The BurmaNet News - 12 February, 19

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The BurmaNet News, 12 February, 1998
Issue #933

Noted in passing:

"The ICFTU, which represents 125 million unionised workers world-wide, 
stated it was holding the military fully responsible for the physical and
psychological integrity of the striking workers and their families?"
(see DVB: ICFTU MESSAGE TO NAMTU MINERS)

HEADLINES:
==========
BKK POST: ECONOMIC MALADIES EXPOSE FISCAL FLAWS
BKK POST: TASK FORCE TO RELOCATE REFUGEES 
SCMP: SMUGGLERS TAKE RIVER ROUTES TO OUTWIT 
SCMP: JUNTA 'PRESSURE' BANGKOK TO FINISH PIPELINE
DVB: ICFTU MESSAGE TO NAMTU MINERS

Feature:
RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES ET STRATEGIQUES: ONCE
THE RICE-BOWL OF ASIA - Part Two

Mon  & Union Day Statements:
JOINT STATEMENT: 51st ANNIVERSARY OF MON NATIONAL DAY 
SDU: MESSAGE FOR MON NATIONAL DAY
NCGUB: 51ST ANNIVERSARY OF UNION DAY STATEMENT
------------------------------------------------------------------------
     
BKK POST: ECONOMIC MALADIES EXPOSE FISCAL FLAWS
11February, 1998

Asia's financial fumble has pulled the rug out from under Rangoon's recovery

RANGOON, AFP
Asia's financial storm has exposed the faultlines in Burma's
fragile economy, forcing the ruling junta to switch its focus
from boosting political control to urgently tackling economic
woes, experts say.

"The economy is clearly in crisis," one foreign expert here said.
"Burma's difficulties are not directly linked to the regional
turmoil, but the extra stress has thrown the existing problems
into relief."

While the firestorm which has devastated Asia's most thriving
economies has not hit Burma directly it has wiped out expected
regional  funding, on which the military government  had been
banking.

"The fact of the matter is that the Asian countries which have
been investing in and assisting Burma no longer have the money to
pay for  their own bills, let alone somebody else's," another.
analyst said.

The financial crisis has seen direct investment vanish from the
region - notably the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (Asean)
which Burma joined in July, hoping it would help bring
prosperity.

Plans to move garment and other goods factories from the more
developed Asean nations into Burma,  which lags far behind its
neighbours economically, have been scrapped, while direct
investment  has been frozen.       

A massive 39 percent of proposed investment projects here are
from Asean countries and are unlikely to  materialise in the
forseeable future  diplomats said. Total foreign direct
investment for the  year to March 1997 stood at US$6 billion, but
only 40 to 60 percent of it has been disbursed, investment
commission officials said. 
     
Construction of a plush twin-tower hotel in central Rangoon has
been halted by the Thai unit of French hotelier Sofitel, while
stricken South Korea's Daewoo group has halted or suspended its
35 industrial projects here.

In addition, tourism from the region is falling away as
once-flush Asians find themselves out of pocket.

The unwelcome surprise has come at a time when Burma is battling
a range of basic economic problems which have been festering for
years amid a lack of economic know how among the ruling generals.

The country's foreign reserves have been run down to levels which
foreign experts estimate will cover only a few weeks' imports,
showing up Burma's yawning trade deficit of $631 million in
1995-96.

Burma late last year closed its borders with Thailand, China and
India for trade to curtail imports which were boosting the value
of the US dollar against the local currency, the kyat, and
draining reserves.

The move-coupled with the arrests of black market currency
traders- saw the kyat soar  by  more than 30 percent in January 
amid a plunge in other regional .currencies .

In addition, sanctions imposed by the United States and other
countries are hitting hard, repelling foreign investment,
pressuring firms already operating here to pull out and blocking
vital financial assistance from the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund. 
     
The generals had hoped that opening up slowly to the outside
world- particularly Asean - would help ease the country's lack of
economic expertise and its shortage of funds to build crucial
infrastructure.

But the crisis has dashed hopes of Asian assistance, while
support from the rest of the world has been all but ruled out by
international outrage at the government's human rights abuses.

The deepening crisis and the fear of social unrest have prompted
the authorities to publicly shift their attention to economics.

 "We are prepared to face all the hardships and know it won't
always  be easy, but Burma has survived isolation and hardship
before and can  certainly do so again," a senior government
official proclaimed.

******************************************************

BKK POST: TASK FORCE TO RELOCATE REFUGEES 
11 February, 1998
by Cheewin Sattha in Mae Hong Son

FOREIGN AGENCIES PROMISE TO HELP

Some 1,000 members of security forces and officials will be
mobilised to hell) transfer more than 12,000 Karen refugees from
the Salween National Park to a refugee camp in Sop Moei District
starting tomorrow.

A border official said the  Salween Special Task Force will send
soldiers, local and border patrol police, rangers and other
officials to help facilitate the orderly transfer of more 12,000
Burmese war refugees from the Salween National Park to Mae Lama
Luang Camp in Sop Moei District in an attempt to suppress illegal
logging along the border.
     
The operation will simultaneously start at Ban Mae Yae Tha and
Ban Pho Sor in Sop Ngae, some 88 kilometres from the Mae Sariang
district town, where more than 2,000 refugees reside.

Many foreign non-governmental organisations have agreed to
support the transfer with more than 20 six and four-wheel trucks,
the source added.

According to the source, the operation is expected to last about
one month due to inadequate security and shortage of vehicles as
well as resistance from some of the refugees.

Another official responsible for the transfer said concerned
officials had been informed that some of the refugees who were
politically active against Rangoon would take a huge number of
hidden war weapons with them.

According to the source, almost 1,000 of all refugees under the
transfer plan are Burmese students.

On Monday, Mae Hong Son governor Pakdi Chomphooming met
representatives of the Third Army and government agencies at the
Third Army headquarters to work out measures to control these
refugees and suppress illegal logging in the Salween forest.

*********************************************************

SCMP: SMUGGLERS TAKE RIVER ROUTES TO OUTWIT 
ANTI-DRUG FORCES
11 February,1998
by Donald Morris in Houesai, LAOS

The Mekong River through Laos is increasingly being used as a 
Transport route for narcotics, with the town of Houesai acting as 
a focal point for smuggling activity, according to sources in Laos 
and in Chiang Rai, Thailand.

Burma's Shan state, just north of the Laotian border, has long been 
a centre for production of illegal drugs with amphetamines now an important
part of
the trade.

Smugglers have relied more on river routes since the Thai 
Government set up its Narcotics Taskforce for Border Areas in 
August.

The squad targeted the drugs trade between the Burmese town of 
Tachilek and the Thai town of Mae Sae. As a result, traffickers 
shifted their routes east to move drugs through the Lao town of 
Banmom, which faces Burma across the Mekong.

The drugs are then shipped down river on Lao cargo boats, some 
of which dock in the Thai towns of Chiang Saen and Chiang Khong.

According to Pornthep Iamprapai, chief narcotics control officer 
for Chiang Rai province, the trade mostly consists of amphetamines
to meet booming demand in Thailand's north.

The border taskforce was disbanded in December due to budget cuts, 
and Mr Pornthep said this could have boosted smuggling activity.

Sources in Houesai said the river was still in use as a smuggling route, 
And conceded that policing measures on both sides of the border were
inadequate.

A source in Houesai said heroin was also shipped north along the 
Mekong into China, and down river to the Lao cities of Luang Prabang
and Vientiane.

Much of the heroin is destined for Vietnam.

According to Mr Pornthep, Laos is also a production centre for drugs.

Last month an amphetamine laboratory was raided in the village of 
Paktha, about 20 kilometres south of Houesai.

Eighteen people were reportedly arrested in the raid.

*********************************************************

SCMP: JUNTA 'PRESSURE' BANGKOK TO FINISH PIPELINE
ON TIME
11 February, 1998
by Greg Torode in Bangkok

Burmese pressure has effectively forced Thailand's new Government
to ensure a controversial gas pipeline is completed on time despite
mounting protests.

Thai diplomats said considerable pressure was being placed on 
Chuan Leekpai's Government by Burma's ruling junta which has 
made clear  the future of Thai-Burma relations is at stake with any 
delay.

The line is set to yield up to US$400 million (HK$3.09 billion) a 
year to Burma's generals - their biggest source of foreign capital and
revenues that have already been used to attract new loans to the
cash-strapped military.

Government officials confirmed Mr Chuan has apparently swept 
his previous concerns aside as work escalates to finish the lucrative 
Yadana pipeline by July.

"The Government cannot order the project to stop," the premier told 
the Bangkok Post yesterday.

The 261-kilometre line links gas fields in the Andaman Sea to new 
Markets through some of Thailand's forests that environmentalists 
claim will be irreparably damaged.

Protests have involved more than 20,000 people and led to Mr Chuan setting
up a top-level review panel which was due start work this week.

Reports from Rangoon at the weekend suggested Thailand could face penalty
payments of up to US$125,000 for every day the project is 
delayed.

*********************************************************

ICFTU: MESSAGE TO NAMTU MINERS
11 February, 1998

INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS  
Burma: ICFTU sends radio message to striking workers at Namtu
silver mine.
 
Brussels, February 11, 1998 (ICFTU OnLine): The ICFTU today
addressed  a message of solidarity by radio to 3,000 workers on strike
at the  Namtu Silver Mine, in the northern Shan State of Burma. 
The workers, supported by up to 5,000 relatives, went on strike on 2 
February to  demand rice at subsidised prices, wage rises for 
underground workers, medical care, a six-day working week and the 
repair of their dilapidated dormitories. The army quickly stepped in 
when the work  stoppage erupted. A meeting between 21 workers'
representatives and  the local administration was chaired by the 
Commander of Light  Infantry Battalion (LIB) 324. 
 
Up to sixty similar army units were identified last November by the
ICFTU during special hearings on forced labour in Burma held at the
Geneva-based International Labour Organisation (ILO), a specialised 
UN agency. Several LIB commanding officers were listed by name 
and rank and identified by the ICFTU as responsible for grave human 
rights' violations, such as arbitrary detention, torture, rape, extrajudicial
executions, looting and village destruction, all committed within the 
context of forced labour on infrastructure and commercial projects
controlled by the Tadmadaw, the country's armed forces. The report of
the ILO Commission of Inquiry, which is currently investigating the issue
in the region itself, is expected to be published next June. 
 
The ICFTU's solidarity message to the Namtu miners was put on
the air  today by the Democratic Voice of Burma.

(DVB)(http://www.communique.no/dvb/ ), which broadcast from
Oslo and is received in Burma. The DVB, on the air in Burmese
and ethnic  languages one half hour per day, has been in operation 
since 1992 and  is mainly supported by the Norwegian, Danish and 
Swedish Governments. 
 
In its message, the ICFTU assured the striking miners and their  
families of its fullest support for their legitimate demands. The 
ICFTU, which represents 125 million unionised workers world-wide, 
stated it was holding the military fully responsible for the physical 
and psychological integrity of the striking workers and their families 
and, in particular, of the 21-strong Workers' Committee negotiating 
with management and the authorities. 
 
Together with the Federation of Trade Unions - Burma (FTUB),
operating underground inside Burma as well as from neighbouring countries,
the ICFTU has monitored trade union and other human rights in Burma since
1991.
 
Contact: ICFTU-Press at: ++32-2 224.02.12 (Brussels). For more
information, visit our website at: (http://www.icftu.org).
 
*****************************************************

RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES ET STRATEGIQUES: ONCE
THE RICE-BOWL OF ASIA - Part Two
Autumn, 1997
by David Arnott

The military destruction of Burma's economy 

THE CIVIL WAR
 
The enlargement and re-equipment of the "Tatmadaw" has had 
important implications for the civil war. Apart from neutralising the 
threat of popular uprisings in the cities, SLORC's major military 
objective is the defeat of the ethnic insurgencies.  Some of these 
began shortly after Independence and were to a large extent fueled 
by the "vigorously assimilationist policies" of Burmanisation, in the
words of Clifford Geertz (36). These policies took on a religious 
colour with U Nu's 1962 declaration of Buddhism as the State 
religion, a move which alienated many of the non-Buddhist groups, 
for instance the Christian Kachin. Attacks on non-Burman groups 
have been made at various moments in Burma's history, including 
the present, when the regime feels a need to invoke the phenomenon
of "bonding by exclusion" in order to unify the Burman majority 
against a religious, ethnic or political scapegoat. One of the 
"Tatmadaw's" principal justifications of its continued rule is that it 
is preventing the disintegration of the Union. 
 
Until 1991 the "Tatmadaw's" main military strategy against the ethnic
insurgents was to conduct seasonal campaigns against their various armies,
then return to barracks during the rainy season.  Now, using all-weather
roads built by Thai loggers or forced labour, and arms and other military
equipment from China, the enlarged "Tatmadaw" can stay in the field
throughout the year and hold onto territory it has captured. This has
favored a strategy of OCCUPATION in which the main victims have been the
non-Burman civilian populations. The social and economic life of millions
of people has been radically dislocated by this strategy, resulting in a
rate of suffering and deaths far greater than during the 
earlier period of COMBAT.  In its major offensives of 1994/95 and early
1997, the Tatmadaw" succeeded in capturing most of the fixed bases of the
Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), which has retreated from a strategy
of holding territory to one of guerrilla warfare, which could continue into
the next generations. 
 
As well as fighting the insurgents directly, the "Tatmadaw" uses a 
Variety of counter-insurgency methods which target the non-Burman civilian
populations, though without any "hearts and minds" component.  The main
practice  is a form of strategic hamletting known as the "Four Cuts"(37),
to cut the insurgents off from any funds, intelligence, food and recruits
which the villagers might provide. This tactic involves the dispersal or
forced relocation of scattered villages to military-guarded "big villages"
where they can be used as a pool of forced labour(38) for military or
infrastructure purposes, or indeed for the commercial activities of
individual army units or officers (for instance the digging and stocking of
fish ponds or the planting of orchards).  In some areas where the
destruction of villages seems to have no such labour purpose, 
and villagers are simply killed (see Karen Human Rights Group report,
below), the goal could be to terrorise the villagers into leaving that
area, or to put pressure on the insurgents to surrender.   
 
1996 was a particularly devastating year for forced relocations, with 
at least 100,000 villagers forcibly relocated in Shan State alone (39), 
and 30,000 in Kayah (Karenni) State where, theoretically, the 
insurgents have a cease-fire with SLORC. The destabilization or 
destruction of village life is also achieved by economic sabotage 
(e.g. burning crops or rice barns, killing animals, taking farmers from 
their fields for forced labor) and terror. Villagers forced to leave their 
home region suffer malnutrition and sometimes starvation when, as 
often occurs, they are forbidden or unable to grow crops in the 
relocation zones. Weakened by malnutrition and forced labor, those
relocated to lower areas often fall ill and die because they have no
resistance to the local diseases.  Recent reports from Karen State and
Arakan speak of mass starvation as a result of forced relocation, army
destruction of food stocks and other practices.  Some observers speak of a
"North Korea" type situation. The following extract from a recent Karen
Human Rights Group report suggests something of the scale and flavour of
these activities.
   
Destruction of All Hill Villages in Papun District
   
"Since the beginning of 1996, SLORC has launched campaigns in 
many parts of Burma to forcibly move or wipe out all rural villages 
which are not under the direct physical control of an Army camp.  In
February/March 1997, SLORC began a campaign to obliterate all 
villages in the hills of Papun District, northern Karen State.  The initial
wave of village destruction was carried out through March 1997, but 
since the beginning of June 1997 SLORC patrols have stepped up their
efforts to destroy all signs of habitation and food supplies wherever
villagers had managed to rebuild.  KHRG has compiled and confirmed a list
of 68 villages which have been completely burned and destroyed and 4 more
which have been partially burned.  These are all Karen villages, averaging
about 15 households (population 100) per village. This list is by no means
complete, and right now SLORC patrols 
continue to burn villages in the area.....
   
"..... On arrival near a village, the troops first shell it with mortars 
from the adjacent hills, then enter the village firing at anything that 
moves and proceed to burn every house, farmfield hut, and shelter 
they find in the  area.  Paddy storage barns are especially sought out 
and burned in order to destroy the villagers' food supply.  Any 
villagers seen in the villages, forests, or fields are shot on sight with
no questions asked.  The troops bring porters with them from Papun
and other towns, but if they need more porters they take any villagers 
they catch, and they have already taken many women and men, some 
aged over 65, for this.  However, the objective is not to catch villagers, 
as in several cases they have surrounded villagers in field huts and then
simply opened fire instead of trying to catch them.  The patrols seem to
have no interest in interrogating the villagers, only in eliminating them.
Villages very close to Papun and Meh Way have been ordered to move to Meh
Way or to Army camps near Papun, such as Toh Thay Pu, but the vast majority
of villages have been given no orders whatsoever, they have simply been
destroyed. Most of the villagers in the area say they do not even
understand why SLORC is doing this, and that they think 
SLORC is just trying to wipe out the Karen population.  KNLA [Karen
National Liberation Army] troops are not based in any of these villages,
and have never yet been in a village when it was attacked."
   
".....Every new patrol that comes around forces the villagers to flee 
yet again and build new shelters elsewhere. Heavy monsoon rains began 
in mid-June and will continue until October, and moving and building are 
very difficult.  Malaria and other fevers, diarrhoea, dysentery, and other
diseases are widespread and the villagers have no medicine whatsoever. Many
children and the elderly have already died.  The villagers have very few
belongings left and little food.  Most of them have managed to plant 
at least a limited rice crop in intervals between SLORC patrols and they 
are desperately relying on this crop, although many do not have enough 
rice to last them until they can harvest it in November/December.  If
the crop fails or if SLORC interferes with it, the villagers admit they do
not know what they will do and the area will certainly be in a state of
emergency."  
   
"......Making the situation worse, SLORC is trying to build a military supply
road straight across the northern part of the area, from Kyauk 
Kyi in Pegu Division (in the Sittang River valley of central Burma) 
directly eastward to Saw Hta on the Salween River, which forms the 
border with Thailand.  They have burned and destroyed all villages 
along the route and have been constructing the road with bulldozers 
under heavy military guard.  They have already pushed the road most 
of the way through by working from both ends, though the KNLA has 
now temporarily stopped the road construction by destroying the 
bulldozers.  SLORC cannot capture enough villagers in the area to use 
them for forced labour on this road, but the fact that they are using
bulldozers instead of bringing in forced labour from elsewhere makes 
it apparent that they are in a hurry to complete this road.  The main
purpose of the road will probably be to support a new offensive along 
the Salween River to gain complete control of the river and all adjacent 
territory along the border with Thailand.  This offensive, which is 
expected to begin after the rainy season, would cut off and contain the
Karen forces in Papun District, block off the further escape of refugees
to Thailand and allow further sweeps through the area to wipe out the
civilian population.  It would also pose a major security threat to 
Thailand, as SLORC would probably follow it up with attacks on 
Karen refugee camps in Thailand's Mae Sariang District, and may 
Also decide to begin claiming pieces of Thai territory east of the
Salween River."  (40) 
 
Those with no other choice try to take refuge in neighboring countries 
if they can reach the border, that is, which is becoming increasingly 
difficult as SLORC extends its control. The official Burmese refugee
population 
in Thailand has been growing over the past years, and after the fighting in 
Karen and Shan States in 1996/97 is now at an all-time high of about
114,000 [d], with several hundred thousand more living in Thailand as
"illegal immigrants".  These figures do not include those internally
displaced within Burma, but in its Human Development Report of 1994, the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) estimated that "between 5% and
10% of the population has been displaced, either within Myanmar or to
neighbouring countries".  Since Burma's population is about 46 million,
this means 2.3-4.6 million.  
 
The medium-term goal of SLORC's civil war strategy is to force the insurgents 
into cease-fires. There is a particular urgency in this since SLORC is
pinning much of its hopes for a steady income on the various commercial
projects on its borders with Thailand, China and India. The gas pipelines
underway to Thailand from the Yadana and Yetagun fields in Burmese waters
are a major project which would be extremely sensitive to guerrilla attack.
There is also agreement in 
principle for a section of the Trans-Asian Highway to run from Mae Sot 
in Thailand, to Rangoon (41) and ambitious Thai/Burmese projects to 
build a road from Thailand to Tavoy, extend the port there and develop 
its seaboard, which could integrate this part of Burma into the Thai economy 
and provide Thailand with a port on the Indian Ocean. These undertakings
would go ahead much more easily, and in the case of the Tavoy project,
attract much more investment, if the ethnic insurgents in the area had
agreed not to conduct acts 
of sabotage.
 
A major problem with this approach is that the cease-fires which have 
been concluded so far have been just that: temporary cease-fires. Most
of the groups involved have kept their arms and continue to administer 
their areas.  There have been no real peace talks or political discussions
regarding the long-term relationship of the groups with Rangoon, and 
the agreements could break down at any time, as they have with the Karenni,
for instance, who are currently fighting SLORC, although they agreed a
cease-fire in 1995 which was broken after a few months by SLORC. Similarly,
the Wa, formidable, Chinese-trained fighters, have clashed with SLORC
troops on numerous occasions since they agreed a cease-fire in 1989.
Cease-fires without political agreements 
are particularly fragile (and expensive, since they require a permanent
"Tatmadaw" presence, which is extremely costly in financial and political
terms). With the exception of the Karenni (Kayah) and possibly the Chin,
none of the organisations of the ethnic groups is demanding secession, and
have agreed to remain within a federal Burma, but SLORC has never agreed to
discuss such issues.
 
 CONCLUSION
 
Most of the early warning signs of radical destabilization are present 
in Burma. These include: an economy in serious decline; 
disproportionate military expenditure; a large and badly-disciplined 
army; widespread human rights abuses;increasing polarization of 
income both within the cities and between urban and rural areas;
environmental degradation and civil war; and increasing malnutrition and
reports of deaths from starvation. 
 
The decision by the military leaders in 1988 to opt for military solutions
to political problems, abandon the attempt to govern by balancing the
internal forces of the country, and instead to seek military and financial
inputs from outside the country to impose their order on the Burmese
people, has gone badly wrong.  The expected financial inputs have not
materialised to any substantial degree.  Having stripped and sold the
country's immediately disposable assets, 
and its money-making projects such as rice export and the Tourist Year
having failed, SLORC is once more approaching insolvency. Unless SLORC can
bring itself to move away from the military option it chose in 1988, and
engage in genuine three-way negotiations with the political opposition and
the organisations
of the non-Burman ethnic groups, and together request international
assistance, further economic deterioration and serious destabilisation of
the country seem inevitable. One scenario would be disintegration into a
generalised pattern of
the warlordism already practised in the border regions by regional commanders 
and the chiefs of certain ethnic groups and militias. The implications of
this scenario should be taken very seriously indeed by the "Tatmadaw" which
claims to be maintaining national unity, as well as by the neighbours and
the international community. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
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ENDNOTES
 
(1) The main issues concerning what to call the country are
political rather than linguistic. In 1989 the military junta
changed the official name of the country to "Myanmar", which
is what the country is called in written Burmese, the language
of the largest ethnic group, the Burmans. Other ethnic groups,
which feel oppressed by the perceived policies of cultural,
economic and political assimilation by the "big race" Burmans,
see the change of name as yet another example of
Burmanisation. The British name for the country, "Burma",
though given by the colonial power, had in time become
ethnically neutral.  Another objection to "Myanmar" voiced,
among others, by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, whom one can argue has
the mandate of the Burmese people, is that the junta, lacking
legitimacy, had no right to change the name.  For these
reasons, and because the term "Myanmar" does not enjoy wide
international usage, the present article uses "Burma".
(2) Donald M. Seekins, "Playing With Fire: Regime Survival and
Burma-China Relations" "Asian Survey", June 1997
(3) An attempt to attract 500,000 tourists in the 1996/97 tourist season 
(4) Drawing much of this part of Burma into the yuan economy 
(5) Andrew Selth, "Transforming the Tatmadaw - the Burmese Armed Forces
since 1988" Australian National University, Canberra, 1996
(6) "Burman" refers to the Burman ethnic group, which makes up
half to two thirds of the population, while "Burmese" indicates 
citizens of the country.
(7) This article does not discuss this trade, which the US State 
Department considers equal in value to all other Burmese exports combined,
nor the Burmese military's involvement in it. However, 
an accessible introduction is contained in the "Nouvelle Observateur" 
of 5-11 June 1997 and various reports issued by the Observatoire
Geopolitique des Drogues.  The most thorough study is Bertil Lintner's
"Burma in Revolt, Opium and Insurgency since 1948",  Oxford and Bangkok, 1994.
(8) The kyat fell from 185 to 280 Kyat to the US$ from late June to 
mid July 1997, following the floating of the Thai Bhat, with predictions
of a further fall in value [b].
(9) Khin Maung Kyi, "Myanmar: Will Forever Flow the Ayeyarwady?"
"Southeast Asian Affairs", 1994. Professor Khin Maung Kyi was 
formerly Professor of Economics at Rangoon University and Professor 
of agri-business at the University of Pertanian in Malaysia.  He is 
currently a private consultant and a senior Fellow at the National 
University of Singapore.
(10) Donald M. Seekins, "The North Wind and the Sun: Japan's
response to the political crisis in Burma, 1988-1996" (unpublished
conference paper) 
(11) ibid
(12) Economist Intelligence Unit, "Myanmar (Burma)", 1st quarter 
1997 (henceforward, EIU) p3 
(13) "The Nikkei Weekly", 31 March 1997
(14) "Far Eastern Economic Review", 5 June 1997, "Loan Squeeze" 
(15) Asian Development Bank Economic Report on Myanmar,
November 1995 pvi
(16) US Embassy Rangoon, Burma, Country Commercial Guide,
Burma. July 1996 (henceforward "CCG") p8
(17) In a 1995 report, the World Bank states that:
"Substantial gains in economic efficiency would ... result if the ban
on private-sector exports of paddy and rice were eliminated, and the
scope of government paddy procurement were reduced.  Reforming 
these paddy policies would help to reduce poverty and enhance equity
because they imply LARGE INCOME TRANSFERS FROM THE 
RURAL POOR TO THE URBAN ELITES (INCLUDING THE MILITARY)" (emphasis added -
DNA) ("Myanmar: Policies for 
Sustaining Economic Reform", World Bank Report No.14062-BA, 
October 16, 1995, p xiv) 
(18) Stefan Collignon, "Miscarried Reforms", European Institute for
Asian Studies (EIAS), 1994 p3 
(19) Stefan Collignon, "The Burmese Economy and the Withdrawal
of European Trade Preferences" A report written at the request of 
the European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS) March 1997 
(henceforward EIAS) p4
(20) Khin Maung Kyi, op cit
(21) EIAS op cit p11
(22) Stefan Collignon, "Miscarried Reforms", op cit, p9
(23) Steinberg is writing in 1991.  We should therefore read 
"twenty-one out of the thirty-five years".
(24) The ordained monkhood (DNA)
(25) David Steinberg, "Power, Economy, and Democracy in
Myanmar/Burma: The Donors' Dilemmas".  Paper given at the
seminar "Myanmar/Birma: Das Ringen um Demokratie und Frieden
mit den Mindenheiten, Schlsschen Schnberg, Hofgeismar, Germany, 
March 22-24 1991 
(26) Khin Maung Kyi, op cit
(27) ibid
(28) Khin Maung Kyi, op cit
(29) EIAS  op cit  p12
(30) Khin Maung Kyi, op cit
(31) CCG p30
(32) ibid p10
(33) EIU op cit, p3
(34) EIAS op cit p16
(35) In fact, Japan ceased major government assistance in 1986, since
it found that Burma was an economic "black hole".  See Seekins,"The 
North Wind and the Sun" op cit
(36) Clifford Geertz, "The Interpretation of Cultures", London 1973, p287
 (37)  See Martin Smith "Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity"
London 1991, p258 and passim; and Martin Smith, "Ethnic Groups in Burma"
London, Anti-Slavery International, 1994, p46
(38) Forced labour is one of the best-documented violations of human 
rights in Burma.  Reports or condemnations of forced labour have been made
by the UN General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights, 
the International Labour Organisation, the European Commission and human
rights organisations.  The US State Department's "Foreign 
Economic Trends: Burma" of July 1996 calculates the degree to which
forced labour contributes to the Burmese economy. 
(39) There is a large literature on forced relocations in Burma. See, for
example, Shan Human Rights Group,"Uprooting the Shan" Chiang Mai, Thailand,
December, 1996; Green November 32, "Exodus, an update on
the current situation in Karenni", Mae Hong Son, Thailand, August 1996;
Karen Human Rights Group, "Forced Relocations in Karenni" Thailand, July
1996; updated February 1997; See also various reports by Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch/Asia, US State Dept. Country Reports.
(40) Karen Human Rights Group Information Update, Thailand, June 25, 1997.
(41) "Thailand Times" 22/June/97
 
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UPDATES (5 February 1998)
 [a] Burma is now an ASEAN member, and BIST-EC, a Thai initiative, is now,
with the inclusion of Myanmar, called "BIMST-EC"
 
[b] By January 1998 the Kyat was reported to be oscillating in the range of
350-400 Kyat/US$.
 
[c] Although the description of these countries as"successful" must be
reviewed in the light of the current financial crisis in the region, it is
clear that Burma's economic collapse is much more serious by most economic
indicators.
 
[d] Currently over 116,000.  
 
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JOINT STATEMENT: 51st ANNIVERSARY OF MON NATIONAL DAY 
12 February, 1998

This year marks the 51st anniversary of Mon National Day. Traditionally we
Mon have celebrated the founding of our Nation on the first Waning 
of Mide, a Mon lunar date, which happens to fall this year on 12 February.

Mon National Day commemorates the inception of the Mon kingdom, Hongsawadee
(Pegu),  founded in 825 A.D by two brothers, Samala 
and Vimala, in what is now called Pegu, in Lower Burma. On this auspicious
day may all Mon people be blessed with physical and 
mental health.

The twilight of Hongsawadee came in 1757 when it was occupied by the
Burmans, with a terrible loss of life to the Mon monarchy, scholars, monks
and people as well as a great destruction of Mon Culture.

The Mon and other indigenous peoples have been oppressed and their culture
suppressed by successive Burmese regimes since U Aung Ze Ya's period over
two hundred years ago.

Just before Burma gained independence from the British in 1948, Mon leaders
held a meeting and agreed on the Lunar day of the waning of Mide as the Mon
National Day. Since then, Mon people wherever they may be celebrate their
National Day.

The fall of Mon Kingdom to the Burmans in 1757 not only marked the end of
the once flourishing Mon kingdom but of all administrative and political
powers as well. Thus a nation of great significance in Southeast Asian
history was reduced to an ethnic minority and has tended to have been
forgotten by the modern world.

Mon political forces joined hand in hand with Burmans and other ethnic
groups in gaining independence from the British in 1948. But after the
independence the Mon were denied their political rights with the excuse
that there were no particular differences between the Mon and the Burmans.
As the result of this, the Mons continued to endure suppression of their
rights and their country.

When the situation became unbearable, Mon people along with various other
ethnic groups took up arms and fought against the central Burman- dominated
government. Consequently some 50 years of the protracted civil war has cost
countless lives and caused indescribable suffering. 

The present military junta, in cooperation with some of Burma's neighbors,
has placed overwhelming pressure on armed revolutionary movements, to
surrender. However, the cease-fire reached with the Mon armed opposition,
the New Mon State Party (NMSP) has not addressed the political and cultural
grievances of the Mon. If has simply imposed a military cease-fire with its
own self interest in mind. A true reconciliation has not been allowed.

The Mon National Democratic Front (MNDF) which took part in the 1990
general election, won seats in Mon populated area was abolished in 1992. As
long as democracy is suppressed, peace will not prevail in the country.

Completely ignoring the Burmese military junta's human rights abuses, the
Association of South East Asia Nations (ASEAN) has accepted Burma as its
new member in July 1997. This has received much criticism from the European
Union (EU) and the United States. They have questioned the admission of
Burma into ASEAN while Burma remains a military dictatorship that subjects
its population to practices such as forced labour, rape, corruption and
other gross violation of human rights.

The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC, formally known as SLORC) has
opened its doors to foreign investment and economic liberalization. But the
profits remain with the military officials and their families and the
people remain poor and deprived of any benefits.

If the SPDC remains in power the people including the Mon and all ethnic
groups, will continue to suffer from poverty and denial of their basic
human rights.

We Mon people are still severely oppressed under the ruling of
dictatorship, SPDC and had been deprived of our fundamental rights, the
rights of self- determination.

In this auspicious occasion, Mon National Day, let us all Mon people commit
ourselves to be united into as a one family and to struggle for freedom of
our homeland where we Mon could exercise the rights of self - determination
and where we could enjoy a peaceful life.
 
On the occasion of the 51st anniversary of Mon National Day, we would like
to urge the international community to support our struggle to gain:

*A tri-partite dialogue between the democratic forces, ethnic leaders and
the SPDC;
*The achievement of democratic freedom through national and international
struggle and cooperation;
*The achievement of peace and true national reconciliation among all
nationalities of Burma;
*The release of all political prisoners ;
*The transfer of state power to the civilian government as soon as possible.

Mon National Day Celebration Committee:
1) Committee from United States of America
2) Committee from Canada
3) Committee from Australia
4) Committee From Thailand
5) Individually from Norway

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SDU: MESSAGE FOR MON NATIONAL DAY
12 February, 1998

The Mon National Day this year coincides with the Union Day or the day on
which the Panglong Agreement was signed between the leaders of Burma and
those of non-Burman lands. The gist of the terms of agreement were that in
the union with Burma, the non-Burman nationalities should enjoy the
following rights: 

Full political autonomy; full economic autonomy; democracy; and, human
rights. 

The agreement was important because it was witnessed by the British
Government's special representative and moreover, without it, the future of
Burma with or without the non-Burman participation hung in the balance. It
would not be an exaggeration to say that without the treaty, the
non-Burmans would be independent states today.

We believe that the terms agreed by the Kachin, Chin, Shan and Burman
leaders there are the terms desired by all nationalities including Mons,
Karens, Arakanese and the Karennis, if they are persuaded to join a new
union. We also believe that these rights should not be reserved only for
the Shan States and the Karennis, but all, including our Burman brethren.
Let us those who have joined the UNPO encourage and support that the other
non-UNPO states in the now defunct Union of Burma deserve equal rights with
us, and we are confident the cause of all the non-Burman nationalities for
their right of self determination together with the cause of democracy of
our Burman brethren shall be a guaranteed success.

Executive Committee, Shan Democratic Union
9 February, 1998

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NCGUB: 51ST ANNIVERSARY OF UNION DAY STATEMENT
12 February, 1998

NATIONAL COALITION GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF BURMA

1. The 12th of February 1998 is the 51st anniversary of the memorable day
on which the historic Panglong Agreement was signed by Gen. Aung San and
leaders of the ethnic nationalities, after reaching the understanding to
obtain independence together, with the might of national unity, at the
conference held at Panglong town of the Shan State.

2. Various ethnic nationalities have been inhabiting together in the Union
of Burma since many centuries past. Therefore, the Union of Burma is the
State commonly owned by the various nationalities indigenous to the land.
The right to self-determination of all the nationalities, their rights to
ethnic and political equality are self-evident and inalienable.

3. After the fall of Gen. Aung San, the architect of the Union of Burma,
the implementation of  Panglong Agreement had been rather weak. The
government elected in 1960 had tried to make amendments for accommodating
the demands of the ethnic nationalities with regard to the Union, after
acquiring the positions of the then opposition parties and leaders of the
ethnic nationalities,. 

4. The military clique led by Gen. Ne Win, with the fabricated accusations
that federalism was secession and an attempt to disintegrate the union,
seized power in 1962, and ruled the country with a unitary system. From
that time on, the unity established by Gen. Aung San and leaders of the
ethnic nationalities, had disintegrated, and the role of Panglong Agreement
had withered. The advent and  domination of military dictatorship have been
one of the main causes preventing the realization of the essence of
Panglong Agreement, up to this day. Under the military dictatorship,
democratic rights, human rights and the  ethnic nationalities' rights to
self-determination and equality, will continue to be deprived.

5. The questions of the ethnic nationalities cannot be resolved by armed
peace. In other words, they cannot be resolved by having temporary
cease-fire agreements. Moreover, they cannot be eliminated by armed
suppression. Accordingly, for the restoration of unity of all the
nationalities, it is necessary to terminate the military dictatorship. Only
if we can, in practice, implement the Panglong Agreement, the spirit of the
Union will live on forever, and the unity of all the nationalities will
remain durable.

6. In conclusion, we firmly believe that we will achieve genuine national
unity and a durable Union, only when a Federation, guaranteeing ethnic
equality and self-determination of all the nationalities, democratic rights
and basic human rights, can be established. Therefore, it is necessary to
hold politically genuine, serious and meaningful dialogue to resolve the
two fundamental political issues of Burma, the ethnic question and the
question of democratic rights for all the people.  

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