[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index ][Thread Index ]

9/12/97: AN ASSESSMENT ON SPDC/SLOR



/* Written 13 Jan 11:00am 1998 by drunoo@xxxxxxxxxxxx in igc:reg.burma */
/* ---------------" Note on SPDC/SLORC and ... "------------------ */

To: Friends
Date: 9 December 1997
---------------------------------------------------------------
 RE: ASSESSMENT ON SPDC/SLORC AND 
     THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION THIS YEAR

1. SLORC renamed SPDC: On 15-Nov-1997, State Law and Order Restoration
Council(SLORC), Burma's ruling junta since 1988, renamed itself to 
become State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The new ruling 
council, SPDC, consists of two separate bodies: a 14-member
Cabinet and a 14-member advisory board (report enclosed).

2. Military reconsolidating its position: The military's creation 
of new ruling body, SPDC, is seen by some analysts as the SLORC
reconsolidating its position. By creating SPDC, the military has 
made counter-measures against growing disunity within the SLORC.
Reportedly, there were two factions within SLORC: one led by
Lt-General Khin Nyunt and another by General Maung Aye. There were
speculations that Lt-Gen.Khin Nyunt faction has been more moderate
and it therefore can be encouraged to enter dialogue with National
League for Democracy.

3. Military try to improve its political legitimacy: There has
also been a slight possibility that the ruling junta wish to take
a new direction (possibly a change in policy) and therefore SLORC
has "sunk-the-old-ship". Following announcement of SPDC, the ruling 
group reportedly launched investigations into alleged corruptions
by former SLORC ministers. This can be seen as SPDC/SLORC trying
to improve its domestic political legitimacy.

4. Collective pressure will be needed: Because of creation of 
SPDC, the pressures need to exert on ruling group as a whole
instead of pressures aiming towards one faction, in order to
initiate dialogue. On the possibility of SPDC/SLORC changing
policy, it will require more time to evaluate military's true
intention.

5. New body is more conducive to transition: The new ruling body,
SPDC, nonetheless appear to have more convenient structure than
that of SLORC in regards to political transition. It is possible
to separate, in the new SPDC, between the executive branch 
(14-member Cabinet) and `Legislative Council'(advisory board).
The elected NLD representatives should look into forming a 
(transitional) Legislative body which may include SPDC's 
advisory board. The (transitional) Legislative body may carry 
out various tasks such as writing constitution, proposing new 
legislation and promoting new economic/social policy in the 
transitional period.

6. Encouraging initiatives by the UNGA'97: The UN General
Assembly appears to have taken new steps in this years Burma
resolution. ONe noticeable point is the General Assembly's 
endorsement of all recommendations made by Human Rights Special
Rapporteur (see para.13 of Resolution A/C.3/52/L.63 enclosed).
The Special Rapporteur did not make any bold initiatives, 
such as recommending to send in-country human rights monitors 
Burma. However, the S.R.'s recommendations are quite encouraging 
in that the recommendation (A/52/484 enclosed) spell out a very
fine and small details that may prove to be practical steps 
towards improvement of human rights situation in Burma.

7. The two remaining issues: There are two remaining issues that
need our attention. Firstly, initiatives are needed to divert the
money from the sale of natural gas to Thailand. The pipeline is
due to complete on Mid-1998 which annual sale of $400 million. 
A physical obstruction of operation of the pipeline (especially,
inside of the Burmese border) is not a good option. We will
need to look into possible methods of delaying/blocking/diverting
the money flowing into SPDC/SLORC coffers.
	Secondly, the long standing issue of protection of our
refugees in Thailand. It is vital that our refugees in Thailand
get a proper UNHCR attention. The Royal Thai Government has yet
to make appropriate measures in this regards.

8. Visit of Special Rapporteur to Burma: Since his appointment
in 1996, the Special Rapporteur has been denied of visit to Burma
by the SLORC. This will amount to Burmese junta not cooperating
with United Nations in improving its human rights records. Pressures
need to exert on SPDC/SLORC to get Human Rights Special Rapporteur
unhindered access to Burma.

9. DASSK agreeable to ASEAN mediation: According to diplomatic
sources, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is agreeable to ASEAN help in 
promoting dialogue with Burmese military. A further co-ordinatations
by ASEAN and its dialogue partners and democratic forces are needed
to look into possible helps.

With best regards, U Ne Oo.

/* Endreport */
___________________________________________________________________
!                     drunoo@xxxxxxxxxxxx                         !
!          http://www.physics.adelaide.edu.au/~uneoo              !
!                    ***** NOW ALSO ON *****                      !
! http://freeburma.org/ (A one stop homepage for all Burma info.) !
-------------------------------------------------------------------