ILO: FORCED LABOUR IN BURMA-24

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[ILO COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON FORCED LABOUR IN BURMA, SLICE
24]



C. NO PERMISSIBLE EXCEPTION UNDER ARTICLE 2 APPLIES

None of the forced labour practices in Myanmar qualifies as an
exception from the Convention's general prohibition on the use
of forced or compulsory labour under Article 2. That Article
sets forth five narrow exceptions, discussed in turn below:
(a) compulsory military service; (b) normal civic obligations;
(c) labour as punishment for duly convicted prisoners; (d)
circumstances of emergency threatening the population; and (e)
minor communal service. In addition, the Government has
sought to exempt its practices because its forced labourers
are, or are entitled to be, paid. However, under Article 2(2)
whether a forced labourer is paid makes no difference to the
determination of whether the conduct qualifies under one of
the exceptions.(150)


1. The forced labour practices do not constitute work
   or service "exacted in virtue of compulsory
   military service laws for work of a purely
   military character" under Article 2(2)(a)

The exception found in Article 2(2)(a) for "work of a purely
military character" is not met by Myanmar's practice of forced
labour. The Government of Myanmar has consistently asserted
that recruitment into the military is on a purely voluntary
basis.(151) Accordingly, it seems unlikely that there are
"compulsory military service laws" within the meaning of this
article of Convention No. 29, and thus "any work or service
 ... of a purely military character" by non-volunteers falls
outside the exception. Civilians forced to work as porters who
perform military tasks pursuant to the Villages Act 1908 and
the Towns Act 1907, or under threat or use of force are ipso
facto non-volunteers.(152)


2. Forced and compulsory labour in Myanmar is not part
   of the normal civic obligations of the citizenry, within
   the meaning of Article2(2)(b) of the Convention

Forced labour in Myanmar is not contemplated by the exception
found in Article 2(2)(b) for "normal civic obligations". That
exception contemplates such matters as compulsory jury
service, the duty to assist a person in danger, and the duty
to assist in the enforcement of law and order.(153) The nature
and scope of forced and compulsory labour in Myanmar are in no
way analogous to these exceptions, due to the personal effort,
danger, harm and inconvenience the practice of forced labour
in Myanmar requires.(154)


3. The labour exacted from prisoners does not
   meet the strict requirements of Article 2(2)(c)

The forced labour of prisoners in Myanmar does not qualify
under the narrow requirements of Article 2(2)(c). That Article
requires that work exacted from prisoners as part of their
punishment cannot be made available to private individuals
except at the prisoner's free choice.(155) The Article further
requires that the work be exacted "as a consequence of a
conviction in a court of law" and "aims at ensuring that penal
labour will not be imposed unless the guarantees laid down in
the general principles of law recognized by the community of
nations are observed, such as the presumption of innocence,
equality before the law, regularity and impartiality of
proceedings, independence and impartiality of courts,
guarantees necessary for defence, clear definition of the
offence and non-retroactivity of penal law".(156)

Documented reports demonstrate that the process of criminal
convictions in Myanmar falls far short of process standards,
both in military tribunals and in "civilian" courts
established under SLORC administration.(157) In many cases,
convictions are entered after summary trials or trials that
fail to meet internationally recognized minimum standards of
due process, including failure to observe the presumption of
innocence, the defendant's right to counsel and other
guarantees necessary for an adequate defence.(158) In some
cases, conviction is entered without trial.(159) Persons
convicted either by military tribunals, or by civilian courts
cannot be considered to have been "convicted in a court of
law" within the meaning of Article 2(2)(c), and any exaction
of forced labour from them does not meet the requirements of
that exception. 

Furthermore, there is no evidence that any prisoner working in
a labour camp in Myanmar is offered the choice whether to
work, irrespective of the entity for which the work is being
performed. Moreover, work on infrastructure projects related
to private investment, such as the Yadana pipeline, does not
qualify as an exception under these circumstances.


4. No emergency within the meaning of Article 2(2)(d)
   exists to permit the forced and compulsory labour
   that is currently being performed in Myanmar

The circumstances under which forced labour is practised in
Myanmar fail to meet the type of exception contemplated by
Article 2(2)(d). In that Article the concept of emergency
requires "a sudden, unforeseen happening calling for instant
countermeasures",(160) "that endangers the existence or the
well-being of the whole or part of the population". No
emergency exists or has existed in Myanmar that qualifies
under Article 2(2)(d). The nature of the armed insurgencies
were not "sudden" or "unforeseen" but rather the result of a
protracted civil war of more than 40 years. The insurgencies
of themselves did not result from endangerment of the
population itself, but rather threatened the political control
of the junta in the areas of conflict.(161)

Even if it were considered that the nature of the armed
conflicts in outlying areas came within the meaning of Article
2(2)(d), the forced and compulsory labour that is being and
has been performed in Myanmar is not exacted in accordance
with the conditions required by that Article. The Article
requires that the labour be "limited to what is strictly
required" by the circumstances and to the duration of the
emergency.(162) To the contrary, the widespread and systematic
forced or compulsory labour in Myanmar is out of proportion to
the insurgencies, and has lasted for decades. Moreover, forced
labour in Myanmar goes far beyond what is strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation. For example, infrastructure
and tourist development bear no relation to any state of
emergency caused by the armed insurgencies, and sexual
services exacted by way of rape bear no relation to justified
response to war. 


5. Forced or compulsory labour in Myanmar goes far
   beyond the concept of "minor communal service"
   in Article 2(2)(e) 

Forced and compulsory labour in Myanmar does not meet the
requirements of Article 2(2)(e). As the Article provides,
minor communal services must be "truly minor", such as
maintenance work, or the construction of schools; performed
for the benefit of the direct community of people who perform
the work, not some wider group; and performed following
consultation of the community or its representatives
concerning the work to be performed.(163) In Myanmar, in
contrast, the work is commonly extensive and significant in
scope, not minor. It involves construction of roads,
embankments and dams, and continues for days and sometimes
weeks at a time. Forced labour is commonly performed for
groups other than the citizenry, such as the military,
or private interests. Where the labour is performed for
general public benefit, as in infrastructure development, the
benefits to the local community are diffuse and speculative at
best, because the effect inures to communities far beyond
those by whom the work is performed.(164) Indeed, the
Committee of Experts refused under certain circumstances to
accept that construction of projects of such scale and
significance as railways meets the requirements of this
Article.(165) Members of the community and their
representatives are not consulted concerning the work to be
performed. On the contrary, the evidence shows that where
community representatives are involved, village headmen
are ordered to present community members for work, and that
commonly people are literally forced to work, being captured
and seized from their community and made to labour.



D. A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD DOES NOT APPLY IN THIS CASE AND, 
   EVEN IF A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD APPLIED, THE GOVERNMENT OF    
   MYANMAR HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE COMPLIANCE WITH THE       
   GUARANTEES THAT GOVERN SUCH A PERIOD 


1. The ILO noted that no transitional period applies
   to exempt the Government of Myanmar from its
   obligation under Convention No. 29 to suppress
   forced labour in all its forms

The Article 24 Committee determined that there was no question
of a transitional period in this case.(166) While the
Commission of Inquiry will be at liberty to make its own
findings of fact and law de novo, the conclusions of the
Article 24 Committee should be given considerable weight, and
followed.(167) 


2. A transitional period does not apply in the case
   of Myanmar as a matter of fact or law

The 40 years since Myanmar ratified Convention No. 29 in
1955(168) constitutes more than ample time to make any
required alterations to its laws and practices during any
necessary period of transition. The brevity of the
transitional period contemplated by the Convention is
indicated by the requirements that certain forms of forced
labour be immediately suppressed, the strict conditions and
limitations which apply to any forced labour exacted during
the transitional period; and the provision in Convention No.
29 itself(169) for two reviews of its operation, after five
and ten years from its coming into force, with a view to the
suppression of forced labour in all its forms, and without a
further transitional period.

The concept of the transitional period, and the guarantees
provided for concerning the conditions for the continued use
of forced and compulsory labour during that period(170) "were
aimed essentially at certain colonial practices".(171) By 1968
"relatively few of the countries bound by the Convention
[were] still in a position to avail themselves of the
transitional arrangements ..."(172) and by 1979 the
transitional provisions were "hardly ever invoked ... as a
justification for retaining forced or compulsory labour."(173)
The Villages Act 1908 and the Towns Act 1907 are colonial laws
never abolished after independence in Burma. The jurisprudence
and General Surveys of the Committee of Experts support the
conclusion that the laws do not conform to the understanding
and interpretation of Convention No. 29 by the majority of
States parties to it.


3. Myanmar is bound by its declaration
   that no transitional period applies

The Government of Myanmar took the position before the Article
24 Committee that the transitional period did not apply.(174)
That position can be considered as a declaration that gives
rise to an obligation binding on it. In the Nuclear tests
cases, the International Court of Justice held that a
declaration concerning a legal or actual situation, made by
way of a unilateral act of a State, may give rise to
obligations which are binding on that State, and owed by it to
the international community erga omnes, without the need for
any acceptance of the act by any other State.(175) Whether or
not an act has this effect depends upon the circumstances in
which it occurs, and the intention of the maker of the
statement. In the case before the International Court of
Justice, the unilateral declaration by France that it would
not conduct any more atmospheric tests, made in the vicinity
of the International Court of Justice, and in litigious
circomstances, gave rise to an obligation binding it to abide
by that declaration: "It was bound to assume that other States
might take note of these statements and rely on their being
effective."(176) In assessing the intention of the State
making the declaration, a restrictive interpretation is called
for where the content of the declaration would limit the
State's future freedom of action.(177) Further, it is more
likely that a State intended to be bound by the declaration in
circumstances where it could not bind itself by the ordinary
means of formal agreement.(178)

In this case it can be argued that the Government of Myanmar
is bound by its unilateral acts of confirmation of compliance
with Convention No. 29, of which other States took note. The
Government did not invoke the transitional period as
justification for the practice of forced portering, the
subject of the representation by the ICFTU under article 24 of
the ILO Constitution. Accordingly the Article 24
Committee(179) determined that there is no longer any question
of a transitional period for Myanmar. This is in accordance
with the position taken by the Government of Myanmar in its
reports to the Committee of Experts under article 22 of the
ILO Constitution concerning its compliance with its
obligations under Convention No. 29 since 1967.(180) These
actions by the Government of Myanmar were unilateral acts,
having the effect of limiting its future freedom under
Convention No. 29, and concerned a matter not amenable
to formal agreement with any other State or group of States.
Accordingly Myannar, having made a declaration to the
international community, through the avenue of the Article 24
Committee, may now be held to the content of that declaration
by the international community through the ILO.



4. In any event, none of the conditions and
   guarantees required during the transitional
   period is satisfied in Myanmar

The facts in this case demonstrate that, even if there were a
transitional period in effect, the forced labour practices of
Myanmar do not meet the conditions and guarantees required by
the Convention. Article 1(2) requires that, during the
transitional period, recourse may be had to compulsory labour
for public purposes only, as an exceptional measure, and
subject to the conditions and guarantees subsequently
provided.(181) The practice of forced labour in Myanmar
breaches key components of Article 1(2): evidence demonstrates
that forced labour is used for the benefit of private
associations, individuals and companies;(182) forced labour is
used widely and systematically, and is in fact a budgeted part
of the Government's development programme; the use of forced
labour is not limited in any way to use as an exceptional
measure.(183) Furthermore, none of the conditions and
guarantees subsequently set forth is met.

Articles 8, 23 and 24.(184) As a military administration,
SLORC and its local counterpart authorities do not meet the
required description of a highest "civil" authority. To the
extent that any regulations have been promulgated concerning
the use of forced labour, those available publicly, such as
the Villages Act, the Towns Act and uncovered "secret"
directives, fail to provide for complaints to be submitted by
persons from whom forced labour is exacted and for complaints
to be considered.(185) Furthermore, there is no evidence of
any attempt to enforce standards regulating the conditions
under which forced labour is exacted.

Article 9.(186) No available evidence suggests that any
authority, civil or otherwise, has made or is directed to make
the determinations contemplated by the preambular parts of the
Article prior to imposition of forced labour. In fact, the
evidence demonstrates that forced labour is imposed under
opposite circumstances. The work performed is not for the
"important direct interest for the community called upon to do
[the] work". Rather the forced labour exacted from people is
for broad public benefit (roads, railways); for purely
personal gratification (sexual services); for private company
interests (gas exploration and exploitation ventures, tourist
projects); and for the military for its own counter-insurgency
or private commercial purposes.(187) None of the forms of
labour exacted from the people of Myanmar is of imminent
necessity.(188) There is no evidence of the SLORC or the
Tatmadaw, as the case may be, ever having sought voluntary
labour for any of the forms of forced labour, and there is
little or no evidence of payment. The work and services
exacted lay an unjustly heavy burden on the people of Myanmar
from whom they are exacted. Fees are exacted from the poor to
avoid forced labour; farmers and fishermen are forced to leave
their occupations for long periods of time, disrupting
planting and harvesting cycles; and family life is disrupted
while members go away to perform work. Children are deprived
of their education and childhood. In cases of rape, the
physical and psychological damage, as well as social harm, are
excruciating.(189)

Article 10.(190) Because the alternative to providing forced
labour is payment of fees, it can be argued that people's
labour is being exacted from them as a tax, in breach of
Article 10(2). Because the determinations required by Articles
10(2)(a)-(c) are identical to Articles 9(a)-(c), the arguments
made concerning those Articles are incorporated here. Many of
the workers are forced to travel long distances to labour
camps, to go portering. No respect for the exigencies of
religion, social life or agriculture is observed.

Article 11.(191) The evidence demonstrates that Article 11(1)
is breached regularly.(192) Many children, women and elderly
work on forced labour projects and as porters. The evidence
indicates that there is no prior physical assessment; no
exemptions; and no consideration to the maintenance of the
number of able-bodied adult males in any community, or to
conjugal or family ties.

Article 12.(193) The evidence suggests that, rather than any
attempt to regulate the length of time that persons are
required to perform forced labour, the opposite occurs.(194)
According to reliable reports, people in some areas are
required to perform forced labour two weeks in every month.
Many people are repeatedly required to serve as forced
labourers, even where they have paid porter fees and met other
demands. There is certainly no certification of service given
out, or any attempt made to see that the burden of forced
labour is shared around.

Articles 13 and 14.(195) The evidence demonstrates that
Articles 13 and 14 are breached regularly in the practice of
forced labour in Myanmar. The hours of work required of those
performing forced labour are excessive, there is little or no
payment, and there are no or insufficient rest periods and
breaks. 

Article 15.(196) While the Government of Myanmar has stated
from time to time that the workers' compensation laws are
applicable to "people's contribution" labour,(197) reliable
and independently corroborated accounts, together with
forensic and other physical evidence, attests that people are
left to die from injuries suffered at work, unattended when
disease occurs, and routinely subject to beatings, summary
execution and rape.(198)

Article 16.(199) Contrary to Article 16, little or no respect
is paid to using forced labour in the same location as that
from which the people come, let alone attention to gradual
habituation to new areas.

Article 17.(200) As discussed supra, there is no evidence of
prior medical assessment or provision of appropriate medical
care during work assignments; in most cases workers travel at
their own expense and are left to suffer the consequences of
any injuries they suffer wherever they are working; no efforts
are made to ensure the subsistence of other members of
workers' families.

Article 18.(201) The practice of forced portering in Myanmar
is one of the most notorious breaches of its obligations under
Convention No. 29. Portering is not conducted in accordance
with any regard for the health and well-being of the people
who perform the work, or of the communities from which the
porters are taken, nor are any of the safeguards required by
Article 18 routinely observed.(202)

********************************

                          V. CONCLUSIONS


Based on the above statement of facts and discussion of law,
the complainants consider that:

1. Ample evidence demonstrates that forced labour in Myanmar
is a widespread practice, provided for by law, and carried on
without any prospect of prevention or punishment of those who
exact forced labour from the citizens of Myanmar. The
Government of Myanmar is therefore in flagrant breach of the
Convention on Forced Labour, 1930 (ILO Convention No.
29).

2. Previous, repeated findings of the different organs of the
ILO supervisory mechanisms have not brought progress in
observance of the Convention. The question of the Government
of Myanmar's non-compliance with its obligations under
Convention No. 29 has been exhaustively considered by the
Committee of Experts, the Conference Committee, and the
Committee established to examine the Representation under
article 24 of the ILO Constitution. Despite the views
expressed by those bodies, the Government of Myanmar continues
to blur the distinction between forced and voluntary labour,
and persistently fails to eliminate the serious discrepancies
identified in its law and practice.

3. In view of the above, complainants consider that the
establishment of a Commission of Inquiry is appropriate and
merited. 

4. The complainants consider that the security of witnesses
testifying before the Commission of Inquiry is of paramount
importance. It should be ensured that any witnesses, whether
testifying on their own initiative or upon request of any
party, are protected from and held safe against any harm,
reprisal or discrimination on the basis of their statements to
the Commission of Inquiry. The same safeguards should be
required for witnesses' families and next of kin.

5. The complainants would hope that, in any hearing or on-site
visits, the Commission of Inquiry would be granted unhindered
and private access to witnesses, would allow for anonymity of
witnesses where necessary, and would be in a position to
guarantee privacy and confidentiality of all hearings of and
communications with witnesses. For any activities of the
Commission of Inquiry within Myanmar itself, safeguards should
include obtaining and monitoring commitments by the
Government of Myanmar to ensure that credible assurances are
given by high and local commander levels that no retaliatory
measures will be taken against witnesses.

6. The complainants request that the Commission of Inquiry
give due attention to the need for the Government to take
immediate remedial measures and hence:

     (i)  immediately repeal or amend the Villages Act 1908    
          and the Towns Act 1907;

     (ii) immediately enact penal provisions against all
          practices involving forced labour in contravention   
          of Convention No. 29.

     (iii)proceed diligently with penal investigations and     
          prosecutions in accordance with internationally      
          recognized standards against anyone, including       
          military members, who resort to forced labour        
          contrary to Convention No. 29, including any         
          criminal offences revealed during the course of the  
          ILO inquiry;

     (iv) provide adequate compensation to villages and
          families that have suffered loss of life, health,    
          property and earnings during the course of the       
          exaction of forced labour from them;

     (v)  enact laws or regulations to provide that complaints
          by any person alleging subjection to forced labour   
          practices be permitted, examined and considered by   
          the authorities.

                 *******************************
___________________

NOTES

150.  In exempting certain types of labour that would
otherwise be "forced or compulsory" under the Convention,
Article 2(2) is silent on the question of payment. The silence
reflects the irrelevance of the question of payment to the
determination of whether a certain type of conduct is exempt
from the Convention. See also the discussion on the
relationship between payment and compulsion at notes 119, 120
supra and accompanying text.  

151.  See, e.g., Memorandum of Observations, note 57 supra at
10-11. 

152.  See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text (methods of
apprehension for portering and other forced labour practices). 

153.  1979 General Survey, note 114 supra at para. 34. 

154.  See generally section III supra (lengthy work
assignments, heavy construction and portering duties,
participation in military activities and minesweeping, forced
sexual services, fatal or serious diseases and injuries). 

155.  Prisoners may choose to work for private individuals, so
long as the working relationship between a prisoner and the
private beneficiary is analogous to that of a freely entered
employment relationship, 1979 General Survey, note 114 supra
at para. 97. 

156.  idem, at para. 94, and note 4 (referring to the 1968
General Survey (note 114 supra), at para. 78; also to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN GA Res. 217A, UN
doc. A/810, articles 7-11, (1948); and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN GA Res. 2200
adopted 16 December 1966, entered into forced 23 March 1976,
UN GAOR 21st Session, Supp. No. 16, UN doc. A/6316, articles
14, 15). 

157.  For an analysis of the operation of the military
tribunals, judged against the international standards to which
the General Surveys refer, supra note 114, see the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights: "Summary injustice: Military
tribunals in Burma" (Apr. 1991) ("Summary injustice"); "Beyond
the law", note 51 supra at 34-40 (concerns about fair trials
according to international standards in Myanmar's civilian and
military courts); International Commission of Jurists: "The
Burmese way: To where? Report of a mission to Myanmar"
(Geneva, Dec. 1991), pp. 37-54 (Chapter 3: The rule of law and
the legal system, concerning laws of the SLORC and the system
of military tribunals). 

158.  See generally, idem. 

159.  See, e.g., Reuters. Sep. 1996, conviction upon arrest of
aide to Aung San Suu Kyi, available on Internet. 

160.  1979 General Survey, note 114 supra at para. 36. 

161.  Only one dissident group is still in open conflict with
the Government. See, e.g., the statement by His Excellency U
Ohn Gyaw, Chairman of the delegation of the Union of Myanmar
to the United Nations, New York (3 0ct. 1995), p. 5. 

162.  1979 General Survey, note 114 supra at para. 66, citing
1968 General Survey, note 114 supra at para. 54. 

163.  1979 General Survey, note 114 supra at para. 37. 

164.  RCE, 1988, note 143 supra at 95 (case concerning
Tanzania: minor communal service does not include forced
labour, pursuant to law, to implement schemes for agricultural
and pastoral development, for construction of works or
buildings for the social welfare of residents, or in
establishment of any industry or construction of any public
utility). 

165.  idem. 

166.  Article 24 Report, note 17 supra paras. 50, 51.
Convention No. 29 provides that States parties may continue to
use forced or compulsory labour after their ratification,
"during the transitional period, for public purposes only and
as an exceptional measure, subject to the conditions and
guarantees" subsequently provided, Article 1(2). The
guarantees include the provisions in Articles 7-19 and 22-24
of Convention No. 29, 1979 General Survey, note 114 supra at
para. 7. 

167.  The proceedings of the supervisory bodies of the ILO are
properly regarded as a source of international labour law, to
which weight should be given. See generally Valticos:
"International Labour Law" (1979), pp. 61, 62. 

168.  See note 1 supra and accompanying text. 

169.  Article 1(3). 

170.  See note 114 supra and accompanying text. 

171.  1979 General Survey, note 114 supra at para. 7. 

172.  1968 General Survey, note 114 supra at para. 22 (the
nature of the undertaking is to suppress forced labour and,
after the Convention comes into effect for the country,
neither to introduce new forms of forced labour, nor to
reintroduce forms which had been abolished). 

173.  1979 General Survey, note 114 supra at para. 7 

174.  See note 25 supra and accompanying text. 

175.  Or even any act of acknowledgment, Nuclear tests cases
(Australia v. France) (New Zealand v. France), Judgement of
20 Dec. 1976, ICJ Reports. 

176.  idem, pp. 269-70, paras. 50-51, and pp. 474-5, paras.
52-53. 

177.  idem, p. 267, para. 44. and pp. 472-3, para. 47. 

178.  Frontier dispute: Judgement, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 584,
para. 40. 

179.  More relevantly, there is no question of a transitional
period in this case, Article 24 Report, note 17 supra at
paras. 50, 51. 

180.  idem. 

181.  The conditions and guarantees for the transitional
regime are found in Articles 7-19 and 22-24 of the Convention,
1979 General Survey, note 114 supra at para. 7; see also 1968
General Survey, note 114 supra at paras. 19, 20.  

182.  See notes 90-104 supra and accompanying text. 

183.  See notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text. 

184.  Article 8 provides that the responsibility for recourse
to forced labour, although delegable, must rest with the
highest civil authority. Article 23 provides that complete and
precise regulations governing the use of forced labour should
be promulgated, and should contain rules permitting complaints
from any person from whom forced labour is exacted. Article 24
provides that the regulations governing the use of forced
labour should be strictly enforced through methods of
inspection. 

185.  See notes 11, 112 supra and accompanying text. 

186.  Article 9 provides that before recourse to forced
labour, any authority competent to exact forced labour must
satisfy itself that the work is "of important direct interest
for the community" from whom the labour is exacted (Article
9(a)); that the work is of present or imminent necessity
(Article 9(b)); that it has been impossible to obtain
voluntary labour by the offer of wages and conditions
comparable with those prevailing in the relevant area (Article
9(c)); and that the performance of the work will not lay too
heavy a burden on the population (Article 9(d)). 

187.  See generally section III supra. 

188.  See the discussion at notes 160-162 supra and
accompanying text concerning whether there is an emergency
within the meaning of Article 2(2)(d). 

189.  See notes 54-87 supra and accompanying text. 

190.  Article 10 provides that forced or compulsory labour
exacted as a tax is to be progressively abolished, except in
accordance with the same determinations as required under
Article 9. See notes 186-189 supra and accompanying text. In
addition, the Article requires that the forced labourers be
allowed to remain at their habitual residence and that respect
for religion, social life and agriculture be observed
(Articles 10(d), (e)). 

191.  Article 11 provides that only able-bodied males between
the ages of 18 and 45 should be conscripted for duty as forced
labourers; where they are required to work it should be
subject to a medical examination, exemption for certain
groups, and respect for communal and personal needs. 

192.  See, e.g., note 36 supra and accompanying text. 

193.  Article 12 provides that there must be a limit of 60
days forced labour in any year, and that people who have
performed forced labour should receive certification of their
period(s) of service. 

194.  See note 35 supra and accompanying text. 

195.  Article 13 requires that working hours and rates of pay
should be equal to those prevailing for voluntary labour, and
a weekly day of rest should be granted. Except in the case of
forced labour as a form of tax, in accordance with Article 10,
forced labour should be remunerated at prevailing rates of
pay, and precautions should be taken to ensure that those who
perform forced labour receive their wages. 

196.  Article 15 stipulates that workers' compensation laws
shall apply equally to forced labourers as they do to
voluntary labourers, and in any case the authority using
forced labour is responsible for maintaining the subsistence
of any person who is incapacitated as a result of performing
forced labour.  

197.  See, e.g., Article 24 Report, note 17 supra at para. 41
(Article 24 Committee noting the Government of Myanmar's
assertion that the Workmen's Compensation Law is applied in
the case of porters). 

198.  See notes 43-49 supra and accompanying text (porters
suffer gross human rights abuses), and notes 66-73 supra
(gross human rights abuses are routine during forced labour on
development projects). 

199.  Article 16 requires that measures should be taken to
ensure that people are not moved to different parts of the
country in which their health may be affected or, where that
is necessary, to ensure gradual acclimatization. Similar
measures should be taken in cases where people are forced to
labour at work to which they are not accustomed. 

200.  Article 17 provides that in cases where forced labour is
to endure for extended periods, measures should be taken to
ensure appropriate medical care is available, that the
subsistence of the workers' families is ensured, that the cost
of the workers' journeys to and from the workplace (including
any return by reason of illness or injury) are borne by the
authorities, and that workers are given the opportunity to
stay as voluntary labourers following their period of
compulsory labour. 

201.  Article 18 mandates that forced labour for the transport
of persons and goods is to be "abolished within the shortest
possible period". Where it is used during the transitional
period, care is to be taken for the health of the workers
performing the work; regulations should limit the duration and
nature of the work they are required to perform; and care
should be taken to maintain the community from which the
workers come.  

202.  See generally notes 27-53 supra and accompanying text. 


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