Burma/Thailand No Safety in Burma,

[brelief@xxxxxxx]

Burma/Thailand No Safety in Burma, No Sanctuary in Thailand 
Part II

Human Rights Watch/Asia
July 1997
Vol 9, No. 6

II. BACKGROUND

The first major influx of refugees from Burma arrived in Thailand in 1984.
This group of some 9,000 people were ethnic Karens fleeing fighting between
the Burmese central government and members of the KNU. Up until 1984, people
displaced by fighting had been contained within Burma, but as the KNU lost
territory, refugee camps were established on Thailand's western border with
Burma. At that time, a vast international effort was providing support for
500,000 Cambodian refugees on Thailand's eastern border. The Thai government
did not want a similar situation to develop on its western border. Although
the UNHCR did not become involved, Thailand allowed these refugees to remain
on Thai soil and to receive support from various NGOs working through the
Committee for the Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand.
Up until 1988, the refugees were often migratory, returning to Burma as the
fighting diminished at the end of each rainy season.4

Since 1988, when nationwide pro-democracy demonstrations took place in Burma
and the SLORC took power, the nature of human rights abuses in Burma has
changed and increased in intensity. The new military government doubled the
size of its armed forces to an estimated 350,000 by 1997 and was able to
establish a permanent presence in territory formerly held by the ethnic
armed groups.

In February 1997, the SLORC launched a new offensive against the KNU, so
that by the end of May 1997 the refugees in camps along the Thai/Burmese
border numbered 114,801.5 The majority are from Burma's ethnic minorities
(primarily Karen, Mon and Karenni), which make up over one third of Burma's
forty-five million people. Despite this significant number of refugees, the
UNHCR is still not permitted by the Royal Thai government to carry out its
mandate at the Thai/Burmese border. It therefore has no permanent presence
in any of the refugee camps nor any role in their administration.
Representatives of the UNHCR in Bangkok are able to visit the camps at the
border only with prior permission for each visit. No other organization is
mandated, nor indeed able, to carry out a monitoring or protection role in
relation to the refugees. Since the February influx, representatives from
embassies based in Bangkok have also visited the camps. The U.S. Embassy has
been particularly active in this regard. However, these visits are no
substitute for the UNHCR's presence or for the fulfillment of its mandated
function. 6

In addition to those in refugee camps, there are also an estimated one
million illegal migrant workers from Burma in Thailand, working on
construction sites, on farms, in the fishing industry and in the sex
industry. Many of them are refugees. Of these, at least 60,000 are villagers
from Burma's Shan State who fled a wave of human rights abuses in 1996 and
1997 (see below).

III. REFUGEES FROM BURMA'S KAREN AND MON STATES AND TENASSERIM DIVISION

Human Rights Violations by the Burmese Military

Since 1989, the SLORC has embarked on a policy of attempting to reach
cease-fire agreements with the numerous ethnic insurgent groups. In most
cases, although the details of the agreements have not been made public, the
rebels were permitted to retain territory and arms while at the same time
gaining from significant economic and development projects which the SLORC
undertook. However, despite such agreements, human rights abuses have
continued as the SLORC deployed more troops in areas formerly considered
"brown," that is, in the control of neither the government nor the rebels.
The military required barracks, and villagers were forced to build them.
They patrolled the areas bordering rebel territory, and the villagers were
forced to carry their supplies. Above all, villagers were required to
provide free labor to work on infrastructure projects which would further
reinforce the military's control of the area. In March 1995 the cease-fire
agreement with the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) broke down
after the SLORC deployed troops within the KNPP's territory and continued to
take people to work as porters for the army.

Significant portions of the Karen and Mon States and Tenasserim Division are
of great economic importance to both the SLORC and the Royal Thai
government. The Yadana gas pipeline, which will transport gas to Thailand
from Burma's offshore Yadana gas field, is being built across northern
Tenasserim Division through areas which are home to a mixed population of
Burmans, Mon and Karen ethnic communities. The Burmese government will
receive an estimated U.S.$400 million per year for the supply of the gas,
scheduled to commence in July 1997.7

Thai companies are also involved in developing a deep-water seaport at Tavoy
in Burma. A number of important roads linking Thailand and Burma are being
planned, including highways from Three Pagodas Pass on the Thai/Burmese
border to Thanbyuzayat in Burma's Mon State, from Bong Ti on the
Thai/Burmese border to Tavoy and from Bang Saphan in Thailand to Bokpyin. It
has also been reported that the Thai company Ital-Thai is undertaking a
feasibility study for a hydroelectric dam on the Mae Kok River, also in a
Karen area.8 The area also has huge untapped potential as a tourist
destination, and the establishment of a million-hectare "biosphere" in the
Myinmolekat Nature Reserve is underway.

Given the economic importance of the area, it has long been a policy of both
Burma and Thailand to "clean up" the border region. Military and political
pressure on many of the groups along the border successfully resulted in
cease-fires, and in the case of the Mon, the repatriation of Mon refugees. 9
By the end of 1996, with the effective defeat of the KNPP, only the KNU
remained an obstacle. The KNU is one of only a handful of ethnic insurgent
groups not to have signed a cease-fire agreement with the SLORC, despite
being in sporadic negotiations since March 1992. In January 1997, over one
hundred representatives from several ethnic rebel groups, including some
groups which had already formed cease-fire agreements with the SLORC, took
part in an ethnic nationalities seminar in KNU-held territory. The seminar
ended with a ten-point agreement which included a statement of support for
the opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi.' 10 It is believed that above all
else, the KNU's involvement in the seminar led to the SLORC's decision to
embark on a final offensive against them in February. By May, the KNU had
privately agreed to withdraw its support for certain items of the agreement
in order to resume negotiations with the SLORC. However, on July 8, 1997,
the KNU broke off all negotiations with the SLORC, saying that the SLORC had
acted in bad faith by making its position public. 11

Even before the February offensive began, human rights violations in the
region were widespread, as confirmed by interviews conducted in Thailand in
June 1997. Refugees from Burma described a variety of abuses in areas under
the control of Burmese forces, some going back to 1993.

A thirty-eight-year-old Burman man from Tha Yet Chaung township in Tavoy
District said he had been forced to work as a porter for the army for over
one month in mid-1995 during an operation against the KNU, carrying arms,
ammunition, food and the soldiers' backpacks: 12

"Once I asked some soldiers for more food, as we were only given a small
amount of rice each day. I was beaten on the head by a soldier with a bamboo
stick. Another time I saw a porter being beaten to death because he was too
exhausted to carry his load."

He also spoke of another occasion during the same operation when he and the
other porters had to cross a fast-flowing river, holding onto a piece of
rope as a guide secured on both sides of the riverbank. It was difficult for
them to keep their balance due to the heavy loads they were carrying. The
rope broke after he had crossed, but a number of the porters behind him were
swept away down the river being dragged under the water by their loads. He
believed that at least ten porters drowned.

Just a few months earlier, in April 1995, this man said he had been taken by
the army to Kanbauk, in the north of Tenasserim Division. He was kept under
guard, with a number of others, in a reserve pool of porters in case the
army required them in the run up to and during the Burmese New Year
festivities, which takes place in April each year. He was kept in Kanbauk
for ten days before being released. He witnessed one of the porters trying
to run away. He was caught and stabbed by a SLORC soldier.

This same man told Human Rights Watch/Asia that throughout 1995 and early
1996, he had been forced to work as a porter for SLORC soldiers who were
guarding the Yadana gas pipeline, which passes across northern Tenasserim
Division. 13  He spoke of an increase in demand for porters in his area, Tha
Yet Chaung township, since the pipeline project had commenced. He was forced
by the army to go to the pipeline area two or three times a month. He said
he and other porters would carry weapons and food for the soldiers who were
patrolling the area of the pipeline. As he got to know the area better he
would usually run away from the soldiers after some days. He eventually fled
from his village to the Thai/Burmese border because he could not stand
working as a porter any longer. He was unable to make enough money to
support his family because he was always doing forced labor for the army.

A twenty-year-old Karen man who lived in Taungoo in Burma's Pegu Division
said that his father had been involved in the KNU for as long as he could
remember until his death in 1995. While working in the Pegu mountain range
in February 1996, he learned that his mother had been arrested. With the
help of a relative, he went to the military intelligence office in Taungoo
where his mother was being held:

"Her hands were tied behind her back, she had been beaten up and could
barely speak. I asked why they had done this to her and I was told that my
family was suspected of having connections with the KNU. I asked to be taken
in my mother's place so she could go to a hospital and they agreed."

He was held in the compound for a week where he was interrogated on three
occasions. He was asked many questions about the KNU, including whether he
or his family were hiding weapons or if anyone from the KNU stayed at their
family home. He was always questioned by the same two SLORC soldiers, one of
whom was an officer:

"When they questioned me, one soldier whipped my back with wire cable. He
also punched and kicked me. I was questioned about three times, and this
happened each time they questioned me. They kept asking me the same questions."

After a week, he was taken to Taungoo prison and from there taken by the
army in mid-1996 to be a porter. He was forced to porter for the Burmese
army in Karenni State and spoke of how four older porters in his group were
unable to keep up with the soldiers:

"They apologized to the soldiers for their lack of speed and pleaded for
mercy. They were beaten up by the soldiers and each one pushed off the edge
of a cliff."

He then recounted how he himself had fallen sick and asked one of the
soldiers for some medicine. He was hit in the mouth with the butt of a gun
and lost two teeth. The soldier then stabbed him and slashed the back of his
head with a knife. He was left for dead but was found and taken in by some
local villagers.

Many civilians pay "porter fees"that can, sometimes, substitute for work as
porters. However, when porters are in short supply, civilians are often
taken by the army regardless of whether a porter fee has been paid. The
level of porter fees varies over time and place but they increase when
porters are in short supply. Those who cannot afford these fees have no
choice other than to work as a porter or to flee.

One of the most notorious projects on which civilians are forced to work by
the SLORC is the 160- kilometer railway between Ye in Mon State to Tavoy in
Tenasserim Division.'4 A thirty- four-year-old Karen man from Ye Bone
village, some sixteen kilometers south of Kanbauk in Tenasserim Division,
interviewed in a refugee camp in Thailand in June 1997, said that he had
worked on the railway in 1993, clearing a section of the route before
construction of the railway itself in that area began. Workers were taken
from his village in rotation by the army. He did not have to work on the
railway in 1994, although he had to work as a porter for the army many times
that year. During his time as a porter, he was forced to carry supplies,
including weapons and ammunition, for soldiers during their operations
against the KNU. In 1995, he was again taken by the army to work on the
Ye-Tavoy railway:

"Each week, ten people from our village would be taken to work on the
railway. It tended to work out that I would have to work one week on the
railway and then would have two weeks at home before being taken again. I
saw people who were too sick to work being beaten by soldiers for taking a
rest. I also witnessed a landslide at the work site which resulted in a
number of laborers' deaths. My legs were injured in this landslide. My wife
came to take my place working on the railway so that I could return home to
recover."

He said that Burmese forces built three military barracks near his village
between 1988 and 1990. He and all the men from his village had been forced
to construct the barracks. Periodically since 1990, he and others from his
village had to go back to the barracks to do further work, such as making
fence posts and putting up new fencing.

A man from Tavoy District in Tenasserim Division, interviewed by Human
Rights Watch/Asia, had worked for two periods of fifteen days during 1995 on
the Ye-Tavoy railway, at a site nineteen miles from Tavoy. He described how
men and women from his village would have to go to work on the railway in
rotation. He had to dig and carry soil every day he was at the site:

"I saw many people from many villages in my area and other townships working
on the railway. I also saw prisoners from Rangoon working at the site. They
were wearing white clothes and their legs were shackled together with a long
chain, which most of them placed round their neck to keep it out of their
way while they were working.

This system of forced labor was described by several men and women who spoke
of being forced to work without pay constructing and repairing roads and on
army-owned farms. These people said that "forced labor fees" as well as
"porter fees" were often collected from the villagers. A woman living in
northern Tenasserim Division told Human Rights Watch/Asia that in 1995, an
army commander had told the headman of her village that in order for the
villagers to avoid forced labor on the Ye-Tavoy railway, after the project
restarted in 1995, the village as a whole would have to pay 10,000 kyat a
month (about one hundred dollars or a month's salary for a teacher). It was
left to the headman to collect this money from the villagers. 15

Human rights abuses of this nature drove 101,175 refugees from Burma seeking
refuge on the Thai/Burmese border by the start of 1997. 16  Since then, they
have been joined by at least a further 20,000 refugees (not all of whom are
in the established refugee camps) who fled fighting during the February
SLORC offensive against the KNU.

The offensive was launched against the KNU's 4th Brigade (Mergui Tavoy
District) and 6th (Duplay. District) Brigade areas, located in Burma's
Tenasserim Division and Karen State. On February 7, 1997, government troops,
supported by supplies carried by mules, bulldozers and civilians forced to
work as porters, started fighting troops of the KNU at the village of Myitta
on the upper reaches of the Tenasserim River in the KNU's 4th Brigade area.
The two-pronged attack by the Burmese army, along the Tenasserim and Paw Klo
Rivers, proceeded quickly with new villages being taken by the army on
almost a daily basis. The 4th Brigade headquarters at Htee Kee was taken by
the Burmese army on February 26.

On February 11, the offensive against the KNU 6th Brigade area commenced.
Two days later, the KNU headquarters in this area, at Htee Ker Pler, was
taken by government troops, and on February 17, some three hundred troops of
the Karen National Liberated Army, the troops of the KNU 16th Battalion,
surrendered to the Burmese army. 17

With these important objectives achieved, the Burmese army continued its
sweep south along Burma's border with Thailand. Reinforcements were sent
into the region from Ye further north, Palaw in the west and Mergui in the
south. From Mergui the SLORC troops advanced north along the Tenasserim
river to join with troops advancing along the river in a southerly
direction, as well as advancing south, capturing the headquarters of the KNU
11th Battalion at Ler Ker on March 18. By the end of March, virtually the
whole river valley of the Tenasserim River was occupied by SLORC troops.

A number of rebel opposition groups in addition to the KNU had bases located
in the south of Burma's Tenasserim Division, and by May, it was reported
that government troops had attacked the All Burma Students Democratic
Front's (ABSDF) 8888 camp, Mukapaw camp of the All Burma Muslim Union (ABMU)
and Chang Chee and Hway Pha camps. of the Mon Army Mergui District (MAMD), a
splinter group from the New Mon State Party (NMSP). On May 25, the MAMD
surrendered to the government.

As in all previous offensives, a large number of porters were used by the
Burmese army. 18  These porters were taken both prior to and during the
offensive, primarily from the areas between Moulmein in Mon State to Tavoy
in Tenasserim Division. Three women from Moulmein interviewed by Human
Rights Watch/Asia witnessed dozens of porters being rounded up in February
from a video house, theater and railway station. Another eye witness saw
porters being taken from the bazaar in Moulmein as well as from other
smaller shops in the city. A pool of approximately three hundred porters
were reportedly kept at a football field in Thanbyuzayat in Mon State during
February in order to provide a ready supply of porters to the Burmese army.

Many of the 20,000 people who have fled into Thailand since the offensive
started did so in advance of the SLORC troops and thus avoided being subject
to other abuses. However, some of those interviewed by Human Rights
Watch/Asia remained in their villages for a period after the government
forces took control.

A thirty-six-year-old Karen headman, from a village near Kyunchaung in Karen
State, said his village had been in an area under the control of the KNU 6th
Brigade. However, in early March 1997, troops of the Burmese army arrived
and told the villagers that they were looking for "the enemies," meaning
people connected to the KNU.

He recounted how, after two days in the village, the commander in charge of
the troops singled out three villagers who were suspected of assisting the
KNU. According to his account, he witnessed all three having their hands
tied behind their backs and being beaten by four or five soldiers in front
of the villagers, in order to try to obtain information about the KNU. The
soldiers used their fists and the butts of their guns to beat these men
while asking them questions. One of these three men was accused of having a
brother in the KNU. The soldiers wrapped a plastic sheet around his head and
tied it with twine so that it seemed as though he would suffocate. After
this, these three men were held in a compound the soldiers had forced the
villagers to build for them. Two of the men were released after three days
but had to report to the military compound each day. The third man was
detained for a month and continually forced to serve as a porter; he was
said to have escaped from the soldiers while portering for them.

The same Karen headman said that a large number of porters were taken by the
Burmese authorities from his village to accompany the soldiers on patrols in
the area on a three-day rotational basis. As the village headman, he had to
nominate and gather together the porters for the army. In addition, he said
that the soldiers took rice from the villagers without giving them any
payment. They also killed and ate pigs, chickens, cows and buffalos
belonging to the villagers. Two months after the army entered his village,
he fled to Thailand as he felt unable to continue to nominate and gather
porters and feared being tortured and beaten by the soldiers for suspected
involvement with the KNU.

A forty-eight-year-old Karen man from Pa Der Plaw village in Kya In
township, Karen State, said that the Burmese army started passing through
his village very regularly from February 1997. He was a member of the
village council and had to arrange for the villagers to provide bullock
carts and drivers for the soldiers to take supplies from Kya In to Taungzun,
further south in Karen State. They would be gone for eight to ten days at a
time. As the rainy season began in earnest, the bullock carts could not
always be used, so the soldiers demanded porters from his village to carry
their goods, which he also had to arrange. The headman of his village had
been arrested and detained three times because the officials thought he had
information about the KNU. On the first occasion, the headman was tied up
and detained for four days at the place in the village which the army used
as an occasional base. On the second occasion, the headman was tied to a
wooden post and punched, slapped and beaten by some soldiers. He was
released when two ex-KNU soldiers who had surrendered said that they knew
the village headman had no information about the KNU.

On the third occasion, the village headman was detained for over a month,
held first at Haw Her village and then at Paw Raw Mu village. On his return
to his village, the headman told some of the villagers how he was beaten and
tortured by the soldiers while they questioned him for information about the
KNU. He still bore the scars of the treatment he had suffered, which
included burns to his torso where the soldiers had set fire to his shirt and
stubbed out their cheroots on him. After the headman's return, a number of
villagers felt they were in danger of receiving similar treatment from the
soldiers and fled to the border.

Repatriations and Denial of Access By the Royal Thai Government

Even as the first refugees fleeing the SLORC offensive arrived in Thailand,
the Burmese and Thai military were meeting to lay contingency plans. On
February 25, 1997, Burmese Army Chief Gen. Maung Aye and his Thai
counterpart, Gen. Chetta Thanajaro, met in the border town of Tachilek. In
that meeting, Gen. Maung Aye reportedly said that the government of Burma
had to use force against Karen rebels as Rangoon did not want other ASEAN
countries "to be concerned" about the issue. He also reportedly said that
Thailand is given prior written warning whenever the Burmese Army plans a
new offensive. 19  Thus, with the Thai authorities working hand in glove
with the Burmese, they were able to anticipate a major influx of refugees
from Burma fleeing the advance of SLORC troops. Despite knowing full well
that denying refuge to this group would leave them vulnerable to Burmese
government abuses during a major military offensive, the Thai response, was
to minimize the number of refugees in Thailand by both denying access at the
border and returning refugees to Burma. In short, there was a policy of
refoulement.


4 See Human Rights Watch/ Asia, "The Mon: Persecuted in Burma, Forced Back
from Thailand," A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 6, no.14, December 1994.

5 Figures of the Burmese Boarder Consortium: Burmese Border Camp Locations
with Population Figures, May 1997. Of the 114,801 refugees at the border it
is important to note that 12,846 of these are from the Mon ethnic group and
are located in four camps on the Burma side of the border having been
repatriated in 1995 and early 1996 to areas under the control of the New Mon
State Party (NMSP) under the terms of their June 1995 cease-fire agreement
with SLORC. The Mon in these four camps are presently able to receive
assistance from NGOs based in Thailand.

6 As at the end of June 1997, delegations from the following embassies had
made visits to camps at the Thai/Burmese border: Austrian, Belgium, British,
Canadian, Danish, Dutch, Finnish, French, Japanese, Norwegian, Swedish,
Swiss and USA. The head of the European Union delegation in Bangkok also did so.

7 The joint venture constructing the pipeline involves four companies: the
U.S. company, Unocal, the French company, Total, the Petroleum Authority of
Thailand (PTT), and Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, a Burmese state owned
enterprise. See Earth Rights International and Southeast Asian Information
Network, ''Total Denial'' (Thailand: EarthRights International and Southeast
Asian Information Network, July 1996).

8 Robert Horn, "Thai Army Pushing Male Refugees Back to Burma; Rebel Base
Falls," Associated Press (AP), February 26, 1997.

9 These Mon refugees have not been resettled in Burma but remain internally
displaced in territory held by the NMSP.

10 The Meh Tha Raw Ta Agreement. It was signed by the Karenni National
Progressive Party, Pa-O Peoples Liberation Organization, Wa National
Organization, United Wa State Party, Palaung State Liberation Front, Kachin
Independence Organization, All-Arakan Students and Youths Council, Lahu
Democratic Front, New Mon State Party, Arakan Liberation Party, Kayan New
Land Party, Shan United Revolutionary Army, Chin National Front, Shan
Democratic Union, and the Karen National Union, although there has been some
dispute over whether all those present actually signed the agreement. The
Kachin Independence Organization, for example, had left the meeting before
the final statement was drawn up.

11 KNU press release, July 8, 1997.

12 Since 1988, forced labor has been systematically used by the SLORC across
Burma on a huge scale. A common form of forced labor is portering for the
Burmese army, often during military operations. The pattern of forced labor
in Burma has been documented by Human Rights Watch/Asia since 1990. See
Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Burma: Entrenchment or Reform? Human Rights
Developments and the Need for Continued Pressure,' A Human Rights Watch
Short Report, vol. 7, no. 10, July 1995; Human Right Watch/Asia, "Burma:
Abuses Linked to the Fall of Manerplaw," A Human Rights Watch Short Report,
vol. 7, no. 5, March 1995; Human Rights Watch/Asia, "The Mon: Persecuted in
Burma, Forced Back from Thailand," A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol.
6, no. 14, December 1994; Asia Watch (now Human Rights Watch/Asia), "Burma:
Rape, Forced Labor and Religious Persecution in Northern Arakan," A Human
Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 4, no. 13, May 7, 1992.

13 A number of people have commenced legal proceedings against Unocal in the
U.S., one of the partners in the joint venture which is constructing the
pipeline in Burma, which they allege was responsible for human rights abuses
they suffered, including forced labor, in connection with the pipeline
construction. See John Doe 1, et. al. v. Unocal Corp, et. al. Case No. CV
96- 6959 RAP.

14 Burma's use of unpaid civilians on development and infrastructure
projects is widespread. Burmese officials force civilians to work on such
projects and justifies this by claiming these developmental projects are
designed for the long-term benefit of all. See Human Rights Watch/Asia, "The
Mon: Persecuted in Burma, Forced Back From Thailand."
15 Use of forced or compulsory labor is a violation of the International
Labor Organization's (ILO)1930 Convention Concerning Forced Labor (No 29),
ratified by Burma on March 4, 1955

16 This figure includes some 11,185 Mon. whose camps were relocated onto the
Burma side on the border during 1995 and early 1996 by the Thai authorities.

17 "Mass Surrender of Rebel KNU Fighters," Bangkok Post, February 19, 1997.

18 "See Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Abuse Linked to the Fall of Manerplaw."

19 "Maung Aye Comes Clean on Offensive," The Nation, February 26, 1997. In
this report, Gen. Maung Aye was quoted as saying, "Rangoon did not want
other ASEAN countries to be concerned about the issue" and that "the Burmese
army...had informed Thailand in advance and in writing whenever it planned a
new offensive." "Burmese vow to pursue offensive against rebels
indefinitely," AP, March 4, 1997. This report states that a senior military
intelligence official of the Burmese army, Col. Kyaw Thein, said in relation
to the offensive against the Karen that there was a "complete understanding
between the two countries." To facilitate the repatriation of Burmese, a
Thai/Burmese Regional Border Committee was formed in 1993.

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