UNHCR repat programme evaluation, M

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Subject: UNHCR repat programme evaluation, May 1998, EC report


JOINT (DG1B/ECHO) EVALUATION

MISSION

Of

EC Support to the UNHCR Programme
Providing Assistance to Rohingya Returnees
in Myanmar (Rakhine State), and to Rohingya
Refugees in Bangladesh (Cox's Bazaar)

Final Report

May 1998

SUMMARY


(1) The UNHCR intervention has temporarily resolved a difficult humanitarian
problematic in Bangladesh and partially reduced the immediate pressures
generating migratory outflows in Burma. (ii) Gaining access to the
caseloads in
both Bangladesh and Burma, upholding humanitarian principles, and
demonstrating
the value added of the UNHCR role and mandate to the respective governments
have been achieved with difficulty. (iii) The UNHCR repatriation and
reintegration activities have made a useful, if limited, initial contribution
to settling the returnees into their villages of origin. (iv) More thorough
initial research and appraisal work would have resulted. in better designed
interventions and greater impact for UNHCR's beneficiaries (v) The adverse
policy and operational environment maintained by the Burmese authorities means
that major and critical challenges remain to be addressed in the fields of
human rights and poverty. (vi) The scale and complexity of actions now
required
to bring durable socio-economic development and stability to the area will
require renewed commitment from the international community if further mass
departures are to be avoided.

1. Overview: Since 1994 the United Nations' High Commisioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) has repatriated approximately 230,000 Burmese Muslim refugees from
Bangladesh to Burma. Some 21,000 Burmese Muslims remain in two camps in
Bangladesh. Return to Burma is organised within the framework of two bilateral
agreements (Memorandum of Understanding) with the governments of the
country of
asylum (Bangladesh) and the country of origin (Burma). UNHCR has supported the
initial reinstallation and reintegration of the returnees into their home
villages. The overall cost of the UNHCR repatriation and reintegration
programme to date has been' US$ 46 million. The European Community (EC) has
contributed US$ 11.7 million making it the biggest individual donor. A joint
field evaluation '(DG1B/ECHO) of the UNHCR programme in Bangladesh (Cox's
Bazaar) and Burma (north Rakhine State) was conducted between 17 - 29 May.

The mission's fieldwork focussed on the strategy, management, and
implementation of the UNHCR intervention in Burma and Bangladesh in both its
repatriation and reintegration phases. It assessed the latter programme within
the perspective of three key considerations. Firstly, identifiable progress in
addressing the factors that precipitated the mass departures to Bangladesh of
1978 and 1991. Secondly, the relevance, effectiveness, and efficiency of the
programme?s design in relation to its objectives, and the impact on its
intended beneficiaries. Thirdly, the future prospects for assistance to the
area. The evaluation mission undertook extensive site visits in Maungdaw,
Buthidaung, and Rathedaung townships -to see both completed and ongoing
projects implemented by UNHCR, by local contractors, and by NGOS.

The mission took due account of the programme's challenging policy and
operational environment in both Bangladesh and Burma. In that context, the
presence of a number of critical specifications were identified. (a)
Repatriation operations are ideally realised within the legal framework of a
Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) involving UNHCR, the country of
asylum, and the country of origin. In the present operation, no tripartite
agreement or official mechanism exists in which sensitive and complex issues
can be reviewed by all parties. (b) Although the Government of the Union of
Burma has accepted the return of 230,000 Burmese Muslims from Bangladesh, it
does not acknowledge them as its citizens nor sees fit to provide them with
any
meaningful status. (c) In a conventional situation, it is the government's
responsibility to ensure that its citizens (including returnees) are provided
protection under the law. Due to the GoUB's discriminatory policy and
practices, UNHCR has had to widen its formal concerns for the well being of
returnees to include monitoring of the conditions for the general
population of
the area. (c) At the time of the repatriation operation, and for much of the
reintegration phase, UNHCR was the only international organisation permitted
access to north Rakhine State, and a principal source of external finance to
all public sector social support in the area. (d) The area's unusual
topography
and environment, and annual rainfall estimated to be among the highest in the
world at over 6,500 mm, present in themselves development and logistical
challenges of unusual complexity.

2. Repatriation (Bangladesh): The principle challenge for UNHCR in Bangladesh
was, and remains, gaining adequate access to the caseload. Citing domestic
economic concerns, the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) made it clear from the
outset that the refugees should return to Burma as soon as possible. It only
allowed UNHCR full access to the camp populations in 1993 and even now permits
only a minimalist programme of essential support (shelter, water, food and
health) to the camp. populations. In 1991 the GoB returned some 54,000
refugees
to Burma under a bilateral arrangement with the Government of the Union of
Burma (GoUB). Following expressions of international concern at the GoB's
actions, UNHCR successfully negotiated agreements with both governments for
the
repatriation of the remaining 200,000 refugees in April 1993 (Bangladesh) and
November 1993 (Burma). Voluntary repatriation was actively promoted from early
1994 onwards and by 1997 the caseload had been reduced to 21,000. The
remaining
refugees are housed in the two camps (Kuta Palong and Nayapura) left from the
original eighteen.

Repatriation movements have been stalled since the attempt of the Bangladeshi
authorities to forcibly return several hundred refugees in July 1997. This
resulted in some violence and the loss of control by the Bangladeshi
authorities of a large part of Nayapura camp. Repatriation is still] regarded
by UNHCR as the best durable solution for the majority of the remaining
population. However, its promotion attracts criticism from human rights
activists and NGOs who highlight the continuing problems inside north Rakhine
State and in-camp pressures on refugee to return. UNHCR acknowledges that a
substantial number of individuals (c.3,000) in the camps may have a well
founded fear of persecution should they return to Burma. The agency is
reluctant to introduce a formal status determination procedure (screening).
for
fear of creating cross border pull factors. Despite tighter supervision of the
land border, there continue to be new arrivals. UNHCR (Bangladesh) .hopes to
negotiate the local integration (or temporary residence) of a portion of the
remaining caseload and to resettle a small number of cases in third countries.
In April 1998 the GOUB agreed to take back an additional 7,000 refugees (after
lengthy delays to verify their biodata) and UNHCR is hopeful that voluntary
repatriation can resume after the GoB has reasserted full authority in the
camps. The GoB authorities and some segments of the local populations remain
antagonistic to the refugees' presence. The latter's reluctance to return to
Burma will ensure that the endgame remains delicate and its resolution
unpredictable.

Comments: (1) The antagonistic attitude of the government of Bangladesh
towards
the refugees, and its insistence on their early return to Burma, appears to
have been overly influenced by earlier events in 1978 as well as current
economic concerns. (it is estimated that there are already some 500,000
Burmese
Muslims living in the Chittagong Division.) In 1978, repatriation was achieved
with little international support .and involvement, particularly inside Burma.
In 1992; the evident differences in the political context, the human rights
situation, and the heavy presence of the military and security forces in north
Rakhine state, made unconditional repatriation much more risky. Until recent
disturbances (suspected to have been instigated by local commercial
interests),
few specific examples of tensions between the local populations and the
refugees were recorded. It may be surmised, however, that demographic
pressures
on the area's scarce resources ensure that relations are sensitive. (2) The
UNHCR faced a difficult moral dilemma in seeking to exercise its mandate in
such compromised circumstances and in weighing up the durable solution
options.
However, in choosing to sign official agreements promoting voluntary
repatriation when the human rights climate in Burma was far from ideal, UNHCR
invited criticism by human rights observers, NGOS, and other opponents of the
military government. In hindsight, more critical scrutiny of the situation in
north Rakhine would have been advisable. (3) This background constrains
present
policy with regard to both the remaining 21,000 caseload and to new arrivals.
The agency's present reluctance to determine the status of the remaining
caseload and new arrivals. reflects understandable concerns about prompting
possible further departures from Burma. However, this in itself raises
uncomfortable questions about the durability of the solution chosen in 1993.
Nor does it allay the anxieties of those refugees still in Bangladesh who have
justified fears about their return.

3. Repatriation - Burma: In view of the large number of refugees (190,000)
returning during the period 1993-5, UNHCR's main preoccupations inside Burma
were initially logistical. Although the area covered is not 'extensive (c.
5,000 square kilometres), accessing returnee villages in over 200 locations in
the absence of communications infrastructure was a major challenge. The agency
has gradually built up a substantial field presence (20 expatriates) in north
Rakhine state. It has offices in both Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships from
where 95% of the returnee originate. During 1994-95 it installed the necessary
reception, processing, and transport infrastructure and equipment to enable
large monthly returns to take place. The distribution of cash grants, food
rations, and in-kind essentials was channelled through transit centres
prior to
the refugees return to their home villages. Mechanisms have been set up for
following up an identified total of 20,000 vulnerable individuals
(unaccompanied minors, elderly people, handicapped, widows etc) through the
Burma/Myanmar Red Cross. Society (MRCS). The UNHCR's counterpart, the
immigration and Population Department (IPD) has been tasked with overseeing
the
registration, -of - the returnees, customs and health procedures, and the
issuing of identity documentation. It was also responsible for seconding staff
to the UNHCR programme and for negotiations with contractors for repatriation
related infrastructure works. Over 260 small scale projects have been
implemented to an approximate value of US$ 1.3 million. These conventional
parts of any UNHCR repatriation operation have been implemented with few
problems other than those posed by the remote locations and the climate.

Comments: "(1) It is understood that the ground for UNHCR's intervention in
Burma was prepared during a private meeting between UNHCR High Commissioner
Sadako Ogata and Burmese Foreign Minister Ohh Gyaw in mid 1993. The Memorandum
of Understanding (MoU) which sets the framework for the repatriation and
reintegration of the Burmese Muslims to North Rakhine State was signed in
November 1993. It may be concluded that UNHCR had been unable to make more
than
a cursory analysis of the probable operational challenges on the ground before
it signed the agreement. A more cautious approach to its negotiation might
therefore have been justified, particularly with regard to protection issues.
(2) In operational terms, the organisation and implementation of the movement
phase was the most successful (if evidently the most straightforward) element
of the repatriation and reintegration exercise. The choice of institutional
counterpart, the Ministry of immigration, Manpower, and Population (MIMP), a
powerful component of the military government's security apparatus, posed
obvious threats to UNHCR's credibility in the eyes of the returnees. But it
did
have the obvious virtue of being able to overcome numerous internal
bureaucratic constraints with respect to procurement, transportation, and
logistics. These were important factors in ensuring the movement phase was
initiated and executed in a timely manner. That was in itself critical to
generating immediate confidence among the refugees to return home.

4. Reintegration (1): The first phase of the UNHCR reintegration programme was
characterised by two main strategic orientations. During the period 1994-96 a
large number of interventions in the water supply (shallow, wens, tubewells,
ponds), sanitation (latrines), health (hospital renovations) and education
(schools) sectors were chosen and implemented from an orthodox menu of 'quick
impact projects.' These were intended to ease the socio-economic challenges of
resettlement and stabilise the returnees. Site and intervention selection was
against known returnee concentration and UNHCR needs assessment projections.
They were mostly implemented by IPD contracted local companies, many of whom
were Muslim, in as widely dispersed an area as possible. In the social sectors
large allocations were made to renovating and providing equipment and material
to existing public facilities (schools, hospitals, health clinics). Some
suppport was also provided for training actions. When significant numbers of
Burmese Muslims (mostly landless labourers) again left the country in the.
first part of 1996, UNHCR responded with a variety of emergency actions. It
distributed direct cash and in kind grants (in the guise of income generation
projects) and organised food for work programmes in conjunction with the World
Food Programme (WFP) in a bid to combat its perceived causes - unemployment
and
poverty.

(ii) Since early 1997, UNHCR has adopted a more developmental approach to its
reintegration work. The same sectoral focus has been retained on agriculture,
income generation, health, and education but community based approaches have
been given greater emphasis. The amendment of the programme was recognised by
UNHCR as being more responsive to beneficiary needs and more technically
appropriate for tackling the core economic problem of seasonal
under-employment. This orientation has been facilitated by UNHCR's
reinforcement of its own field capacities (through recruiting consultants in
these sectors) and by bringing more international and local Non Government
Organisations (NGOS) into the programme. Overall implementing capacity has
thus
been strengthened and diversified. All components presently work within the
administrative framework and budget set by UNHCR. In addition, there are; two
NGOs (MSF Holland, Action Contre Le Faim) working in complementary fashion to
the UNHCR Programme (in malaria control and water supply respectively) but
under autonomous agreements with the government. The latter are neither
easy to
acquire nor to maintain and both NGOs encounter regular difficulties.

5. Protection: (i) Human rights abuses by the military and security forces in
northern Rakhine State precipitated the exodus of the 250,000 Burmese Muslims
into Bangladesh in 1991. Providing protection to the returning population, and
monitoring their well-being, was thus an important, function for UNHCR from
the
beginning of the operation. In conventional situations, the government of the
country of origin is normally expected to ensure the rights of its citizens
are
respected. UNHCR concentrates mainly on ensuring that returnees are not
persecuted for having left the country. This was the main focus of the
agency's
modest field presence available for monitoring protection issues during the
first two years of UNHCR's actions in north Rakhine State. Protection tasks
were actively pursued and the UNHCR were given access (after initially tight
supervision by the security forces) to alt returnees, including those in
detention. The concerns and strategy changed when fresh and substantial
departures to Bangladesh occurred at the beginning of 1996. By mid-1997, three
years after the agency's arrival in the area, a unit, (four officers)
dedicated
to monitoring specific protection issues (citizenship, forced labour, land
confiscation, freedom of movement, and taxation) had been established in the
field under the direction of a Senior Legal Officer. Working with the other
UNHCR field staff, the unit has brought a more systematic and organised
character to the analysis of protection issues in the north Rakhine State.
This
was exemplified by the comprehensive dossier delivered to the Burmese
authorities during the January 1998 visit of senior UNHCR Geneva officials
responsible (respectively) for the Asia Region (Mr Fouinat) and International
Protection (Mr MacNamara.)

(ii) UNHCR's official counterpart in Burma is the immigration and Population
Department (IPD) of the Ministry of immigration, Manpower and Population
(MIMP). The individual counterpart of the UNHCR Chief of Mission in Rangoon is
the Deputy Minister of the IMPD, Colonel Maung Aung, formerly Director General
of the IPD. In the field in Rakhine State it is the Director of the Border
immigration Head Quarters, Lieutenant Colonel Thet Thut. The latter reports
both to the Commander of the Western Division based in Sittwe and to
Lieutenant
General Khin Nyunt, Secretary One of the State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC). Protection issues have been, and are still periodically discussed
through these channels, but no formal or regular mechanisms have been
established at a high level. UNHCR field staff in Maungdaw and Buthidaung have
successfully intervened on a number of local issues but acknowledge that their
leverage and capacities to effect improvements to the situation is limited.

(iii) The SPDC response to the UNHCR dossier on protection referred to above
has been negative, particularly with regard to the critical matter of the
status of the Burmese Muslims. The mission learned that forced labour
continues
to be widespread albeit at a reduced scale (usually 4 days a month.) Large
scale land appropriation is normally linked to the establishment of new
military installations and the later installation of new Rakhine villages.
(Usually the poorest of the populations in the area.)

The mission was informed that these had become less frequent but security
reasons could always be invoked for further confiscations. Freedom of
movement,
however , is still severely restricted. Muslims require permission from the
head of the Village Peace and Development Council to remain overnight in
another village outside the immediate administrative area. Bureaucratic
requirements and "fees" make travel to the provincial capital, Sittwe,
prohibitive. Travel outside the Rakhine is virtually impossible. Arbitrary
taxation is widely practised by many members of the security forces to
supplement their meagre incomes. Muslims can be (and are) taxed for virtually
anything. UNHCR and NGOs have occasionally persuaded the local military
hierarchy to intervene when projects have been the victims of this extortion.

Comments: The resources devoted to the repatriation and movement phase during
1994-95, and the diversion of attention to combatting the renewed
departures in
1996, meant that UNHCR's reintegration strategy was largely characterised
by ad
hoc actions until mid-1997. At no point did UNHCR conduct or commission any
base
line surveys or deploy participatory tools to assist in the generation of data
for planning purposes. The agency approached the task from the beginning
with a
standardised template of "quick impact projects" to be implemented
according to
set procedures as in a standard UNHCR programme context. Resource allocation
was based more on the potential fit of this UNHCR template, and the available
implementation capacities, rather than prioritised needs identified in
conjunction with :the beneficiaries. Project selection has tended to favour
hardware (infrastructure) over software (training, community development),
visible short term actions over longer term engagement. This reflect both
UNHCR's corporate habits and mandate, and the critical absence of reliable,
politically disinterested counterparts, capable of undertaking more complex,
developmental assignments with the Muslim communities themselves. A more
analytical, enquiring approach to determine what interventions might best
serve
the objective of durable reintegration, or how they might best be designed and
implemented, was not apparent until 1997. The strategy that has since emerged
places more emphasis on agriculture and income generation (in addition to
health, education and water supply) and community involvement. The mission
found that this was still characterised by discrete, unrelated projects, with
little evidence of a coherent or systematic approach to building relationships
with communities. As a result, there exists no real basis or delivery system
for scaling up future actions other than through the largely dysfunctional
public sector. The mission was aware of UNHCR's own formal limitations, and
the
difficulties of the operating environment. However, it formed the opinion that
a deeper appraisal of the the socio-economic character of the area and its
inhabitants (including gender relations), the use of less formulaic approaches
to reintegration work, and placing less reliance on official counterparts
might
have contributed to the earlier realisation of a more appropriate strategy.

The overall management architecture of the UNHCR mission in Burma, as
elsewhere,
is set up in a typical command and control hierarchy designed to secure
limited
objectives in a short time frame. This reflects UNHCR's normal modus
operandum,
one which is well adapted to the agency's usual tasks of managing sudden large
population movements in often adverse circumstances. It is less well suited to
the more analytically challenging and complex tasks of a reintegration
operation. In a remote and sensitive location like the North Rakhine, a
measure
of decentralisation and flexibility is required. (Although communications have
improved, the Maungdaw Sub Office is equipped with only one satellite
telephone, whose use is restricted.) The mission was struck by the very
orthodox, almost old fashioned, programme management arrangements in the face
of such a difficult and challenging environment. UNHCR field staff carry out
their designated tasks with enthusiasm but in a compartmentalised manner,
largely independent of each other. Field officers operate geographically,
consultants sectorally, and protection specialists thematically. No systematic
programme wide planning or monitoring and evaluation functions are in place,
most performance indicators established were conventional and quantitative. In
the most obvious manifestation of the limitations of this approach, the
deployment of adequate resources to monitor and evaluate the human rights
environment in north Rakhine State did not take place, until mid-1997.

Mechanisms to exchange views, review problems, and set agreed benchmarks with
the authorities at different levels have not been systematised. In their
absence, the mission observed that there had been differences of opinion
within
the UNHCR programme about how best to approach protection issues. As a result,
they were not raised in official form at a high level with the GOUM until the
January 1998 mission of Messrs Fouinat and MacNamara. The mission believes
that
less stratified management arrangements would have assisted the programme to
plan and deliver services to its beneficiaries more effectively and
efficiently. They would also have assisted UNHCR in the generation and
exchange
of information and ideas to the greater benefit of the whole operation.

The design and implementation of UNHCR supported interventions in north
Rakhine
reflects both the agency's essentially, emergency mandate and mindset and the
constraints of the policy environment. The quantity of actions was impressive;
over 2,500 interventions have been implemented since the UNHCR arrived in
1994.
A wide geographical spread has been achieved and projects realised in most
returnee areas. The mission leader found the general conditions in Buthidaung
and Maungdaw visibly improved since the time of his previous visit four years
previously. Of concern, however, was the qualitative aspects of the programme.
A premium has been placed on rapid implementation in order to achieve an
immediate impact. The scale and complexity of the reintegration challenge also
requires attention to qualitative aspects. The mission identified the fact
that
most UNHCR micro infrastructure and water supply work sub-contracted to local
enterprises had been undertaken without any consideration for future
maintenance costs or sustainability. Few measurable indicators of project
success had been established except those being implemented by NGOS.

In the area of social support, government ministries are theoretically
responsible for budget support to local line departments at township and
village tract level. Running and recurring operational costs are thus not
included in any UNHCR contractual agreements with such counterparts. In
practice three decades of central planning superseded by a military
dictatorship have reduced the public sector to a state of virtual collapse.
Thus, the UNHCR assisted public hospitals and health centres visited by the
mission were barely operational due to lack of regular resources and supplies
(personnel, finance, drugs, and equipment). Medical personnel receive their
tiny salaries irregularly (doctors earn US$ 6.00 per month) and are forced
into
private enterprise. Attendance at -public- health structures is minimal. The
Muslim populations avoid treatment by Burmese doctors and nurses, unless in
need of emergency care. (The mission did, however, encounter some broadminded
and committed young Rakhine healthworkers.) In these circumstances, the wisdom
of supporting such a dysfunctional system is questionable. UNHCR have decided
to direct more resources into training (especially focussing on women) and
support to community based primary health care initiatives. An appropriate
implementation strategy and delivery system has still to be devised.
(Assistance to vulnerable individuals delivered by the Burmese Red Cross is
essentially done by outreach rather than community based methods.) In the
education sector, most of the schools were on holiday during the mission. It
was able to observe Burmese language literacy classes (a prerequisite for
Muslims entering the official school system) for girls and boys supported by
incentives for both families (food) and teachers (cash, food). If the
initiative is dependent on UNHCR and WFP support (and is thus inherently
unsustainable) it did have the merit of addressing a crucial long term
obstacle
to the integration of Muslim communities. It was not possible to determine how
many children were subsequently attending state education but some initial
successes have been claimed.

The limited asessment of counterpart capacities and beneficiary needs was not
confined to social support interventions. The mission observed a number of
village ponds and tubewells that had fallen into disuse and required
repair. As
no community development strategy has been evolved, prior discussion and
agreement with beneficiaries about the technical and social aspects of project
design, and about responsibilities for their operation and maintenance, has
been limited.

Guidance as to project type, selection, and beneficiary targetting seems to
have been based mainly on the observations of UNHCR personnel rather than
empirical data about wealth and vulnerability.

The mission noted that certain components were addressing these systemic
shortcomings. In agriculture and forestry, two international NGOs (GRET and
CARE) had devoted considerable time and resources to participatory research
and
project appraisal. Both interventions were relatively new but were already
showing encouraging results. GRET have sought to increase landless labourer
and
sharecropper incomes through boosting dry season rice cultivation. This has
been identified as a key factor underpinning past and present decisions by the
local populations in seeking refuge and/or economic opportunity in Bangladesh.
During the 1997-98 dry season, a total of 2,530 tonnes of paddy have been
produced with a total value of US$ 550,000. This is around 13% of the total
estimated rice deficit of north Rakhine State.

The UNHCR recruited consultant for income generating activities was slowly
introducing more rigorous project design methods into the sector. UNHCR
inhibitions about entering into fully fledged development work (outside its
mandate), and the lack of experience of its local staff in this area of work,
has slowed progress in building up a structure for supporting micro
enterprises
and credit delivery. The programme currently consists principally of making a
sizeable number of grants to solidarity groups (in cash or kind). The
choice of
enterprise and activity appeared sound and the recipients (mostly men)
expressed their satisfaction. However, apart from the introduction of a recent
hire purchase scheme (for trishaws) no repayment schedules are imposed and no
regular management systems are in place to track grant performance. Whilst
this
may assist its beneficiaries in the short term, it is not a sound or
sustainable basis upon which to build robust and viable rural credit
institutions.

As noted above, the establishment of a protection unit within the UNHCR field
operation has brought much needed focus and rigour to this important area of
the agency's work. The mission learned of successful UNHCR interventions in
cases where serious abuses of returnee human rights had occurred. It noted,
however, that harassment of the Muslim population continued and was on a scale
of incidence that UNHCR's resources were unable to combat. Much of present
UNHCR protection activity is geared towards research and data collection. A
programming shortcoming has been the absence of effective mechanisms to raise
protection issues with the GOUM at different levels. (The adverse climate for
discussion of such sensitive matters is acknowledged.) To date the strategy
for
addressing key issues (e.g. citizenship) has placed considerable reliance on
the good intentions of individual MIMP officials in Rangoon. The Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) signed between UNHCR and the GOUM provides for the
possibility (Article 15) for the review of progress of the agreement. This has
not been formally exploited by UNHCR and might have provided a convenient
channel through which the GoUM's willingness to address critical protection
questions might have been raised and tested. At local level, meetings with the
Director of the Border immigration Headquarters (BIHQ) have been neither
structured nor regular.

The UNHCR Field Protection Unit has understandably approached its task from a
legal perspective. It might also examine the possibility of creating
administrative mechanisms at local level comprising UNHCR/BIHQ/SPDC and
village
committees) within which certain issues (taxation,' forced labour, movements
within North Rakhine) could be reviewed. At present, no formal channel exists
though which all interested parties (particularly the Muslim populations) can
discuss concerns in a transparent and non-confrontational way. Such an
initiative might have provided a basis on which the Muslim population could
have had formal and regular access to UNHCR protection assistance other than
clandestine and risky contacts. In addition to its early warning function on
human rights issues, it might also (the authorities indulgence permitting)
have
given an additional impetus to village and community organisation and
development.