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No Safety in Burma, No Sanctuary in



HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA
Vol 9, No 6
July 1997

Burma/Thailand
No Safety in Burma, No Sanctuary in Thailand

I. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) prepares to admit
Burma as a full member at the annual ministerial meeting in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia on July 24-25, 1997, thousands of Burmese continue to flee into
neighboring countries to escape gross human rights abuses committed by the
Burmese military. Thailand has borne the main burden of refugees in the past
year, but Bangladesh has also received an estimated 10,000 Muslim Rohingyas
since March 1997.  As the major refugee producing country in the region,
Burma has been denounced in successive United Nations resolutions and by
many governments, yet ASEAN has largely remained silent. If membership of
ASEAN is to have any positive effect in restraining the worst abuses of the
Burmese military and bringing about an improvement in the overall human
rights situation there, as many ASEAN governments have claimed it will, then
the treatment of ethnic minorities is one of the most pressing problems. In
addition, since February 1997, the Royal Thai government is responsible for
the treatment of more than 20,000 new refugees; it has violated
international legal norms by forcibly repatriating and refusing access to
persons fleeing armed conflict.1  Even more ominous are indications that
Thailand will grant only temporary refuge to all the 115,000 refugees from
Burma in camps along the border, and may attempt to repatriate them once
there is an end to sustained military activity on the Burma side. This is
based on the false assumption that the right to asylum is limited to those
fleeing armed conflict. In fact, Human Rights Watch/Asia has found that most
are fleeing abuses which justify a well founded fear of persecution, even in
areas where rebel groups have signed cease-fire agreements with Burma's
central government, or where there is otherwise no fighting.

This report documents the continued systematic violation of internationally
recognized human rights by the Burmese military against ethnic minority
villagers in Burma's Karen, Mon and Shan States during 1996 and 1997. It
also catalogues the treatment by the Thai authorities of those who fled
these abuses and sought refuge in Thailand.2

In February 1997, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)
launched an offensive against the remaining rebel-held territory along the
Thai border causing an estimated 20,000 refugees to flee into Thailand. The
majority came from areas which had been controlled by the Karen National
Union (KNU) for decades, and all of them would therefore be considered by
the SLORC to be enemies of the state. As such they would be at risk of being
subjected to beatings, torture and death by the Burmese armed forces. Even
before the February offensive began, human rights abuses in the form of
summary executions, forced labor, forced portering and forced relocations in
Burma's ethnic minority areas had been increasing markedly since March 1996.
None of these abuses had declined in areas where ethnic armies had signed
cease-fire agreements with the SLORC; to the contrary, in many cases an
increased Burmese military presence had only increased the burden of forced
labor.

As the refugees sought sanctuary in Thailand, some 8,500 found that long-
standing Thai policy allowing asylum seekers from Burma temporary refuge had
been reversed: soldiers of the Ninth Division of the Thai First Army (Ninth
Division) forced them back across the border, or otherwise refused to allow
them safe refuge in Thailand. Those who were allowed to cross the border
were sent to sites where no preparations for the refugees had been put in
place and where they were forced to sleep on the earth with only plastic
sheeting as cover. In other areas, Karen and Karenni refugees who have been
granted temporary refuge in Thailand for some years remained vulnerable to
attacks by Burmese paramilitary forces.

The growing hostility of the Thai authorities towards refugees from Burma
has grown in direct proportion to the increased economic cooperation between
the Burmese and Thai governments. It is feared that as economic interests
continue to grow, all of the 115,000 refugees living in camps in Thailand
will be increasingly vulnerable to pushbacks and that new asylum seekers
will be denied access into Thailand. The new Karen arrivals were in imminent
danger of repatriation as this report went to press, but all other refugees
from Burma also remained vulnerable. In May, refugees further north along
the Thai/Burmese border were threatened with new draconian restrictions and
a group of refugees from the Shan State, who have never been granted
permission to establish refugee camps, were pushed back. This report also
documents the abuses to which villagers in the Shan State were subject to
from March 1996 onwards, in particular, forced relocations affecting an
estimated 100,000 people, and the refusal of the Thai authorities to allow
them refuge in camps where they could receive urgently needed humanitarian
assistance.

Recommendations

Since the Royal Thai government clearly lacks the political will to offer
more than temporary refuge to asylum seekers from Burma, only sustained
international pressure will ensure their protection in Thailand and curb
further outflows. This pressure needs to come not only from western
governments and Japan, but also from ASEAN governments, which have an
interest in promoting stability in the region and a peaceful transition in
Burma. In July, ASEAN was reconsidering Cambodia's admission in light of the
coup against its elected government, but has so far indicated it will hold
to plans to admit Burma. In addition, the international community must
continue to press Burma to implement the recommendations of the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights resolution adopted unanimously on April
16, 1997, and to cease the abusive practices which lead to refugee outflows,
while creating the necessary conditions for the voluntary return of refugees
in safety and dignity.

In particular, Human Rights Watch/Asia recommends the following measures be
taken:

To the State Law and Order Restoration Council

Burma should take immediate steps to comply with the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights resolution of April 16, 1997 (E/CN.4/1997/L.97)
and the United Nations General Assembly resolution of December 12, 1996
(A/RES/51/117). In particular the paragraphs urging the SLORC "and all other
parties to the hostilities in Myanmar to respect fully its obligations under
international humanitarian law, including Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions" and "to create the necessary conditions to remove the causes of
displacement and of refugee flows to neighboring countries and to create
conditions conducive to their voluntary return and their full reintegration
in safety and dignity, in close cooperation with the Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees."

Burma should cooperate fully with Judge Rajsoomer Lallah, the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on Burma, and allow him to visit Burma with unrestricted
access to al! ethnic minority areas. Though he has tried to get access since
1996, the SLORC has refused to grant him permission to visit Burma.

Burma must comply with its obligations under general international law not
to subject those under its jurisdiction to extrajudicial executions, torture
or other forms of serious ill-treatment and to investigate, prosecute and
punish those responsible for such violations.

Burma must stop the practice of forced labor immediately in accordance with
the International Labor Organization's Convention No.29, which Burma
ratified in 1955 and allow this to be independently verified. Those found to
be responsible for the practice should be prosecuted and punished.

To the Royal Thai Government

Thailand should accede to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.

Thailand must abide by its obligations under international law and provide
safe asylum to all those fleeing from persecution inside Burma in a
consistent manner and in particular to ensure that the border is not closed
to those currently fleeing persecution. The refugees must not be repatriated
against their will and any repatriation must comply with the obligation of
non-refoulement and the Conclusions of Executive Committee of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Programmer the UNHCR should
be permitted to carry out its role in relation to any such voluntary
repatriation as elaborated in its voluntary repatriation handbook.3

Thailand should establish procedures under which nationals from Burma can
seek asylum in order to prevent refoulement occurring of people arrested,
convicted and deported for illegal entry into Thailand.
Thailand must stop equating an absence of fighting as the sole condition for
Burma to be considered safe for the return of the refugees. Those fleeing
Burma should be treated as refugees where there is a well-founded fear of
persecution, regardless of whether or not this is experienced in the context
of fighting. An end to fighting in Burma does not in itself mean an end to
human rights abuses.

Thailand should allow the UNHCR to carry out its mandate in relation to the
refugees from Burma on the Thai/Burma border.

Thailand should continue to allow access to the refugee camps on the
Thai/Burmese border to those nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) who
provide assistance and relief to the refugees.

Those camps which are vulnerable to cross-border attacks and raids by the
Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA) and the SLORC should be moved to safer
sites located further inside Thailand, away from the border; Thailand should
take immediate steps to provide an adequate level of security in the camps.

The refugees housed in camps on the Thai/Burmese border must be allowed to
live in humane conditions.

Refugees from Burma's Shan State should be allowed to establish refugee
camps at which they are able to receive humanitarian assistance.

Thailand must abide by its treaty obligations as they concern refugees under
the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 1966 International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

To the Association of South East Asian Nations

ASEAN should establish a working group to promote a peaceful end to violence
and continued repression in Burma and the implementation of measures to
create conditions under which refugees could voluntarily return to Burma in
safety and dignity.

All ASEAN member states should be encouraged to abide by international
standards for the treatment of refugees. Concern should be expressed to both
the Thai and Burmese governments where these standards are violated.

As a means of demonstrating Burma's willingness to cooperate with the
international community as a responsible member of ASEAN, member states
should press Burma to permit the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Burma to carry
out his mandate and visit the country, especially ethnic minority areas, in
time for him to be able to report to the U.N. General Assembly in November 1997.
ASEAN governments should also urge Burma to implement other key
recommendations in the U.N. resolutions, including the release of all
political prisoners, detained solely for the exercise of their
internationally recognized rights, ensuring full respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, opinion, expression,
association and assembly, and protecting the safety of all political leaders
including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

ASEAN governments should agree, in advance of the next ASEAN meeting in
December in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, to informally review the situation in
Burma and consider additional initiatives that might be undertaken jointly
or on a bilateral basis.

ASEAN's dialogue partners?including Japan, the European Union, Australia,
the United States and Canada?should raise these concerns during the ASEAN
Post Ministerial Conference in Malaysia, July 28-29, 1997. They should also
urge China, which will be represented at the conference and gives
substantial economic and military assistance to Burma, to use its influence
with the SLORC.

To the International Community

Until such time as UNHCR can assume a genuine protective role, countries
with embassies in Bangkok should continue to closely monitor the situation
for refugees in Thailand, visiting the refugee sites and places where
repatriations take place as often as possible, and intervening with the Thai
government to ensure that international norms concerning refugee protection
are respected. They should also continue to provide humanitarian assistance
to the refugees through the NGOs in Thailand and should relieve Thailand of
some of the burden by offering third country resettlement where possible.

Coordinated pressure must be applied to ensure that human rights are
respected in Burma. Governments should explore ways of exerting economic
pressure on the SLORC, including further measures by the European Union
(E.U.), following the March 1997 withdrawal of trade benefits to Burma under
the Generalized System of Preferences, to press for an end to all forced
labor. E.U. governments should prohibit all new private investment in Burma
until forced labor is ended and this has been independently verified.
Australia, Canada and other trading partners should move urgently to take
similar steps. Japan should continue the suspension of most of its Official
Development Assistance (ODA) to Burma, discourage further private investment
by Japanese companies and increase humanitarian assistance to refugees in
Thailand through NGOs.

In order to ensure that they do not directly or indirectly benefit from or
contribute to the use of forced labor, foreign companies should not invest
in Burma until and unless there is verifiable evidence that all forms of
forced labor have ceased in all parts of the country.

International financial institutions, including the World Bank,
International Monetary Fund, and Asian Development Bank, should maintain the
current ban on assistance to Burma. At the World Bank's annual meeting in
Hong Kong in September -1997, donor governments should issue a joint
statement urging respect for the rule of law, accountability, transparency
and other measures to ensure "good governance" in Burma, strongly
reaffirming the donors' position that under current economic conditions in
Burma due to the repressive political situation, World Bank assistance
should not be extended.

To the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

The UNHCR should continue to strive by way of negotiations with the Royal
Thai government to establish a formal presence at the Thai/Burmese border in
order to carry out its mandate in relation to the refugees situated there.
In the meantime, it should continue its practice of visiting all the refugee
camps on a regular basis.

The UNHCR should be mindful of Thailand's obligation not to return refugees
under customary international law and publicly condemn all instances of
refoulement, including denial of access to those seeking refuge at the
Thai/Burmese border.

The UNHCR must press the Royal Thai government to ensure that any return of
the refugees to Burner . voluntary. UNHCR should not involve itself, even as
an observer, in repatriations which fall short of the standards contained in
UNHCR's voluntary repatriation handbook. UNHCR should clearly state that
letters consenting to return to Burma from individuals purporting to
represent refugee groups do not establish voluntariness on the part of the
group of refugees.

 - - - - - 
1 Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, but it is bound by customary international law to
allow all persons fleeing persecution to seek asylum.
2 This report is based on a research mission to the Thai/Burma border in
June 1997, and interviews conducted with refugees at that time. It also
includes some information from interviews of refugees from the Shan State
conducted in November 1996. In some cases the real names of villages and
towns in Burma have been used, but in others the refugees requested that
they be omitted. All refugees interviewed requested anonymity, and their
names have not been used. Many nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers
based in Thailand also requested anonymity, for fear of jeopardizing their
ability to work with the refugees.
3 Refoulement means to expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to
the frontiers of territories where his or her life or freedom would be
threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a
particular social group or political opinion. Political opinion in this
context means the existence of a defacto political attribution by the state
of origin, even where the individual does not possess such a political
opinion or explicitly disavows the views ascribed to him or her by the
state. See James Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status (Toronto and Vancouver:
Butterworths 1996), pp.l55.
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