Norway's Burma Policy: Opportunitie

[suriya@xxxxxxxxxxxx]

Address by   Minister  for International Development 
and Human Rights, Hilde F. Johnson,
at a conference on Burma, 9 December 1997.

Norway's Burma Policy: Opportunities and Means

Ladies and gentlemen!                                                      


As the new Norwegian Government's minister in charge of international development 
and  human rights, I am pleased to take the place of the Prime Minister, who was 
unable to attend today's conference on Burma, to speak about "Norway's Burma 
Policy: Opportunities and Means".

I am also pleased to inform You that our ambassador to Singapore, who is also accredited to Burma, met Aung San Suu Kyi last week. She sent her best regards to everyone who is participation, in the seminar here today and expressed again her thanks and appreciation for your and the Norwegian government's tireless efforts in the quest for democracy and human rights in Burma.

1.	It is cause for deep concern to my Government that despite opposition from all corners of the world, the military regime in Yangon continues to defy public opinion in Burma and to disregard the just demands for the return of civil liberties and the rule of law.  This regime has not only defied the world by denying the National League for Democracy its legitimate role as a majority, governing party after its stunning election victory in 1988.  The regime has in addition denied the NLD an alternative legitimate role as a democratic opposition to the regime by having its activities restricted, its leadership isolated, and by generally trying  to marginalize the party as a whole.

The suppression has hit not only party leaders and members.  Supporters among  students and the public at large have been prevented from demonstrating  their support through closure of institutions of higher education and police dispersion of crowds assembling at Aung  San Suu Kyi's house.  Or they have been scared away from active support by new laws and regulations setting severe penalties for activities considered to undermine national stability and security.

We have for quite some time witnessed the efforts of the junta to bring the guerrilla groups among Burma's many ethnic minorities under control through cease-fire agreements and economic benefits, or by chasing them over the border to Thailand. For political and economic reasons the Thai authorities seem to be interested in repatriating the Burmese groups who have sought shelter on Thai territory and in keeping the activities of the Burmese exile community in Thailand within certain controlled limits.

2.          It was on this sombre background of restrictions and suppressions in Burma that the new Government started a reassessment of ends and means in our Burma policy. We generally felt that the time had come to take a fresh look on the various means and opportunities in this context.

Although we have not yet come to many firm conclusions, it seems rather safe to predict that there will be some shifts in focus and priorities, but less in the level of activity and basic direction, of Norway's Burma policy.  Norway has already for some years been one of the leading critiques of the military regime in Burma and supporters of the democratic forces in the country.  The strong commitment is mainly due to Norway's emphasis on human rights and to the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Aung San Suu Kyi in 1991.

3 .       The instruments of Norway's Burma policy can be divided into four main categories: Firstly, public criticism of the Burmese regime in the context of human rights and democracy. Secondly, active efforts to achieve international sanctions against the regime.  Thirdly, implementation of unilateral Norwegian measures if the basis for international sanctions is lacking.  Fourthly, political and economic support for the Burmese democratic forces.

I would like to explain in more detail how and to what extent these policy instruments are being, applied today, which priorities we plan to assign to each of them in the future, and how far 1 believe we can influence the course of events in Burma by means of these instruments.

4.	The first instrument, public criticism of Burma's military regime and its policies, will be one of our major priorities with regard to Burma.  This criticism is expressed both at the national level, bilateral through demarches, and last but not least at the international level through Norwegian statements and support for resolutions on Burma in the UN.  For several years, Norway has belonged to a group of like-minded countries which have been advocating the strongest possible wording of resolutions in the UN.  we have placed particular emphasis on the need to include elements such as a strong, condemnation of Burma's human rights violations, requests for the release of political prisoners, a call for a dialogue between the junta, and the democratic opposition's right to a legitimate place in the country's political life.

Until 1996 Norway was one of several Western co-sponsors of a draft resolution on the human rights situation in Burma introduced by Sweden.  But last year and this year Norway and other like-minded countries such as Finland, the Netherlands, Ireland, the UK and Canada abstained from co-sponsoring the resolution.  The purpose of the abstention was to mark their dissatisfaction with the text.  Despite active lobbying by this group of countries, the final version of the text presented to the 3rd Committee of the General Assembly for acceptance by consensus was in their view too weak in its criticism of the Burmese regime.

Like other like-minded Western countries, Norway has compensated for the lack of
global support for a strongly worded resolution in the UN by including a strong criticism of the Burmese military regime and its policies in our main statement in the General Assembly's 3rd Committee, where the human rights situation in individual countries is regularly discussed.

5.      The second main instrument in our Burma policy is the implementation of international sanctions or the threat of such sanctions against Burma.  The new Norwegian Government will continue and intensify the former government's efforts in this field.  In 1992, Norway was the first country to take the initiative in the UN for an arms embargo and other sanctions against the Burmese regime.  We hare not received sufficiently broad support for our initiative so far, and for the time being there seems to be little prospect of achieving it.  Nevertheless we shall continue to advocate international sanctions against  Burma.

6.	As long as there is as little support for the adoption of sanctions in the UN and other international bodies as there seems today, we find it necessary, as a third instrument, to implement unilateral measures.  Ideally these should be applied by as many countries as possible, in order to increase their impact on the Burmese regime.

During the last two years, Norway has introduced several unilateral measures against Burma in response to the deteriorating situation for democracy and human rights in the country. These measures have been co-ordinated with the EU countries.  Norway formally associated itself with the EU "Common Position'' document of 28 October 1996 and the later extensions of its validity.  In accordance with this document, Norway has introduced visa restrictions for certain categories of Burmese nationals, suspended high level visits to Burma, and imposed an arms embargo.  In May of this year we decided., as did the EU countries, to exclude Burma from the general system of customs preferences, the GSP.

Unilaterally we have also introduced another measure, which I believe is unique in international terms. I am referring, to the public statements made by the Norwegian 
authorities since 1995, advising  private Norwegian companies in general not to invest in Burma as long as the present situation continues.  In the last two years, these statements have also included advice to private companies to avoid trade with Burma.  This advice has to a large extent been heeded, particularly with regard to investments, but also in the trade sector.  Our trade with Burma has been considerably reduced since these statements were made, and sank to only 1,1 million kroner (approximately USD 150 000) in exports and 8,5 million kroner (approx. USD 1,2 mill) in imports in 1996.	-


The reduction in our trade with Burma is encouraging, but the Government is working  for total abolition of trade, particularly imports, where the main items have traditionally been timber, cork and furniture.  We will continue to seek voluntary reductions by the parties involved.  That is why  I- through a letter today - have approached branch organizations, companies and organizations still trading with Burma, advising them to contribute actively to a trade reduction, with a view to obtaining total abolition of all kinds of trade with Burma.

7.	My Government has recently taken the initiative for co-ordinated Nordic measures against the Burmese regime and in support of the opposition.  The Nordic countries first discussed this possibility at prime minister level during the last session of the Nordic Council in Helsinki in November.  The details of such a common position have not yet been agreed upon.  However, the Nordic countries have agreed on the need to consider new international sanctions.  They have also agreed to propose a visit by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to Burma and to use available contacts with ASEAN to influence developments in Burma.

8.        It will also be difficult for Norway , with its commitment to limiting exchanges and contacts with Burma in accordance with the EU "Common position" document of 28 October 1996, to have formal contacts and a positive influence n Burma through a possible EFTA-ASEAN channel.  This was explicitly  made clear during the EFTA  ministerial meeting  in Geneva  last week,  here I participated on behalf of the Norwegian Government.

9.	We have also tried to establish a bilateral human rights dialogue with the Burmese government, which, however, has turned down our requests for a dialogue. We have also received quite unsatisfactory answers to our requests for further information about the circumstances around the sudden death of our consul general in Yangon, Mr. James Nichols.

10.	The fourth instrument in our Burma policy, is the support for the Burmese democratic forces.  On the political level a manifestation of this support is the close contact established between central  Norwegian authorities and the exile government NCGUB.  We will continue to receive the leader of the exile Government, Dr. Sein Win, and other leading representatives of the NCGUB for political talks in Oslo.
Internationally, Norway will continue to be one of the most active supporters of the NCGUB.

The Norwegian authorities have established close, direct personal contacts with the NLD  leader and Nobel peace prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.  The new Norwegian Government will make every effort to continue and reinforce the dialogue with her by telephone and through exchanges of letters and talks with her during, political and diplomatic visits to Rangoon.  Both in public statements and during, the discussions of resolutions on Burma in the UN, Norway has put special emphasis on Aung San Suu Kyi's situation.  We have considered it important to include a passage on the need for a dialogue between the junta and Aung San Suu Kyi. I would also like to add that Norway participates actively in the diplomatic contact arrangement  which has been established to give Aung, San Suu Kyi political and moral support.

11.         We will continue to support ethnic minority ,groups in Burma, including  ethnic refugees in the border areas, and student groups in Thailand. In political terms, this support includes Norwegian participation, together with the EU countries, in "field trips" to Karen refugee camps on the border between Thailand and Burma, and co-ordination with UNHCR representatives on support measures.

As you are probably aware through the media, Burmese refugees recently clashed with Thai military forces in one of the border areas.  Norway and other Western countries have responded to this episode by lodging  a diplomatic protest in Bangkok against what has generally been viewed is an incident in which unlawful and unnecessary military force was used against the refugees.

12.	Norway provides substantial economic support to the opposition.  This includes contributions to the radio station Democratic Voice of Burma, which has been broadcasting from Norway in the Burmese language for several Years. Norway also gives humanitarian assistance to Burmese refugees in the order of NOK 6-8 million per year. We support a number of projects and measures      under the direction of  NCGUB and affiliated student organizations, the Burma Border Consortium and other Burmese exile organizations. Much of our support is channeled through the Norwegian Burma Council.  We will maintain our economic support at the same level in 1998.

13.       Finally, few comments on the change in the top leadership of Burma, as the SLORC has been replaced by a new military leadership with the new name of "State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).  It is in my opinion too early to draw firm  conclusions with regard to the background and impact of this recent institutional change. It may have its origin in the very widespread corruption in the SLORC leadership and very difficult economic situation Burma is now facing. It can, however, also be the result of an inner power struggle.  Many people, myself included, believe that the change partly may be a response also to the international criticism and measures against the regime and its policies.  We have to wait and see which policy the SPDC now will follow.

In the meantime we will continue our Burma policy in a clear and consistent manner.
We are by no means at the end of the road in our work for democracy and human rights in Burma.


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