Jane's Intelligence Review, March 1

[brelief@xxxxxxx]

Copyright 1998 Jane's Information Group Limited,
All Rights Reserved
Jane's Intelligence Review 

March 1, 1998 

SECTION:   ASIA; Vol. 10; No. 3; Pg. 32 

LENGTH:   2900 words 

HEADLINE:  Burma receives advances from its silent suitors in Singapore 

BYLINE:  William Ashton 

HIGHLIGHT:  While China may be the most obvious country trying to win over
Burma's affections, Rangoon has, in fact, received significant advances
from an altogether more subtle suitor, as William Ashton reports. 

BODY:  

Ever since the establishment of the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC) almost 10 years ago, there have been persistent claims that Burma's
military government has been secretly supported by Singapore.  Rumours of a
close strategic relationship continue to circulate under the SLORC's
successor, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the formation of
which seems to have been prompted by representations made to General Ne Win
during his recent Southeast Asian tour.  While Singapore's motives clearly
include a wish to take advantage of the commercial opportunities flowing
from Rangoon's new 'open door' economic policies, wider strategic factors
are just as important. 

Following the massacres of pro-democracy demonstrators and creation of the
SLORC in September 1988, Burma was severely criticised by most of the
international community.  Aid and financial flows critical to the survival
of the military regime were suspended.  In addition, Burma's traditional
arms suppliers announced that they would not sell it any new weapons or
military equipment.  Even West Germany, until then the main source of
Burma's military technology, suspended co-operation on indigenous arms
production.  The SLORC, faced with the country's economic collapse and
fearful of a link-up between ethnic insurgents in the countryside and
urban-based dissidents, was desperate to restock its depleted armouries.
China and Thailand were quick to step in with offers of support, but the
first country to come to the regime's rescue was in fact Singapore. 

Traces of a relationship 

Details are hard to come by but, according to one regional journal, in
October 1988 hundreds of boxes marked 'Allied Ordnance, Singapore' were
unloaded from two vessels of Burma's Five Star Shipping Line in Rangoon's
port.  These shipments reportedly included mortars, ammunition and raw
materials for Burma's arms factories.  The consignment also contained 84 mm
rockets for the Burmese army's Carl Gustav recoilless guns, which were made
by Chartered Industries of Singapore under licence from Forenade
Fabriksverken in Sweden.  The shipment thus violated an agreement under
which the original export licence had been negotiated, requiring that any
re-exports only be made with the permission of the Swedish Government.  No
such clearance was granted. 

In August 1989 Singapore was again accused of providing arms to the SLORC
when weapons and ammunition originating in Belgium and Israel were
trans-shipped to Burma, apparently with the assistance of SKS Marketing, a
newly formed Singapore-based joint venture with the Burmese military
regime.  There have been reports that these latter shipments included
second-hand 40 mm RPG-2 grenade launchers and 57 mm anti-tank guns of
Eastern Bloc origin.  One well-informed Burma -watcher has suggested that
this equipment may have come from Palestinian stocks captured in southern
Lebanon by Israel in 1982 and re-sold to Burma. 

It is highly unlikely that any of these arms shipments to Burma could have
been made without the knowledge and support of the Singapore Government. 

Winning friends 

These gestures of practical assistance to the SLORC, at a time when it felt
most vulnerable, won Singapore some powerful friends in the military
regime.  Largely because of this high-level support, the bilateral
relationship has blossomed.  Since 1988 there have been frequent exchanges
of senior visitors, including the heads of state of both countries.
Economic ties have also greatly expanded.  Singapore is now Burma's largest
foreign investor, with over US$1 billion committed to nearly 50 different
projects (mainly in hotels, property development and tourism).  Both
governments appear to be prepared to overlook the fact that some of these
investment dollars have been generated by narcotics production in the
Golden Triangle.  Notorious traffickers like Lo Hsing-han are thought to
control a number of companies in Singapore that are investing heavily in
Burma.  The flow of illicit funds can also go in the opposite direction.
For example, it has been suggested that in 1991 foreign currency generated
by narcotics sales was used by the SLORC to pay for a large shipment of
arms from China, with the money being passed through a bank in Singapore. 

The close political and economic ties that now exist between Singapore and
Burma are well known, but much less publicity has surrounded the bilateral
co-operation that is occurring in a number of more controversial areas.
Burma's armed forces, for instance have apparently continued to order arms
and ammunition from Singaporean companies.  They also seem to have turned
to Singapore for military training, intelligence advice and defence
technology.  This has placed Singapore in a category reserved for Burma's
special friends, a category currently shared only by the Burmese junta's
main financial backer and strategic ally:  China. 

Bolstering the friendship

Since those early consignments, a wide variety of additional arms and
ammunition has reportedly been shipped to Burma from firms based in
Singapore, and Singaporean brokers appear to have facilitated the sale of
munitions to Burma from other suppliers.  The details of these deals are
not always clear, but they are believed to have included M16A1 automatic
rifles and 5.56 mm ammunition (apparently in violation of another export
agreement attached to their licensed production in Singapore), 7.62 mm
assault rifles and ammunition, communications equipment of various kinds
and at least one (but possibly more) British Aerospace Bloodhound Mk 2
surface-to-air missile systems with Scorpion target illuminating radars.
If this latter report is true, then Singapore would be responsible for
providing the Burmese armed forces with their first guided missile system. 

Bilateral links 

The close bilateral relationship is also reflected in links between the
armed forces of both countries.  For example, the Singapore Armed Forces
(SAF) have provided training in Singapore to specialist units like the
Burmese army's parachute team, and there have been persistent rumours in
Rangoon that the SAF are providing the Burmese army with artillery training
in Burma.  Another version of this story has it that the SAF are, in fact,
undertaking artillery training on Burmese ranges.  This is one explanation
given to account for the occasional visits to Rangoon of Republic of
Singapore Air Force (RSAF) Fokker F-50 and Lockheed C-130 transports.  In
fact, RSAF aircraft regularly stage through Rangoon on their way to
Bangladesh, reportedly on 'navigational training' flights.  While some of
these reports are difficult to prove, the relationship between the armed
forces of the two countries is clearly much closer than publicly
acknowledged. 

Singapore is also believed to be the main source of information technology
being obtained by Burma's military regime.  For example, a Singaporean
firm, or group of firms, has apparently installed computers throughout
Burma's Defence Ministry and helped to upgrade its communications links
with the 10 Regional Military Commands.  Singapore is probably also the
source of the equipment installed in the ministry's ' cyber war centre'
(created a few years ago under a new Directorate of Defence Services
Computers).  This centre is reported to be closely involved in the
monitoring and recording of foreign and domestic telecommunications,
including the satellite telephone conversations of Burmese opposition
groups.  A recent study has also suggested that Singapore may have provided
the Burmese armed forces with modern frequency-hopping radios and
encryption devices to protect their own signals from interception (see p35). 

Bilateral co-operation may have also been extended to other intelligence
areas.  One Australian analyst has recently cited a claim that Singapore is
providing intelligence training to Burma's 'secret police' in central
Singapore.  Hundreds of Burmese officers are reported to be involved.
There has also been at least one credible press report that Singaporean
intelligence officers have been observed in Burma near the Thai- Burma
border.  The current Singaporean ambassador to Burma is a former senior SAF
officer and a past director of Singapore's defence-oriented Joint
Intelligence Directorate.  This appointment may simply be a coincidence,
but it is curious that Singapore has chosen to assign someone with a
military background to this new member of the Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and not one of its many capable professional diplomats. 

There have also been repeated, if still unconfirmed, reports that a
Singaporean company, or group of companies, has stepped in to help
modernise and expand Burma's arms industries, drawing on Singapore's
well-developed expertise in this field.  Singaporean technicians, for
example, have apparently replaced the German technicians formerly based at
Padaung, across the Irrawaddy River from Prome and close to one of the
regime's well-guarded defence industrial complexes.  Once again, these
claims are difficult to verify, but Singaporean involvement in these
factories would be consistent with the SLORC's (and now the SPDC's) aim of
making Burma more self-sufficient in arms production.  Singapore is less
likely to face the kinds of domestic pressures which in 1988 forced Germany
to reconsider its support for Burma's arms industries. 

Singaporean denials 

Ever since they began to surface, these rumours and news media reports have
been consistently denied by the Singaporean Government.  Indeed, Singapore
has shown considerable sensitivity to any suggestion that it is secretly
supporting the military regime in Rangoon or turning a blind eye to Burmese
money-laundering operations.  Some of the reasons for this sensitivity are
obvious.  Despite ASEAN's ambivalent attitude toward Burma since 1988,
there would be considerable diplomatic embarrassment to Singapore if it was
known to be actively supporting an international pariah like the SPDC in
such a fashion.  Singapore can hardly accuse Western countries of
interfering in Burma's internal affairs (by condemning the military
regime's repressive policies) when it is helping to provide the same regime
with the means to retain its iron grip on power.  Nor does Singapore wish
to lose its reputation as an honest dealer in regional affairs and a
staunch opponent of narcotics trafficking. 

There is another explanation for Singapore's sensitivity on this issue,
however, and that is its wish to avoid any potential difficulties in its
developing relationship with China. 

Despite statements to the contrary from elder statesmen like former prime
minister Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore is acutely conscious of China's growing
economic strength and strategic influence.  It has watched China's
behaviour in the region, including its rapidly growing links with the
military regime in Burma, with some concern.  In order to avoid pushing the
SPDC further into the arms of the Chinese, Singapore and the other ASEAN
states have refused to join in the widespread condemnation of the Burmese
junta for its abuses of human rights and have undertaken instead to
'constructively engage' the Rangoon regime. 

These countries have included in their efforts the pursuit of commercial
opportunities in Burma and in some cases modest defence ties, but in
Singapore's case a close (and hidden) strategic partnership appears to be a
very high priority. 

Well-placed to gain 

Of all the ASEAN countries, Singapore is perhaps best placed to pursue this
particular aim.  It is not one of Burma's immediate neighbours and
therefore does not have to cope with the territorial disputes and refugee
outflows which tend to characterise Burma's relations with Thailand.
Similarly, Singapore cares little about human rights, in particular the
plight of the ethnic and religious minorities in Burma, which occasionally
troubles Muslim states like Indonesia and Malaysia.  Also, having developed
one of the region's most advanced armed forces and defence industrial
support bases, Singapore is in a good position to offer Burma a number of
inducements which other ASEAN countries would find hard to match. 

Singapore seems to have decided that, in a number of ways, close links with
the military regime in Rangoon serves its long-term national security
interests.  Having apparently assessed that Aung San Suu Kyi and the
pro-democracy forces were unlikely to win power for the foreseeable future,
Singapore has deliberately set out to forge closer ties with the real
centre of power in Burma:  namely the armed forces.  

By assisting with arms sales, defence technology transfers, military
training and intelligence co-operation, Singapore has been able to win a
sympathetic hearing at the very heart of Burma's official councils.  From
there, it is in a good position not only to encourage its own commercial
interests but also to pursue wider strategic aims.  These relate in part to
Burma's own growing military capabilities, but also to China's future role
in the Asia-Pacific region. 

Singapore has recognised, perhaps more readily than most countries, that
Burma has the potential to become a more influential factor in the region's
changing strategic environment.  As part of an ambitious expansion and
modernisation plan, for example, the Burmese armed forces have grown from
around 186,000 in 1988 to more than 400,000 - and at a time when all other
regional countries are reducing the size of their armed forces.  In
addition, since 1988 the SLORC has acquired around 130 new combat aircraft,
nearly 30 new naval vessels and large numbers of AFVs, multiple rocket
launchers and artillery pieces.  The Rangoon regime has also improved its
command and control systems, and upgraded its military infrastructure.
With one of the largest armed forces in Southeast Asia, newly equipped with
a wide range of more modern weapons, Burma now has the potential to play a
far greater conventional defence role than at any other time in its history. 

The Chinese factor 

More importantly, most of the new arms and equipment facilitating this
massive military expansion programme have come from China, assisted by the
provision of generous loans and special 'friendship' prices. 

In addition, hundreds of Burmese servicemen have undertaken training
courses in China, and up to 100 People's Liberation Army instructors have
been posted to Burma at different times to teach Burmese personnel how to
use their new weapons.  China seems to have negotiated a comprehensive
intelligence co-operation arrangement with Burma, which may even extend to
the operation of joint signals intelligence posts scattered around Burma's
long coastline.  Since 1988 China has also played a major role in the
development of Burma's civil and military infrastructure. 

This dramatic departure from Burma's traditional neutrality in
international affairs, along with its new strategic partnership with a
major power like China, has sent ripples of concern around the region.
There are fears that Burma may eventually become a 'client state' of China,
provide support to Chinese naval deployments to the Indian Ocean or act as
a stalking horse for Chinese interests in regional councils such as ASEAN.
At times, these fears appear rather exaggerated and fail to take into
account Burma's passionate nationalism and deep-seated suspicions of
Chinese intentions.  Some of these fears may in fact be politically
inspired by countries like India in an effort to discredit China and garner
favour with the ASEAN members.  Even so, real concerns remain - including
in Singapore - that China is developing such a hold on Burma's economy and
armed forces that it will constrain the Rangoon regime's ability to act
independently in the future. 

Singapore's motives 

Thus, Singapore has a number of immediate and obvious reasons for wanting
to develop a close working relationship with Burma.  These relate mainly to
Singapore's own perceived commercial and political interests.  Less
obvious, perhaps, is Singapore's desire to cultivate better links with a
regional country that is expanding its military capabilities and external
contacts after decades of self-imposed isolation.  In the final analysis,
however, China's shadow falls constantly across Singapore's relationship
with Burma, and it is concern about China's future role in the region that
has prompted many of the steps taken by Singapore in recent years to
consolidate its special relationship with the military regime in Rangoon. 

While this remains the case, Singapore will continue to be very sensitive
about any publicity which may complicate its long-term plans.  These
include a two-track approach of cultivating close relations with China
while hedging its bets by supporting an independent Burma within ASEAN.  In
these circumstances, any prospect of Singapore's hidden partnership with
Burma being re-examined as a result of international pressure seems remote. 

William Ashton is a freelance journalist based in Canberra, Australia. 

GRAPHIC:  Photograph 1, Key men in the SPDC, including Than Shwe (front
left), Maung Aye (centre) and Khin Nyunt (front right).  Singapore won
powerful friends among these men when it supplied moral and materiel
support following Burma's crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in
September 1988.  Most other nations had ostracised the junta.  P A News;
Photograph 2, Flying visits:  RSAF C-130s regularly stage through Rangoon
on their way to Bangladesh, reportedly on 'navigational training' flights
but possibly also in support of an artillery training programme.  D Boey 

LANGUAGE:  ENGLISH 


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