Present situation of Burma: Request

[mikio@xxxxxxxxx]

Dear all,

I will have a seminar on the present situation of Burma at Sarawak
University of Malaysia this coming Thursday. My basic understanding of the
present situation is as follows, and I have several questions regarding it.
I would be grateful if you would provide me with any comments on any part
of the following statement or your view on the issues raised in the
question part. (Please take note that because of a limited amount of time
my focus in this seminar will be on the assessment of nonviolence strategy
by the pro-democracy movement rather than the situation surrounding
minority groups, although I admit that the two issues are closely related
to each other.)

Thank you in anticipation for your co-operation.

Dr. Mikio Oishi,
Faculty of Social Sciences, 
Sarawak University of Malaysia,
Malaysia

***************

The confrontation between the pro-democracy movement and the military junta
is in a stalemate. The military junta has not been able to crash the
NLD-led pro-democracy movement although it commands overwhelming military
power and severely oppresses the Burmese people, particularly NLD activists
and supporters. Campaigns to isolate the military junta in the
international community have been a huge success. The international
condemnation has resulted in the West's economic sanctions and
international tourism boycott, whose bites, combined with the drying up of
investments and aid from ASEAN countries and China due to the economic
crisis in East Asia, are felt increasingly by the military junta. 

ASEAN played a role of supporter for the military junta in its move to
admit Burma into itself. But once Burma is in the fold, ASEAN has been
forced to play a role of mediator between NLD and SLORC/SPDC. At the moment
ASEAN is tentatively engaging NLD as well as SPDC, and is slowly and
silently changing its Burma policy from "constructive engagement" (which is
exclusively economic) to "constructive intervention" (which is political as
well as economic). This change should be credited ultimately to citizens'
groups (within and outside ASEAN) which were opposed to the admission of
the SLORC Burma and helped generate a huge international pressure on ASEAN
to produce results in the wake of the admission. The military junta can no
longer rely on ASEAN as its unconditional supporter and is under stronger
pressure from the organisation to change. 

Thus, the SLORC/SPDC has been "disarmed" to a considerable degree in
economic, moral and military terms. Such a situation has left the junta
with very few options to take and would eventually drag it to a
dialogue/negotiation with NLD and the representatives of minorities
(perhaps this will take place after an open split of the junta into the
"hardliners" and the "realists"/"moderates"?What happened to the Marcos
regime's armed forces under the pressure of the "People's Power" will be
replayed in Burma?). 

On the other hand, The pro-democracy movement has won the support of  the
international community as well as maintaining its own strength. However,
the struggle has not yet brought about a tangible change on the side of the
junta. NLD has not realised its short-term goal of starting a genuine
dialogue with SLORC/SPDC. For this reason, different views on the
achievement of the movement as well as different opinions about the next
step to be taken seem to be emerging within the pro-democracy camp.
Particularly, there appears to be a division between those who would stick
to the present strategy of self-empowerment and confrontation and those who
countenance more conciliatory and/or  "realistic" approaches. 

In this way, both camps are now under huge pressure, which may cause an
internal division on each side with significant consequences for the future
course of the conflict. 

*****
The above is my understanding of the present situation of Burma. Now my
questions are:

(1) Is there any desire or mood among the pro-democracy activists to look
for a third party who could mediate the two camps? It is true that NLD led
by DASSK has mediatory principles, and that because of these principles NLD
qualifies as a national mediator/reconciliator (actually, the pro-democracy
movement itself can be regarded as part of national reconciliation process
of Burma), but in this particular stage of the process, NLD has to play a
role of a party to conflict rather than mediator. It is quite difficult for
the same group to play as a party to conflict and as a mediator at the same
time. It seems an outside(s) is needed to mediate the two camps in the
present impasse. 

(2) If the answer of the 1st question is yes, who is the possible mediator?
There are at least two candidates for the role. First, ASEAN seems to have
already taken up this responsibility albeit tentatively and grudgingly.
ASEAN may be able to bring the two camps together, using its economic and
political clout. Second, there may be someone who command respect of both
parties, such as a Buddhist monk of high virtues who has not been directly
involved in the conflict. I once heard of conciliation efforts by Rev.
Rivitta Dhamma (sorry if spelling is wrong) who was based in England (Does
he still continue his efforts? Does anyone have more detailed
information?). Religious persons or institutions often play an important
role in mediation, as has been demonstrated in national reconciliation in
the Philippines and South Africa. Can this be the case for Burma?