The BurmaNet News: June 30, 1998

[strider@xxxxxxxxxxx]

------------------------ BurmaNet ------------------------
 "Appropriate Information Technologies, Practical Strategies"
----------------------------------------------------------

The BurmaNet News: June 30, 1998
Issue #1037

HEADLINES:
==========
REUTERS: MYANMAR JUNTA THREATENS SUU KYI WITH LEGAL ACTION
NLD: STATEMENT ON SPDC ATTACK ON STUDY GROUP
THE NATION: POOR ASEAN NATIONS REEL UNDER CRISIS
THE NATION: GOOD IDEAS NEED DISCREET LOBBYING
BURMANET SUBJECT-MATTER RESOURCE LIST
BURMANET SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION
****************************************************************

Reuters: Myanmar Junta Threatens Suu Kyi with Legal Action
29 June, 1998 

YANGON, June 29 (Reuters) - Myanmar's military junta threatened on Monday
to take legal action against opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and her
political party, saying she was on a collision course with the government.

The warnings were carried in commentaries run by three state-owned
newspapers which said: ``The Myanmar government and its people can no
longer tolerate the acts of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi who ignores the interest
of the nation and people.''
Similar warnings appeared in the media in the days prior to Suu Kyi's house
arrest in 1989 for nearly six years by the then ruling military government.
The Nobel Peace prize winner was released from detention in mid-1995.

The country's media are considered mouthpieces of the ruling State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC).

The latest threat follows demands by Suu Kyi and her National League for
Democracy (NLD) party that the junta convene parliament by August 2 in
accordance with the results of the 1990 election. The NLD swept the
election, but its victory was never recognised by the military.

The newspaper commentaries cited Law Number 5/96, which they said
prohibited individuals or organisations from ``disturbing, destroying,
obstructing, inciting, delivering speeches, making oral or written
statements and disseminating in order to undermine, belittle and make
people misunderstand the functions being carried out by the National
Convention for the emergence of a firm and enduring Constitution.''
They said those convicted for the offence faced a minimum of five years to
a maximum of 20 years in jail.

During the eighth anniversary celebration of the NLD's 1990 election
victory late last month, Suu Kyi demanded that the SPDC convene parliament
to facilitate a session of elected members of parliament.

The SPDC bluntly rejected her call and said parliament could not be
convened without the completion of a new national constitution being
drafted by a government-appointed National Convention.

The Convention was set up in early 1993. It has not met since 1996,
although the junta says two thirds of the new charter is complete.

The NLD walked out of the Convention some months after Suu Kyi's release
from detention, calling it a sham.

Suu Kyi has repeatedly sought talks with the military but the junta flatly
refuses to deal with her.

She has accused the military of abusing human rights and curbing her
party's political activities.

The newspapers said Suu Kyi was being used by the West to undermine the
junta and the national interests of Myanmar.

``Daw Suu Kyi ignored the interests of the nation and the people. Instead,
she got so conceited that she acted like a dictator within the party and
made trouble with her reliance on West at the expense of improving
stability, peace and development in the country,'' said the commentary.

``Aung San Suu Kyi should take a good lesson from the case of former
President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam, who was used by the Western bloc,
but he did not win public support'' it added.

Ngo Dinh Diem was executed after a bloody coup in Vietnam in 1963. 

****************************************************************

NLD: Statement on SPDC Attack on Study Group
26 June, 1998 

[Unofficial translation]

National League for Democracy
No. 97/b, West Shwe Gontaing Rd,
Bhan Township, Rangoon

Announcement 4 (6/98)

(1) The NLD is a legal, registered political party. Therefore, NLD
activities related to national politics are legal actions. Conducting a
study session is also legal activity.

(2) A bi-weekly study session was arranged for June 29, 1998 youth
education.  Intelligence personnel in Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's compound were
notified of the names of those involved, including four elected
representatives and forty young men.

(3) The authority's security forces at the gate, who usually monitor the
entrance way of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's compound, blocked those people who
were heading in an orderly manner to the compound. Those security forces
pushed these NLD members, so the NLD members retreated to a traffic light
at the junction of Kaba Aye Sati Road and University Avenue.

(4) When they were informed of the incident, U Tin Oo (NLD Vice-Chairman)
and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (NLD General Secretary) went to the junction and
brought those NLD members coming to the study session back to Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi's compound in an orderly manner.

(5) After blocking the NLD members at various points, a person directed the
security forces to hit the NLD members, using abusive language, such as
"leader or no leader -- hit her!" and "I don't care, leader or whatever,
hit that leader!"  Those present described the person issuing the commands
as tall, fair-skinned, and in a yellow civilian shirt.  They could identify
him if they saw him again.

(6) During the incident, the security forces hit the NLD members hard with
police batons and tree branches from near by.  Eight NLD youth members
suffered injuries to the head and other parts of the body as a result of
the attack.  The location of the incident was a restricted area, so no one
else was present.

(7) Upon being informed of the incident, the NLD Chairman and three other
NLD Executive Committee members went to the scene immediately, but the
authorities blocked their entry.

(8) Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was slightly injured. The security forces stayed
positioned in the same location, and U Tin Oo and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
stayed outside of the compound in windy rain from 14:00 p.m. (6/25/98) to
01:00 a.m. (6/26/98).

(9) The political, economic, and social crisis in the country will indeed
not be solved by such hitting, arresting, and confining methods.

Rangoon				Central Executive Committee
June 26, 1998			(National League for Democracy)

****************************************************************

The Nation: Poor Asean Nations Reel Under Crisis 
29 June, 1998 

WHILE the spotlight is firmly on Asia's crippled "tiger" economies, the
region's poorest countries are also feeling the pinch as their already weak
currencies slump and trade with wealthier neighbours takes a dive.

The long-isolated currencies of Burma, Laos and Cambodia have taken a
hammering, serving only to reinforce the dominance of the US dollar in many
circles in the poverty-stricken countries and drive up prices for basic as
well as luxury goods.

The crisis, which began with last July's float of the Thai baht and has
since spread across Asia, has dragged landlocked Laos into the era of
globalisation, with its kip currency trading at record lows of about 3,400
to the dollar, down nearly 75 per cent from a year ago.

The Thai Farmers Research Centre reported earlier this month that Laos's
currency had also plunged drastically against its Thai counterpart,
touching a low of 130 kip to the baht at the beginning of June, compared
with between 45 to 50 kip to the baht early this year.

Cambodia's riel rallied from a record low of about 4,800 to the dollar just
before historic UN-backed elections in 1993 to around 2,700 before the
crisis and domestic upheaval last year sent it plunging.

Earlier this month the riel slumped as low as 4,300 to the dollar but has
since steadied to about 4,000.

Burma, one of the most closed countries in the world, has also been forced
to reluctantly face up to the crisis. Although the official exchange rate
of about six kyat to the dollar persists, traders say authorities have
abandoned attempts to crack down on the blackmarket whenever it starts
selling dollars for more than 300 kyat.

"It used to be that every time the rate to the bench-mark of 300 kyat to
the dollar, you could expect intelligence personnel to move in," one
businessman involved in black-market currency dealing said.

Beside the impact of the Asian economic crisis, the Burmese junta
contributed to the currency's decline though its tendency to mint more of
the in an effort to balance the budget," Rangoon analyst added.

"Even if present import restrictions were removed, most of us would
hesitate to import simply because it is not practical to do so at this time
when the free market value of the kyat is so low."

The turmoil has forced up prices across the board in Burma, and the costs
of basic items such as beans, pulses and onions have soared by about 100
per cent in Rangoon's markets in the last two weeks alone.

In Cambodia, the economic woes have been compounded by seasonal rice
shortages, drought-stricken harvests and hoarding of some commodities ahead
of the country's scheduled July 26 elections.

Finance Ministry figures show rice prices surging from US$400 a tonne in
April to the current rate of about $430.

Cambodia's economy was dealt a double blow last July when the start of the
regional crisis coincided with Second Prime Minister Hun Sen's violent
ouster of rival co-premier Prince Norodom Ranariddh.

Foreign investors took flight, sending asset values diving and smothering
the slow but steady growth the economy had made since 1993.

In Laos, efforts by authorities to stabilise the lap currency are doomed to
failure, and the country has little hope of emerging unscathed from the
regional crisis, according to the Thai Farmers Bank report.

The report said dwindling overseas investment, low foreign reserves, a
sharp decline in border trade with neighbouring Thailand and a heavy
reliance on loans and aid meant Laos could not isolate itself from regional
woes.

As the kip has declined, the government has introduced a range of measures
to stabilise the unit, including halting the sale of foreign currencies by
banks and imprisoning black-market dealers.

In early June authorities announced that foreign currencies could only be
purchased by businesses registered in Laos in an effort to control
speculation and currency flows.

The move followed a ban on the use of foreign currencies in trade last
June, but the use of the Thai baht and the dollar in everyday business
transactions remains widespread.

Both measures backfired by effectively bringing an end to the local foreign
exchange market, stimulating the re-emergence of a thriving black market
for currencies, the research centre report said.

"Some depositors withdrew their kip deposits so as to buy dollars and baht
because they no longer had faith in their own currency," the report said.

A serious clamp-down on illegal currency speculation improved the situation
a little, with the kip edging back to around 80 to 85 to the baht in mid-June.

As of the first quarter of 1998, Thailand's investment in Laos of $57
million constituted 90 per cent of overall foreign investment in that
country as Thai businessmen were driven by their own local woes to look for
places offering cheaper production costs, but the report said the continued
slump in Thailand was slowing down Thai projects in Laos.

With foreign investment likely to grind to a halt, Laos' looming trouble
will be further compounded by economic woes in Japan, which has been
providing major aid to Vientiane.

Laos' foreign reserves now stand at $190 million, or about three and a half
month of imports. The International Monetary Fund has described that as a
"worrisome" figure.

Worse still for the poor countries, their current problems are attributed
only to the first regional crisis. Now Laos, Cambodia and Burma await the
effects of the so-called second wave of the crisis on their fractured
economies. 

****************************************************************

The Nation: Good Ideas Need Discreet Lobbying 
29 June by Kavi Chongkittavorn 

Regional Perspective

Armed with a landmark idea that could change the core nature of Asean, one
would expect the Foreign Ministry to do its homework thoroughly, including
sufficient lobbying and discreet consultation with Asean colleagues before
putting it to the test in the public domain.

As it turns out, the ministry has done neither. Worse, the conservative
bureaucrats there were unprepared: some of them still thought the
initiative was a self-promotion, not to be taken seriously.

When it was first broached by Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan in his speech
in Kuala Lumpur early this month, the plan calling for a modification of
Asean's principle of non-interference was not picked up by his
policy-makers, with the exception of the speech-writer.

Following comments and interviews made in the past weeks by the ministry,
officials suggested that the ministry's Conservative bureaucrats had not
yet fully appreciated his proposal, which must be considered, if it is ever
taken up, as one of Asean's most radical and dramatic.

To show that the call is not personal but on behalf of the Thai government,
Surin proposed a similar idea a week later at Thammasat University. At that
time the ministry's bureaucrats had not moved an inch to push Surin's
proposal.

For the minister to stick his neck out without proper support from the
bureaucrats is a very dangerous undertaking, recipe for disaster. Doubtless
when the foreign ministries of Laos and Burma recently summoned the Thai
ambassadors in their respective capitals for further clarification, the
envoys were at a loss for words and ended up giving the impression that it
was Surin's personal Initiative. The damage had been done.

After some probing in the Asean capitals and their lukewarm response, the
plan has rapidly gone through several metamorphoses from constructive
intervention to constructive involvement. The concept has been watered down.

It was only last Friday that extra efforts were made to articulate the
definition following a report on Thursday that Surin had decided to back
down from his proposal. It was then that it was transformed again into
something called "flexible engagement", whatever that means.

That was the first time that Saranrom's top policy-makers had really been
in tune with the chief and able to discuss the proposal seriously in terms
of mechanics.

Given the sensitivity of the issue and the attitude of most Asean members,
this noble idea could end up in the dustbin of history, like many other
proposals by Thailand in the past years, such as the call for an
establishment of a people's council, unless the Foreign Ministry remedies
the situation and puts the proposal in perspective along side the three
decade history of Asean. Of late, there has been a lot of discussion about
the possibility of reviewing the non-interference principle in, academic
and press circles, but no Asean countries dare to put forward the idea.
Everyone knows it is a non-starter to kick off such a move, especially at
this juncture when the grouping is encountering plenty of uncertainties and
unknown trends.

When Malaysia's Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Ibrahim Anwar
first wrote about constructive intervention last year, it was within the
political context emanating from the political turmoil in Cambodia and
Burma. He wanted to challenge the non-interference principle by arguing
that intervention can be constructive on certain domestic problems within
member countries that have immediate effects on their neighbours.

Owing to the complexity of Malaysian politics and the dilemma Anwar is
facing at the moment, he is not in a position to pursue his idea. The
region's tumultuous events in the past several months, including the
financial crisis, haze, migration, drug trafficking and the unexpected
departure of president Suharto, have convinced the top Democrat Party
leaders that Thailand could serve as a conduit to strengthen new
cooperation and engagement within Asean and its new members.

After all, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai is considered a suitable leader to
push forward the efforts to make Asean countries more transparent, open and
democratic. He has on behalf of Asean on several occasions, including the
recent second Asia-Europe Meeting in London and the Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation summit in Canada last year.

In time of economic meltdown in the next few years, the new Asean outlook
could serve as a fresh catalyst to garner new bargaining fore longer found
in economic performance but rather on the level of political development
and progress.

The Thai government believes that only through this new approach can Asean
remain a regional force to be reckoned with. In addition it would allow
Bangkok to apply its foreign policies of protecting human rights and
promoting democracy within a broader regional framework.

To avoid the past pitfalls in which several Thai proposals were shot down
early, the Thais have to be extremely discreet with their proposal. They
have to follow the time-consuming Asean ritual of consensus-building. In
addition, failure to halt confusing comments or speak with one script) or
premature declarations of victory and acceptance before it is submitted and
seriously considered by Asean senior officials and relevant authorities
will definitely kill every Thai endeavour.

Most importantly, in promoting idea, senior Thai officials have to abandon
their commonly held attitude of "not rocking the boat" and "begin neglect".
They have to be firm and bold. Why? Because they have an important job to
convince the Asean member that as a family they should do things, be frank
or risk harm to other family members. After all, the proposal will benefit
Asean as a whole, not any particular nation.

What good does it do Thailand if It is to enjoy the fruits of freedom and
democracy while its neighbours, also Asean members, do not enjoy the same
experience?

****************************************************************

BurmaNet Subject Matter Resource List 

BurmaNet regularly receives inquiries on a number of different topics
related to Burma. If you have questions on any of the following subjects,
please direct email to the following volunteer coordinators, who will
either answer your question or try to put you in contact with someone who
can: 

Campus activism: 	zni@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Boycott campaigns: 	Dan Orzech: orzech@xxxxxxxx
Buddhism:		Buddhist Relief Mission: brelief@xxxxxxx
Chin history/culture:	[volunteer needed] 
Fonts: 			tom@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
High School Activism: 	Zan Rubin: cyclic@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
History of Burma:	zni@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
International Affairs: 	Julien Moe: moe@xxxxxxxxxxxxx  
Kachin history/culture: 	74750.1267@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx  
Karen history/culture: 	Karen Historical Society:  
102113.2571@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Mon history/culture:         [volunteer needed] 
Naga history/culture: 	Wungram Shishak: z954001@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Burma-India border 	aungsan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Pipeline Campaign :	freeburma@xxxxxxx 
Resettlement info:	refugee_help@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Rakhaing (Arakan) history/culture	 
			Kyaw Tha Hla: thisthis@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Rohingya culture		volunteer needed 
Selective Purchasing	Dan Orzech: orzech@xxxxxxxx
			Simon Billenness: sbillenness@xxxxxxxx
Shan history/culture: 	Sao Hpa Han: burma@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Shareholder activism: 	Simon Billenness: sbillenness@xxxxxxxx
Teak Boycott		Tim Keating: relief@xxxxxxx
Total - France		Dawn Star: cd@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Tourism campaigns:	bagp@xxxxxxxxxx "Attn. S. Sutcliffe"    
volunteering: 		refugee_help@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
World Wide Web:	FreeBurma@xxxxxxxxx
 
REGIONAL CONTACTS: 
Australia:		Australia Burma Council: azappia@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
Canada:    		Canadian Friends of Burma: cfob@xxxxxxx
Great Britain:		Burma Action Group/UK bagp@xxxxxxxxxx

United States --
New England:		Simon Billenness sbillenness@xxxxxxxx
Northwest		Larry Dohrs dohrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
[Feel free to suggest more areas of coverage] 

****************************************************************

BurmaNet Subscription Information

The BurmaNet News is an electronic newspaper covering Burma. Articles from
newspapers, magazines, newsletters, the wire services and the Internet as
well as original material are published.  It is produced with the support
of the Burma Information Group (B.I.G) and the Research Department of the
ABSDF.  We are also grateful to many other friends around the world who
send us articles to post. 

The BurmaNet News is e-mailed directly to subscribers and is also
distributed via the soc.culture.burma and seasia-l mailing lists.  

For a free subscription to the BurmaNet News:  

send a message to: majordomo@xxxxxxxxxxx    
 
a. For the BurmaNet News only:  
    in the message, type:    subscribe burmanews-l 
 
b. For the BurmaNet News and 4-5 other messages a day: 
    in the message, type:     subscribe burmanet-l   
 
(NOTE: all lower case letters, last letter is a lower case "L", not the
numeral one). 

Letters to the editor, comments or contributions of articles should be sent
to the editor at: strider@xxxxxxxxxxx 
 
****************************************************************