DISPOSSESSED -- Forced Relocation a

[brelief@xxxxxxx]

DISPOSSESSED (Part I of text)

Forced Relocation and Extrajudicial Killings in Shan State

The Shan Human Rights Foundation
April 1998

The Shan Human Rights Foundation
The SHRF is a non-governmental organisation formed on December 6, 1990, in
the free territory of Shan State, with the support of the Buddhist
brotherhood, the national resistance, expatriate Shans and many individuals
inside and outside Shan State.

The SHRF has the following aims:
1.	To strive for human rights and restore justice to the victims
2.	To promote democracy in accordance with the desire and will of the
people, and establish a popular government based on democratic principles;
3.	To strive for unity, fraternity, equality and cooperation'
4.	To strive for world peace, freedom and prosperity.

Contact address: 	The Shan Human Rights Foundation
				P.O. Box 201
				Phrasing P.O.
				Chiang Mai 50200
				Thailand

Executive Summary

Since March 1996, the Burmese military regime has forcibly relocated over
1,400 villages throughout 7,000 square miles in Central Shan State. Over
30O,000 people have been ordered to move at gunpoint into strategic
relocation sites. No assistance has been provided to them.

The relocation program has intensified during 1997 and 1998, with new areas
being forced to relocate, and existing relocation sites being forced to move
again. Vast rural areas of 11 townships have been turned into depopulated
"free-fire" zones.

During 1997 there was a sharp increase in the number of extrajudicial
killings by the regime's troops, with repeated massacres of villagers caught
outside the relocation sites. In one township alone, SHRF has documented the
killings of over 300 relocated villagers.

The villagers in the relocation sites are used for forced labour by the
junta's troops. They must work as porters, build roads, and perform tasks
such as digging ditches or building fences at the nearby military camps
without food or pay.

There are three main patterns of displacement for the relocated villagers.
Most move to the relocation sites, and try to survive by selling off
possessions, working as wage labourers, or even begging. Others remain
hiding in the jungle near their villages, dodging army patrols to try and
cultivate their old farms. Finally, there are those driven to desperation by
the lack of food and security who flee to other parts of Shan State or to
Thailand.

It is estimated that over 80,000 Shans have fled into Thailand during the
last two years. Current Thai policy has denied these Shan safe refuge and
the right to receive humanitarian assistance. Shan refugees have therefore
been forced to survive as illegal migrants, seeking shelter and food at
construction sites or on farms. Their already precarious situation has been
worsened by the Thai economic crisis, which has led to a lack of work and
increased arrests and repatriations by the Thai authorities.

This report details the devastating extent of the forced relocation program
in Shan State that is continuing to this day. Hundreds of thousands of Shans
have been dispossessed of their ancestral lands, cultural heritage and
livelihood. The damage inflicted by the regime's two-year relocation program
will take generations to repair.

Call for Action
SHRF calls on ASEAN, the United Nations, and other concerned international
bodies to pressure the Burmese military regime to stop the forced relocation
program and extrajudicial killings in Shan State and to allow the Shan
villagers to return to their original homes without further abuse.

In addition, SHRF calls on the Royal Thai Government to allow the Shans
fleeing this relocation program access to safe refuge in Thailand and the
right to receive humanitarian assistance until such abuses are stopped.

BACKGROUND

Population and forced relocation in Shan State are not new. They have been
common occurrences since the Burmese Army first came to Shan State in 1950
on the pretext of driving away the Chinese Nationalist KMT, who were pushed
into Shan State from Yunnan Province of China by Mao Tse Tung's troops. All
kinds of human rights violations were committed by both the Burmese Army and
KMT alike.

The situation became worse after the military seized power in 1962 and
resistance forces sprang up all over Shan State. In their attempts to crush
the forces of the opposition, one of the strategies of the Burmese Army has
been the "Four Cuts" operation, aimed at cutting the food, funds,
intelligence and recruits provided by local villagers to the resistance
armies. This often involved forcing whole village tracts to move to
strategic sites which could be closely guarded. Throughout the past thirty
years, large areas of Shan State have been repeatedly disrupted in this way.
However, the massive forced relocation begun by the SLORC in Central Shan
State in 1996 and continuing up to this day is totally unprecedented in scale.

EVENTS PRECEDING THE 1996 RELOCATIONS

In early January 1996, the Shan Mong Tai Army (MTA) led by Khun Sa
surrendered to the SLORC military regime. However, large numbers of ex-MTA
troops refused to surrender, and instead began moving north from the former
MTA areas along the Thai-Burma border to join the other Shan resistance
groups, the Shan State Army and the Shan State National Army, who had
ceasefire agreements with the SLORC. These ex-MTA soldiers regrouped
themselves into a new army (the Shan United Revolutionary Army -- SURA)
under the leadership of Major Yord Serk.

By late January, 1996, these breakaway Shan troops had crossed to the north
of the Salween River, and begun heading north to the area of Larng Kher.
Despite SLORC attempts to block their passage, by February they had
penetrated into Central Shan State, and began operating as a guerrilla force.

The SLORC responded with drastic measures. In early March, they embarked on
a systematic program to relocate all villages in suspected rebel areas to
towns or sites along main roads and near SLORC army bases. The aim was to
prevent the villagers from providing any support to the rebels and therefore
force the Shan soldiers to surrender.

THE 1996 RELOCATION PROGRAM 

Beginning in March, 1996, the SLORC troops ordered village after village in
eight townships -- Larng Kher, Murng Nai, Nam Zarng, Lai Kha, Murng Kerng,
Kun Hing, Ke See and Murng Su -- to move, turning once thriving farming
communities into depopulated "free-fire" zones.

In most cases the villagers were given only 3-5 days to move, and were
threatened to be shot if they did not comply. Those villagers with ox-carts
could carry some supplies with them, but those walking on foot could carry
almost nothing. The relocation sites were often a day's walk away. Nearly
all farmers, they were forced to leave behind their crops and most of their
animals, many of which were stolen immediately by the SLORC troops. During
the relocation, villagers were beaten, burned alive and shot dead.

No assistance was provided for the villagers at the relocation sites, which
were just empty areas along the sides of roads. Those lucky enough to have
relatives in towns moved in to stay with them; the rest had to build
make-shift huts in the sites. Living conditions were crude and unsanitary,
and many died of malnourishment and illness. Children were seen begging at
the side of the roads.

As well as depriving the villagers of their homes and livelihood, the SLORC
troops also used them as forced labour. Villagers were made to stand guard
along the roads and clear trees and bushes along the roads so that rebel
soldiers could not hide there. They were also made to work at SLORC military
camps and on road-building projects.

The SHRF report "Uprooting the Shan" published in December 1996, documented
a total of 605 villages relocated in eight townships, as follows:
Township 	no. of villages relocated  	no. of households relocated 
Kun Hing 		95 				3,407
Nam Zarng 	68 				2,704
Lai Kha 		80 				3,043
Ke See 		232 				7,112
Murng Kerng 	24 				1,230
Murng Nai 	56 				2,965
Larng Kher 	22 				835
Murng Su 	28 				697

Total 		605 				21,993

With an average household containing at least 5 people, it was estimated
that well over 100,000 people were affected by the forced relocation in
1996. The area from which people were relocated covered approximately 5,000
square miles.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN 1997

Even while the relocations were going on in 1996, the SURA were attempting
to negotiate with the SLORC to reach a ceasefire agreement. SURA leader Sao
Yord Serk sent several letters to SLORC Chairman Than Shwe asking for
dialogue, but received no reply. The SLORC also warned the two other main
Shan groups, the SSA and SSNA, who already had a ceasefire agreement with
the SLORC, not to make any contact with the SURA or give them any help.

However, in mid-September 1997, the leaders of the three Shan groups met at
the SSA camp of Seng Kaeo in Si Paw township and signed an agreement to
unite under a common banner, the Shan States Army (SSA).
Sao Sai Naung, the Chief of the combined force, then went to Rangoon and
made another peace attempt, asking for SLORC's official recognition of their
new group. This offer was again turned down and the fighting has been
continuing to the present, with the SLORC vowing to "crush" the SURA, and
continuing its forced relocation program against the Shan civilian population.

THE 1997/1998 RELOCATION PROGRAM

In March 1997, SLORC began relocating previously untouched villages in seven
out of the eight townships already affected by the 1996 relocations, as well
as moving already existing relocation sites closer to the towns, to bring
the villagers further under their control. The only exception was Murng Su
township, where relocations were not continued after 1996, as the SURA
troops were not operating there.

In May 1997, the relocation program spread south-east to the township of
Murng Pan, where the SURA had started operating. Then in December 1997,
relocations began to the east of the Salween to Murng Paeng, and in
January-February 1998, the area of relocation spread to the west in the
townships of Loi Lem and Ho Pong.

During the relocations, the villagers were usually given only 3-7 days to
move, but in some cases, the villagers were given no warning whatsoever, and
houses were burned down with people still in them.

The SPDC continues to provide nothing to the relocated villagers, and to use
them for forced labour. They used for portering, road-construction, and work
on nearby army camps such as building of barracks and fences.

The total number of villages that have been forced to move since 1996 and
remain relocated to the present is as follows:

Township no. 	of villages relocated 	no. of households relocated 
Kun Hing 		185 				9,551
Nam Zarng 	181 				7,296
Lai Kha 		201 				8,735
Ke See 		364 				11,663
Murng Kerng 	186 				8,681
Murng Nai 	99 				3,870
Larng Kher 	31 				1,157
Murng Pan 	61 				2,031
Murng Paeng 	24 				285
Loi Lem 		129 				2,445
Ho Pong 		17 				243

Total 		1,478 			55,957

With an average household containing at least 5 people, this means that at
least 300,000 people have now been affected by the forced relocation. The
affected areas now total approximately 7,000 square miles.

EXTRAJUDICIAL KILLINGS

In 1997, in addition to expanding the area of forced relocation, the
regime's troops also began systematically killing villagers caught outside
the relocation sites in a program to deter others from going back to their
original villages.

On March 30, 1997, SLORC troops raped and shot dead a girl of 12 while she
was taking hay to cattle in a field near her old village of Ho Pung, Lai Kha
township. When her relatives requested permission to bury the body, the
SLORC troops said: "She must be kept like this as an example for you people
of Shan State to see. If you bury her you must die with her."  (SHRF June
1997 monthly report)

On July 11, 1997, SLORC troops laid out the beheaded bodies of 26 villagers
beside the main Keng Lom-Kun Hing road in an apparent warning to other
villagers straying from the relocation sites. On July 12, a further 12
headless corpses of villagers were placed by the Keng Lom-Keng Tong road in
Kun Hing township.

Throughout 1997, SLORC troops killed villagers who were simply foraging for
food near the relocation sites. Examples include a woman blown up by a
grenade when collecting bamboo shoots in a field (May 30, 1997, Kun Hing); 3
men shot dead when fishing in a stream (March 30, 1997, Nam Zarng); and 6
men shot dead when collecting wild honey in the forest (June 6, 1997, Nam
Zarng).

Villagers have also been massacred in large groups. This has included those
who were given official permission to return to their villages.

For example, on June 16, 1997, two groups of villagers who had been
relocated to the town of Kun Hing were given permission to return to their
old villages to collect rice. They left in two convoys of ox-carts. Both
groups were stopped on the way by SLORC troops; one near Sai Khao, one near
Tard Pa Ho waterfall. In one group, 29 of the villagers were massacred, in
the other 27. One of the survivors, a woman with a small child, who was
spared, related the horror of the massacre:

"We were made to stay in a house. . They (the SLORC troops) came to the door
and called out the people one by one. They called away 16 people first, 12
men and 4 women. Then they came and called another group of 10. . . Then to
the west I heard bursts of machine gunfire. They were killing the 16 people.
Then after just a bit I heard gunfire nearby. . . In the group of 10 my
husband died. In the group of 16 my younger sister and her husband died... I
was sure I would be killed too..  I was shaking, shaking! I was sitting and
shaking all the time. My blood was hot all over my body. I could not think
properly. I would have run away but they were standing there guarding me...
I think I would be dead if I hadn't had my son with me. One of the women who
was killed had left her baby at home. She squeezed out milk from her breast
to show she had a baby, but the SLORC commander said that her baby must have
died (and killed her anyway)." (KHRG interview with villager from Keng Kham,
August 30, 1997)

The extrajudicial killings also include people who were killed while inside
relocation sites. For example, on February 21, 1997, at about 9.00 pm, 2
Shan families, including three young children, were blown up while
sheltering in a ditch near their homes by SLORC troops at Kho Lam relocation
site in Nam Zarng township. The troops had fired shells into the site in
retaliation for a Shan Army raid in the area.

SHRF has recorded the following numbers of villagers killed in the
relocation areas during 1997 (for details of killings see Appendix 6):
Kun Hing 		319 killed
Nam Zarng 	159 killed
Lai Kha 		58 killed
Ke See 		45 killed 
Murng Kerng 	17 killed
Murng Nai 	23 killed
Larng Kher 	5 killed 
Murng Pan 	37 killed
Loi Lem		1 killed

Total number of people killed = 664

(Note: This is only the confirmed total. It is believed that many other
killings have gone undocumented.)

PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

The movements of villagers who have been forcibly relocated appear to fall
into three main categories: 
a) those who move to the relocation sites; 
b) those who continue to stay around their village, hiding in the jungle; and 
c) those that move elsewhere, mainly to Thailand.

a) The displaced in the relocation sites

Most of the villagers are too afraid to disobey the relocation orders and
end up moving to the relocation sites. Unless they have relatives in the
area they can stay with, they have to build their own huts, sometimes
sharing with other displaced families. In most cases, the land close to the
relocation sites is too arid to plant, or is already claimed by other
villagers living in the area. Thus, people survive by selling off
possessions and doing day labour.

"They built little huts and then they made a living doing day labour..for
whoever needed work done. They did not have any fixed employers. They worked
for different employers in turn. They earned about 50-60 kyats a day. It is
not enough to survive, because they had to buy rice." (KHRG interview with
refugee from Murng Nai, August 30, 1997)

Those that have nothing to sell or cannot find work must resort to begging.
"Many don 't have enough to eat. Some have to beg along the road and people
are crying all the time. Some people take refuge in the monasteries." (KHRG
interview with monk from Lai Kha, Aug 31, 1997)

Although in some areas the displaced may get written permission to return to
tend their fields if they are close to the site, the fact that villagers can
be shot on sight outside the site makes many too afraid to risk this.

b) The displaced in hiding

It is impossible to estimate the numbers of villagers who are hiding near
their villages in the jungle. Those who do so are either afraid they will
not survive in the relocation sites because they are too poor, or,
particularly in the case of old people, simply feel too insecure to go far
from their homes. They thus stay close to their farms, either secretly
planting their old fields, or else relying on stores of rice they have
hidden nearby.  They cannot stay in their old villages, but make makeshift
huts among clumps of trees, or in thick bush, where they are not easily visible.

One 18-year-old Shan villager who had spent over a year hiding in the east
of Murng Kerng, described his experience:

"We could not move to the town because we had no money. There were about 4
other families from our village who hid in the jungle. We took our rice from
home and hid it in the ground, so we could go and get it when we needed it.
We stayed under trees and moved around all the time. If we stayed too long
in one place, the paths we used became too obvious, and we were afraid the
SLORC soldiers would find us. Finally, though, we found a cave, where we
felt safe, so we stayed there."  (SHRF interview with villager from Murng
Kerng, November 1997.)

Another teenage boy, disabled from birth and unable to walk, from a village
near Keng Kham, related how he and his father had hidden in the jungle,
rather than move to the site of Kun Hing.

"When we were relocated, my father, who had looked after me since my mother
died, knew he could not support me if we moved to Bun Hing, so we stayed
near to our village. But one day, we were very unlucky: as we were going
through the jungle, we suddenly met some SLORC troops. They seized my
father. I cried, and begged them to leave him with me. I told them I
couldn't stay alone, but they took him away and killed him....After that, I
decided I would come to Thailand, where I had a sister. I crawled and begged
my way down to the border. It took me five months." (SHRF interview with
villager from Keng Kham, November 1997)

c) The displaced that flee to Thailand

Because of the difficulties of surviving in the relocation sites and fear of
the abuses of the SLORC/SPDC troops, many relocated villagers decide to seek
food and shelter elsewhere. Some move to other parts of Shan State where
they have relatives or think they can find work. However, most of them flee
to Thailand.

Some of the relocated villagers travel straight to Thailand after receiving
the relocation orders, and do not even go to the relocation sites.

"In Kali and Kun Hing (relocation sites) we had heard there was nothing for
most of us. How could we move there? We had no money, so how could we buy
food there? Some people had money, and they came to Thailand immediately,
while they still had money. We knew that if we came to Thailand we could
work and get money, but if we went to Kun Hing, we would starve. So I came
to Thailand. Actually I didn't even have enough money to come to Thailand,
so I had to borrow some from relatives." (KHRG interview with villager from
Keng Kham, August 30, 1997)

Others have come to Thailand in desperation after trying to survive as long
as a year or more in a relocation site or in hiding near their village.

A major factor that influences people to come to the border appears to be
their level of information about Thailand. Many of the first Shan refugees
to arrive in April-May of 1996 following the start of the relocation
program, were those from the southernmost townships of Central Shan State,
such as Murng Nai and Larng Kher, where there is a traditional flow of
migrant labour to Thailand. They were thus following established routes to
the border, and many had members of their communities already working in
Thailand who they could initially come and stay with when they arrived.

However, as more and more refugees have been coming to Thailand over the
last 2 years, the networks of information have been spreading deeper inside
Shan State, bringing more people to the border.

Money can be a factor influencing people's decision to come to Thailand, as
those travelling by truck must pay up to 8,000 kyats per person to travel to
the border. However, many also walk to reach the border, often taking
several weeks.

FORCED RELOCATION IN KUN HING

No. of villages relocated: 185 
No. of households relocated: 9,551

Background of the area

Most of the people of Kun Hing are farmers, cultivating the valleys of this
mountainous region, which is thickly forested with teak.

The 7th Brigade of the SSA ceasefire group still has an area of operation
north-east of Kun Hing, north of the Kun Hing-Kali road.

Relocation 

In 1996, relocation began in March, with villages between the Nam Pang and
Salween Rivers and south of the Kun Hing-Murng Paeng road being ordered to
move to 3 main relocation sites. In May, most of the villages south of Kun
Hing and west of the Nam Pang were ordered to move to 4 main sites.

Between March and May 1997, the SLORC began clearing all of the area south
of Kun Hing. All of the relocation sites from 1996, as well as the remaining
villages that had not been relocated in 1996, were ordered north to the town
of Kun Hing, or to east of the town, on the Kun Hing-Murng Paeng road.

Villagers in the Keng Kham area were ordered to move by May 9. They were
given 3 days to move. Some of the villagers were ordered to be porters by
the SLORC even during the move.

"We were all ordered to come to a temple in Keng Kham. We were guarded in a
group there. The SLORC commander told us we had just the next day and the
day after that to move all our things. The last day was May 9...  In the
morning they took some people as porters. Just imagine - they had just been
ordered to move, and yet they still had to go as porters. How could they
move their things ? Some of their wives even cried."  (KHRG, interview with
villager from Keng Kham, Aug 30,  1997)

Extrajudicial killings in Kun Hing township in 1997

Owing to the fact that Kun Hing was one of the main areas of operation of
the SURA, the SLORC enforced the relocation with extreme brutality. Anyone
found in their old village was shot on sight. Many of the villages were
burned down. A killing by Shan soldiers of 25 Burmese civilians east of Kun
Hing at Pha Lang on 13 June 1997, also led to a spate of revenge killings
against Shan civilians in the ensuing weeks.

SHRF has documented the following extrajudicial killings of villagers either
found near their old villages or in the actual relocation sites in the Kun
Hing area in 1997:

Date 	No. of villagers killed 	site of killing 	killed by 

28.1.97 	2 (1 beaten to death) 		Long Maw 	LIB 332
10.2.97 	2 (beaten to dead) 		Sal Murng 	IB 43
late 3/97 	1 Abbot (tied up in 		Keng Kham 	IB 246
		sack and drowned)
ear. 4 97 	3 					near Nam Pang 	IB 246
mid-4 97 	1 					Ho Lin 		IB 246
18.4.97 	1 (beaten to death) 		Nong Hai 		LIB 378
8.5.97 	3 					Nar Mark Khaw Div. 55
13.5.97 	1 (raped & killed) 		nr. Wo Long 	IB 44
30.5.97 	1 					Wan Kun Ho Yard IB 246
10.6.97 	6 					west of Kun Hing LIB 524
11.6.97 	10 					Wan Phai 		LIB 524
16.6.97 	29 					Sai Khao 		LIB 513
16.6.97 	27 					Tard Pha Ho 	IB 246
3-4.7.97 	96 (tortured & killed) 	Kun Mi 		LIB 524
6.7.97 	4 					Kun Ho Haw 	LIB 516
11.7.97 	26 (beheaded) 			Keng Lom-Kun 
							Hing road		unknown			
12.7.97 	17 (beheaded) 			Keng Lom-	unknown
							Kengtong road
20.7.97 	1 					Nawng Pa Man LIB 376
24.7.97 	4 					Sai Murng 	LIB 524
28.7.97 	1 (raped and killed) 		Nar Kun 		LIB 516
6.8.97 	2 					Sai Murng 	LIB 524
mid-Aug	2 					Nar Mon 		IB 44
18.8.97 	1 					Kun Hing jail 	unknown
18.8.97 	4 					Kung Sa 		LIB 516
19.8.97 	1 					Kung Sa 		LIB 516
20.8.97 	2 					Wan Mai 		LIB 516
7.8.97 	2 					Wan Lao 		LIB 516
2.9.97 	1 					Luk Long 		LIB 442
5.10.97 	62 					Sai Leng 		LIB 524
18.11.97 	5 					Kung Sa 		IB 246 & IB 120
18.11.97 	1 					Kawng Ke 	Div. 55

Total: 319 villagers killed

Conditions in relocation sites

In 1996, at the relocation sites of Wan Lao and Sai Khao south of Kun Hing,
villagers were allowed back for 5 days at a time to farm their fields.
Following the March 1997 relocations to Kun Hing, villagers were strictly
forbidden to travel farther than 3 miles from their sites. However, during
the rice-planting season beginning in August 1997, some farmers in areas
closer to Kun Hing were allowed back to their fields for 7 days at a time to
plant and then harvest rice. Owing to fear of being shot anyway, farmers
reportedly harvested in haste, simply cutting the paddy and putting it in
bags, not leaving it in the fields to thresh.

During 1997, villagers relocated around Kun Hing were forced to cut
thousands of pieces of bamboo, weave roofing, cut hardwood for posts and
build bases for SLORC troops at Kun Hing and Kali. They also had to build
fences around the bases, and man check-points along the main roads.

(to be continued)
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