ASIAWEEK: 980417: Gently, discreetl

[suriya@xxxxxxxxxxxx]

                                              Ballot Power?

    Gently, discreetly, China is debating political change


WERE PRESIDENT JIANG ZEMIN to jot down on a napkin how he would like to see
political reform emerge in China, the scenario might go something like this: slowly, slowly, in the
dead of night, when all eyes are focused elsewhere. Well, don't look now. With virtually all of Asia
engrossed in the impact of falling currencies, tottering banks and depressed consumers, something
momentous may be stirring in China. In recent months, the highly sensitive issue of political reform
has been under renewed debate not only by Chinese intelligentsia but also within the political
hierarchy.

China continues to pressure its dissidents, but the atmosphere has become noticeably more relaxed.
Early this year, Fang Jue, a former bureaucrat in the southern coastal city of Fuzhou, outlined a brief
but comprehensive proposal to overhaul China's political system. He wanted an end to the
Communist Party's monopoly on power, open elections at various levels of government, the rule of
law and effective protection of speech and press freedoms. Remarkably, the authorities allowed
Fang to publicly distribute his tract. Since then, similar ideas have been repeatedly aired in press
articles, books and university seminars.

Political reform has entered the agendas of top state think-tanks too. According to an international
Chinese newsweekly, the party leadership recently asked the elite Academy of Social Sciences to
prepare a comprehensive plan for political change. Bai Gang, a deputy director of the body, told the
independent Yazhou Zhoukan that one key proposal was a two-tier voting system, under which
candidates for public office must secure a 50% popular vote before they can qualify for the decisive
balloting within the party. The idea, says Bai, is to extend reform upward progressively so long as
the system produces leaders who are more capable and popular as well as less corrupt.

Growing signs suggest that Jiang himself may be behind the fresh interest in political change. The
issue dates back to the early 1980s, when party chief Hu Yaobang tried to push it -- with Deng
Xiaoping's blessing. But the effort soon stalled under the opposition of powerful vested interests.
After the trauma of Tiananmen in 1989, political reform was virtually taboo as stability became
Beijing's top concern. 

Deng's death in February last year opened new possibilities. At the patriarch's funeral, Jiang
surprised many onlookers by mentioning political reform in his eulogy. More recently, Deng's
successor reportedly told top cadres in internal meetings that a major problem in crisis-stricken
Southeast Asia was that "feudalism" had put too much unchecked power in the hands of bureaucrats
and politicians, feeding corruption and other ills. China, Jiang said, must strive to become
"anti-feudalistic and democratic." And without mentioning any timetable, Zhu Rongji said at his
maiden press conference after becoming premier last month that he favored "democratic elections."

Jiang and his senior colleagues have strong, practical reasons to pursue political liberalization. As
China undertakes painful reforms to head off economic crisis, social tensions will simmer as
industries are overhauled and millions lose their jobs. If people are allowed to vent their discontent
without jeopardizing the party's ultimate authority, that would in fact be stabilizing. Moreover, as
village elections have shown in recent years, officials with a direct mandate from the people tend to
perform better and be less susceptible to graft. A greater degree of democracy in China would also
give a further boost to Beijing's relations with the United States and other Western powers,
increasing its diplomatic clout.

Another, perhaps even more important, factor is Taiwan. A dream of every Chinese leader this
century has been reunification with the estranged island. But so long as the mainland remains under
autocratic rule, democratic Taiwan's citizens will resist reunion. If Beijing is able to convince them of
its commitment to a pluralistic political culture, that would be a powerful inducement to conciliation.
Jiang's authority is now unchallenged in Beijing, and he is looking for ways he can emerge from the
giant shadow of his mentor Deng to distinguish himself as a leader and statesman. If he can establish
himself as the man who successfully modernized China's politics and set the nation firmly down the
path to reunification, his place in the history books will be secure. Such achievements would match,
if not exceed, Deng's legacy of economic revitalization and the recovery of Hong Kong.

Even so, China's liberalization will be slow and difficult. Officials accustomed to unchecked power
will continue to resist the reformers. Another obstacle is the low educational levels that prevail in
much of China, a frequent lament of liberal party cadres. If Beijing intends to allow more of its
people to vote, it will first have to prepare them to do so meaningfully by educating them properly.
Zhu's recent citation of education as a priority of his government is an encouraging start. 

Jiang's own cautious style also ensures that any democratization will be gradual. The step-by-step,
trial-and-error approach that characterized Dengist economic reform will likely apply to political
change in China as well. Setbacks, which are inevitable, may well tempt Beijing's leaders to call a
halt to the experiment. But the recent experience of culturally similar societies -- such as Taiwan and
South Korea -- suggests that efforts to turn the clock back are usually painful and ultimately futile.
Politics is the last great frontier of Chinese reform, one Jiang Zemin may be getting ready to cross.
Steady navigation will be of the utmost importance.