The Nation-An approach to break the

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Subject: The Nation-An approach to break the Burmese political deadlock

The Nation
Dec.9,1998
Editorial & Opinion


An approach to break the Burmese political deadlock

The United Nations is pursuing quiet diplomacy which it is hoped will lead
to national reconciliation in Burma. Yindee Lertcharoenchok looks at its
development.

East and West finally met. After a decade of finger-pointing and
cross-criticism, Western supporters of sanctions and isolation and Eastern
advocates of ''constructive engagement'' have decided to probe a compromise
approach that they hope will help break the political deadlock and end the
tragic human misery in Burma.

Both sides accepted during an informal meeting in October in England that
their unilateral efforts had been exhausted and there still had been no
positive sign of progress in democracy and human rights in the country.
Moreover, they realised the Burmese economy was fast deteriorating to a
point of total collapse and at stake were the 45 million Burmese people at
the mercy of the whole political turmoil.

They agreed that growing Western pressure on the Burmese junta had not only
strengthened its resistance to change and its ''further withdrawal into its
shell'' but also intensified the regime's increased suppression of the
popular National League for Democracy (NLD). On the other hand, East Asian
policy is neither constructive nor engaging and has equally failed to
convince the regime to initiate substantive dialogue with the NLD, which won
a legitimate landslide victory in the 1990 general election.

A major breakthrough of the Oct 12-13 meeting, which drew some 20 senior
government officials from Europe, Scandinavia, North America and Asia in
charge of their country's Burma policy, five Rangoon-based ambassadors and
UN and World Bank representatives to discuss and exchange views on Burma,
was the ''consensus'' agreement to support and strengthen the role of the
United Nations, which has for nine consecutive years held annual Burma
debates and passed yearly resolutions on it. They also agreed to consider
''humanitarian and technical assistance'' to Burma if there were
improvements in the political and human-rights fields.

In the past few years the Burmese military leaders have been too annoyed to
cooperate with any UN peace efforts. They have refused entry to several UN
special envoys, repeatedly accusing them of filing biased reports on the
country. The UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Burma, former
Mauritian chief judge Rajsoomer Lallah, has been unable to visit the country
since his appointment in 1996. The ruling State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC) has also refused to receive Malaysia's Razali Ismail, who was
recently appointed Kofi Annan's special emissary on Burma.

Still, participants to the October meeting believed the UN, as an
international ''neutral'' body, might be more acceptable to the ruling
Burmese Council than any individual country's efforts with carrot or stick.
The officials, who agreed to meet in their ''personal capacity'', decided to
strongly support the UN quiet diplomacy to persuade both the SPDC and the
NLD to break the current deadlock and open dialogue which would hopefully
lead to national reconciliation and subsequently allow the flow of
humanitarian and technical assistance into the country.

Of late, the international community has been very worried about the serious
political stand-off in Burma. The SPDC reacted toughly to the NLD's
September decision to form a committee representing the Parliament of
elected representatives to challenge the regime's legitimacy, by ordering
the nationwide arrest in early October of nearly 1,000 elected MPs, party
members and supporters and forcing the closure of party offices and the
massive resignation of its members across the country. The NLD has responded
with more calls for tougher international pressure and sanctions against the
regime, particularly now that the UN is about to pass a new resolution on
Burma. The Western-initiated draft document has South Korea as its first
Asian co-sponsor.

''We agreed that the UN is to act as a facilitator and not arbiter. There is
no financial promise or attachment whatsoever related to its efforts,'' said
one senior government official who attended the October meeting. He said the
participants were very surprised by the reported US$1-billion UN and World
Bank financial offer to Burma in exchange for talks between the regime and
the NLD and believed the ''distorted'' leak was intended ''to sabotage'' UN
peace attempts.

The official quoted a senior World Bank representative as explaining that
the global financial institution was ''technically'' unable to extend any
new loans to Burma until it had paid off its arrears and unless the board of
the World Bank, which includes some of the regime's strongest critics,
approved resumption of new loans and credits to the country. According to
recent World Bank press releases, during 1998 Burma went into arrears on its
repayments to the International Development Association, the Bank's
concessional lending arm, and the portfolio was given non-accrual status on
Sept 2. Burma's accumulated arrears as of end-August were about $14 million.
There has been no new commitment to Burma since 1987, and no projects are
currently being prepared.

Human-rights campaigners and opponents of the regime are opposed to the
unconditional release of financial assistance and loans to Burma and fear
the UN efforts might already have been jeopardised by the media exposure.
They are also concerned that any ''carrots without sticks'' will only
strengthen the Burmese regime and tilt its bargaining power against the NLD.

But proponents of the UN role remain optimistic that both the SPDC and the
NLD will seriously consider the UN initiative and give it a try to open
talks without preconditions. They cite as a positive sign the Burmese
rulers' eventual agreement, after several refusals, to receive Alvaro de
Soto, the special representative of the UN secretary-general, who then tried
to explain the UN role and persuade the SPDC to open dialogue with the NLD
and its leader Aung San Suu Kyi. De Soto also met Suu Kyi twice, on the
second occasion with other senior NLD members.

For her part, Suu Kyi explained her party's fundamental position that the
SPDC had to release all political prisoners, allow the NLD to pursue its
party activities and her to act as its secretary-general, while SPDC leader
Gen Khin Nyunt, though ''not keen on the [UN] idea at all'' agreed to lay it
before other senior leaders.

''Although neither side made any commitment, the positive outcome is that
nobody rejected [the UN initiative] outright. We hope that at least some
low-level officials from both sides will be able to begin the process of
confidence-building that will in the end lead to high-level talks,'' the
official said.

It remains to be seen if there is any positive response to the UN peace
initiative. There is continuing debate and underlying pressure for the world
body to consider the inevitable option of suspending Burma's membership in
various UN agencies, particularly the International Labour Organisation, in
view of the regime's bad record of forced labour and human-rights abuse.

The Nation