Burma Future! (r)

[enmasse_1@xxxxxxxxxxx]

Re: Burma Future!
=================

Dear Friends,

When you read this posting, it would have been 21 August and Burma may 
have entered into one of the states that the author has painted in the 
attached article. It really is a bone chilling one indeed.

Whichever the case may be, it is regretable to take note that the time 
had already ran out for the SPDC to make the best out of it. To our 
disappointment,in fact, nothing much was done. But, surely, the military 
regime had taken a very long time( i.e more than 10 years )to do just 
that after it seized power in 1988 . The SPDC should have been concerned 
about engaging the NLD party led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi more positively 
and ends its illegitimate rule in a peaceful manner and handover the 
power to the NLD party which won the general elections in May 1990. 
Instead, it decided to play games at a time like this. It should be 
reminded that the SPDC is dealing with the elected party. In legality, 
that's all it matters now. It's the best time for the SDPC to show that 
they really don't intend to hang on to power forever as they claimed all 
the time. 

Though the military regime has the records of using excessive force to 
put down any possible unrests, I would like to hope that the SPDC will 
handle the situation peacefully as demands to convene the parliament was 
made in time of peace and by the elected political party who has the 
mandate from the people of Burma. Besides, ample time was given to 
settle the differences in handling the transfer of power. I would like 
to emphasise that the situation is entirely different from that of 1988 
and negotiation is still possible if the SPDC has the faith in the NLD.


In soliderity with the NLD's movements,

Minn Kyaw Minn
==============


>From notes@xxxxxxx Thu Aug 20 19:57:49 1998
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>Date: 20 Aug 1998 19:22:52
>Reply-To: Conference "reg.burma" <burmanet-l@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>From: hag2@xxxxxxxxxxx
>Subject: Burma Future!
>To: Recipients of burmanet-l <burmanet-l@xxxxxxxxxxx>
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>The Future Course of Burma
>
>
>The NLD, the victorious party in the 1990 election, and the Burmese
>military regime, Burma's de facto rulers, are heading to a showdown on
>August 21, 1998, the date that the NLD has given as an ultimatum for
>convening the parliament.
>
>As August 8th approached, the regime grew very worried about the tenth
>anniversary of the nationwide demonstration now known as "four eights"
>(8-8-88).  To avoid a repeat of such large-scale uprisings, the SPDC
>suddenly called a meeting with NLD Chairman U Aung Swe on August 6, a 
mere
>two days before the momentous anniversary.  This was a trick typical of 
the
>Burmese military, who are trying to buy time and give false hope to 
those
>who are preparing to strike.
>
>When we look more closely at the meeting called for by the SPDC, it 
becomes
>clear that they are still excluding not only Daw Aung San Suu Kyi but 
also
>U Tin Oo from these talks.  It was not by any means a sincere attempt 
at
>dialogue, since neither of the opposition parties have any right to 
choose
>whom they wish to send to the meeting.  Instead, the military is 
reserving
>the right to dictate with whom it will speak.  Even though NLD had not
>mentioned whom they wish to send to talk to the SPDC, the SPDC has 
always
>recognized U Aung Shwe and deliberately rejected Aung San Suu Kyi as 
the
>voice of the NLD.  This time the NLD outright rejected this offer of 
talks
>because its members do not believe that the regime has any intention of
>coming to a lasting agreement with them.  Furthermore, the fact that 
the
>SPDC has called for talks so soon before the tenth anniversary of
>nationwide protests against military rule betrays its underhanded 
strategy;
>they are not beneath using overtures for peace as a tactic for holding 
on
>to their power.
>
>More crucially, both sides have been waiting for August 21st with
>anxiousness and fear.  The SPDC of course fears that Burma will once 
again
>be swept by nationwide demonstrations; as for the NLD, it is worried 
that
>there will be no large-scale protests on that day and on the days 
following.
>
>Case 1
>If, on August 21st, there are no demonstrations as the NLD fears, the 
NLD
>must then do something out of the fact that it has set down an 
ultimatum
>for convening the parliament.  As Aung San Suu Kyi and U Aung Shwe are
>legally authorized to do so by the NLD's elected representatives, they 
have
>the right to form a cabinet if necessary.  In the absence of 
large-scale
>protests, the NLD might give a formal announcement of who the cabinet
>members are after the targeted date.  Were they to make such an
>annoucement, the NLD cabinet would then become the legitimate 
government
>because they have received the mandate from the people.  As a result, 
there
>would then be two governmental bodies in Burma: the 
democratically-elected
>government headed by the ASSK and the de facto government of the 
military
>junta.  The NCGUB, which was formed in the jungle and has recently 
moved to
>Australia, will dissolve because it would not be necessary for it to 
exist
>once the NLD had formed its cabinet.  Such an act would boost the
>activities of the Burmese communities abroad because the NCGUB has been
>acting as a toll-keeper for democracy, which has been hindering the
>establishment of a true democratic political order rather than 
promoting it.
>
>In 1988, former Prime Minister U Nu formed a parallel government, but 
the
>students and other politicians refused give it their formal 
recognition.
>By contrast, the NLD has much more of a chance than U Nu's effort; it 
has a
>popular mandate and plays an active, leading role in Burmese politics, 
its
>leader ASSK is a Nobel laureate who enjoys the respect and esteem of 
world
>leaders and international organizations.  If, in this scenario, ASSK 
were
>not to take a position in the cabinet but were to continue acting as 
the
>NLD's party chief, the SPDC would find itself in a sticky predicament.  
It
>would then be tremendously difficult for the SPDC to continue to paint 
her
>as a power-hungry politician.  ASSK will have shown that she cares 
foremost
>for the well-being of the people, and not for any personal gain.  In
>abiding by her disbarrment from running in the 1990 elections, ASSK 
will
>only strengthen her cause as one who seeks to better Burma and not her 
own
>interests.  The 1988 democratic revolution has turned out many positive
>results for the people of Burma as well as for the NLD in 1998.  Within 
ten
>years, the Burmese struggle for democracy has become well known 
throughout
>the world and has received the support of international organizations 
and
>activists from other countries.  The arrest of eighteen international
>activists in Burma this month has proven that the problem of freedom 
for
>Burma is not an issue isolated from the international community.  
Unlike in
>1988, Burmese students and activists are forming their own 
organizations in
>Japan,Thailand, Canada, Australia, Norway, Germany, and the United 
States.
>They have all been instrumental in rallying support for a democratic 
Burma.
>
>If the NLD formed its own cabinet, the West and the United States would
>likely give their support, but authoritarian states such as China and 
North
>Korea and semi-democratic countries might wait and see if it will stay 
in
>power before giving their recognition.  It is possible that China, 
North
>Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore will support the SPDC in 
secret
>during this critical period.  When the democratic government collides 
with
>the military regime, the ones to suffer the most will be the Burmese
>people.  Blood will flow on Burmese soil, many will lose their lives.  
If
>the SPDC were to arrest the NLD cabinet members, international
>organizations will come out strongly against the regime, perhaps 
leading to
>tough sanctions against Burma.  Also, ASEAN will have to respond to 
this
>outbreak of political chaos.  The SPDC has not strengthened Burma's
>economy, and Burma's currency remains in free-fall.
>
>Today, the morale of the people and the nation's economic plight are in 
far
>worse condition than in 1988.  A monk, taking a rest on an automobile 
trip
>from Mandalay to Kyauk Sae, relates how he was approached by hungry
>children who offered to give him and his companions massages in 
exchange
>for money.  The monk was shocked by the the desperateness in the 
children's
>eyes, who were forced to go around begging.  A businessman, exporting 
soy
>and other beans from Burma, relates how his supplier, responding to the
>demand for fresh green beans, will dye other kinds of beans green for
>export to various countries.  Another common trick of the suppliers is 
to
>spray the beans with water and cover them with a layer of dry beans.  
The
>wet beans weigh more than dry ones, but they become rotten when they 
arrive
>at their destination.  The supplies will even place set stones in the
>middle of sacks in order to make them weigh more.  Now, no one wants to
>order materials and products from Burma.  The morale of the people has
>reached a breaking point.  Few have adequate knowledge of business.  In
>most countries, ordering products in greater quantities will drive down 
the
>price.  In Burma, it is the opposite.  If the buyer orders more of
>something, the seller will try to make a greater profit by raising 
prices.
>It is a mentality that causes many in Burma to suffer.  Even though the
>SPDC remains stubbornly attached to its power, economic collapse will 
bring
>them down in the near future.
>
>Economic failure and political oppression leads to social unrest.  If 
many
>lose their lives in the struggle, the responsibility lies at the door 
not
>just of the SPDC and the NLD, but also with the United Nations.  The UN 
has
>been very passive on the Burma issue and also legally recognizes the 
SPDC
>as a legitimate government.  Recent overtures by the UN Secretary 
General
>to send his representative to Burma was turned down by the SPDC.  It 
shows
>that the UN needs to take a firmer stance against the SPDC's
>authoritarianism.  It is proven that merely issuing a letter of concern 
is
>not enough to solve Burma's core problems.  The UN must demonstrate its
>effectiveness in resolving such crises, including that of Burma's 
political
>order.
>
>Case B 
>On August 21st, if there are nationwide demonstrations, as the SPDC 
fears,
>the military regime will once again kill unarmed demonstrators like it 
did
>in 1988.  But whether the army will carry out its orders this time is
>placed in doubt by the fact that most soldiers below the rank of major 
are
>now suffering the problems faced by most of the people of Burma.  They 
know
>now that the only people benefiting from the regime's corruption are 
above
>the rank of colonel.  They realize that the country's interests are 
being
>blatantly ignored, and that the future of Burma remains quite bleak.  
They
>cannot deny any longer that their leadership is corrupt and that the 
army
>has been manipulated and misused since 1962.  U Aung Gyi, who was close 
to
>the military, declared last month that the army is a divided entity.  
In
>1988, we witnessed some units of the army joining the demonstrations.
>Recent years have seen SLORC's generals Tun Kyi, Kyaw Ba, Myint Aung, 
and
>Maung Hla sacked from the army and detained.  Their supporters remain 
in
>the military and are ready to join the opposition when the opportunity
>arises.  The loyalty of the army to its leaders is uncertain.  The SPDC 
is
>quite reluctant to put it to the test.  Followers of the sacked 
generals
>might join the demonstrators for various reasons, whether out of hatred 
for
>the regime or the desire for revenge.  On this score, the emergence of 
a
>Burmese Ramos is possible.  Of the 400,000 SPDC troops, if 20,000 were 
to
>join the people, then this faction of soldiers backing the "Burmese 
Ramos"
>will be supported by people who are fed up with the regime.   Rangoon 
and
>Mandalay alone will those soldiers have a chance for recruiting 
hundreds of
>thousands of civilian supporters.  Furthermore, it is likely that more 
SPDC
>will defect to the side of the opposition.  A full-scale civil war 
might
>erupt.  To avoid such an awful occurrence, both the NLD and the SPDC 
need
>to engage in serious talks about the fate of the country.  The UN needs 
to
>encourage the SPDC to negotiate, but also put pressure on them to work 
out
>an acceptable political solution.  If the UN enters as a mediator, the 
NLD
>will accept its participation, but the SPDC will only cooperate if it 
sees
>a carrot on the end of the international stick.  The only way to 
resolve
>the Burmese crisis is to initiate talks between the SPDC and the NLD.
>Otherwise, the country will slip into the appalling destruction of 
civil war.
>
>
>


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