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ILO REPORT ON FL IN BURMA: SLICE 11



[ILO COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON FORCED LABOUR IN BURMA, SLICE
11]
 
C. THEMATIC ANALYSES OF THE FORMS OF LABOUR AND 
   SERVICES REQUISITIONED BY CERTAIN AUTHORITIES
 
299. This part of the chapter presents a thematic analysis of
the forms of forced labour and services requisitioned by
certain authorities in Myanmar. The first four sections deal
with work directly related to the military or militia groups
(portering, military camp work, other work in support of the
military and forced recruitment). The latter four sections
deal with work which, although it commonly involves these
groups, is of a more general nature (work on agriculture,
logging and other production projects, construction and
maintenance of roads, railways and bridges, other
infrastructure work and general urban work). 
 
 
(1) Portering
 
(a) Documentary material 
 
300. Nature and conditions of work. Because of the rugged
terrain and lack of roads and other infrastructure in many
parts of Myanmar, the army regularly moved troops and supplies
on foot.(349) In general, civilian porters were used for this
purpose, usually against their will. The regular major
offensives which the "Tatmadaw" conducted against insurgent
groups required large quantities of supplies and equipment,
and could involve the use of thousands or even tens of
thousands of civilian porters for periods of several months.
(350) In addition to the use of porters for such major
offensives, the Commission was informed that in both conflict
and non-conflict areas troops demanded porters on a regular
basis for a wide range of duties such as carrying equipment
and supplies for routine patrols, carrying provisions to the
local military camp, carrying out various duties at military
camps or staying at the camp on "stand-by" in case they were
needed for some task. Porters were also often sent ahead of
soldiers in potential danger situations, to draw enemy fire or
in the hope that insurgents would not attack when there was a
danger that the porters might be killed. They were also sent
ahead of troops in suspected minefields, to detonate mines;
many were reportedly killed or injured in this way.(351)
 
301. Soldiers appeared to generally prefer able-bodied males
to work as porters, since they were able to move more quickly
and carry heavier loads. In cases where women were taken as
porters, they were generally released as soon as men were
found to replace them, though this could in certain
circumstances be after a considerable period of time.(352)
 
302. The methods used to procure porters varied. For major
operations where large numbers of porters were required,
various procurement methods were used. Orders to provide
porters emanated from the highest levels of the military
command structure.(353) Depending on the number of porters
required, the quota might be spread over a number of
districts, or even over a number of States and Divisions.(354)
The order would be transmitted down the administrative command
structure, so that a given township would be required to send
a certain number of porters to a certain gathering point on a
certain date. In order to fill this quota, orders were sent to
each ward and village to provide a particular number of
people. In cases where it was difficult to fill the quota in
this way, the authorities resorted to rounding up civilians in
urban areas, at such places as cinemas, video halls, tea-
shops, stations, from buses or trains, or at any other place
where there were large gatherings of people, such as at
markets, religious festivals, weddings or funerals.(355) In
rural areas, troops went into villages and rounded up everyone
they could catch. In the absence of a sufficient number of
able-bodied men, the authorities would take women, children,
the elderly, and persons otherwise unfit for work.(356) The
only way to avoid being taken was to pay a substantial sum of
money (of the order of several thousand kyat(257)) to the
authorities to be exempted from this work. Having released
those people who paid such a sum, the authorities would have
to round up more people to replace them. It appeared that
often the authorities would round up many more people than
required, knowing that some would pay money to be released;
the amount of money to be paid would depend on the number of
"spare" people they had rounded up.(358)
 
303. Prisoners were also regularly sent from prisons and
labour camps across the country to be used by the army in
major offensives. They continued to wear prison uniforms and
were usually kept separate from the other porters. In certain
cases, prisoners were forced to continue working in such
conditions beyond their normal release date.(359) 
 
304. In rural areas, orders to provide porters usually gave
some general indication of what task the porters were required
for: general duties at the army camp, a particular task such
as carrying supplies to the camp, or for a military operation.
It was then up to the village head to arrange which villagers
would go. In addition, villages had to provide a fixed number
of porters to each of the army camps in their area on a
permanent basis; this would normally be done by villagers in
rotating shifts of a few days. The only way to avoid such
duties was to hire a replacement or in some cases pay a sum of
money to be exempted.
 
305. Urban populations were normally only required to provide
porters at times of major operations, though troops might also
round up people in the streets in urban areas for other, more
minor tasks. Again, the only way to avoid such duties was to
pay a sum of money to be exempted, or hire a replacement.
 
306. When people were ordered to work as porters either by the
village head or local authorities, or directly by the
military, no indication was normally given as to the length of
the assignment. Even where such an indication was given, it
was unlikely to be accurate and was not respected.(360)
 
307. In addition to rounding people up in an organized way, or
ordering local authorities to provide them, military units
also captured people at random from villages and rural areas
which they passed through. This might be in the context of a
major operation, or on a routine patrol through a non-conflict
area. Military units constantly needed to "top-up" their
supply of porters, to replace those who had been killed, who
had escaped, or who were sick or otherwise unable to continue.
Taking porters might also be used as a means of extorting
money from the community, or as a means of punishment or
oppression.(361) The only way to avoid being taken as a porter
in such circumstances was to pay a sum of money to be
exempted. In cases where people were taken directly by
soldiers to work as porters, the family of the person was not
notified.(362)
 
308. When troops arrived in a village, the men would often
have already fled, because they feared being arrested or
killed by the army, particularly in conflict areas where they
might be accused of being rebels. The women usually stayed
behind, because they were likely to be treated less violently.
In such cases, the women were liable to be taken as porters if
the troops could find no men.(363) There were cases where
pregnant women and nursing mothers were taken by force to work
as porters.(364)
 
309. Given the wide variation in the amount of portering work
required of different villages at different times, it would
appear that little attempt was made to keep such requirements
within any kind of limit. In some cases, a village household
had to provide a porter as often as twice a month, for an
indeterminate length of time, in addition to the other demands
for labour.(365)
 
310. The length of portering assignments varied considerably,
and depended on a number of factors. Porters taken on routine
patrols would usually be replaced at regular intervals of
around two weeks by other people from the same village. It was
up to the village head to find out where the troops were, and
send the replacements. Porters were not normally released
until their replacements arrived. Sometimes it was difficult
for replacements to be sent, either because the troops were a
long distance from the village, or because their whereabouts
was unknown. In such cases porters might have to work for
considerably longer periods.
 
311. Porters taken for offensives usually had to work for much
longer periods, since it was much more difficult for them to
be replaced, and the demand for porters was very high at such
times. Given the dangers of disease, injury or abuse at the
hands of the soldiers, many porters chose to flee rather than
waiting to be released. Escaping porters were routinely shot,
and if recaptured were beaten or killed in front of other
porters as a warning.(366) Porters who attempted escape in
conflict areas appeared to suffer the most severe retaliation.
 
312. Villagers and townspeople across Myanmar had to pay a
variety of fees and taxes including the "porter fee".(367)
This was in addition to any money which might have to be paid
to avoid doing actual work as a porter, since payment of
porter fees did not appear to reduce the demand on a community
to provide porters; if a community failed to pay porter fees,
however, a likely punishment was an increase in the demand for
porters, since people who failed to pay such fees were
typically arrested and used as porters. While collection of
these fees was ostensibly for the purpose of providing
salaries to porters, it appeared that porters were in fact
never paid, except when they were hired by another person to
go in their place.(368) 
 
313. It could, however, be difficult or at least extremely
expensive to hire a replacement for some kinds of portering
work, particularly portering in military operations, which
lasted for a long time and was particularly dangerous and
demanding.(369)  
 
314. The Commission received a great deal of information
detailing the situation of porters during their assignments.
This information indicated that porters were generally given
loads of 30 to 40 kg for men and 20 to 30 kg for women, though
reports of porters having to carry up to 50 kg were not
uncommon.(370) This could consist of food, ammunition,
soldiers' backpacks or other items, usually carried in woven
cane or bamboo baskets, with straps across the shoulders and
an additional strap across the forehead. When excessive loads
were carried for prolonged periods, the straps of the basket
and the basket itself dug into the flesh of the shoulders and
back, causing serious injuries and sometimes exposing the
bone.(371) Injuries to the feet were also common.(372) Women
and children were generally given lighter loads, but otherwise
the size of the load was generally irrespective of the age,
physical fitness or strength of the person in question.(373)
 
315. Porters were required to carry such loads for long
distances, resting only as and when the troops themselves
rested. Porters regularly had to carry such loads for a period
in excess of 12 hours per day with little rest, over periods
of days, weeks or months. It was not uncommon, particularly in
offensives, for porters to have to carry their loads
continuously for 24 or 36 hours with no sleep.(374) Porters,
particularly those who had been rounded up without warning and
forced to work, would have few belongings, usually only the
clothes they were wearing at the time they were rounded up.
They were not provided with any additional clothing, blankets
or adequate footwear.
 
316. Porters were generally fed minimal rations amounting to
between a half and one tin of rice per day,(375) sometimes
accompanied by a little salt, some chillies, or some watery
yellow-pea curry.(376) Many former porters said that this was
considerably less than the amount given to the soldiers, and
that if the soldiers had better quality food such as meat, the
porters did not receive any. Unlike soldiers, porters did not
have water-bottles and were usually prevented from drinking
from streams as they walked, as the soldiers often claimed
this would slow them down.(377) Porters who had asked to drink
from soldiers' water bottles had been beaten.(378)
 
317. Female porters were sometimes raped or otherwise sexually
abused by soldiers.(379) Porters who walked too slowly
were regularly beaten with sticks, punched, kicked, hit with
rifle butts or prodded with bayonets.(380) Porters who were
persistently slow, or who were unable to carry their loads
because of exhaustion, sickness or injury were often severely
beaten and forced to continue, or if this was not possible
they were abandoned or killed.(381) The killing of porters who
could not continue appeared to be more common in potential
conflict areas.(382) In such areas, porters were usually not
shot, but were beaten to death, had their throats cut, were
thrown from the sides of mountains, were thrown into rivers
with their hands tied behind their backs, or were burned
alive.(383) Porters who were able to carry their loads at the
required pace, who did not slip or fall and who were otherwise
obedient were generally not beaten.
 
318. In addition to those who were executed, many porters died
from disease, particularly malaria and gastrointestinal
infections. Malaria was particularly endemic in the
densely-forested mountainous regions away from Myanmar's
central plains where most armed opposition to the government
was located. In addition, porters were not provided with any
form of prophylaxis and were rarely given medical treatment or
medication of any kind.(384)
 
319. Porters were also exposed to dangerous combat
situations.(385) This could include exposure to mines and
other kinds of booby-traps, ambushes and major or minor
battles. There appeared to be no attempt made by military
units using porters to minimize the exposure of porters to
such situations. On the contrary, soldiers sometimes forced
porters to walk ahead of them in areas where mines, other
booby-traps, or ambushes were suspected in order to minimize
the exposure of troops to such dangers; if they were carrying
ammunition, porters also had to take this to soldiers
requiring it during battles.(386) There were also reportedly
cases of soldiers forcing porters to exchange clothes with
them, in order to draw enemy fire.(387) Many porters were
killed or injured in this way.(388) Compensation for death or
injury, or medical treatment in the event of injury, appeared
to be minimal.(389) In cases of death, the family of the
porter was not normally notified.
 
320. To prevent their escape, porters were guarded at all
times. During the day they were often tied together, or to
their loads, and they were kept guarded in bunkers or tied
together in groups at night.(390) At night, they often had to
sleep in the open, with no shelter or blankets provided, even
in cold and wet situations. During actual fighting, where they
might be able to take advantage of the confusion to escape,
porters were often kept in the middle of the soldiers so as to
make escape more difficult.(391) Former porters mentioned that
it was less feasible to try to escape when they had been sent
by the village head in response to an order from the military,
because their identities, or at least the identity of their
village, was known to the troops, and so they, their families
or village could face problems. Porters who had been arrested
directly by passing troops could not be identified as easily
in this way, and so they were less likely to face problems if
they managed to escape. 
 
321. In cases where large numbers of porters were needed and
the quota was spread over a wide area, people might be taken
considerable distances from their homes. Cases of people being
taken from the capital Yangon or even Rakhine State to work
as porters in offensives near the Thai border were not
uncommon. It was suggested that this might be a deliberate
strategy to reduce the chances of porters escaping, since they
would be in territory which was unfamiliar to them.(392)
 
322. If such people did manage to escape, or if they were
released after some period, they would find themselves in an
unfamiliar area, with no money or possessions. No provision
was made for released porters to be transported back to their
homes, though in some cases they might be given passes which
should allow them to pass through military checkpoints in the
area. Such escaped or released porters often became internally
displaced, with no opportunity of returning to their homes.
They were liable to be arrested as porters by some other
military unit as they passed through checkpoints or if they
ran into military patrols.(393)
 
323. Specific examples. The Commission had information
relating to the requisition and use of porters in most parts
of Myanmar, covering Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine
and Shan States and Ayeyarwady, Bago, Sagaing, Tanintharyi and
Yangon Divisions. Those required to work as porters included
women, minors, persons over the age of 45, and persons
otherwise unfit for work.(394) 
 
324. Use of porters in the eastern and central parts of
Myanmar was very common, particularly in large-scale military
operations against opposition groups in the region near the
eastern border with Thailand. This region will be discussed in
the paragraphs which follow.
 
325. In Shan State, civilians were requisitioned by military
units in a number of areas(395) and used as porters.(396) The
information related to a period from 1992 to 1997. Civilians
were also reportedly forced to act as sentries on the Namhsam
to Mongnai railway in 1995.(397)
 
326. There was a considerable amount of information relating
to Kayah State.(398) Porters were requisitioned by various
military units from a number of townships,(399) particularly
at relocation sites such as Demawso, Shadaw and Ywathit. The
information received covered the period from 1992 to 1997, and
included copies of several orders from Demawso Township
LORC in 1995 requiring villages to provide porters for a
military operation.
 
327. A very large volume of information was received relating
to the requisition and use of porters in every part of Kayin
State,(400) involving a large number of military units as well
as the Democratic Kayin Buddhist Army (DKBA) militia.(401)
Porters in Kayin State were also regularly forced to carry out
other tasks such as acting as sentries and guides for the
troops, a practice discussed further in paragraphs 374-388
below. There was also information that civilians, including
women, were forced to act as human minesweepers, often during
portering assignments.(402) Porters were also used by soldiers
to transport back to their camps goods which had been looted
from villages.(403) The information covered a period from 1988
to 1997, and included copies of orders from the authorities
requiring villages to provide porters, as well as information
from army deserters.
 
328. In Bago Division, porters were mostly taken by the
military in areas near to the border with Kayin State which
have a majority Karen population, including Shwegyin and
Kyaukkyi townships, various parts of Toungoo district
including Toungoo town, and parts of Nyaunglebin district. A
number of porters were also rounded up in other parts of the
Division.(404) The information related to a period from 1992
to 1997. Some porters, including women, were forced to walk in
front of troops as human minesweepers; several were injured or
killed by mines. Porters were also used by the military for
sentry duty.(405)
 
329. People were also rounded up in Yangon Division for use as
porters in military operations in other parts of the country;
Muslims appeared to be particularly targeted. In October 1988
a large number of people were rounded up by the military in
the capital Yangon and forced to work as porters in Kayin
State.(406)  The same thing happened in 1994 and 1995, for
another offensive in the same area.(407)
 
330. A large volume of information was also received relating
to Mon State.(408) Porters were rounded up or used by various
military units in a number of different areas.(409) As
discussed further below,(410) civilians were also forced to
carry out a number of other tasks, usually in the context of
portering, such as acting as guides for troops, acting as
human minesweepers, or working as sentries; civilians were
also used by troops as human shields.(411) The information
covered a period from 1990 to 1997, and included copies of
orders from the authorities requiring that porters be
provided. 
 
331. A very large volume of information was provided to the
Commission regarding portering in Tanintharyi Division. Forced
portering appeared to be particularly prevalent in Yebyu
township,(412) though there was information of people being
requisitioned by various military units(413) in most parts of
the Division and forced to work as porters.(414) The
information covered a period from 1991 to 1997, and included
information from army deserters and copies of orders from the
authorities requiring provision of porters.
 
332. In the western part of the country, porters were more
commonly used for routine patrols and other tasks of a shorter
duration. This was the case in various parts of Chin
State,(415) over at least the period 1994 to 1997. The
information included interviews with "Tatmadaw" deserters, as
well as a number of orders from the authorities requiring the
provision of porters.(416) Porters were also used for sentry
duty and as human shields in Chin State. For example, 30
villagers were required to work as sentries guarding six
sentry posts in Thantlang.(417) Porters were similarly used
for various portering tasks in Kachin State,(418) Sagaing
Division(419) and Ayeyarwady Division.(420) This practice is
discussed further in paragraphs 374-388 below. 
 
333. In Rakhine State, porters were rounded up and used by
both the army and NaSaKa. Porters were rounded up from various
areas, including Sittway (Akyab) town and Maungdaw and
Buthidaung townships, from both the Rohingya and Rakhine
populations.(421) Civilians were also forced to act as
sentries, for example at a NaSaKa camp in Maungdaw township
in 1992.(422) 
___________________
 
NOTES
 
349. See para. 19 of the response of the Government of Myanmar
to the memorandum of the Special Rapporteur, transmitted
to the Special Rapporteur in a note verbale dated 4 Oct. 1995
by the Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the United Nations 
Office at Geneva, UN doc. UNGA A/50/568 (16 Oct. 1995), p. 26. 
 
350. Human Rights Watch/Asia, 001-0057, 001-0059; Mon
Information Service, M57-7432; Heppner, XII/14; Human
Rights Watch/Asia, "Abuses Linked to the Fall of Manerplaw",
Mar. 1995, p. 7. 
 
351. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-1462, 016-2149, 032-2422;
Min Lwin, III/16; Liddell, V/35-36; Lin, VII/39;
Heppner, XII/18-19. 
 
352. Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Abuses Linked to the Fall of
Manerplaw", op. cit., note 350, p. 7. 
 
353. Heppner, XII/27-28. 
 
354. Mon Information Service, M57-7432; Heppner, XII/15. 
 
355. Karen Human Rights Group, 016-2147; Human Rights
Watch/Asia, 065-2572 to 2573; Lin, VII/54; Heppner, XII/25. 
 
356. Lin, VII/26; Heppner, XII/28. 
 
357. This is a substantial sum for most people in Myanmar. For
an indication of purchasing power, see under "kyat" in
Appendix X. 
 
358. Mon Information Service, M57-7432; Karen Human Rights
Group, 032-2422. 
 
359. Karen Human Rights Group, 016-2148, 032-2429; Liddell,
V/23. 
 
360. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-1474; Guest, II/24. 
 
361. Amnesty International, 088-3588. 
 
362. Heppner, XII/15-16. 
 
363. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0028; Guest, II/12; Ka Hsaw
Wa, X/13. 
 
364. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-1461 to 1462. 
 
365. Guest, II/12-13. 
 
366. Guest, II/10-11; Ka Hsaw Wa, X/15. 
 
367. See paras. 294-295 above. 
 
368. Heppner, XII/64. 
 
369. In one of the documents submitted to the Commission it
was noted that hired porters perhaps face less abuse from
soldiers, since they were accustomed to the work and, being
paid, they were in a position to bribe soldiers to get better
food or treatment. See Karen Human Rights Group, 016-2149. 
 
370. Karen Human Rights Group, 016-2147; Min Lwin, III/16;
Heppner, XII/16. 
 
371. See photos at 155-5474, 156-5517; see also Karen Human
Rights Group, 032-2422; Heppner, XIII/5. 
 
372. Lin, VII/52-53. 
 
373. In one case an epileptic woman was taken as a porter,
even though her sister explained this to the soldiers, and she
died after the first day (Liddell, V/11); in another case, an
elderly Mon man was taken as a porter and forced to carry
heavy loads of ammunition, resulting in serious injuries (Lin,
VII/26). See also Karen Human Rights Group, 001-1461 to 1462,
016-2149.
 
374. Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Abuses Linked to the Fall of
Manerplaw", op. cit., note 350, p. 9. 
 
375. "Tin" refers to condensed milk tins of a standard size,
which are the usual measure for small quantities of dry goods
in Myanmar. One tin is equal to approximately 300 grams of
uncooked rice. By contrast, the World Food Programme
reportedly estimated that a family of six to eight persons
required 6 kg of rice per day, or up to 1 kg per person (see
Human Rights Watch/Asia, H07-5806). 
 
376. Liddell, V/8. 
 
377. Karen Human Rights Group, 016-2147; Heppner, XII/16;
Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Abuses Linked to the Fall of
Manerplaw", op. cit., note 350, p. 9. 
 
378. Liddell, V/8. 
 
379. Human Rights Watch/Asia, 001-0059; Liddell, V/6-7; Ka
Hsaw Wa, X/11-12. 
 
380. Human Rights Watch/Asia, 001-0057; Guest, II/11; Min
Lwin, III/18-19; Liddell, V/8; Heppner, XII/16; Human Rights
Watch/Asia, "Abuses Linked to the Fall of Manerplaw", op.
cit., note 350, pp. 9-10. 
 
381. Human Rights Watch/Asia, 001-0060; Guest, II/10; Ka Hsaw
Wa, X/14-15; Heppner, XII/16-18; Human Rights Watch/Asia,
"Abuses Linked to the Fall of Manerplaw", ibid., pp. 9-11. 
 
382. This might be done to prevent them from providing
intelligence to hostile forces. Karen Human Rights Group,
032-2422; Heppner, XII/16. 
 
383. Karen Human Rights Group, 032-2422; Heppner, XII/16. 
 
384. Guest, II/24; Liddell, V/8; Lin, VII/41-42. 
 
385. Human Rights Watch/Asia, 001-0059, 065-2971; Karen Human
Rights Group, 001-1462; Ka Hsaw Wa, X/17. 
 
386. Min Lwin, III/16. 
 
387. Heppner, XII/18-19. 
 
388. Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Abuses Linked to the Fall of
Manerplaw", op. cit., note 350, pp. 6-7, 9. 
 
389. Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Abuses Linked to the Fall of
Manerplaw", ibid., p. 10. 
 
390. Human Rights Watch/Asia, "Abuses Linked to the Fall of
Manerplaw", ibid., pp. 8-9. 
 
391. Min Lwin, III/16. 
 
392. Karen Human Rights Group, 016-2147; Ka Hsaw Wa, X/16. 
 
393. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-1469, 032-2422; Heppner,
XII/17. 
 
394. See, for example, Liddell, V/11-12; Heppner, XII/17-18;
Amnesty International, 001-0505, 090-3653; Images Asia,
001-0216; Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0187, 001-0189,
001-0196 to 0197, 001-0905, 001-0921. 
 
395. The areas mentioned covered the following townships: Hsi
Hseng (by LIB 424), Kengtung, Kunhing, Laikha (by LIB
515), Langkho, Mongnai (by LIB 520), Mong Hsat, Mong Yai (by
Light Infantry Regiment 31), Namhsam (by LIB 518), and
Tachilek. 
 
396. Human Rights Watch/Asia, 001-0059 to 60; Shan Human
Rights Foundation, 001-0176, 001-0369, 001-0417,
144-4536 to 4537, 145-4581 to 4583; Amnesty International,
001-0505 to 0506, 091-3693, 099-3892, 168-8397 to
8398. 
 
397. S.H.A.N/Shan Human Rights Foundation, 001-0170. 
 
398. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0305 to 0306, 001-0320,
001-0324, 001-1970 to 1972, 154-5095; Amnesty
International, 090-3660, 099-3891 to 3892, 099-3896; Images
Asia, M37-7039. 
 
399. Areas mentioned included Loikaw town (by IB 54), Demawso
township, including Demawso relocation camp (by
battalions 102 and 249), Ywathit relocation site, Shadaw
township (by LIB 336), Mawchi township, and Pasaung township. 
 
400. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0186 to 0187, 001-0189,
001-0191 to 0197, 001-0310, 001-0318 to 0319, 001-0325,
001-0327, 001-0364 to 0365, 001-0367, 001-0376, 001-0388,
001-0449, 001-0481, 001-0485, 001-0552, 001-0593, 001-0607 to
0608, 001-0620, 001-0762 to 0764, 001-0905, 001-0921,
001-1342, 001-1855, 001-1868 to 1869, 015-2127, 017-2153,
027-2278 to 2279, 027-2294, 031-2393 to 2394, 031-2396,
031-2399, 031-2403 to 2404, 031-2409 to 2410, 154-4935,
154-5188, 154-5196, 154-5220, 154-5228, 154-5232, H21-6350 to
6354, H23-6388, H23-6391, H23-6396, M50-7354 to 7355, M50-7358
to 7360; Human Rights Watch/Asia, 001-0057, 150-4692,
H07-5800; Amnesty International, 001-0767 to 0770, 001-0774,
087-3580, 088-3589 to 3591, 090-3653, 092-3719 to 3720; Images
Asia, 125-4031, 125-4034, 125-4036, 125-4038; HRDU, M34-6952. 
 
401. The following military units were mentioned specifically:
IB 1, LIB 4, IB 5, LIB 8, 11 Division, LIB 12, LIB 13, IB 19,
LIB 22, 22 Division, IB 23, Battalion 36, 44 Division, IB 51,
IB 75, LIB 76, 77 Division, Battalion 77, IB 84, LIB 88, IB
97, 99 Division, Battalion 104, IB 106, LIB 113, LIB 116, LIB
119, LIB 207, Battalion 230, IB 231, Battalion 248, Battalion
249, IB 258, Battalion 301, IB 310, IB 317, LIB 339, LIB 340,
LIB 355, Battalion 356, Battalion 357, LIB 420, LIB 434,
Battalion 531, LIB 545, LIB 549, and the DKBA. 
 
402. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0189, 001-0319, 001-0376,
001-0449, 001-0619 to 0620, 031-2401, 031-2403 to 2405;
Amnesty International, 088-3592; Images Asia, 125-4038;
Human Rights Watch/Asia, 150-4692. 
 
403. Karen Human Rights Group, 154-5188. 
 
404. There is information that this happened in Letpadan
township and in Ouk-twin town. 
 
405. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0179 to 0182, 001-0305 to
0308, 001-0338, 001-0340 to 0341, 001-0399, 001-0707 to 0708,
001-0924 to 0927, 073-3357 to 3359, M49-7311 to 7314; Images
Asia, 001-0201 to 0226. 
 
406. Amnesty International, 087-3579. 
 
407. Human Rights Watch/Asia, 001-0054, 065-2973; Amnesty
International, 001-0769; Images Asia, 001-0880. In 1994,
a Muslim man was also captured by soldiers on the Yangon to
Mottama (Martaban) train and forced to be a porter in the
same offensive. See Human Rights Watch/Asia, 065-2972. 
 
408. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0299, 001-0759 to 0760,
001-0763, 001-1068, 001-1341, 001-1609 to 1612, 154-5220;
Amnesty International, 001-0792, 088-3589, 090-3653, 094-3786,
099-3890; Mon Information Service, 001-1279, 001-1284,
139-4445; Human Rights Watch/Asia, 065-2972. 
 
409. The information specifically referred to the following
areas: Kyaikto township (by LIB 1 and LIB 207), Mawlamyine
(Moulmein) town (by Battalion 104 and Regiment 80), Mottama
(Martaban) town, Mudon township (by IB 62 and LIB 209), Thaton
town, and Ye township (by IB 61 and LIB 406). 
 
410. See paras. 374-388. 
 
411. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0304, 001-0312; Amnesty
International, 093-3751. 
 
412. HRDU, 001-0150; Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0176,
001-0412 to 0413, 001-1036, 001-1051, 001-1054 to 1057,
001-1072, 001-1368 to 1372, 029-2370; Amnesty International,
001-0500, 001-0791 to 0792; Images Asia, 001-1184; Mon
Information Service, 001-1276 to 1277, 001-1386, 043-2651,
139-4443 to 4445, 139-4449 to 4450; Human Rights Watch/Asia,
150-4688 to 4689; affidavit of John Doe B, H20-6297. 
 
413. The following areas and military units were specifically
mentioned: Yebyu township, including for 33 Division, IB 104,
LIB 273, Battalion 403, LIB 404, LIB 405, LIB 406, LIB 407,
LIB 408, LIB 409, LIB 410 and LIB 431; Dawei (Tavoy) township,
including for LIB 17, Battalion 25, 33 Division, 66 Division,
IB 80 and Battalion 402; Thayetchaung township, including for
33 Division, LIB 403, LIB 404, Battalion 405 and IB 25;
Launglon township, including for 33 Division; Palaw township,
including for Battalion 280 and Battalion 101; and Bokpyin
township. 
 
414. HRDU, 001-0150, M34-6950, M34-6958 to 6959; Karen Human
Rights Group, 001-0176, 001-0412 to 4113, 001-0434, 001-0448,
001-1032, 001-1036 to 1045, 001-1051, 001-1054 to 1057,
001-1072, 001-1129, 001-1368 to 1372, 029-2370, 154-5112,
H24-6442, H24-6476, H24-6485; Amnesty International, 001-0500,
001-0791 to 0792; Images Asia, 001-1184; Mon Information
Service, 001-1276 to 1277, 001-1386, 043-2651, 139-4442 to
4445, 139-4449 to 4450, M56-7421 to 7422; Human Rights
Watch/Asia, 150-4688 to 4689, 150-4691, 154-5310; FTUB,
164-7766 to 7767; affidavit of John Doe B, H20-6297. 
 
415. The information covered the townships of Thantlang,
Tiddim, Falam, Matupi and Paletwa. 
 
416. Karen Human Rights Group, 028-2341, 154-5134 to 5136,
154-5152 to 5156; Images Asia, 167-8308; Interview, M12-6812
to 6813. 
 
417. Karen Human Rights Group, 154-5138. This work was done
for LIB 266. 
 
418. Amnesty International, 090-3653. 
 
419. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0563 to 0564. 
 
420. Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0535, 001-0692; Amnesty
International, 001-0770 to 0772. 
 
421. Amnesty International, 089-3624a, 089-3624b, 089-3608 to
3616; Karen Human Rights Group, 001-0557 to 0558; Human Rights
Watch/Asia, 001-0711, 001-0716, 107-3940 to 3941, 118-3995,
154-4923 to 4924, H07-5800; UNHCR, 033-2435 to 2436; Zunetta
Liddell, 114-3986 to 3987. 
 
422. Human Rights Watch/Asia, 001-0711; UNHCR, 033-2435. See
also the discussion on this practice in paras. 374-388 below. 
 
[END OF SLICE 11]