> 
> Excerpts from "Shin Yuan Nin Gen" (Going Back to the Roots) by Kanbawza Win
> 
> The crop of military leaders starting from U Ne Win, whose name is Shu Meng,
> are half cast Chinese, names like General San Yu, Colonel Tan Yu Siang,
> General Than Shwe are Burmanized names of Chinese ancestry.  Thus in
> contrast to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's heritage, no Burmese soldier ever knew
> who is the father of U Ne Win not to mention his grandfather a Pauk Phaw.
> All have their roots in China and in their hearts of heart they might feel
> originally that they are Chinese and that being close to China is the most
> convenient way to preserve their power.  So it is obvious why the present
> Chinese leaders are helping the present Burmese military junta.  It has also
> been rumoured that the ruling Burmese General has been quietly told by the
> Chinese leaders to change the country to Myanmar which is more akin to the
> Chinese word Myantien than the official name of Burma.  Hence the Junta has
> to find some justification to change the country to Myanmar.  A peaceful
> Chinese colonization of Burma resented by most of the people of Burma.  The
> Chinese leaders are conscious that Hongkong and Taiwan will have to be the
> priority before Myantien (a) Myanmar, so as a preliminary step they have
> secretly requested the Junta to change the name of the country from Burma to
> Myanmar to see whether the Buremse generals would comply.  Hence this is but
> one of the underlying rationales for changing the country's name, which
> every patriotic Burmese including the ethnic groups vehemently opposed.
> 
> Sinonization of Burma
> 
> Many articles have been written by scholars about the sinonization of Burma
> under the present military regime.  Dr. Mya Maung wrote
> 
> "In the streets and market place of downtown Mandalay, the proud tradition
> of using polite Burmese towards greeting by Mandalayians has evaporated, now
> replaced by an alien tongue and rude Burmese dialects.  The change was
> fostered deliberately by the present military regime of Burma, the SLORC."
> (Asian Survey Vol XXXIV, No. 5, May ?95)
> 
> The shift to an open door economy attracts a direct investment from a
> private corporate world.  In particular, Chinese trade investment, economy
> and special military aid were sought.  By 1990 SLORC has struck an arms deal
> worth over $1.4 billion with China, now Burma's most power and biggest ally.
> Since then, Chinese goods of all kinds have been steadily flooding Mandalay
> and other urban centres of Burma.  A gigantic China-Burma border trade,
> including illicit drugs, conservatively estimated at $1 billion annually had
> been thriving ever since the formal legalization of border trade in 1989.
> 
> (a) Construction Sector in Sinonization
> 
> From that time, the majority of roads and bridges built or renovated in
> Burma facilitate Burma- China border trade.  With the help of Chinese, the
> junta has been building new roads and renovating a number of old trading
> routes in the northern states of Kachin, Chin, and Shan. Among the old roads
> renovated and reopened for use are the Burma Road and the Ledo Road that
> came to fame in the latter stages of World War II.  The three districts of
> Yunnan Province adjacent to the Burmese border are Yingchiang, Lungchuan and
> Tengchung.  In Jan. 1993, a 35 mile road from Yingchiang to the Burmese
> towns of Taihone, Moe Mauk and Bahmo was constructed and is now open for
> use.  In April 1993, the Lungchuan district authority completed the
> construction and opened a 56 mile road from Lianghe to Bahmo.  On May 15,
> 1993, SLORC held an inauguration ceremony for opening the Myitkyina-Sadon
> Sailaw Mngmin Road.  Its construction as a link to the Burma road had begun
> in 1992 under an agreement between Burma and China. The 21 mile road
> connects the capital of Kachin State, Myitkyina with the Tengchong district
> of Yunnan Province.  On May 30, the Chinese news agency, Xinhua, announced
> the opening of another Sino Burmese trans-border highway connecting Zangeng,
> a port entry of Yunnan Province and Bhamo, a thoroughfare in northern Burma.
> 
> The main route from Burma-China border trade as been the old Burma road
> connecting Mandalay via the Shan cities of Lashio and Muse, with the
> Chienwse border outposts, Wantin and Ruili.  Burma border outposts are
> Namkham, Muse and the small Shan town of Kyukok located across the Wantin
> rivulet.  In May 1991, the Burmese Foreign Minister U Ohn Gyaw signed an
> agreement with his Chinese counterpart, M Qi Muai Yuan, to build two bridges
> across the border over the Shweli river linking Muse, Wantin and Ruili.  The
> first bridge was completed and opened for use in October 1992.  In January
> 1993, a series of Chinese arms shipments across this bridge, dubbed locally
> as the "Gun Bridge"was reported.  The deliveries included light infantry
> weapons, rocket launchers, mortars, recoilless rifles and armored personal
> carriers.  Between 1990 and 1992, and reportedly using the renovated old
> roads and new ones, the Chinese shipped to Burma 16 war planes (F6), 169
> armored vehicles, 25 anti aircraft guns, 6 Heinan type cruisers, several
> hundred trucks and thousands of tons of light weapons and munitions.....
> 
>  (b) The Role of Drugs in Sinonization
> 
>  (c) The Role of Relocation in Sinonization
> 
> According to the official census of 1993, Mandalay's population is over
> 653,000 with only 2,670 aliens.  The unofficial estimates of the total
> population of Mandalay, however, are one million because of the large influx
> of unregistered illegal aliens.  (Kyaw Win Myint "The 1993 Model Mandalay"
> Dana Economic Magazine, in Burmese p. 53) The majority of the alien
> population comprises foreign born Chinese who reportedly become Burmese
> nationals overnight by acquiring National Registration Cart (NRCs) in the
> black market.  According to reports, many Chinese families from Yunnan
> Province have crossed over the border to settle in a number of villages
> inside northern Burma.  This virtual takeover of central Mandalay actually
> began with two devastating fires in 1981 and 1984 that destroyed sections of
> the downtown areas.  In 1984, when Burmese businessmen and residents could
> not finance the reconstruction of shops, buildings and homes according to
> the specifications mandated by te military government, they were forced to
> sell their real estate to rich ethnic Chinese investors and merchants.
> Since then, Mandalay's native Burmese residents have gradually moved away
> from the centre to the peripheral areas of the city.  Making way for the
> peaceful take over of the city by the Chinese.
> 
> After 1989 and especially during 1990, the SLORC forced a massive relocation
> of Burmese in Mandalay to new satellite towns in the name of City
> Beatification and Development Program.  Its ostensible purpose was to
> attract foreign tourists and investors.  However, Khmer Rouge style
> relocation of over one million of the urban population from the central
> cities to satellite towns across Burma points to the real purpose of
> subjugating and dispersing the concentration of political dissidents of
> central cities.  The program was launched intensively prior to the May 1990
> multi-party election that was won in a landslide by the National League for
> Democracy (NLD), the opposition party of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi who was put
> under house arrest in July 1989.  Forced relocation was part of the SLORC's
> nationwide campaign to facelift major cities.  Besides Mandalay, Pagan (the
> famed ancient city of architectural wonder and a main tourist attraction
> that houses thousands of Buddhist temples and pagodas built by Burmese
> kings) and Amarapura in Upper Burma were also targeted.
> 
>  (d) Liquidating of Buddhist Monks as Sinozation
> 
> The massive relocation of Mandalayians was accompanied by the subjugation of
> Buddhist monks who had led a political protest against the SLORC .  The
> tradition of political protest by leading Buddhist monks against unjust rule
> dates back to the days of Buremse kings and British colonial rule.  Since
> 1988, Mandalay monks have continued to protest against the SLORC's unjust
> rule and brutal suppression of the people, including the dishonoring of the
> May 1990 election results.  On August 8, 1990, over 7,000 monks participated
> in the Mandalayians commemoration of the second anniversary of the 0--8-88
> massacre of demonstrators by the Burmese army across Burma and it was
> crushed by the army resulting in several arrests and deaths.  On August 27,
> 1990 the senior abbots of Mandalay met and ordered religious sanctions under
> which monks should not perform religious services for military families.
> These powerful religious sanctions of the Mandalay monks spread like
> wildfire across Burma throughout September causing alarm and trauma to the
> ruling SLORC.  By October, the religious sanctions against the military
> families had spread as far as Rangoon.  Many monasteries were surrounded by
> soldiers and dissident monks were arrested.
> 
> The chairman of the SLORC, General Saw Maung, issued Oct 1990 Order 5/90 and
> 6/90 that sought to revoke the religious boycott against military families
> and dissolve as illegal all Buddhist organizations other than the nine legal
> sects.  Buddhist monks of the so-called illegal organizations were accused
> of meddling in politics and carrying out anti-government activities.  The
> Mandalay monks refused to comply with these orders, resulting in the arrest
> of several hundred monks.  The army surrounded and raided more than 100
> monasteries in Mandalay, and reportedly over 400 monks were arrested by the
> SLORC government.  Buildings near the monasteries were also razed and
> destroyed.  Arrested monks were stripped of their robes and officially
> designated as laymen, including the most famous monk, U Yaiwata, who has
> been incarcerated since that time.  Others were punished with a minimum of
> three years imprisonment.  On Oct. 22, 1990, Order 7/90 was issued by SLORC,
> empowering the military commanders under martial law to disrobe and imprison
> monks who continued to boycott the military families and protest against the
> government.  Following the issuance of that order, leaflets calling for an
> end to religious boycott were dropped over Mandalay monasteries from army
> helicopters, later soldiers invaded 133 monasteries, beating and arresting
> hundreds of monks.  The ultimate subjugation of the Buddhist clerical order
> was brought about by passing Law No. 20 on Oct. 30, 1990, which defined a
> proper code of conduct for a Buddhist monk and stipulated severe penalties
> for violations by monks and monk organizations.
> 
>  (e) The Economic Factor in Sinonization
> 
> In the 1990s, after the forced relocation and subjugation were completed, a
> different process of population relocation and restructuring of Mandalay
> took place.  Real estate prices in central Mandalay have escalated to levels
> never seen before.  The price of a small plot of land measuring less than 50
> square feet at key sites in central Mandalay has climbed to K 50 million -
> $500,000 at the black market exchange of U.S. $ 1 = K 100.  Aggressive and
> wealthy Chinese investors, ethnic Chinese Kokang and Wa drug war lords and
> military "robber barons"have made wholesale acquisition of real estate and
> homes.  By offering exorbitant prices to the Burmese landowners, they
> sharply accelerated the relocation process.
> 
> In effect the Chinese takeover of Mandalay and northern Burma replicates the
> economic consequences of the British colonization of Burma, which included
> an massive importation of Indian, and to a lesser degree, Chinese manpower
> and capital.  The striking difference between the two types of colonization
> is that the case of British Burma the takeover was imposed by an imperial
> power that deposed native rulers after waging and winning three hard fought
> Anglo- Burmese wars.  In the open door economy"of present day Burma, the
> Chinese colonization of Mandalay and the norther states of Burma occurred
> without wars and were welcomed by a Burmese government, the SLORC. The
> similarity between the two cases is that both the SLORC and Great Britain
> came to power through force without the democratic consent of the people of
> Burma.
> 
> In 1993, the new satellite towns built by SLORC on the outskirts of
> Mandalay, such as Pelihpyu Gone, Kantha Yar, Mya Ye Nanda, Mya Ye Kantha and
> Mya Marlar, have become the centres of Buremse culture where the relatively
> poor ethnic Burmese of Mandalay have been congregated.  In contrast, the
> central quarters of Mandalay have been transformed into a thriving business
> centre of alien culture with modern homes, hotels, shops and high rise
> buildings teeming with rich Chinese businessmen (Law Pan), ethnic Chinese
> drug warlords and other Asian merchants.  Only a handful of native owned
> business establishments such as printing houses, shoe shops and cheroot
> factories are left, dwarfed by the towering buildings and offices of foreign
> enterprises.
> 
> The economic plight of the majority of the native residents of Mandalay
> stems from the fact that most of them earn their livelihood as artisans in
> traditional cottage industries? making furniture, art works, antiques,
> cheroots, gold leaf, tapestries, carpentry, masonry, precious stones,
> polishing, embroidering, weaving, tailoring and so on.  Low wages in these
> professions relative to the skyrocketing prices of domestic and imported
> consumer goods have been pushing their standard of living below subsistence.
> Since 1989 the price of the main stable food, rice, in Mandalay has been
> steadily increasing.  In 1989, the price per pyi (1.49 lbs) of first quality
> rice Pawsan Hmwe was K 12 but has been rising steadily upward to K 50 in
> 1992 and K 75 in 1993, an increase of 525 percent in four years.  On the
> other hand, until March 1993, the monthly pay scale of government workers
> was kept frozen by the  military at a range from K 450 to K 2,000 and which
> was only raised by an average of 30 percent, covering only a fraction of the
> increase in the cost of rice.  On average, a single Burmese consumes 16 pyis
> of rice per month at a cost of K 1,200 (K 75 times 16 pyis).  Since the
> majority of government workers make less than K 1,200 monthly wage ($10 at
> the 1993 black market exchange rate of K 120 = US$1) most of them cannot
> afford to buy the main staple food let alone other basic necessities.  Even
> those who make the top salary are in the same predicament if they are
> married and have children.
> 
>  (f) Moral Degradation as Sinonization
> 
> Attracted by the opportunity of making a good income, young women from
> across Burma have flocked to Mandalay and other cities to take jobs.
> Opportunities to make an honest living as caterers and waitresses have
> shrunk with the increased number of migrant waitresses, and the greater
> income and rewards offered by the rich clients to masseuses and prostitutes
> subject these migrants to considerable temptations.  The streets in the
> business centres of Burmese cities are filled with the sound of Chinese
> music pouring out of thriving Chinese shops.
> 
> Another sign of cultural and moral decay in Mandalay, Rangoon and other
> major cities is reflected in the rising tide of liquor consumption
> (especially Chinese beer) among the Buremse Buddhists, as sign according to
> one of the Five Precepts of Burmese Buddhism.  In the past, drinking and the
> sale of liquor were done privately.  Today they are done openly everywhere
> in Mandalay.  Although Chinese beers are illegal import products, they have
> been flowing freely into Burma and Chinese beer consumption has risen
> greatly relative to that of the domestic "Mandalay beer" which is
> manufactured and sold by the state enterprise at K 9 per bottle to a
> privileged few at state shops and K 100 per bottle in black-market.  Even
> though the retail price per bottle of Chinese beer is about the same as that
> of the black-market price of the Mandalay beer, its consumption has
> increased greatly.  A long time resident in northern Shan State said:
> 
> "The number of beer bottles entering Burma from China is so large, one
> wonders whether or not forty million Burmese are becoming beer drunkards."
> (Zin Thant, "Myanmah Pyi's or Burma's Northern Gateway' Dana Economic
> Magazine (in Burmese) June 91p 53)
> 
> The erosion of traditional Burmese Buddhist cultural life in Burma under the
> massi> ve Chinese onslaught has been causing resentment and apprehension not
> only among the lay people but also among the Buddhist clergy, the Sangha of
> Mandalay.  The distinguished Buddhist monk Ashin Myittah Nanda deplored the
> potential demise of Buddhist culture in Mandalay under the cultural
> onslaught of a non-Buddhist Chinese and alien population.  He attributes the
> drastic decline in the number of Buddhist monks in central Mandalay to the
> difficulties monks face in receiving rice, alms and robes from non-Buddhist
> residents as well as from impoverished worshipers in distant satellite
> towns.  Foreign observers might be tempted to dismiss a Buddhist monk's
> partisan concern about cultural decline in Mandalay, but many Burmese
> dissidents of the SLORC are disturbed by what is happening to the sacred
> City of Gems and Burma as a whole.  The road to Mandalay is no longer a
> quaint and romantic place of the glorious past as it has become a cruel
> playground built by the Buremse military regime for the economic dragons of
> China.
> 
> Since 1989, Burma has adopted and pursued an open market economy"that is
> particularly open to China.  The private corporate world and individual
> governments of both the West an Asian countries including some UN agencies
> have shown willingness to tolerate the continued human rights violations of
> the Buremse military regime by not sanctioning and imposing a total trade
> and arms embargo against Burma.  However, the single most important
> parameter of the Burmese military regime's strange hold on power has been
> the massive trade and economic and military support received from its giant
> neighbor China.  The socio economic consequences of the sinonization of
> Upper Burma has been resurrection of the colonial plural society in which
> alien social groups dominate the society and economy at the expense of
> economic hardship and cultural decay for the Burmese....
>  
> 
> (g) SLORC's Psyche in Sinonization
> 
> Geopolitics
> 
> Sino-Burma Relations
> 
> Indo-Burma Relations
> 
> Regional Reactions
> 
> SLORC's Strategy
> 
> The Price of Sinonization
> 
> SLORC's Gamble
> 
> Back to the Roots
> 
> The SLORC turned to China in 1988 as an expedient measure to ensure its
> immediate survival and to help restore Burma's diplomatic and economic
> standing in world affairs.  In these aims, the military regime seems to have
> been at least partly successful.  The armed forces now seem firmly
> entrenched in power, Burma's economy is slowly improving and the SLORC is
> being wooed by India and the members of the ASEAN.  In these circumstances
> there may be indication that Burma will eventually attempt to draw back from
> China and try to find a more balanced international position.  Whether the
> SLORC is successful in using China in this way, or will find itself being
> used instead by China, is something that India and other countries of the
> region will be watching very closely.
> 
> It has to be admitted that the Chinese Communist has successfully sold a
> nationalist claim to the boundaries of the old empire to the international
> community.  The idea that
> 
> "China has been a united state composed of multiple nationalities is both a
> popular, dogmatic statement of the political propaganda and a universal
> Chinese academic conclusion." (Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic
> Frontiers"by Shih-Chung Hsieh)
> 
> The Burmese generals were so angry with the US and the West for their
> criticism that their mind has been colonized to such a degree that they are
> blind to any other form of colonialism especially that of the Chinese.
> Logic has pointed out that it is far better to be in the arms of the Chinese
> than those of the West because China will guarantee them to be in power for
> the foreseeable future.
> 
> However it is a fact that the Burmese generals starting from Ne Win to the
> present ones are half SinoBurmese.  Blood is thicker than water goes the
> saying and what is more true than in the case of Myantien or Myanmar.  So it
> is natural that Myanmar will go back to its roots and even now the tribes of
> China particularly the Di and the Jingphaw act and dress exactly as the
> Myanmar.  Maybe in a few decades these peaceful colonizations of Burma by
> the Chinese through the Burmese generals would eventually succeed and the
> age old dream of U Ne Win or rather Shu Meng would be realized.  So instead
> of Maha Myanmar, they'll soon be calling themselves Mah Ta Yoke.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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