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IPRA conference paper on Burma



Dear all,

The following is my recent paper submitted to the International Peace
Research Association (IPRA) general conference in Durban, South Africa,
23-26 June 1998. Dr. Thein Win of Free Burma Coalition (South Africa)
presented it to the conference together with a slide show.

Any comments are very welcome.

Mikio Oishi, in Kuching, Malaysia

**************
NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE OF THE BURMESE PEOPLE FOR DEMOCRACY

A PAPER SUBMITTED TO IPRA CONFERENCE,
(NONVIOLENCE COMMISSION)

Mikio OISHI,
Faculty of Social Sciences,
Universiti Malaysia Sarawak


1. Origin and Development of the Conflict

The present crisis in Burma is a result of the failed domestic policy of
the ruling military junta which took power in a 1962 coup. Behind the
coup was the uphill task of integrating a newly independent state,
comprising the majority Burmans (60-70% of the total population) and
more than 60 ethnic minorities [1]. After the assassination of the
national hero General Aung San just before the Independence in 1948,
efforts to politically unite the nation crumbled, and civil wars have
since ravaged the border areas of the country. In the course of time,
the military emerged as the major institution to maintain the semblance
of national unity, and eventually assumed the state power in 1962 [2].

The junta adopted the ?gBurmese Way to Socialism?h, and closed the
country to the outside world. Political activities were banned and the
national economy deteriorated constantly. By 1988, a country, rich in
natural resources and once considered one of the two most economically
promising countries in South East Asia [3] had been reduced to the rank
of world?fs poorest countries, and people?fs grievances had built up to
a flashing point. The serious lack of commodities, high inflation, and
the bank notes unilaterally declared void were the last straw to their
patience.

Spontaneous demonstrations took place in August 1988. Rather than
responding to the people?fs voice and initiating overdue reforms, the
junta crushed the demonstrations with guns. It is estimated that during
this period 40,000 people were killed on the streets of Rangoon alone
[4]. In the turmoil, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)
was declared a new government, and promised to hold general elections to
form a civilian government. However, when the National League for
Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of Aung San, won a
landslide victory in the 1990 elections, the junta refused to hand over
power to the NLD, and launched a crackdown on the party and its
sympathisers [5]. Under the SLORC rule, human rights abuses are
perpetrated extensively, and there is no end to the suffering of the
Burmese people [6]. In November 1997, SLORC dissolved itself and the
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) [7] was formed. Some of most
corrupt generals have been expelled from the ruling council.  However,
more than that, no tangible reform has been made so far by the junta,
and the same conflict situation continues.

2. Parties to Conflict

The conflict started as the one between the military junta and the
Burmese people. During this early period, the people were not
well-organised nor well-trained in the practice of nonviolence. There
was always a danger of violent confrontation between the two sides. The
NLD tried to mediate them by representing the people and conveying their
grievances to the junta in a peaceful manner. However, when the junta
refused to listen to the NLD, neglected the results of the elections,
and started to attack the organisation, the conflict was transformed
into the one between the SLORC, which is determined to cling to power by
any means and the NLD, which has the mandate of the people and wants to
restore democracy and respect for human rights in the country. NLD?fs
short-term goal is to realise a genuine dialogue with the SLORC in order
to solve the country?fs social, economic and political problems, but so
far the latter has adamantly refused it. The NLD has been forced to take
a confrontational stance against the SLORC, but still it keeps mediatory
principles inside, which could be fully utilised once the long waited
dialogue starts.


3. Nonviolent Struggle of the Burmese People

(1) Principles

Three basic principles can be identified in the peaceful struggle of the
NLD. These principles, rendering the movement qualitatively different
from similar struggles in the contemporary world, have particularly been
articulated in the writings, speeches, press statements and other acts
of its leader Aung San Suu Kyi:

(a) Drawing on Burmese cultural traditions to formulate indigenous ideas
of democracy and human rights: The democracy movement relies on
teachings of the Buddha, which are the backbone of Burmese culture.
According to Aung San Suu Kyi, democracy and human rights are ideas not
alien to the country. For example: Buddhism emphasises that each person
is endowed with a ?gseed?h of Buddha or the potential of achieving the
final enlightenment. This is a teaching that provides a firm basis for
human dignity. Meanwhile, the government has been regarded by the
Burmese tradition as a necessary evil and counted among the "five
perils" for society. Accordingly, a number of codes of conduct for the
rulers, such as the ?gTen Duties of Kings?h, have been stipulated to
curb their power and prevent  its abuse. In addition, Buddhist
scriptures state that the government cannot oppose the will of the
people, who are on their part encouraged to independently use their own
understanding and judgement. These ideas are the resources on which a
Burmese version of democracy and human rights may thrive [8].

(b) Overcoming fear by resorting to Buddhist and spiritual principles:
The NLD considers "overcoming fear" as the most fundamental challenge
for those who seek to create a just society. Without this, the positive
Burmese values will not be realised in daily activities under the
present adverse situation. It is actually a duty for every Buddhist to
overcome fear, as according to Buddhism fear is the most powerful factor
to corrupt person. Aung San Suu Kyi observes: "It is not power that
corrupts but fear. Fear of losing power corrupts those who wield it and
fear of the scourge of power corrupts those who are subject to it" [9].
She condemns social institutions which manipulate fear as a means of
social control, and calls for a struggle to liberate ourselves and
society from its grip. She suggests several practical measures to cope
with fear [10], but on the bottom-line, the best cure is to act in spite
of fear and surrender oneself to the protective power of the truth [11].

(c) No power struggle but a struggle to achieve personal and social
integrity: The NLD does not regard its struggle as essentially a
struggle to capture the government. It is rather an exercise to
establish personal and social integrity against the forces which would
undermine it. As Aung San Suu Kyi puts it: "We just want to be able to
go about our own business freely and peacefully, not doing anybody any
harm, just earning a decent living without anxiety and fear" [12]. The
present situation in Burma does not warrant such an honest living based
on human dignity. It will remain so until the people start changing the
prevalent culture of repression. The NLD urges the Burmese people to
participate in such an endeavour, and expects the military junta to be
eventually converted to the cause of the people, by "coming to their
senses". Because of the essentially conciliatory nature of the struggle
of NLD and because of its respect for life, the organisation is opposed
to creating a polarised situation in which a final showdown between the
mobilised people and the armed forces may take place [13]. It prefers an
incremental and educational approach.


(2) Strategy

NLD leaders proclaim that it is not their objective to defeat their
chief adversary, the military junta. They hope that pressure from inside
and outside, in addition to the convincing force of the truth,
eventually coax the junta generals to see the reality of the conflict
and to start the long overdue dialogue with the representatives of the
people.

What the NLD activists are doing can be understood in terms of what Hugh
Miall calls "finding the
truth of the situation". This concept reflects Mahatma Gandhi's
satyagraha
(grasping the truth) and ahimsa (nonviolence). As Miall puts it:

"Gandhi always insisted that his nonviolence campaigns were an effort to
find the truth of the situation through struggle. Both contenders had a
place in finding a just outcome, even though Gandhi clearly saw more
justice on one side [14].

Thus, no party can claim the monopoly of truth and justice. Except for
extreme and rare cases, all parties are entitled to their own versions
of truth and justice, which need to be brought together in order to form
the commonly shared truth and justice.

>From this perspective, the democracy movement in Burma can be understood
as an effort to involve a growing segment of Burmese society and,
eventually, even the junta in the exercise of finding the truth and
justice of the situation. The military junta is envisaged to convert
finally to the truth and the justice thus found, and to surrender its
sectarian interests to the authority that these qualities command.

However, such a meaningful exchange between the opponents can hardly be
possible in the natural state of conflict, since there is no space in
which such an exercise can take place. What exists instead is a rampant
use of coercion and manipulation by the stronger party against the
weaker one in order to win the conflict. It is therefore necessary to
create such a space. Many of the seemingly disparate activities
conducted by the democracy camp can be regarded as an endeavour to
create this space, which might be called, a "problem-solving space"
[15].


(a) Establishing and empowering a collective actor

It is crucial to establish and empower a collective actor as a first
step towards the creation of a problem-solving space. The democracy
movement in Burma aims to achieve this task by mobilising the people
around Aung San Suu Kyi as a core person [16].

Since coming back to her country from the United Kingdom in 1988, Aung
San Suu Kyi has remained within Burma, although the SLORC has
consistently put pressure on her to leave the country. For the Burmese
people, the ?gLady?fs House?h on No. 54, University Drive has become a
rallying point of the democratic forces in the country. Even during her
house arrest, the place was the symbol of the national resistance
against repression, continuing to provide hope for the people.

The collective actor, thus formed, plays significant roles.

*It can manifest a fundamental conflict within the country. It is
necessary for the conflict to be brought to the surface, especially when
the power holders try to suppress and diffuse it. The conflict must be
recognised first. After that, it can be addressed and, eventually,
resolved in a true sense. The role of the collective actor in this
process of conflict manifestation and maintenance is essential.

*The people need a body that articulates their grievances and
aspirations in an orderly, peaceful and coherent manner. Without such a
body, the people would have little choice but to express them through
extreme means such as riots, sabotages and insurrections. Thus, a
democracy movement as a collective actor would be able to rescue a
country from disasters and chaos, which may take place inevitably when
the people's resentment is so high and widespread as in Burma.

*The collective actor can serve as a centre from which democratic and
liberating ideas emanate towards the Burmese people and, thus, empower
them [17]. The party is in a good position to politically educate them
by instilling into them democratic ideas which derive from the best part
of the Buddhist-Burmese tradition. The consequent empowerment of the
people contributes towards rectifying a huge imbalance of power between
the military rulers and the democracy movement.


(b) ?gDisarming?h the SLORC/SPDC

It is often not enough for the weaker party to establish and empower
itself. The stronger party may still exert overwhelming power against
the weaker one. As long as situation is like this, the stronger party
does not feel any need to change its hardliner tactics. It is therefore
necessary for the weaker party to ?gdisarm?h its opponent to the degree
that both parties are on the par with each other in terms of strength.
In the Burmese case, the ?gdisarmament?h is being carried out by the
co-operation between the NLD in Burma and support groups around the
world [18]. There are two aspects of the disarmament.

Economic disarmament

Foreign investments in Burma, implemented in joint-ventures with the
Burmese military or those who are connected to it, are one of the main
props of the military regime. It is therefore significant to sever the
ties between the junta and foreign companies. Support groups in Western
countries have been campaigning to boycott the products by the companies
involved in Burma. Started from university campuses in the US, this
movement has spread not only all over the US, but also to Europe. These
groups have also lobbied the US government at local, state and federal
levels to take action against the military junta [19]. Thus, the US
Federal Government has banned the US-based companies from newly
investing in Burma, and a State Government and more than 10 Municipal
Councils have adopted the Selective Purchasing Law, which prohibits them
from making contracts with companies operating in Burma. Furthermore,
the support groups investigate and expose how a number of foreign
investments are implicated in narcotic money generated in the border
areas where poppies are widely cultivated [20].

Tourism is another source of income for the junta, which aims to acquire
badly needed hard currencies by exploiting the rich history and pristine
nature of the country. In response to the appeal by the NLD, the
international support network calls on prospective foreign visitors not
to visit Burma for now, and put pressure on tourism agencies not to
organise tours to Burma [21].


Moral  disarmament

The support groups are also engaged in moral disarmament of the
SLORC/SPDC. This is a tactics to render the military junta morally
defenceless in their own eyes as well as against the condemnation by the
international community. In co-operation with human rights
organisations, they publicise cases of human rights abuses and the lack
of democracy in Burma through mass media, UN sessions and internet, and
successfully put the Burma issue on an international agenda. They are
also exposing the link between narcotic trafficking and regional army
commanders [22], aiming to alienate the governments of Burma?fs
neighbouring countries [23] from the SLORC/SPDC and to subject it to
even stronger condemnation by the Western countries.


(c) Creating a problem-solving space

As a collective actor is established and empowered, and the stronger
party disarmed considerably, the latter is left with little choice but
to recognise the former as a legitimate party to dispute [24].
Recognition, although it may be given grudgingly, is a basis of a
meaningful interaction between the parties. Thus, the actor formation
and empowerment of the weaker party, the disarmament of the stronger
party, and the recognition of the former by the latter contribute to the
creation of a problem-solving space. This space is characterised by the
near impossibility of using illegitimate force against opponents.


(d) Creative interaction within the problem-solving space

There are at least two parts of a creative interaction. The first one is
reconciliation, in which the parties to conflict remove the
psychological obstacles to forging a working relationship among them.
There would be bitter memories, distrust and contempt, which should be
addressed properly. Although NLD has not yet made public a
reconciliatory programme, it is probable that it organise a committee
which is similar to the ?gTruth and Reconciliation Committee?h set up in
the Philippines and South Africa in the period of national
reconciliation [25]. In such a committee, representatives of the major
actors plus the victims and perpetrators of atrocities would get
together and be engaged in in-depth dialogue on particular cases and
issues from various standpoints so that  a common understanding of them
may be reached, apology and repentance may be made, and forgiveness may
be granted. This would be the final phase of finding the truth and
justice of the situation?an exercise having been carried on since the
early stage of mobilising the Burmese people.

Another part of the creative interaction is to discuss the substantial
issues of the country, such as the deploring state of the national
economy, social problems like drugs, Aids, and disorientation and
materialistic tendencies among the youth, the ethnic minority issue and
national unity. These are issues which need to be addressed urgently,
and it has become clear to anyone that the SPDC generals alone cannot
handle these problems. As an NLD leader recently remarked: ?gDialogue is
the only way that can solve all the problems in our country?h [26].


4. Present Situation

(1) Successful Results of the Campaigns

The National League for Democracy (NLD) has carried out its strategy
quite successfully. It has established itself as a legitimate party to
the Burmese conflict, which it has transformed into a peaceful process
of democratisation. Domestically, the NLD continues to enjoy an
overwhelming support by the Burmese people, who regard ?gthe Lady?h
(Aung San Suu Kyi) as their only source of hope and inspiration. On the
other hand, the international community in general recognises the NLD as
the true representative of the Burmese people, and urges the military
junta to hand over power to the NLD as soon as possible [27].

The organisation?fs campaign to disarm SLORC/SPDC has mostly achieved
its goals. The international condemnation on junta?fs abysmal human
rights records and its blatant disrespect for democracy has resulted in
economic sanctions by the Western governments, International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank as well as international boycotts by prospective
tourists and tourist agencies. Moreover, under the pressure of
consumers?f boycott campaigns, a number of West-based companies have
terminated operations in Burma [28]. People over the world have become
aware of the sinister association between the junta and drug
trafficking, and are urging their own governments to take drastic action
in order to protect their countries from the narcotic threat emanating
from Burma [29]. As a result, SPDC has not only been rendered morally
defenceless in the eyes of the international community, but also been
deprived of financial sources such as companies and governments in the
West, international lending institutions, tourism, and, perhaps soon,
drug trafficking.

This has left Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China
as the only major supporters of the junta. However, the economic crisis
which has hit East and Southeast Asia since July 1997 has virtually
stopped the flow of investment and aid from these countries, further
disarming SPDC in economic terms [30].


(2) Changing Role of ASEAN

It is particularly interesting to observe the changing position of ASEAN
towards the political actors in Burma. The founding fathers of the
organisation had the vision of ?gASEAN TEN?h [31], in which all nations
in Southeast Asia including Burma would be re-united after a long period
of division and subjugation by foreign powers. It is therefore no wonder
that ASEAN has sought to establish and maintain a good relationship with
Burma, particularly with its incumbent government, SLORC/SPDC. However,
the current situation seems to indicate that ASEAN has been
?gneutralised?h as a supporter of the military junta, and that it is
gradually taking up the role of mediator between the two camps. This
change will be discussed in more detail. However, ASEAN?fs  traditional
idea of regional stability will be first examined in order to put the
recent change into perspective.

ASEAN?fs Idea of Regional Stability

Southeast Asia has been an area of strategic importance for the great
powers such as the US, Russia and China. During the Cold War period it
was a major battle ground for the rival Capitalist and Communist bloc.
In such a global political context, it has been ASEAN?fs traditional
strategy to achieve regional stability by resisting the involvement of
the great powers in the regional affairs and by creating and maintaining
a good relationship among the member states. What is called the ?gASEAN
Way?h stressing such values as respect, responsibility, consultation and
consensus has been adopted to manage inter-state conflicts/disputes with
a considerable success [32].

The ASEAN way works as long as national security is defined in military
terms, in which other countries are regarded as a potential military
threat to a country. In such a case, the country?fs external security
needs are satisfied as long as there is a good relationship among the
national leaders of the countries in a region. When it comes to domestic
issues, a state is considered to be something like an impenetrable and
opaque iron box, and it does not concern ASEAN members what is going on
within the box so long as it is not shaking or bursting. However, this
iron box theory seems to be untenable any more. There is an increasing
spillover of the domestic problems of Burma into the neighbouring
countries, such as the trafficking of drugs and women, spread of AIDS
and other epidemics, and inflow of refugees, all of which can pose a
threat to national security of the affected countries and thus can be
the sources of regional instability [33].

Burma?fs Admission to ASEAN and ASEAN?fs Dilemma

ASEAN?fs official policy towards Burma has been ?gconstructive
engagement?h, in which ASEAN engages the country as a business partner
rather than isolating it. This policy well reflects the ASEAN endeavour
to build confidence among the member states. By not directly tackling
the fundamental and therefore controversial issues (such as territorial
disputes and domestic affairs) but exploring areas where co-operation is
possible (such as economic co-operation), the states are expected to
form a sense of community, which can have an impact on the behaviour of
individual states. In the Burmese case, it has been envisaged that by
constructive engagement SLORC/SPDC be silently taught into toeing the
line in its handling with its citizens. The rationale behind this policy
is that  the comparatively liberal values of the government officials
and businesspersons from other ASEAN countries may gradually influence
the Burmese generals into adopting democratic practices, particularly
the rule of law. However, ASEAN cannot say for certain that this policy
actually will have such an effect, and existent evidence seems to tell
otherwise. In this context, It is noteworthy to point out that the ASEAN
way, of which the constructive engagement is a part, has mainly be
applied to inter-state issues, not intra-state ones. This may indicate
the limit of the ASEAN way and the constructive engagement.

ASEAN has been a de facto supporter of the military regime, as the
constructive engagement has provided an opportunity to establish rapport
between the junta generals and ASEAN leaders as well as economically
supporting the regime with investments. Also, Burma?fs admission into
ASEAN in July 1997 was tantamount  to further conferring legitimacy on
the SLORC. It was done despite a strong protest from the international
community, particularly from citizens?f groups [34].

However, now that Burma is already in the fold of ASEAN, the
organisation is under a huge international pressure to show results in
terms of change in the country?fs domestic situation. This means that
ASEAN finds it increasingly difficult to continue to play the role of a
supporter of the military junta [35] and that it has to play a role of
mediator, who would coax the opposing camps to start a dialogue, as has
been urged by the international community. Despite their failure to stop
ASEAN from embracing Burma, the citizens?f groups over the world have
tremendously contributed to such a situation by forming an international
public opinion on the Burma issue. Particularly noteworthy is the
activities of a network of citizens?f groups in ASEAN. The network has
demonstrated an alternative ?gASEAN Solidarity?h with the struggle of
the Burmese people, and articulated the voice of ASEAN citizens against
the repression in Burma, putting a considerable pressure on ASEAN
governments to change their position [36].

For the reasons discussed so far, ASEAN seems to be tentatively shifting
from constructive engagement, which is mainly economic, to
?gconstructive intervention?h [37], in which the organisation would play
a more proactive role in dealing with the political situation in a
member country so that the spillover effects can be handled more
effectively. It is a challenge for ASEAN to explore a way to intervene
in Burma?fs domestic politics while avoiding the accusation of
interference with its domestic affairs.


(3) Deteriorating Domestic Situation

Despite a current good prospect for a peaceful change in Burma, one
source of concern is a deteriorating economic situation and its effects
on the lives of the Burmese people. There has been a high inflation
(annual rate is almost 50%) due to the general shortage of commodities
and weakening national currency [38]. Particularly serious is the rice
shortage caused by floods and the mismanagement of rice collection and
distribution by the junta [39]. Accordingly, there are increasing signs
of social unrest. There have been reports of strikes by textile and
mining workers and demonstrations by students [40]. Some quarters point
out the similarity between the present situation and the one just before
the 1988 demonstrations. It is not the strategy of the NLD to create a
volatile situation in which a general uprising may take place. The
emerging social unrest may undermine what the NLD has achieved through
peaceful struggle.


5. Future Prospect

It may safely be said that the SPDC has been disarmed to a considerable
degree. It has not been able to crush the pro-democracy movement despite
its overwhelming military power. It seems that a problem-solving space
has been created to a considerable degree in the conflict situation in
Burma. Although NLD?fs peaceful struggle has not yet brought about a
tangible change of attitude on the side of the junta and the
pro-democracy movement has yet to realise its immediate goal of starting
a genuine dialogue with its opponents, it is increasingly clear that
such a dialogue is the only way to solve social, economic and political
problems plaguing Burma.

It appears that two opposite tendencies are emerging within the ruling
junta. One is the willingness to bring back the country to international
seclusion as it used to be in until the late 1980s. The hardliners seems
to be more and more inclined to this option, arguing that Burma had
survived on an autarky economy until it opened its market to
international capitals. What they forget is that it is this very
isolationism which had led the country to the brink of economic collapse
and to the social turmoil in 1988. Another tendency is to seek some form
of compromise with the democratic forces. Since 1997, the ?gpragmatist?h
faction in the junta has started a tentative and clumsy move towards a
dialogue with the NLD, having meeting with several senior members of the
NLD excluding Aung San Suu Kyi [41]. As the pressure from inside and
outside become stronger, there may be polarisation between the two
factions, probably resulting in a split in the military. It is hoped
that the junta leaders learn from the on-going crisis in Indonesia, and
immediately start a meaningful dialogue with the NLD to prevent the
possible chaos and bloodbath in the country.


NOTES AND REFERENCES

[1] Osborne, M. (1988), Southeast Asia, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, pp.
57-58.

[2] Bo Min Baung (1990), Aun San Shoogun to Sanjuu-nin no Shishi: Biruma
Dokuritsu Gyuu Gun to Nihon (General Aung San and the Thirty Comrades:
Burma Independence Army and Japan), translated by Hisao Tanabe from the
Burmese original, Tokyo: Chuo-koron-sha, pp. 167-71.

[3] The other country was the Philippines.

[4] Webb, P. (1993) "Escape from Burma", Occasional Paper Series No.
2, Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Territory University, p. 7.

[5] A number of the NLD activists, sympathisers and elected MPs were
imprisoned and Aung San Suu Kyi was put under house arrest for 6 years.

[6] Examples of human rights abuse by the junta are: arbitrary arrest,
forced labour (including child labour), forced relocation of villages,
systematic oppression of ethnic minorities such as extortion of money,
confiscation of property, forced conscription, extrajudicial killing,
sexual abuse of women, contempt for minorities' religions and cultures
and denial of Burmese citizenship. They are documented in Yokota, Y.
(1995), "Statement of Mr. Yozo Yokota, Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar
to the Fiftieth Session of the General Assembly" on 06/12/1995.

[7] This paper uses SLORC, SPDC or SLORC/SPDC to refer to the ruling
military junta as it sees fit.

[8] Aung San Suu Kyi (1991b), "In Quest of Democracy", in Aung San Suu
Kyi (1991a), Freedom from Fear and Other Writings, London: Penguin
Books, pp. 167-79.

[9] Aung San Suu Kyi (1991c), "Freedom From Fear", in Aung San Suu Kyi
(1991a), op. cit., pp. 180-85.

[10] Such as achieving a moral high ground, analysing the state of fear
in the country from a wider perspective, and getting unused to fear
(because fear is a habit). See, Aung San Suu Kyi (1991e), "The People
Want Freedom", interview by Dominic Faulder of Asia Week on 01/7/1989,
in Aung San Suu Kyi (1991a), p. 234.

[11] Aung San Suu Kyi (1991d), "The Role of the Citizen in the Struggle
for Democracy", in Aung San Suu Kyi (1991a), op. cit., p. 218.

[12] Aung San Suu Kyi (1991b), op. cit., p. 173.

[13] Aung san Suu Kyi (1996), interview by Scott Kraft, Paris bureau
chief for the Times, at her home in Rangoon, carried in Los Angeles
Times 16/4/96.

[14] Miall, H. (1992), The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
since 1945, London: Macmillan, p. 33.

[15] I have coined this term by combining (1) the principle of
"problem-solving" as has been proposed by John Burton and (2) a
"democratic space" in a democratising process in society. Burton
envisages the function of problem-solving taking place within a
carefully formulated workshop--a "problem-solving workshop". In the
idea of "problem-solving space", this function can take place in a
society under certain conditions, which I will discuss shortly.  For
Burton's idea of problem-solving workshop, see, Burton, J. W. (1987),
Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Hand Book, London: University Press of
America.

[16] A significant thing about the mobilisation is that NLD aims to
achieve this by the convincing power of the truth and justice that it
commands.

[17] Aung San Suu Kyi's speeches at the weekly "People's Forum" were
taped and sent to the people nation-wide. See, Moses, R. (1996) , "Push
against SLORC by the Powerless", Reuters, 07/10/1996.

[18] It should be noted that the people over the world who have joined
support groups are the ones who have been convinced with the just cause
of the NLD. Thus, the NLD's exercise to find the truth and justice of
the situation has successfully mobilised the citizens of global society,
contributing to the formation of a "problem-solving space" in Burma.

[19] Danitz, T. and Strobel, W. P. (1998), "Networking Dissent: Burmese
Cyberactivists Promote Nonviolent Struggle Using the Internet", Report
for The United States Institute of Peace and Nonviolence International
31/1/1998.

[20] New York Burma Support Group (1997), "New York City Passes Burma
Sanctions", Press release, New York 14/5/1997; Bernstein, D. And Kean,
L. (1996), "People of the Opiate", The Nation (US) 16/12/1996;
"Faith, Hope & Destiny", The Sydney Morning Herald 27/10/1997.

[21] "Suu Kyi Urges Boycott by Tourists", The New Straits Times
18/7/1996

[22] Gelbard, R. S. (1996), "Slorc's Drug Links", Far Eastern
Economic Review  21/11/1996;

[23] Some of these countries, notably Malaysia and Singapore, impose
mandatory death penalties on narcotic traffickers.

[24] In many cases, the weaker parties have tried to establish and
empower themselves and eventually won the recognition of themselves (if
not having overpowered and destroyed them) by their opponents through
armed struggle. The costs to achieve this goal is prohibitive. In
contrast, the struggle of the Burmese people is remarkable in that they
aims to achieve the goal through nonviolent means.

[25] Clements, A. and Aung San Suu Kyi (1997), The Voice of Hope,
London: Penguin Books, pp. 12-13.

[26] NLD Vice-Chairman U Tin U's statement, in a joint press statement
to mark the  8th anniversary of their election victory by U Aung Shwe
(Chairman), Daw  Aung San Suu Kyi (General-Secretary)  and U Tin U
(Deputy Chairman), 26/5/98.

[27] U Ne Oo (1998), "The Transitional Phase and Prospects for change
in Burma", article posted to "reg.burma" burmanet-l@xxxxxxxxxxx
05/1/1998.

[28] "BURMA: Sanctions Bite Harder", Financial Times (US) 05/5/1998.

[29] "Faith, Hope & Destiny", The Sydney Morning Herald 27/10/1997

[30] This would make Japan virtually the only state to support
SLORC/SPDC. Compared with ASEAN and China, Japan's role of the junta
supporter had been insignificant until recently. Although Japan had
suspended official development assistance (ODA) programmes since the
massacre of 1988, it has continued to grant $35 million to Burma every
year as part of a debt-relief programme (See, U Ne Oo 1998, op. cit.).
In April 1998, Japan resumed ODA loans to Burma despite strong
international protests. Although their  amounts are relatively small,
Japan's resumption of ODA and the annual debt-relief have a profound
symbolic meaning, boosting the morale of the military junta at the
crucial stage of disarming the junta.

[31] Ajello, R. And Mitton, R. (1997), "And Then There were Ten",
Article posted to "reg.burma" burmanet-l@xxxxxxxxxxx on 13/6/1997.

[32] Ironically, these values have rarely been applied to domestic
conflicts, in which each state has been given a free hand to do whatever
it likes towards its domestic foes. See, Askandar, K. (1996), "The
Association of Southgeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as  Process of Conflict
Management", PhD thesis, University of Bradford 1996.

[33] Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (1998), "Report Card: SLORC's
Performance As the State Peace & Development Council?h, booklet,
Bangkok: Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma.

[34] "Shameful for ASEAN to Embrace Burma", editorial, The Nation
(Thailand) 01/6/1997.

[35] ASEAN increasingly expresses unhappiness about a slow progress
towards democracy in Burma, and high ranking officials from the member
states have started to contact Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders.
The SPDC has realised that it cannot any longer take it for granted that
ASEAN will come forward to defend it whenever it is condemned in the
international arena. For example, during this year?fs UN Human Rights
Commission session, no ASEAN countries objected to a draft resolution
prepared by some Western countries which accused Burma of poor human
rights situation. This cold-shouldering of Burma by ASEAN was something
unprecedented. See, Bachoe, R. (1997), "It's the Worst Year for
Burmese Junta", Bangkok Post 02/11/1997; Burma Peace Foundation (1998),
"DSIF Triumphs in Geneva", Article posted to burmanet-l@xxxxxxxxxxx on
20/4/1998.

[36] The August 8 Joint Committee (1997), "Challenge Issued to ASEAN &
Burma Junta", Media release.

[37] One of the strong advocates of constructive intervention is
Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim.  See, Ibrahim, A.
(1997a), "Crisis Prevention", Newsweek 21/7/1997, p. 13; Ibrahim, A.
(1997b), "What is Success without Freedom?", Interview, Time
06/10/1997, p. 24.

[38] "BURMA: Sanctions bite harder", Financial Times (US) 05/5/1998.

[39] Hsaw Wah Deh (1998), "Rice situation in Burma", Human
Rights-Trade Union Rights Section Report, Federation of Trade
Unions-Burma 02/5/1998

[40] Alternative ASEAN Network on Burma (1998), op. cit., p. 10.

[41] Burton, S. (1997), "Commotion in the Compound", Time 10/11/1997.
The meeting excluded Aung San Suu Kyi, and was held in such a manner
that the NLD leaders were summoned with less than 24 hour notice, and
that, once in the venue, they were scolded for their defiance towards
the junta and "preached" one-sidedly. The NLD regards such a meeting
as hardly a dialogue