Fwd: Lallah report to the 55th UNHR (r)

[darnott@xxxxxxxxxxx]

Subject: Fwd: Lallah report to the 55th UNHRC (part 2)


>>X-From_: owner-burmanet-l@xxxxxxx  Sat Mar 20 08:18:39 1999
>>Date: Fri, 19 Mar 1999 12:41:00 +0100
>>From: "asb" <asb@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>>Sender: owner-burmanet-l@xxxxxxx
>>Subject: Lallah report to the 55th UNHRC (part 2)
>>To: <burmanet-l@xxxxxxxxxxx>
>>X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Pro Version 4.0
>>X-Sender: strider@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>
>>
>>VERSION FRANCAISE <http://www.birmanie.int.ch/~asb/cdh/rappcdh99.html>
>>
>>
>>III.  MISSION TO THAILAND
>>
>>25.   The Special Rapporteur has previously addressed the situation in the
>>ethnic minority States, especially those along the Myanmar/Thai border, in
>>his reports to the General Assembly (A/51/466, annex, paras. 37-51 and
>>A/52/484, annex, paras. 69 142) and to the Commission on Human Rights
>>(E/CN.4/1997/64, paras. 65-100).  His initial concern related to reports of
>>military attacks and looting on civilian settlements, forced relocation of
>>the ethnic groups, forced labour for development and industrial projects
>>and portering for military operations.  In his last report to the
>>Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur called upon the
>>Government of Myanmar to take immediate steps in order to put an end to the
>>forced displacement of persons, to prohibit the practice of forced labour
>>and forced portering and to prevent arbitrary killings, and confiscation of
>>property in the ethnic minority areas.
>>26.   The Special Rapporteur visited Thailand in order to inquire into the
>>current situation of the displaced persons on the border of Myanmar with
>>Thailand, and on the human rights violations committed against ethnic
>>minorities and others who had been subjected to various forms of repression
>>by the Government.  The itinerary of the Special Rapporteur included
>>Bangkok, Kanchanaburi, Mae Sot, Chiang Mai, Mae Hong Son and camps in the
>>Tak province with large populations of displaced persons.  During these
>>visits he was received by representatives of the Thai authorities and met
>>with representatives of international non governmental organizations  and
>>representatives of several ethnic groups.  During his visit, the Special
>>Rapporteur received the testimonies of a total of 50 persons selected from
>>among newly arrived persons from Myanmar, mostly Karen, Shan and Karenni.
>>The information and views obtained in the course of his visits are
>>reflected below under the relevant subject headings.
>>
>>A.  The problem of displacement
>>
>>27.   Internal displacement in Myanmar represents a particular case of
>>human tragedy resulting from conflict between the Government and different
>>ethnic groups.  It is estimated that over half a million displaced
>>persons,living in Mon, Karen, Shan and Karenni States, are in need of
>>
>>humanitarian assistance.Since the independence of Myanmar in 1948, the
>>country has suffered from unresolved conflicts between most of the ethnic
>>minorities and the central authorities in spite of a number of ceasefire
>>agreements.  These conflicts precipitated insurgencies in several parts of
>>the country which have resulted in large numbers of internally displaced
>>persons and a considerable number who have sought refuge in neighbouring
>>countries, particularly Thailand, Bangladesh and India.
>>28.   The Special Rapporteur is not in possession of independently verified
>>statistics on the number of displaced persons in Myanmar, but local and
>>international NGOs estimate the number in Karen State to be between 100,000
>>and 200,000.  Unofficial estimates place the current number in Shan State
>>to be over 300,000  and in Karenni State, 70,000.  Finally, there are
>>reportedly
>>about 40,000 persons displaced in Mon State.
>>29.   By the end of June 1998, the refugee camp caseload of displaced
>>persons from Myanmar living in Thailand was 112,841.  The breakdown by
>>ethnic group was as follows:  86,823 Karen, 12,665 Mon, 13,353 Karenni.  In
>>addition, there were a number of Shan displaced persons who were not living
>>in refugee camps but were scattered mainly throughout the north of
>>Thailand.  It is generally believed that tens of thousands of people from
>>Myanmar have entered Thailand during the last three years.
>>
>>B.  The main causes of displacement
>>
>>30.   The problem of displacement in Myanmar is complex and open to so many
>>different interpretations that a comprehensive assessment is difficult. The
>>causes of displacement are numerous and differ from one region to another,
>>although certain common features and trends can be discerned.
>>31.   The role of the army, in this context, is paramount.  Since
>>independence, it has exercised a strong influence over the governing of the
>>ethnic states.  Many Karen, Karenni and Shan do not perceive the army as a
>>national army, and soldiers, particularly ethnic Burmese, generally behave
>>towards the local population as if they were enemies.
>>32.   Violence against civilians would appear to have been a fundamental
>>component of the overall military strategy of the Myanmar army.  That
>>strategy is designed first to secure resources from the local population,
>>in particular food, combatants and workers, and second to weaken the
>>resource base of insurgent groups and their capacity to govern.  To this
>>latter end, the army not only has undertaken systematically to destroy most
>>of the villages but also, as the local economy is largely based on
>>agriculture, forcibly to displace the rural population so as to disrupt
>>agricultural production.
>>33.   In flagrant violation of the basic rules of humanitarian law,
>>civilians living in rural settlements have been attacked.  In some cases,
>>this has resulted in massacres, in others in disorderly flight to safety,
>>often separating families.  Those who are captured are often subjected to
>>rape and arbitrary killing, or are held captive to grow food for the army,
>>or made to provide forced labour or portering for the army.
>>34.   After these general observations, it is appropriate to specify the
>>
>>main causes of displacement.  These are counter insurgency operations,
>>forced labour and portering restrictions on farmers and land confiscation. 
>>Each is discussed separately below.  Displacement is also attributed to
>>major development projects undertaken by the Government in the process of
>>which large numbers of persons are removed from the lands designated for
>>the projects without being assisted in relocation or being appropriately
>>compensated.
>>
>>1.  Counter insurgency operations
>>
>>35.   Counter insurgency operations by the army have had an important
>>impact on the displacement of the population, both with regard to the
>>number of persons displaced and the methods employed.  These operations
>>have also contributed to the massive uprooting of the rural population by
>>deliberately relocating large numbers of civilians from numerous villages
>>as part of the military strategy against the insurgents.  Despite a number
>>of ceasefire agreements signed by the Government and representatives of
>>ethnic groups, the army is still engaged in counter-insurgency operations
>>in Karen, Shan and Karenni States. 
>>36.   Although the practice of forced relocations by the military as a
>>means of controlling the population in the ethnic regions is not new, the
>>scale of the relocations increased significantly after 1996.  The victims
>>of displacement are mostly peasants, including members of ethnic groups
>>such as the Karen, Karenni, Shan and Mon, who live in areas of insurgency
>>and are victimized by counter-insurgency activities or are caught in the
>>crossfire between the army and the insurgents.
>>37.   Numerous testimonies received by the Special Rapporteur indicate that
>>the civilian population living in or near the combat zone is generally
>>forced to move:  in these "grey zones" (zones controlled or influenced by
>>the insurgents) the armed forces often resort to searches, destruction and
>>burning of houses, and confiscation of property and food to force the
>>people to move, temporarily or permanently.  Testimonies indicate that no
>>distinction between insurgents and non-combatants is generally made and
>>that the inhabitants of these zones are subjected to indiscriminate
>>torture, beatings and arbitrary arrests by the army. 
>>38.   In order to cut the main links between the insurgent groups and the
>>civilian population, entire communities living in the border area between
>>Myanmar and Thailand are moved to relocation sites which are subject to
>>strict military control.  Expulsion orders are issued by the army coupled
>>with the warning that anyone trying to remain in their homes will be shot
>>on sight.
>>39.   The following information provided to the Special Rapporteur is
>>illustrative of the widespread recourse to forced relocation and the
>>consequent violation of most basic rights.  Central Shan State has
>>witnessed one of the largest forced relocation programmes, which still
>>continues. From March 1996 the army has ordered village after village in
>>eight townships (Larng Kher, Murng Nai, Nam Zarng, Lai Kha, Murng Kerng,
>>Kun Hing, Ke See and Murng Su) to move to a total of 45 relocation sites. 
>>The estimated number of people relocated is over 100,000 from over 600
>>
>>villages.  When relocated, the population is left to fend for itself to
>>find work, food and sanitary and education facilities.  In Karenni State,
>>throughout June and July 1996, orders were given to more than 100 villages
>>located between the Pon and Salween Rivers instructing villagers to move to
>>relocation sites near army camps in Sha Daw and Ywa Thit townships.  The
>>estimated number of people affected was 20,000-30,000, most of them ethnic
>>Karenni.  The army's purpose is apparently to isolate the population in
>>that area from Karenni insurgents of the Kayinni National Progressive Party
>>(KNPP).  Army officers are reported to have warned that those who remained
>>in the deserted villages would be considered insurgents or "enemies".  
>>40.   In addition to displacement caused by deliberate action, many persons
>>are said to have left for fear of being attacked when the military fronts
>>move close to their places of residence.  To avoid losing their homes and
>>sources of livelihood, many communities have resisted displacement as long
>>as possible and have developed different strategies for survival.  Several
>>displaced persons living in camps in Thailand described to the Special
>>Rapporteur how people in their village would hide in the forest and return
>>when it was safe to tend to their farms.  As the situation worsened, many
>>families fled the village.  Since fighting was spreading to different parts
>>of the district, they did not know where to go to find shelter and after
>>one week they returned.  The village was finally attacked and the houses
>>destroyed.
>>
>>2.  Forced labour and portering
>>
>>41.   The second reason has to do with the particular phenomenon of forced
>>conscription of civilians into compulsory labour duties for the military
>>authorities.  No pay is given for such labour and the period of service can
>>last for months.  This practice disrupts family life and prevents people
>>from carrying on their daily work in order to earn a living.
>>42.   The Special Rapporteur received reports that villagers throughout
>>Shan State are being forced by the SPDC to work without payment.  The
>>people most seriously affected are those who have been forcibly relocated,
>>as they have been forced to leave their land and become wage labourers and
>>thus cannot afford to work without pay for the military.
>>43.   It is common practice for the military to force villagers to go and
>>work on military bases, either for constructing or maintaining barracks,
>>bunkers or fences, or performing menial tasks like cleaning, weeding, and
>>fetching firewood or water.  Even children are forced to do this kind of
>>work: on 29 May 1998, SPDC troops are reported to have forced 10-15 boys
>>between the ages of 14 and 16 to work at the military bases of LIB 524 and
>>IB 246. They were not fed, and were even beaten up by the soldiers.
>>44.   The Special Rapporteur has received reports that villagers are being
>>forced to grow food for the army.  In June 1998, villagers in Kengtung are
>>reported to have been forced by the SPDC to grow chili peppers, beans and
>>garlic on land that was confiscated from them.  And on 11 July, SPDC base
>>LIB 102 apparently ordered the civilian population to provide labourers for
>>
>>weeding soya bean and corn farms owned by the military in Murng Pan.  Ten
>>persons from each village, from some 15 villages each day, had to bring
>>their own food and tools.  Villagers of Kengtong, Murng Nai, said they had
>>been forced in September 1998 to plant yellow beans for the army, then tend
>>the plots and do weeding and fencing for troops at local bases.
>>45.   Throughout 1998, The Special Rapporteur received reports of villagers
>>from Murng Pan, Larng Khur, Murng Nai, Murng Ton and Nam Zarng being forced
>>to work for the army for periods of up to two weeks splitting rocks near
>>the Salween River crossing of Ta Sarng in Shan State.  The battalions
>>concerned were IB 225, IB 64, IB 65 and LIB 333.  The rocks were conveyed
>>by the army to
>>big cities like Yangon where they were sold for 12,000-15,000 kyats per
>>truckload.
>>46.   Since 4 July 1998, villagers from the Kengtong area are reported to
>>have been forced to drive their oxcarts to carry teak lumber from Kengtong
>>to the SPDC military base of IB 43 at Kunhing.  During July and August 427
>>oxcarts were used.
>>47.   Since April 1998, villagers in 21 villages in the Nam Kham area of
>>Northern Shan State, bordering on China, are reported to have been forced
>>to work on a dam over the Nam Mao River.
>>48.   Throughout 1998, the SPDC military are reported to have been taking
>>porters from the main towns throughout central and southern Shan, where the
>>Shan resistance is operating.  The SPDC had been sending out regular
>>military patrols from its bases around the area, each time demanding groups
>>of porters from the civilian population.  The households provided porters
>>on a rotation
>>basis, and if someone could not go, they were made to pay 8,000-10,000
>>kyats to hire a replacement.
>>
>>3.  Restrictions on farmers
>>
>>49.   Because of the massive displacement of the population, farming has
>>apparently been drastically reduced.  This has led to food shortages among
>>the rural population generally and has provoked voluntary displacement to
>>other areas in search of assistance and security.
>>50.   The army is reported to be increasingly placing restrictions on the
>>kinds of crops grown by the local farmers, forcing them to grow crops for
>>the troops which they will either consume themselves or sell.  On 4 May
>>1998, in Murng Pan, IB 66 is reported to have ordered farmers to grow no
>>more than a small amount of garlic, whereas farmers had traditionally grown
>>this crop for export to Thailand.  They were told they had to grow soya
>>beans for the army instead.  On 23 June, IB 286 in Kaesee told villagers
>>from Murng Nawng and Murng Nang (who had been forcibly relocated) that they
>>needed licences to grow rice and if licenced, they had to give half their
>>rice crop to the army. If they had no licence, their rice fields would be
>>confiscated.  On 2 July, SPDC IB 99 in Larng Khur is reported to have
>>ordered all sugarcane farmers to clear two thirds of their sugarcane farms
>>and grow soya beans and yellow beans for
>>the army instead.  One farmer who had apparently been granted permission to
>>continue farming as usual was reported to have been beaten, kicked,
>>tortured and then shot to death on 3 August 1998.  In September, the
>>
>>villagers of Kengtong, Murng Nai, were said to have been forced to
>>cultivate yellow beans for the SPDC troops at local bases.
>>
>>4.  Land confiscation
>>
>>51.   Another important cause of displacement relates to land confiscation.
>>The majority of the population lives by agriculture.  Farms tend to be
>>small and constitute the only income for families.  Moreover, land is
>>culturally part of a person's identity.  The Special Rapporteur was told
>>that very few legal titles to land exist.  This permits the military to
>>confiscate the land that had traditionally belonged to peasants and farmers
>>living in Karenni, Karen and Shan States and to redistribute it to military
>>officials and soldiers.
>>52.   Since June 1998, the authorities are reported to have issued orders
>>for the confiscation from the people in Tachilek of 1,000 acres of land
>>stretching along the Tachilek-Kengtung main road.  The confiscated land has
>>been bulldozed, divided into small patches and sold to those who can afford
>>it. People from nine villages have been affected.  On 4 June 1998, the
>>Golden Triangle Military Command Commander ordered LIB 422 to confiscate 13
>>plots of land and rice fields owned by villagers of King-Ka in Zone 2 in
>>Kengtung to expand the military base.  The villagers were given a small
>>plot of land each to build a house on, but they had to buy it.  They were
>>still forced to pay their rice quota to the SPDC even though their land had
>>been taken from them.
>>53.   While development and industrial projects such as railway
>>construction, and the creation of tourist attractions are being carried out
>>in areas inhabited by minorities, many people are having their lands
>>confiscated without any compensation and are forced to move to designated
>>sites.
>>
>>C.  Patterns and consequences of displacement
>>
>>54.   The Special Rapporteur has ascertained from his contacts with those
>>who have sought refuge in the camps on the Thai side of the Thai Myanmar
>>frontier that since 1996, there are two distinct categories of internally
>>displaced persons in the ethnic States:  the "displaced" and "dispersed". 
>>The first category consists mostly of families who were forced to go to
>>relocation sites or army camps, while the second category includes persons
>>who instead fled to the mountains or the jungle, trying to avoid the main
>>roads and to hide from the military.  It is much more difficult to identify
>>the dispersed, since they are not concentrated in a group but are literally
>>dispersed throughout the country.  While visiting the camps, the Special
>>Rapporteur spoke with both categories of displaced persons who subsequently
>>fled to Thailand, and in the context of the present report the term
>>"internally displaced" implies both categories.
>>55.   Testimonies received by the Special Rapporteur, as well as
>>observations made by representatives of non-governmental organizations,
>>indicate that the victims of displacement are mostly villagers and farmers
>>who were living in remote areas of Karen, Shan and Karenni States.  Most of
>>them have not been officially registered and do not possess any
>>identification cards or other documents.
>>
>>56.   Cases of forced evictions seem to occur with great frequency and as a
>>matter of policy.  All the people interviewed by the Special Rapporteur
>>stated that they were given at most one week's notice to move and were told
>>that they would be shot if they did not comply.  They were forced to leave
>>their land, their crops and most of their animals.  Much of the property
>>was reportedly immediately stolen or confiscated by the army.  In some
>>cases, there was adequate time to prepare for departure, so that families
>>or even entire communities could leave together.  If not, or if attacked,
>>they had to flee in a disorderly manner, sometimes with the husband, wife
>>and children going in different directions.
>>57.   The internally displaced persons in Myanmar rarely flee in large
>>numbers.  They usually  move in small groups of a few families or
>>individuals. The areas of expulsion are numerous and spread throughout the
>>country, including in the border areas with Thailand.  The displaced's own
>>perceptions of where food and security might be found are determining
>>factors in deciding upon the destination of their flight.  The displaced
>>usually move to neighbouring rural areas or to the jungle; others go
>>directly to relocation sites and from there to camps located in Thailand,
>>or directly to Thailand where they often join relatives or friends from the
>>same area.  In this regard, the Special Rapporteur was often told during
>>the mission that the army is planting landmines in order to prevent the
>>population from using the routes which take them to their paddy fields or
>>to the Thai border.  According to information received, each battalion in
>>the front line area (along the Myanmar Thai border) was issued with about
>>200 landmines and ordered to plant  them.  
>>58.   The two main considerations which led people to flee were security
>>concerns and the need to have a source of livelihood.  These could at times
>>be contradictory concerns.  On the one hand, fear of losing one's land
>>constituted a motive for staying if the harvests were sufficient, while on
>>the other hand, fear of attacks was a motive for departing.  Conversely,
>>the need to find a source of subsistence had to be weighed against the fear
>>of being caught by the army after having been ordered to move to a
>>relocation site.
>>59.   Another problem affecting the displaced is the disintegration of
>>families and communities.  The Special Rapporteur noticed a large number of
>>widows and orphans among the displaced in camps in Thailand.  However,
>>numerous communities have remained more or less together in spite of
>>displacement and have maintained many of their cultural traditions.  This
>>helps to alleviate to some extent the acute problems of displacement and
>>would no doubt facilitate the process of return to the areas of origin.
>>However,  very few returns to areas of origin seem to be taking place. 
>>Continued insecurity coupled with destroyed infrastructure suggest that
>>displaced persons had compelling reasons for wanting to remain in the camps
>>in Thailand.
>>60.   As far as the security situation in the areas of return are
>>concerned, reports continuously reaching the camps speak of, for example,
>>
>>forced labour and portering, arbitrary arrests, detentions and executions
>>by the Myanmar military of persons suspected of sympathizing with
>>insurgents, with no recourse to formal judicial proceedings.  In addition,
>>returnees were finding their homes destroyed and their land either burnt or
>>occupied by the army. In such cases, the returnees had no recourse to
>>justice, either because the judicial system did not exist or because it was
>>not functioning independently. The displaced, moreover, had very few
>>resources and means by which to return home.  The infrastructure of entire
>>villages had been destroyed and many homes levelled by warfare and looting.
>>Finally, it would seem that the local authorities had no intention of
>>dealing with the assistance and protection problems of the returnees.
>>61.   The Special Rapporteur was told that, for the peasants who had lost
>>their land, either because they had to sell it very cheaply before they
>>fled or because it was destroyed or taken by the army, return is not
>>possible.
>>Where the armed conflict is continuing, return is also not an option.  
>>
>>
>>1.  The situation of the dispersed in the jungle
>>
>>62.   Following orders to leave their homes, many villagers avoid moving to
>>relocation sites and usually move first to a nearby rural area or go to the
>>jungle, trying to work in their fields during the day and returning for
>>safety at night.  They can remain in hiding for several months as long as
>>they are able to find sufficient food to survive.  These villagers live in
>>fear that the soldiers will find them, especially in the dry season.  It
>>was reported, for example, that at the start of the dry season in 1998,
>>local army troops shot on site at villagers hiding in the Mi Chaung Theit
>>area.
>>63.   Apart from the lack of security, the lack of food is clearly the main
>>problem facing families living in the jungle.  Families supplement their
>>rice porridge by eating wild roots, leaves and fruit.  Many families
>>interviewed said that they could not cultivate their crop safely and that
>>when they were discovered their fields and paddies were burned.  As a
>>result, without any source of income and without enough food to survive,
>>they try to find their way to Thailand.  In addition, people living in the
>>jungle have limited access to health care.  They have to rely on an
>>insufficient and informal health-care network in the form of "mobile health
>>teams", which provide medicines and vaccinations.  However, it was reported
>>that these mobile teams could not cover all the areas where the displaced
>>hide and live.
>>
>>2.  The situation of the displaced in relocation sites
>>
>>64.   According to testimonies received, relocation sites, as well as the
>>living conditions in the sites, may vary from one place to another.
>>Displaced  persons in refugee camps in Thailand describe the sites as
>>either a large, empty stretch of land surrounded by fences or barbed wire
>>and near a military camp or as the centre of a large village where the army
>>has forced villagers to congregate.  The military outpost is normally in
>>the centre of the village. 
>>65.   No particular arrangements are made by the authorities to receive the
>>
>>new forced arrivals.  There seems to be a food and a health crisis and a
>>general lack of adequate housing and basic services.  Villagers have to
>>build their own makeshift huts and provide their own food.  Family members
>>living in the relocation sites are often requested to do various tasks for
>>the army. Each family also has to provide one person to work for the army. 
>>They perform various duties such as building the fences, cleaning the
>>compound or guarding the site.  The interviews did not make clear to what
>>extent facilities for education and access to health care, especially for
>>children, are available.
>>Unemployment is a major problem in the relocation sites.  The displaced are
>>used to working their own land and it is difficult to start any sort of
>>work to generate income.  When they are able to find work, they are easily
>>exploited.  According to testimonies received, many displaced persons,
>>including children, work as daily workers (porters), whose salaries are
>>around US$ 2 per week, for 12-hour working days.  Others work in
>>construction.
>>Those who find such jobs are considered to be fortunate, since they have an
>>income.
>>66.   The villagers are not entitled to leave the compound without a pass,
>>for which they have to pay.  Their freedom of movement is extremely limited
>>and, in all cases, subject to authorization from the local military
>>battalion.
>>Attempting to flee is said to be interpreted by the authorities as proof of
>>participation in or sympathy with the insurgency and of an intention to
>>report on the abuses committed by the army.  Some are required to obtain
>>safe conduct passes or pay high fees at checkpoints for a "permission" to
>>leave.  Other sources have reported incidents of women and children being
>>shot at while fleeing in areas near the border with Thailand.
>>
>>3.  Special problems affecting women and children
>>
>>67.   Many of the displaced, in particular women and children, reported
>>that they had been terrorized and subjected to inhuman treatment before
>>taking refuge in Thailand.  It was reported that Myanmar soldiers raped and
>>abused women during incursions into the emergency zones or in the
>>relocation sites.
>>In some areas, women who work in the fields still face significant risks of
>>being targeted and victimized.
>>68.   The Special Rapporteur has noted the serious psychological problems
>>facing women and children affected by the crisis.  Abuses against women,
>>especially in the course of violent events, reportedly ranged from having
>>seen their children or husband killed to being raped and losing their home
>>and means of subsistence.  Interviews held in the course of a short visit
>>to a village revealed that many had suffered from such abuses.  It should
>>be mentioned that cultural inhibitions linked to subjects such as sex and
>>the serious social implications of rape and assaults on women compound the
>>problem of lack of outlets for expression and foment deep hatreds.
>>69.   Female-headed households were less able to become self-reliant and
>>were therefore more in need of assistance.  In some cases, they were
>>assisted by other families, for example, in setting up shelters.  The
>>numerous children who had been orphaned or separated from their families
>>
>>constituted a particularly vulnerable group.  In general, there was a
>>willingness on the part of local families or other displaced persons to
>>adopt the children, at least until their parents could be traced if they
>>were still alive.
>>70.   Some of the most serious problems the displaced and dispersed
>>populations face are in the health domain, largely because of the lack of
>>health services.  Children are particularly affected by chronic
>>malnutrition, malaria, diarrhoea and dysentery.  The right to health is
>>seriously jeopardized in those circumstances.
>>71.   Displaced children living in the jungle suffer high mortality and
>>malnutrition rates and their flight from their homes often puts them beyond
>>the reach of any assistance or protection.  Frequently, displaced children
>>have witnessed the murder of their parents or the destruction of their
>>homes.
>>As a consequence, many children suffer from fear and parents, caught in the
>>day-to-day struggle for survival, often have little energy to devote to
>>caring for them.
>>72.   Rather than attending school, many displaced children have had to
>>help support their families.  In any event, many schools are reported to
>>have been destroyed or closed.  Public education is officially free;
>>however, many schools are under funded and parents have to pay tuition so
>>that the school can operate.  Many displaced children do not speak Burmese
>>and have difficulties in communicating with their teachers.  Many children
>>who used to go to school in their native village and learned their native
>>language have to restart their schooling upon arrival in the relocation
>>sites because they are prevented from learning in their own language.  This
>>is not only a negation of sound pedagogical principles but a violation of
>>the right to freedom of expression which includes the right to receive and
>>impart information so necessary in the educational field. 
Internet ProLink PC User