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RICEBOWL: 2ND HELPING



 
                  ONCE THE RICE-BOWL OF ASIA 
        The military destruction of Burma's economy (1) 
                                
 
PART 2 (POSTED IN TWO PARTS FOR EASIER DOWNLOADING)
 
 
THE CIVIL WAR
 
The enlargement and re-equipment of the "Tatmadaw" has had
important implications for the civil war. Apart from
neutralising the threat of popular uprisings in the cities,
SLORC's major military objective is the defeat of the ethnic
insurgencies.  Some of these began shortly after Independence
and were to a large extent fueled by the "vigorously 
assimilationist policies" of Burmanisation, in the words of
Clifford Geertz(36). These policies took on a religious colour
with U Nu's 1962 declaration of Buddhism as the State
religion, a move which alienated many of the non-Buddhist
groups, for instance the Christian Kachin. Attacks on
non-Burman groups have been made at various moments in Burma's
history, including the present, when the regime feels a need
to invoke the phenomenon of "bonding by exclusion" in order to
unify the Burman majority against a religious, ethnic or
political scapegoat. One of the "Tatmadaw's" principal
justifications of its continued rule is that it is preventing
the disintegration of the Union. 
 
Until 1991 the "Tatmadaw's" main military strategy against the
ethnic insurgents was to conduct seasonal campaigns against
their various armies, then return to barracks during the rainy
season.  Now, using all-weather roads built by Thai loggers or
forced labour, and arms and other military equipment from
China, the enlarged "Tatmadaw" can stay in the field
throughout the year and hold onto territory it has captured.
This has favored a strategy of OCCUPATION in which the main
victims have been the non-Burman civilian populations. The
social and economic life of millions of people has been
radically dislocated by this strategy, resulting in a rate of
suffering and deaths far greater than during the earlier
period of COMBAT.  In its major offensives of 1994/95 and
early 1997, the "Tatmadaw" succeeded in capturing most of the
fixed bases of the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA),
which has retreated from a strategy of holding territory to
one of guerrilla warfare, which could continue into the next
generations. 
 
As well as fighting the insurgents directly, the "Tatmadaw"
uses a variety of counter-insurgency methods which target the
non-Burman civilian populations, though without any "hearts
and minds" component.  The main practice  is a form of
strategic hamletting known as the "Four Cuts"(37), to cut the
insurgents off from any funds, intelligence, food and recruits
which the villagers might provide. This tactic involves the 
dispersal or forced relocation of scattered villages to
military-guarded "big villages" where they can be used as a
pool of forced labour(38) for military or infrastructure
purposes, or indeed for the commercial activities of
individual army units or officers (for instance the digging
and stocking of fish ponds or the planting of orchards).  In
some areas where the destruction of villages seems to have no
such labour purpose, and villagers are simply killed (see
Karen Human Rights Group report, below), the goal could be to
terrorise the villagers into leaving that area, or to put
pressure on the insurgents to surrender.   
 
1996 was a particularly devastating year for forced
relocations, with at least 100,000 villagers forcibly
relocated in Shan State alone (39), and 30,000 in Kayah
(Karenni) State where, theoretically, the insurgents have a
cease-fire with SLORC. The destabilization or destruction of 
village life is also achieved by economic sabotage (e.g.
burning crops or rice barns, killing animals, taking farmers
from their fields for forced labor) and terror. Villagers
forced to leave their home region suffer malnutrition and
sometimes starvation when, as often occurs, they are forbidden
or unable to grow crops in the relocation zones. Weakened by
malnutrition and forced labor, those relocated to lower areas
often fall ill and die because they have no resistance to the
local diseases.  Recent reports from Karen State and Arakan
speak of mass starvation as a result of forced relocation,
army destruction of food stocks and other practices.  Some
observers speak of a "North Korea"  type situation. The
following extract from a recent Karen Human Rights Group
report suggests something of the scale and flavour of these
activities :
   
   
     Destruction of All Hill Villages in Papun District
   
"Since the beginning of 1996, SLORC has launched campaigns in
many parts of Burma to forcibly move or wipe out all rural
villages which are not under the direct physical control of an
Army camp.  In February/March 1997, SLORC began a campaign to
obliterate all villages in the hills of Papun District,
northern Karen State.  The initial wave of village destruction
was carried out through March 1997, but since the beginning
of June 1997 SLORC patrols have stepped up their efforts to
destroy all signs of habitation and food supplies wherever
villagers had managed to rebuild.  KHRG has compiled and
confirmed a list of 68 villages which have been completely
burned and destroyed and 4 more which have been partially
burned.  These are all Karen villages, averaging about 15
households (population 100) per village.  This list is by no
means complete, and right now SLORC patrols continue to burn
villages in the area.....
   
   "..... On arrival near a village, the troops first shell it
with mortars from the adjacent hills, then enter the village
firing at anything that moves and proceed to burn every house,
farmfield hut, and shelter they find in the area.  Paddy
storage barns are especially sought out and burned in order to
destroy the villagers' food supply.  Any villagers seen in the
villages, forests, or fields are shot on sight with no
questions asked.  The troops bring porters with them from
Papun and other towns, but if they need more porters they take
any villagers they catch, and they have already taken many
women and men, some aged over 65, for this.  However, the
objective is not to catch villagers, as in several cases
they have surrounded villagers in field huts and then simply
opened fire instead of trying to catch them.  The patrols seem
to have no interest in interrogating the villagers, only in
eliminating them. Villages very close to Papun and Meh Way
have been ordered to move to Meh Way or to Army camps near
Papun, such as Toh Thay Pu, but the vast majority of villages
have been given no orders whatsoever, they have simply been
destroyed. Most of the villagers in the area say they do not
even understand why SLORC is doing this, and that they think
SLORC is just trying to wipe out the Karen population.  KNLA
[Karen National Liberation Army] troops are not based in any
of these villages, and have never yet been in a village when
it was attacked."
   
   ".....Every new patrol that comes around forces the
villagers to flee yet again and build new shelters elsewhere. 
Heavy monsoon rains began in mid-June and will continue until
October, and moving and building are very difficult.  Malaria
and other fevers, diarrhoea, dysentery, and other diseases are
widespread and the villagers have no medicine whatsoever. 
Many children and the elderly have already died.  The
villagers have very few belongings left and little food.  Most
of them have managed to plant at least a limited rice crop in
intervals between SLORC patrols and they are desperately
relying on this crop, although many do not have enough rice to
last them until they can harvest it in November/December.  If
the crop fails or if SLORC interferes with it, the villagers
admit they do not know what they will do and the area will
certainly be in a state of emergency."  
   
   "......Making the situation worse, SLORC is trying to build
a military supply road straight across the northern part of
the area, from Kyauk Kyi in Pegu Division (in the Sittang
River valley of central Burma) directly eastward to Saw Hta on
the Salween River, which forms the border with Thailand.  They
have burned and destroyed all villages along the route and
have been constructing the road with bulldozers under heavy
military guard.  They have already pushed the road most of the
way through by working from both ends, though the KNLA has now
temporarily stopped the road construction by destroying the
bulldozers.  SLORC cannot capture enough villagers in the area
to use them for forced labour on this road, but the fact that
they are using bulldozers instead of bringing in forced labour
from elsewhere makes it apparent that they are in a hurry to
complete this road.  The main purpose of the road will
probably be to support a new offensive along the Salween River
to gain complete control of the river and all adjacent 
territory along the border with Thailand.  This offensive,
which is expected to begin after the rainy season, would cut
off and contain the Karen forces in Papun District, block off
the further escape of refugees to Thailand and allow further
sweeps through the area to wipe out the civilian population. 
It would also pose a major security threat to Thailand, as
SLORC would probably follow it up with attacks on Karen
refugee camps in Thailand's Mae Sariang District, and may also
decide to begin claiming pieces of Thai territory east of the
Salween River."  (40) 
 
Those with no other choice try to take refuge in neighboring
countries; if they can reach the border, that is, which is
becoming increasingly difficult as SLORC extends its control.
The official Burmese refugee population in Thailand has been
growing over the past years, and after the fighting in Karen
and Shan States in 1996/97 is now at an all-time high of about
114,000 [d], with several hundred thousand more living in
Thailand as "illegal immigrants".  These figures do not
include those internally displaced within Burma, but in its
Human Development Report of 1994, the  United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) estimated that "between 5% and
10% of the population has been displaced, either within
Myanmar or to neighbouring countries".  Since Burma's
population is about 46 million, this means 2.3-4.6 million. 
 
 
The medium-term goal of SLORC's civil war strategy is to force
the insurgents into cease-fires. There is a particular urgency
in this since SLORC is pinning much of its hopes for a steady
income on the various commercial projects on its borders with
Thailand, China and India. The gas pipelines underway to
Thailand from the Yadana and Yetagun fields in Burmese waters
are a major project which would be extremely sensitive to
guerrilla attack. There is also agreement in principle for a
section of the Trans-Asian Highway to run from Mae Sot in
Thailand, to Rangoon (41) and ambitious Thai/Burmese projects
to build a road from Thailand to Tavoy, extend the port there
and develop its seaboard, which could integrate this part of
Burma into the Thai economy and provide Thailand with a port
on the Indian Ocean. These undertakings would go ahead much
more easily, and in the case of the Tavoy project, attract
much more investment, if the ethnic insurgents in the area had
agreed not to conduct acts of sabotage.
 
A major problem with this approach is that the cease-fires
which have been concluded so far have been just that:
temporary cease-fires. Most of the groups involved have kept
their arms and continue to administer their areas.  There have
been no real peace talks or political discussions regarding
the long-term relationship of the groups with Rangoon, and the
agreements could break down at any time, as they have with the
Karenni, for instance, who are currently fighting SLORC,
although they agreed a cease-fire in 1995 which was broken
after a few months by SLORC. Similarly, the Wa, formidable,
Chinese-trained fighters, have clashed with SLORC troops on
numerous occasions since they agreed a cease-fire in 1989.
Cease-fires without political agreements are particularly
fragile (and expensive, since they require a permanent
"Tatmadaw" presence, which is extremely costly in financial
and political terms). With the exception of the Karenni
(Kayah) and possibly the Chin, none of the organisations of
the ethnic groups is demanding secession, and have agreed to
remain within a federal Burma, but SLORC has never agreed to
discuss such issues.
 
 
CONCLUSION
 
Most of the early warning signs of radical destabilization are
present in Burma. These include: an economy in serious
decline; disproportionate military expenditure; a large and
badly-disciplined army; widespread human rights abuses;
increasing polarization of income both within the cities
and between urban and rural areas; environmental degradation
and civil war; and increasing malnutrition and reports of
deaths from starvation. 
 
The decision by the military leaders in 1988 to opt for
military solutions to political problems, abandon the attempt
to govern by balancing the internal forces of the country, and
instead to seek military and financial inputs from outside the
country to impose their order on the Burmese people, has gone
badly wrong.  The expected financial inputs have not
materialised to any substantial degree.  Having stripped and
sold the country's immediately disposable assets, and its
money-making projects such as rice export and the Tourist Year
having failed, SLORC is once more approaching insolvency.
Unless SLORC can bring itself to move away from the military
option it chose in 1988, and engage in genuine three-way
negotiations with the political opposition and the
organisations of the non-Burman ethnic groups, and together
request international assistance, further economic
deterioration and serious destabilisation of the country
seem inevitable. One scenario would be disintegration into a
generalised pattern of the warlordism already practised in the
border regions by regional commanders and the chiefs of
certain ethnic groups and militias. The implications of this
scenario should be taken very seriously indeed by the
"Tatmadaw" which claims to be maintaining national unity, as
well as by the neighbours and the international community. 
 
________________________________________________
 
ENDNOTES
 
(1) The main issues concernning what to call the country are
political rather than linguistic. In 1989 the military junta
changed the official name of the country to "Myanmar", which
is what the country is called in written Burmese, the language
of the largest ethnic group, the Burmans. Other ethnic groups,
which feel oppressed by the perceived policies of cultural,
economic and political assimilation by the "big race" Burmans,
see the change of name as yet another example of
Burmanisation. The British name for the country, "Burma",
though given by the colonial power, had in time become
ethnically neutral.  Another objection to "Myanmar" voiced,
among others, by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, whom one can argue has
the mandate of the Burmese people, is that the junta, lacking
legitimacy, had no right to change the name.  For these
reasons, and because the term "Myanmar" does not enjoy wide
international usage, the present article uses "Burma".
 
(2) Donald M. Seekins, "Playing With Fire: Regime Survival and
Burma-China Relations" "Asian Survey", June 1997
 
(3) An attempt to attract 500,000 tourists in the 1996/97
tourist season 
 
(4) Drawing much of this part of Burma into the yuan economy 
 
(5) Andrew Selth, "Transforming the Tatmadaw - the Burmese
Armed Forces since 1988" Australian National University,
Canberra, 1996
 
(6) "Burman" refers to the Burman ethnic group, which makes up
half to two thirds of the population, while "Burmese"
indicates citizens of the country.
 
(7) This article does not discuss this trade, which the US
State Department considers equal in value to all other Burmese
exports combined, nor the Burmese military's involvement in
it. However, an accessible introduction is contained in the
"Nouvelle Observateur" of 5-11 June 1997 and various reports
issued by the Observatoire Geopolitique des Drogues.  The most
thorough study is Bertil Lintner's "Burma in Revolt, Opium and
Insurgency since 1948",  Oxford and Bangkok, 1994.
 
(8) The kyat fell from 185 to 280 Kyat to the US$ from late
June to mid July 1997, following the floating of the Thai
Bhat, with predictions of a further fall in value [b].
 
(9) Khin Maung Kyi, "Myanmar: Will Forever Flow the
Ayeyarwady?"  "Southeast Asian Affairs", 1994. Professor Khin
Maung Kyi was formerly Professor of Economics at Rangoon
University and Professor of agri-business at the University of
Pertanian in Malaysia.  He is currently a private consultant
and a senior Fellow at the National University of Singapore.
 
(10) Donald M. Seekins, "The North Wind and the Sun: Japan's
response to the political crisis in Burma, 1988-1996"
(unpublished conference paper) 
 
(11) ibid
 
(12) Economist Intelligence Unit, "Myanmar (Burma)", 1st
quarter 1997 (henceforward, EIU) p3 
 
(13) "The Nikkei Weekly", 31 March 1997
 
(14) "Far Eastern Economic Review", 5 June 1997, "Loan
Squeeze" 
 
(15) Asian Development Bank Economic Report on Myanmar,
November 1995 pvi
 
(16) US Embassy Rangoon, Burma, Country Commercial Guide,
Burma. July 1996 (henceforward "CCG") p8
 
(17) In a 1995 report, the World Bank states that:
"Substantial gains in economic efficiency would ... result
if the ban on private-sector exports of paddy and rice were
eliminated, and the scope of government paddy procurement were
reduced.  Reforming these paddy policies would help to reduce
poverty and enhance equity because they imply LARGE INCOME
TRANSFERS FROM THE RURAL POOR TO THE URBAN ELITES (INCLUDING
THE MILITARY)" (emphasis added - DNA) ("Myanmar: Policies for
Sustaining Economic Reform", World Bank Report No.14062-BA,
October 16, 1995, p xiv) 
 
(18) Stefan Collignon, "Miscarried Reforms", European
Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS), 1994 p3 
 
(19) Stefan Collignon, "The Burmese Economy and the Withdrawal
of European Trade Preferences" A report written at the request
of the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS) March 1997
(henceforward EIAS) p4
 
(20) Khin Maung Kyi, op cit
 
(21) EIAS op cit p11
 
(22) Stefan Collignon, "Miscarried Reforms", op cit, p9
 
(23) Steinberg is writing in 1991.  We should therefore read
"twenty-one out of the thirty-five years".
 
(24) The ordained monkhood (DNA)
 
(25) David Steinberg, "Power, Economy, and Democracy in
Myanmar/Burma: The Donors' Dilemmas".  Paper given at the
seminar "Myanmar/Birma: Das Ringen um Demokratie und Frieden
mit den Mindenheiten, Schlsschen Schnberg, Hofgeismar,
Germany, March 22-24 1991 
 
(26) Khin Maung Kyi, op cit
 
(27) ibid
 
(28) Khin Maung Kyi, op cit
 
(29) EIAS  op cit  p12
 
(30) Khin Maung Kyi, op cit
 
(31) CCG p30
 
(32) ibid p10
 
(33) EIU op cit, p3
 
(34) EIAS op cit p16
 
(35) In fact, Japan ceased major government assistance in
1986, since it found that Burma was an economic "black hole". 
See Seekins,"The North Wind and the Sun" op cit
 
(36) Clifford Geertz, "The Interpretation of Cultures", London
1973,  p287
 
(37)  See Martin Smith "Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of
Ethnicity" London 1991, p258 and passim; and Martin Smith,
"Ethnic Groups in Burma" London, Anti-Slavery International,
1994, p46
 
(38) Forced labour is one of the best-documented violations of
human rights in Burma.  Reports or condemnations of forced
labour have been made by the UN General Assembly, the
Commission on Human Rights, the International Labour
Organisation, the European Commission and human rights
organisations.  The US State Department's "Foreign Economic
Trends: Burma" of July 1996 calculates the degree to which
forced labour contributes to the Burmese economy. 
 
(39) There is a large literature on forced relocations in
Burma. See, for example, Shan Human Rights Group,"Uprooting
the Shan" Chiang Mai, Thailand, December, 1996; Green November
32, "Exodus, an update on the current situation in Karenni",
Mae Hong Son, Thailand, August 1996; Karen Human Rights
Group, "Forced Relocations in Karenni" Thailand, July 1996;
updated February 1997; See also various reports by Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch/Asia, US State Dept. Country
Reports.
 
(40) Karen Human Rights Group Information Update, Thailand, 
June 25, 1997.
 
(41) "Thailand Times" 22/June/97
 
_________________________
 
 
David Arnott, 
Geneva, 18/7/97
Email darnott@xxxxxxxxxxx
 
**************************
 
 
UPDATES (5 February 1998)
 
[a] Burma is now an ASEAN member, and BIST-EC, a Thai
initiative, is now, with the inclusion of Myanmar, called
"BIMST-EC"
 
[b] By January 1998 the Kyat was reported to be oscillating in
the range of 350-400 Kyat/US$.
 
[c] Although the description of these countries as
"successful" must be reviewed in the light of the current
financial crisis in the region, it is clear that Burma's
economic collapse is much more serious by most economic
indicators.
 
[d] Currently over 116,000.  
 
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