BP: A whimper in Rang

[suriya@xxxxxxxxxxxx]

Bangkok Post June 7, 1998 


                                      



                         GUEST COLUMN / BURMA 

              A whimper in
              Rangoon 

              The efforts of the authorities to limit
              news of the events in Indonesia may
              indicate fears of overt discontent that
              they feel they are required to suppress. 

              DAVID I. STEINBERG 

              Finally, on May 22, in an inside story sandwiched between
              international stories of no significance, the government of Burma
              fiqnally noted in its controlled press, and in only a paragraph or
              two, that there was a change in the leadership of Indonesia. But
              it was an article that just mentioned that Suharto had stepped
              down. There was nothing in it of the turmoil, the discontent, the
              stu dent demonstrations, or the mayhem preceding it that would
              have given the average reader the context of this important event.
              If its past was ignored, its signifi cance and future importance
              was also unstated. It was a whimper of a story that purposefully
              omitted the bang of the change or its impact on the future.
              Members of the State Peace and Development Council, as the
              State Law and Order Restoration Council was renamed, of
              course knew the full story, as did many of the mid-level officials
              who also had access to CNN and BBC, and on whose
              programmes the images of Jakarta in turmoil seemed ubiquitous.

              The motivation of the omission of the Indonesia events was
              obvious. In donesia had been a model, and Su harto personally
              was the friend of General Ne Win, Khin Nyunt and oth er who
              have called on him in the recent past.

              Even more importantly, Indonesia was the obvious model on
              which Bur ma had hoped to build its future. The role of the
              military in the National Assembly that is planned under a new
              constitution whose approval in a heavily scripted scenario seems
              inter minable, the army's ubiquitous posi tion in administration at
              all levels, and its tight rein on the economy, all are part of the
              Indonesian template.

              Even the five-million-strong Burma Union Solidarity and
              Development Association (USDA), under direct military
              guidance and patronage, is seen as the Indonesian Golkar in its
              pre-party stage. General Khin Nyunt had specifically stated in
              December 1993 in a press conference in Jakarta that Burma
              admired Indonesia's "sta bility". It was just this stability that was
              overthrown. The immediate im pact on Burma may seem inconse
              quential, but the future was impor tant enough for the state to
              attempt to deny knowledge of Indonesia's tur moil to the general
              population of Burma.

              Although Burma has only peripher ally been affected by the
              region's eco nomic crisis, Thai trade has dimin ished and foreign
              investments from the other Asean nations have precipi tously
              fallen. Burma has foreign exchange for only a few weeks of im
              ports, the unofficial exchange rate hovers around 300 kyat to the
              US dollar (against the official rate of about 6 kyat), and although
              the gov ernment recognised an inflation rate of about 25 percent,
              most observers believe it is double that figure.

              Economic discontent is prevalent among those on fixed and
              grossly in adequate government incomes, and political frustration
              is said to be wide spread. But are such problems suffi cient to
              cause people to emulate the students in Jakarta?

              In the rise of "people power" in the Philippines in 1986, in South
              Korea in 1987, in Thailand, and now in Indone sia, the military
              may have been a part of the problem, but it has also been a part
              of the solution. Significant ele ments either joined in the change
              pro cess, or they remained neutral. If the events on those
              countries may be termed "people power", then the militaries
              were "people's armies".

              In Burma, the situation remains different. Although many
              observers discuss tensions among elements of the Burmese
              military, there seems general agreement that they know they must
              stick together for essential control of power or find themselves in
              worse difficulties than those in other countries. The population
              has memo ries of the bloodshed of 1988, in com parison with
              which events in Indone sia of the past few weeks pale.

              The Burmese economy may be in dire straits, but evidently there
              is con siderable economic ferment in cities such as Rangoon,
              even though the population does not benefit from change in any
              equitable manner.

              One of the major problems facing Indonesia was the status of
              Suharto's family and their vast economic hold ings that many
              regard as a product of favouritism or corruption, as well as their
              alliance with some overseas Chinese families of vast wealth. In
              Burma, the situation is different. Several ministers were dismissed
              last year for corruption, and although the Chinese economic
              influence is pro found (and is of concern to some in India and
              Thailand), it is not focused on specific families. The children of
              the military elite in Burma may have special status, but they are
              not as evident or as greedy as those in Indonesia. There may be
              mur murings against the role of the Chinese in the country, and
              although there were government-induced dem onstrations against
              the Chinese in 1967 to take pressure off of the eco nomically
              inept Burmese regime, a widespread and directed campaign
              against the Chinese in Burma seems unlikely.

              Most of the schools have been closed since the demonstrations
              of December 1996. There had been rumours that they would
              reopen soon, but the events in Indonesia will prob ably cause
              them to rethink such plans if indeed they had them. Volatile stu
              dents even on their own campuses, whether college or high
              school, are the last things the authorities want.

              The Indonesian crisis is at least well-known in Rangoon and in
              other places where international radio is heard. Government
              attempts to sup press information, as other regimes have found,
              are always unsuccessful over the longer term. But in the short
              run, the efforts of the authorities to control knowledge may
              indicate fears of overt discontent that they feel they are required
              to suppress.

              Indeed, the lessons from Indone sian events for the Burmese
              authori ties, as the latter interpret them, may be that the
              Indonesians were too le nient. They should have been tougher
              and nipped the demonstrations early on, employing more, rather
              than less, force. If this is how the regime in Burma responds, we
              may see less, rather than more, openings in Burma. That would
              increase the Burmese tragedy.

              David I. Steinberg is director of Asian Studies at
              Georgetown Univer sity, and representative of The Asia
              Foundation for Korea. The views pre sented are his alone. 




                                      




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